Timothy Nelson5 said:I don't think you quite caught my drift, because you're arguing against something I didn't even say—something most people already take for granted, I suppose.
Oil and gas prices actually had a much bigger impact in the years leading up to the invasion, specifically from 2014 onwards.
During that window, the White House was busy stacking up cash reserves for a war adventure. Sure, about half of that got frozen, which was unexpected and apparently caught the White House off guard.
Actually, the timing is a bit different than that.
High oil prices right before the Russian invasion of Georgia.
High oil prices right before the Russian annexation of Crimea.
After those events, oil prices stayed relatively low and stable, largely thanks to the expansion of American fracking.
That stability was basically nuked by a senile Biden on his very first day in the White House, just signing whatever document his handlers shoved under his nose. He even admitted himself that he 'didn't know what he was signing.'
In a way, he signed off on giving Putin a massive incentive to invade Ukraine.
But prior to the invasion, it was precisely those high oil (and gas) prices that padded the Russian budget and essentially paved the road to war.
Immediately preceding the war, yes.
Putin finally felt emboldened once his slow-motion coup against Trump in the US succeeded.
Trump was against Nord Stream 2, and he used to press NATO members to stop relying on Russian energy and finally hit that 2% defense spending target they all agreed on.
Trump pushed for fracking. If he were still around, I guess US oil production might be at least 0% higher, maybe even 50% more for natural gas, more LNG terminals would have been built, and the Keystone pipeline wouldn't have been halted.
Under those circumstances, Putin wouldn't have even dreamed of invading Ukraine. A core part of his playbook was assuming that after a 'blitz' victory and taking Kyiv, Europe—completely dependent on Russian gas—would react weakly, maybe with some cosmetic sanctions.
By clumsily killing the Keystone pipeline project, Biden gave Putin the green light he needed.
All in the name of the Green New Deal, I suppose.
Biden basically shot the American economy in the foot.
On that same day, gas prices at the American Henry Hub jumped 100% up, and that was effectively the start of the energy price surge before the war in Ukraine.
But if what you're describing were true, Russia, the Saudis, and the whole OPEC group would have cut production to keep prices high.
It seems you clearly don't grasp the point of sanctions.
I don't think anyone honestly expects Putin to just pack up and walk away from the invasion of Ukraine.
The whole motivation behind Putin’s move... I guess it really traces back to those newly discovered hydrocarbon deposits under the sea near Crimea... and also that Solovjansk-Kramatorsk area which the Ukrainians have been fighting so hard to hold onto throughout this entire conflict.
As for what might have happened next... maybe an oil embargo would have hit sooner—like, instead of December 5th, perhaps by early September. Russia might have made a bit less from speculative trading, but I doubt that would have been the deciding factor.
It likely would have started five or six months earlier.
If you look at the comparative charts for Brent, WTI, and Urals, you can see the discounts on Urals were at their peak when speculative pressure was highest. Once that dropped in early September, the Brent-Urals spread narrowed, and it only really widened again after December 5th.
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Speculative pressure is such a subjective thing, isn't it? It doesn't just rely on supply and demand; it's more about how people perceive them.
That's probably why those firm statements from Western leaders right at the start of the embargo helped keep the speculative price swings somewhat in check.
But even then, it wouldn't have changed the gas market situation much; the outcome would be the same, and the White House was clearly banking much more on gas prices than on oil.
True enough... though I suppose that's because the Germans, led by Merkel, kept pushing for even deeper reliance on Russian pipelines instead of diversifying their supply or actually building out LNG terminals.
Well, the Saudis buy a massive amount of weapons... they're fourth in global spending, yet they practically have zero domestic military production compared to the top three.
The real issue with the Saudi military isn't the gear or the hardware, it's the personnel—it's pretty much the same struggle they face in Russia.
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Well, you've fragmented everything and lost the thread of the argument. Some of your comments aren't even relevant, but since you bolded your own main claim and it's the problem here, let's just go back to basics:
1. The Keystone XL pipeline, with a capacity of 800,000 barrels a day (about 0.8% of global production), was only about 8% complete when Biden banned it a few months later. Sure, Democrats were stalling and undermining it during the Trump administration, and even Obama tried to stop it, but even if everything had gone smoothly, would it really be finished? It might have still been in its early stages.
But there's no doubt that KXL definitely wouldn't be finished today if Biden hadn't blocked it in early 2021—it probably wouldn't have opened until 2026 or 2027. So, that decision doesn't have any real physical impact on today's oil supply; it's mostly just affecting market expectations.
2. Why Putin attacked Ukraine specifically on February 24, 2022, remains a mystery, and as I noted on the forums back then, "the reasons that drove Putin to such a suicidal move will likely be analyzed for decades."
However, regarding US moves that might have nudged Putin toward war, I'm certain the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the way it was handled was far more significant than walking away from KXL.
By the way, despite my ongoing belief that it was a smart strategic move that made the US stronger—just imagine the political fallout if Americans were still stuck trying to secure exits in Afghanistan today.
We should support and fight alongside those who truly want freedom, and let everyone else face their own fate.
3. Now, regardless of what was said in point 2, most people will agree that one of the pillars of Putin's decision was that $380 billion fund, built up over years through gas and oil sales.
4. First, gas.
The main culprit here is Merkel, obviously, but there wasn't much anyone could actually do about it. She was just following the lead of the entire German establishment. We can argue about why—whether it’s rooted in Brandt's Ostpolitik, some lingering debt for reunification, or whatever else—but it was a done deal. It couldn't be changed.
Trump was right on this one. For years, Germans will be haunted by footage of Trump essentially "calling them out" over Russian gas, all while they laughed him off. I won't say I'm not enjoying watching that unfold. Hopefully, they learn to show a little more humility before they start lecturing everyone else on the supposed superiority of the German political-economic model.
Especially once they start talking about China, because their hands are pretty deep in that jam, too...
If Merkel had been the kind of statesman people were hailing her as just a year ago, she would have quietly steered Germany away from its dependence on Russian gas.
But that requires being a true statesman—someone like Roosevelt, who quietly but stubbornly pushed the US toward WWII despite most Americans being against it, simply because he knew it had to be done eventually.
(Though, a few US administrations used that exact same method regarding Vietnam with completely different results, so it’s hard to be too smart about how much a "statesman X" should ignore the will of their voters.)
Anyway, let's not forget that Putin's "gas pillar" is significantly more important than his "oil pillar."
5. Finally, oil.
Oil—the "oil pillar"—matters, but it isn't the key.
Its primary importance is as a fund filler; Russian costs sit around $37 per barrel, so any price above that goes straight into the fund.
No amount of Keystone XL, fracking, or oil sands would have managed to drive oil prices down to those levels during the 2014-2021 window. Even if they theoretically could have, the Saudis and Russians would have just cut production according to their own targets to keep the average between $80 and $100.
Those speculative spikes in oil prices prior to the Russian military adventures were just tactics—tactics that proved strategically important at times, but only until 2022.
If Europe had folded under energy blackmail and decided to abandon Ukraine immediately after the invasion, then I might agree that killing Keystone XL was a major factor, since it defined future expectations.
But since that didn't happen, the importance of that decision as a trigger for the invasion of Ukraine is realistically minor.
Regarding LNG, keep in mind that it isn't just about having LNG terminals—which aren't actually that expensive—it’s the massive issue of tanker availability and numbers, which *are* expensive.
That’s why gas—neither LNG nor pipelines—is the solution.
And as for "green policies" and their supposed guilt for everything wrong in the world...
Green policies were nothing more than an excuse, a bit of camouflage for Russia's actual goals.
The Russians set their goal clearly: use energy as a weapon. Everything else was just tactics, where green advocates were used as useful idiots. It was all shaped by targeted political lobbying where the goal was obvious: push the gas through, and then just declare gas "green," even though there’s very little "green" logic to it.
The Russians certainly had a bit of luck with Fukushima, too, but that was all just smoke and mirrors—a distraction, like a magician's trick.
Without the "green" cover, they would have had to come up with something else.
Because the goal was clear, and the Germans wanted Russian gas anyway—not because of green policies, but for the money, for easy export competitiveness, for commissions, for Ostpolitik, and a whole bunch of other reasons that have nothing to do with being eco-friendly.
In the US, these green narratives look a bit different, but it's clear to everyone that Americans were also widely influenced by Russian lobbyists—maybe just slightly less so than Germany.
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