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Posts by Sandra Murphy33

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Paul Bailey95 said:Oh boy, here we go again with Chesterton.
So, I’m guessing you read "Orthodoxy" in an old edition, not one of those versions put out by someone like Ivo Džeba. I actually went through it twice over Christmas—just like all those translated works back then—and even tried writing in that style myself before telling myself, "No thanks, I'll just be my own person. What is Chesterton anyway?" It’s a nice, snappy style, full of wit... but watch this—he doesn't even truly grasp Nietzsche. Honestly, I could probably write five books modeled after Chesterton's "Orthodoxy" just to mock him using his own weapons, but what do I know? Maybe I should just be a Voltaire, mocking every author from here to Europe, while sipping gallons of coffee like Balzac.

What am I supposed to get out of authors like that in terms of actual seriousness, real knowledge, or total understanding? Reading them is fine, sure, but why would I spend my time on Chesterton when I could be diving into the "Organon," or "Ethics," or actual systems of science? I'm not crazy. Are you looking for pretty prose or actual knowledge? If you want beautiful styles, then that's what you read, and that tells you exactly what you want from words and thoughts: entertainment, diversion, decadence. Chesterton is a decadent—he's witty, he has a great style and a cheerful spirit, but most importantly, he's a decadent. And look, cheerful spirits can be decadent too. He even dares to write about Nietzsche, but—get this—Nietzsche doesn't even care about what a book *can* be about. Why? Because he starts from—wait for it—Christianity. When you analyze an author within a Christian framework, you aren't thinking what the thinker actually thought; you're just thinking Christianly. Nietzsche himself—his whole essence—is outside of metaphysics, which Chesterton completely misses. If he actually knew, he wouldn't have written the things he did about Nietzsche.

That's the thing. With Chesterton, you won't find anything absolute besides some clever paradoxical "nay-saying." If that's your vibe, go ahead and read everything he wrote. But seriously, Hegel gives you a SYSTEM. A system! And you're over here reading Chesterton? Is there anything else you need to add?

I'll take Hegel any day, since we're even talking about it. What on earth is Chesterton? Cheerful spirit, lovely style, sure, but the guy doesn't actually *know* anything significant. He's just easy to read and pleasant, a bit fun, a bit paradoxical—and of course, people like that have their readers.
You type "Hegel" into a search engine and look at the photos. Just look at him. That is a serious man. You can tell from his portrait he isn't interested in joking around; he doesn't bother with paradoxes. That stuff is for kids—pardon me, for Chestertonians.

We'll be getting back to Hegel soon enough. I've had enough of these "juvenile" types and those little clubs where kids gather to debate Chesterton's "ideas." Any real thinker would see right through Chesterton's "ideas."

🤣
Maybe you were being completely serious, Paul Bailey95, but to me, it sounds like you're just joking and laughing at yourself while you talk like this. 🙂
Perhaps that's already the influence of Chesterton—"Orthodoxy" isn't quite my turn yet. I've read "The Man Who Was Thursday" and before that "The Magic City"; now I'm reading "The Ball and the Cross." He has this gentle, diplomatic humor that I enjoy—is that typical English humor, given how much I love that detached irony in English authors? I don't know...
I don't know what he said about Nietzsche. By the way, why is everyone so obsessed with Nietzsche? That's literature for adolescents... just like Dostoevsky, Sartre, Camus, Faulkner—all those people who complain and wish things were different than they are. I am at an age where I need exactly what Chesterton (and other English authors) provides: a gentle, self-ironic acceptance of oneself and the world, without unnecessary internal conflicts, irreconcilable opposites, overwhelming emotions, or constant turmoil.
To quote Campbell again: "Older ages demand a stronger mythology." 😉
You seem to prefer reaching "knowledge, full understanding, and seriousness," but there are plenty of people who learn much more effectively through humor than through excessive solemnity. I also can't quite bring myself to agree that Chesterton was the man you described—cheerful, witty, lighthearted—because his characters skip the pleasantries. Instead of a simple "Good day, how are you, where are you from?", they dive straight into deep philosophical debates and exchanges, quoting their favorite authors. That’s actually how I imagine reality TV should work 😉 (If it were actually like that, my life would probably just consist of endless walks through the city engaging strangers in philosophical discourse, and I wouldn't even bother owning a laptop at home)
I am also curious how someone as brilliant as Chesterton could become a Catholic. To me, Catholicism is the worst religion in the world, and regarding religion in general, I tend to agree with Campbell: they are merely "defenses against true experience (God)."

Amanda Jackson5:
Well, you can't answer that with a single sentence. One has to penetrate their own nature personally. In principle, one could say the same principles apply as when we discussed substance and accidents, or essence and appearance. Or, more simply, the concept itself. One thing is understood through another (substance through its accidents, etc.). Nothing possesses a permanent, solid essence. Everything is transient. According to Buddha, Man has no permanent or self-subsistent self (meaning his substance is nothing more than the aggregate of his accidents). Look at the "three marks of existence."

I've come to understand it more as Buddha, when speaking of "one's own nature," was referring generally to human nature—that which is common to everyone... I agree that "one is understood through another" and that the whole exists because of the parts that compose it, and that there is nothing that can be isolated to say, "This is eternal while everything else decays"—though the concept of "emergence" comes to mind, which if I remember correctly, was "that which transcends both the whole and its parts"?
Regarding the idea that everything is transient, I think there is something that isn't: life itself 🙂 It constantly renews itself; it appears where you least expect it, flowers bloom through narrow cracks in the concrete, and in nature, the cycle of generations never stops. Since we humans are essentially life itself—its manifestation—could we say we are "eternal" because the life within us is eternal? (It's similar to physics, where energy cannot be lost, only transferred from one state to another). I've found that when I think of myself this way—as "life" rather than a "person" (a person is an illusion, something transient)—I feel much better. I find myself more in the moment and less stuck in the past or future, which, unlike before, I only "use" (when they occur) if I can find something beautiful in them, some kind of pleasure, or something good for the soul
In a Hegelian sense, could it be said that I don't identify with either the substance or its accidents, but rather with emergence? 😁
(Paul Bailey95 is going to lose his mind over this...)

If you like it that much, you're welcome to join the American Chesterton Society:
http://americanchestertonians.blogspot.com/

Thanks!!!!! 🎉
Amanda Jackson5 said:Sure, or we could just look at what Buddha used to say—that craving and ignorance, or avidya, are basically the root causes of all our suffering. In this context, avidya isn't just being clueless; it’s that deep, metaphysical lack of understanding regarding our own true nature.

So, what exactly constitutes our "true nature" according to Buddha?
(I haven't studied Buddhism deeply...)

(On a side note, thanks for the Chesterton quote in that other thread. I just finished one of his books and he’s so brilliant I’m planning to read his entire catalog. 🙂 It reminds me of what Joseph Campbell rightly observed: " ... read real books by real people. When you find an author who truly grabs hold of you, read everything they have ever written. Simply consume what that author has to offer. From there, you can begin to explore what they themselves were reading. Only then does the world open up to you in a way that aligns with a specific perspective. )
Amanda Jackson5 said:That’s why we really need to nail down our terminology here. Saying we perceive things as they truly are just means that, in a theoretical sense, it's possible for us to do so; it doesn't mean that every single person walking around has an accurate grasp on reality. If someone's perception is skewed, that's a flaw in their own processing, not a flaw in reality itself. Hegel makes a clear distinction between Appearance and Illusion. An Appearance is essentially the full unveiling of essence without any extra layers. Illusion, on the other hand, is that "things are not what they seem" quality—it's more like a faint hint or a shadow of the true essence. However, an Appearance is contingent rather than necessary, so you have to distinguish it from actual reality and the Concept.

".... When a person views the world through a distorted lens, their behavior inevitably becomes flawed. And when behavior is flawed, the consequences are bound to be disastrous. That is how life becomes nothing more than a cycle of disappointment, suffering, and darkness." (M.)
Amanda Jackson5 said:I think you might have missed the point entirely. The reason the mind can't grasp some "beyond" is simply because there is no "beyond" to begin with. In one of his letters, Hegel points out that the whole trick is realizing there’s nothing outside or behind things; things are exactly what they appear to be. He even mentions in Phenomenology how the spirit treats objects like a curtain, pulling it back to see what’s hiding behind it, only to find absolutely nothing there. The curtain is the thing itself. Substance is really just a collection of its accidents, and essence isn't some "external" phenomenon.
When we talk about internal versus external, even before Hegel came along, people used "internal" to mean the "beyond"—the stuff beneath the surface that constitutes the essence or the self-subsisting core. "External" was just the trivial stuff. For Hegel, if two things are "external" to one another, they’re basically indifferent or independent—like the shape of an object being separate from its color. Nature is external to the spirit, which makes it external to itself, meaning it occupies space and time. But here’s the kicker: the internal and the external are actually the same thing, unified in a single substance. It’s a mediated unity. Since the internal is identical to the external, it has to express itself. That’s why Hegel argues that it is essential for essence to manifest. You can't have an essence that doesn't show up; if it doesn't exist, it doesn't exist. Just like you can't have something without its Concept. Whatever is mental is real, and vice versa. Reality is essentially self-manifesting. This is precisely how Hegel defines reality (Wirklichkeit)—as the unity of essence and appearance. Or, to put it another way, "since the content and form of reality are entirely identical, ...reality is the fact of its own self-externalization."
Furthermore, because of those inherent contradictions and constant self-negations within nature, everything is perpetually undoing itself (which is what we call "time"). But that doesn't mean things lack "being." It just means our understanding distinguishes between the fleeting, transient stuff (appearance) and the enduring stuff that resists change (substance, essence, and ultimately the Concept—defined as that which remains what it is even while it changes).

What Hegel claims—that "things are exactly what we perceive them to be"—doesn't actually hold up in practice. In reality, things are often the exact opposite of how they appear. Have you ever had that experience where something turns out to be completely different from what you initially thought, or even what you believed for a long time?
It feels as though Hegel is ignoring the dimension of time, the element of constant change. He asserts that "there can be no essence of something that does not appear," but I struggle to understand where this non-existent thing is supposed to be hiding, and to whom it is failing to appear. Is it staying hidden forever? If something doesn't manifest today, tomorrow, or the day after, is that sufficient proof that it will never emerge within time? Furthermore, who is this observer deciding what appears and what stays hidden, and who is qualified to claim their perception is final and absolute?

Furthermore, if I interpret Hegel’s "curtain" as a boundary between what is perceptible and what remains hidden from our senses and reason, the logic still falls apart. In practical life, we are constantly discovering new things, forging new connections between phenomena, and forming new perceptions. It just doesn't ring true to suggest that there is nothing "beyond"—nothing currently obscured or permanently hidden from our intellect—nor does it feel right to claim that the "external" is identical to the "internal." 🤷
I suppose my mind is far too "practical" to wrap itself around Hegel's concepts of the internal, the external, and the beyond. His definitions clearly don't align with my own, and likely don't align with how most people in the US experience reality either.
ruggedraven36 said:You missed my point entirely. When I said "the object's interiority is the same as the subject's," I wasn't claiming every object has an identical inner life—I meant that the object *has* an interiority of its own; that the object is also a subject. It's a matter of perspective: what's internal to the outsider is external to the insider. If I am a subject to myself but an object to you, then what am I really? Not "what I am to myself" or "what I am to you"—that's just relativity. I mean what am I, fundamentally? Truth has to be something that transcends the subject-object divide without simply collapsing the subject into the object or vice versa.
That last bit you wrote about "everything being one" is something I can get behind, but that doesn't mean everything is equal.

What are you, truly? 🙂 I don't think philosophy can offer you a definitive answer to that, certainly not through some final, airtight definition. However, if I may point out, the very fact that you function as an object to everyone else while remaining a subject to yourself aligns perfectly with the idea that everything exists only in relation to something else. Nothing stands "in itself" or exists in total isolation from the rest of the universe. In this context, I view "subject" and "object" as purely relational concepts rather than fixed states.
Paul Bailey95 said:Note: We’re kicking things off with the inner realm from chapter three to serve as an intro to two and a half parts, rather than doing an introduction first—then we’ll dive straight into consciousness and sensory certainty. That's it.

The Interior, or the Realm of the Interior

1.
So, here’s the deal: the essence of a thing isn't something consciousness hits head-on. Instead, consciousness relates directly to the thing itself—meaning, just as the thing presents itself to consciousness, consciousness takes that presentation in. It’s like consciousness steps into the middle of this tug-of-war between two opposing forces to try and find the actual bedrock (the thing) underneath. On one side you’ve got Reason, on the other you’ve got the Interior, and the middle ground is that connecting force—the very essence of power. But—and Hegel is being very explicit here—that essence is fleeting. Basically, Reason can't actually "see" that core essence because it vanishes; it’s ungraspable precisely because it disappears. This is what we call a "phenomenon." It’s the same vibe as in the first chapter, where Reason looks at an object in its immediate surroundings and claims it exists or is "real," even though that object isn't truly real in that moment because it’s just a passing flash—it lacks staying power, even if Reason perceives a struggle behind it. For Reason, a phenomenon is the essence of a thing that is, in reality, nothingness. Take a house or a building, for example. To Reason looking at it right now, it’s a solid reality—it’s "here and now"—but give it enough time and that house is gone, replaced by a forest. That building isn't just a appearance to Reason; Hegel goes further and calls it a total illusion. A whole, complete illusion. It sounds wild, but this massive collection of appearances is nothing more than a total illusion. This means everything we pick up through our senses, and almost everything Reason deals with (assuming it’s working with phenomena), is just one big facade. And get this: modern science spends all its time dealing with this exact facade—these objects of phenomena that Hegel calls a total illusion. When you factor in Nobel Prizes in modern science, you realize those awards basically go to people who spend their lives studying this very thing: the totality of illusions. You could almost call them Nobel Prizes for Illusions.

When a psychologist does their job, they’re dealing with phenomena—specifically the psychological kind, not, say, geometry. Otherwise, you'd have psychologists studying the lines and planes of schizophrenia. No, they deal with the "essence" of hysteria, the "essence" of schizophrenia, or autism, and so on. In short, they deal with the essence of vanishing phenomena. But for Hegel, an essence that vanishes isn't really an essence at all; it’s non-existence. A tree that’s been cut down isn't "being" anything anymore. This entire "totality of illusion" is exactly what makes up the interior—this play of forces, this internal reflection of the whole. Within this, consciousness uses these objects to establish what its perceptions are like, but these moments lack any real permanence; they’re constantly flipping over into their own opposites. Take the "essence" of the flu: it hits a person, then it’s gone. Or take a sudden burst of rage—like some guy losing his cool at a dive bar—it hits, and then it vanishes into thin air. All this stuff, this whole dance of forces, is negative. But the truth of the negative is actually the positive—the self-existing object. The essence of an object for consciousness is mediated by the movement of the phenomenon, and the essence of perception or sensory objects always carries that negative weight of disappearing. When we perceive a tree, we see the "essence" of it, but that essence is fleeing. The sensory object is always in flux, always disappearing. Consciousness reflects on this disappearing tree or house, but it turns that reflection inward, creating the idea of the "interior" of the object. It tries to separate the reflection of the thing from its own internal reflection, even though it’s really just one single process. To consciousness, the "interior" feels like something external, something different from itself. Yet, within this private interior, consciousness finds a sense of certainty—a way to find its own true moments of being. However, consciousness doesn't actually realize that it contains these moments or this certainty within itself. It doesn't realize it because the "being" of that interior is, to consciousness, just a negative movement. Consciousness is just a vanishing phenomenon. It’s like how youth is a vanishing phenomenon to a grown man; anyone who clings to that fading youth and pretends he’s still a kid is just a screaming monkey or a pathetic fool. Just as youth has no permanent "being" because it's transient, consciousness doesn't have its own independent being. The "interior" is a concept that consciousness hasn't even begun to truly grasp yet.

When you realize youth is slipping through your fingers, consciousness does this absolutely wild thing—it performs what’s basically a "leap of faith." Because we’re aware that everything is fleeting—that nothing actually sticks around and everything, including ourselves, is ultimately transient—consciousness tries to outrun that emptiness. It jumps into this totally foreign, unknown territory where it feels even slightly steady or unshakable, which is what consciousness labels as "the beyond." Here’s how the mechanics work: This "beyond" sets itself up as the absolute opposite of everything we perceive as temporary or hollow. It positions the supersensual realm as the "true" world, while our messy, sensory, vanishing reality is cast as the "untrue" one. Consciousness ends up trapped in this duality between the here-and-now and the beyond, a gap it can't quite bridge. On one side, you have this disappearing physical world; on the other, you have this permanent, perfect, and—for the theologians—totally inscrutable "beyond." It’s protected by its own mystery; you can’t argue with it or attack it because, to the conscious mind, it represents *something* substantial, whereas humans feel like *nothing*—just imperfect, passing shadows. It’s like those mystics talk about God being a "dark cloud"—it just makes the gap between us and the beyond feel impossible to close.

So, we’ve got the "beyond" acting as the self-referential starting point, but—and this is crucial for Hegel—it’s only an incomplete manifestation of the mind. He’s very clear about this: that otherworldly realm is just an unfinished version of mind, not the whole story. But interestingly enough, the truth actually lives within that incomplete stage. If we bring humanity into the mix—all those driven individuals and the masses—this "beyond" isn't worthless. It’s just... well, fundamentally insignificant in the grand scheme. Think of it as a stepping stone toward Spirit. That said, for actual people, that step is massive. When life here becomes too much—when things get bleak, hopeless, or just plain crushing—this "beyond" steps in like a sort of "consciousness trick," easing the despair and giving people just enough faith to keep moving.

If we look at depression as the defining malady of the 21st century, it’s pretty clear that losing touch with the "beyond" is a byproduct of modern earthly despair. No matter how much anyone wants to believe humans can just exist as purely material, living substances, most people simply cannot function without that sense of something greater. For them, the "beyond" is a necessary rung on the ladder to Spirit, and we really have to respect that as a fundamental truth. Keeping this in mind, Hegel suggests our subject is a conclusion sitting between two poles: interiority on one side, reason on the other, with "phenomena" sitting right in the middle, driving the movement that defines reason. It looks like this:

a) Interiority—the realm of the inner self, intuition, and the supersensual stuff.
b) Reason.
c) The middle ground, or "phenomena"—basically the stuff modern science obsesses over.

The phenomena in category (c) provides the data that Reason (b) uses to identify the interiority found in (a), eventually leading to a lived experience of that inner reality.
Let me give you a concrete example. Take Mark—let’s say he’s a deeply devout guy who actually experiences something we’d call "beyond." He has a vision of heaven, presented by an angel in his room. That supersensual, otherworldly moment manifests as a phenomenon in his physical space. Mark is dead certain about what he saw. He tells a priest about the vision; the priest might dismiss it, but he reports it to his superior, and so the story spreads. Years later, Mark is questioned again, and he still insists his vision was real. This means Mark’s Reason (his intellect) accepted that phenomenon as a true part of his consciousness. Eventually, Mark passes away, and his vision undergoes a rigorous test by others using Reason to determine if his experience of the "beyond" was legitimate. Through long deliberations and study, they eventually validate his vision as a genuine encounter with the "beyond"—an interior reality that manifested as a phenomenon, was processed by his Reason, and finally became a confirmed experience. We have to emphasize: without Mark and his consciousness, there is no vision of the beyond; and without people, there wouldn't even be a concept of the "beyond" to begin with.

(More coming next time)

Nobels of Illusion 😁
The core of this passage is the idea that something which will vanish tomorrow doesn't truly exist today, because it lacks permanence ("a being that vanishes is not being, it is non-being"). In other words, only that which is eternal truly exists, while everything else is part of this "totality of illusion." Everything transient—everything finite—is relative. According to this logic, true being doesn't even exist, because anything ever created is destined to disappear eventually...
This perspective is typically labeled "philosophical" 😉 and the people who view the world this way are called "philosophers" (nothing rattles them, they remain unshakable because they "understand" that "everything is relative," and so on. Though, practically speaking, "if you accept that your physical world is merely an illusion, you won't experience the meaning of the physical world")

This totality of illusion is also what Hegel describes as the interiority—the play of forces, the reflection of the whole within itself. Within this totality, consciousness uses objects to establish what the perceptions of being are like, creating moments without stability or rest that constantly subvert themselves. For instance, consider the "being" of a fever in a person: the fever takes hold, then it passes; or take the "being" of an emotion, like a sudden outburst of rage in a crowded bar...
Through perception, we see the "being" of a tree, yet that "being" fades away; the sensory object is always in flux within the movement of appearance. Therefore, it always carries a negative connotation of vanishing, disappearing, and the like.

By what logic can a "totality of illusion"—the external appearance—be its own "interiority"?
All these "vanishing" appearances—the tree, the house, the fever, the person, etc.—can disappear as individual categories (a specific tree, a specific person), but they will never disappear from the world of ideas, from which they will inevitably "reincarnate." Today's individual will pass away, but tomorrow a new one will emerge; it is the same pattern with the tree, the fever, and so on.

Consciousness emerges from the appearance of a tree or a house, which is constantly vanishing. It reflects upon itself, yet this very act of self-reflection transforms that reflection into the internal essence of the object. This allows consciousness to distinguish the reflection of an object from its own self-reflection, even though they stem from a single reflective process. Consciousness possesses an internal dimension that stands in opposition to itself—something foreign, something distinct—yet within this private interiority, consciousness finds its own certainty. This internal state serves as the metric for truth and provides the moments where consciousness exists for itself. However, consciousness remains unaware of this; it does not realize it possesses such internal moments or certainties, precisely because the "being-for-itself" of that internal realm acts as a negative movement for consciousness.

Trees and houses are always disappearing—but they also constantly reappear...
What is being described here as "self-reflection" is essentially what psychology calls the "internalization" of an external image. We take an external perception and imprint it onto our psyche, allowing us to conjure it up at will later without needing to physically observe it again. The external object or concept now resides within our consciousness—or more accurately, within our "memory." Martinus argues that everything we perceive through our senses and encode into what we eventually call the "mind" isn't actually the creation of new images, but rather the recognition of those same images—concepts already etched into the vast memory we carry with us. I’m not entirely convinced by the claim that "consciousness has an internal something that is different from itself"—if this internal element is produced via consciousness, how can it be considered foreign to it? And what exactly is this "negative movement"?

Upon witnessing the disappearance of youth, consciousness performs something truly extraordinary. Because it is aware of the transience of all phenomena—aware that things are perpetually vanishing and that nothing permanent or lasting can ever be grasped, and indeed aware of the ultimate nothingness of everything, including itself—consciousness performs a sort of "leap of faith." To overcome the vanishing nature of reality, it leaps into a realm that is entirely unknown and alien to it, a realm in which it feels a sense of stability or unshakability, which consciousness labels as the "transcendental."

There is a slight logical inconsistency here, specifically the idea that one movement cannot experience another movement. If everything that is transient is created and exists in a state of continuous motion or change—from birth to disappearance—then a consciousness that perceives and experiences this constant flux cannot itself be purely transient, changing, or finite. The experience of anything requires a point of contrast. Isn't that the case? If we want to experience the passing or existence of something, we can only do so by using something else that is *not* passing or changing. If that "something else" is consciousness, or the ego, then that consciousness—that ego—must be imperishable and eternal, serving as the necessary opposite to the phenomenon it observes. Anyone who can grasp this logically wouldn't need any kind of "leap of faith" 😉

a) The interiority or the realm of the interior (the transcendental, intuition, etc.)
b) Reason
c) The middle ground, or phenomena (the subject of modern science)

I have to admit, I struggle to follow this division. Why is "interiority" defined by things like "intuition," while reason is somehow categorized separately? Is reason meant to be a sensory category? In my view, both reason and intelligence fall under the umbrella of human "interiority." They aren't the same as the raw images flashed onto the "screen of consciousness" when the eye receives light impulses from an external "object," or when the ear picks up sounds, colors, or shapes.

Otherworldliness is emptiness; it is a phenomenon of nothingness. Nothing actually manifests through this appearance, and Mark doesn't see an angel presenting him with a vision of paradise in his room—he sees nothing showing him nothing. What emerges is nothingness, and then it vanishes, whether it be Mark himself or his vision of paradise. Once the vision of paradise appears and subsequently disappears, it is no longer paradise, regardless of how briefly it was revealed.

To put it another way, the "paradise" Mark perceives vanishes just as easily as the chair in his room, the room itself, or Mark himself—as we established at the start of this analysis when noting that every phenomenon is relative because it will "vanish tomorrow." Consequently, it follows that there is essentially no fundamental difference between the tree, the house, Mark, and the angel 😉 (none of them possess an inherent "essence")

The inner essence of things that people defend isn't actually unknowable to the mind. Accordingly, they defend otherworldliness against the intellect by claiming the mind can never and will never be able to grasp it, implying a limitation of the mind or something similar, as if the intellect itself were restricted. The reality is quite simple: the interiority or the "otherworldliness" is entirely empty, and nothing can be known within emptiness. When they claim the divine essence or divine providence is unknowable, they are simply saying: "It is empty."

The truth is that the assertion that "the mind cannot know the otherworld (or the transcendent, the supposedly unknowable)" is incorrect, and I disagree with it. Hegel wrote his works during an era characterized by a harmonious and accepted division between "science" and "faith/religion"—a time when it was taken for granted that only the material could be scientifically understood and proven, while anything "hinted at" by faith was relegated to the realm of the forever unknowable and unprovable, the eternal subject of "faith." Well, we are moving past that today. Science is increasingly finding evidence, or at least logical explanations, for many things that would have fallen under the category of "faith" during the Hegelian era. Therefore, the LOGICAL MIND PROGRESSES—it discovers more and more, no longer confined to perceiving merely current material or external phenomena, but beginning to bring to light what was once considered mere faith and dismissed as "unknowable divine will," sealed away as "unreachable for all eternity."
There is nothing unknowable to the human mind. And there is no end to human knowledge....
Otherwise, everything would perpetually spin in circles and repeat itself endlessly; we would be living in hell. Granted, many people actually believe they are, but until they prove it through experimentation and observation, this theory remains strictly within the domain of pure faith. 😉

To make a point: many great thinkers and scientists born after Hegel have narrowed that gap between "science" and "faith" (a gap which, judging by this interpretation, Hegel's philosophy somehow seals off and declares final, using it as its very foundation). This spans from Einstein, who was the first to establish that "faith without science is blind, and science without faith is lame," down to many modern researchers who unanimously argue that many things previously labeled as "faith" are being proven as scientific truths. Quantum physics and astrophysics, through their discoveries, have confirmed many of the "eternal truths" found in Eastern texts, which during the Hegelian era were dismissed as mere "faith"...
ruggedraven36 said:Look, if a person is aware of their own inner workings, then an object's "inside" is basically just another subject's "inside"—because, at the end of the day, we're all just objects to someone else. This hints at the idea that splitting reality into subject vs. object, or inner vs. outer, isn't some absolute truth. It's just relative.

Are you suggesting that if I am the subject and you are the object—something external to me—and I am conscious of my own inner workings (the source of these sentences), there is no need to question your interiority because it is fundamentally the same as mine? And that the fact different sentences emerge from those different interiors is all just relative and deceptive? Are you implying that my interiority, yours, and everyone else's—our thoughts, feelings, memories, our entire psyche—is essentially identical?

And does this extend to animals and plants as well? That their interiority is identical to ours, that we all share the same psyche, the same internal experiences, and the same conclusions, making any perceived difference purely relative (and perhaps any similarity isn't coincidental at all 😉)?
Is it also relative that my sensation of pain isn't the same as yours, or a dog's, or a chicken's? Is it relative that we won't react to the same stimulus in the exact same way, because ultimately everything is the same since it is established that "all is One"?

danieel —I have to tell you, reading about all this "emptiness" and "nothingness," I felt less like I was reading an interpretation of Hegel and more like I was reading a post from David Miller, who seems to be some kind of "efilist" (whatever that implies) rather than a philosopher 😉
Furthermore, it felt like reading an outdated critique of a religion or theology that has moved on significantly since the very positions mentioned here were first held. Not to mention that it's practically common knowledge now that animals "see" things we can't—that they perceive "spirits" and such... In short, it feels like a collection of many obsolete official doctrines.

(I think I finally understand why some users argued that Hegel might have written his theses and conclusions differently had he lived today. As we see here, most of these conclusions are heavily supported by, derived from, and reliant upon the official religious stances of his era, likely influenced by the scientific reach of that time, the socio-political climate, and so on. Essentially, Hegelian philosophy is tethered to a specific era; to the extent that the period shapes the thought, the thought cannot be considered "eternal.")
I think I’m slightly misinterpreting this, so let me write it out immediately to make sure I haven't "missed the mark" 😁
The issue arises when the "thing-in-itself"—that internal essence within a concept or object—is severed from the object's actual appearance (its external look, or how it presents itself to us). If we follow the Kantian insistence that an object's "inner nature" is unknowable to the subject, then that "interiority" isn't just being separated from the subject; it becomes detached from the object itself. If it’s divorced from the object's appearance (what it seems to be to us as subjects), then it exists independently of its own manifestation. In other words, it becomes unreachable not just to the observer, but to the object's own presence?

In short, the logic would be:
The object's appearance is intelligible to the subject.
The object's interiority is unintelligible to the subject.
Therefore, the appearance and the interiority of the object are two distinct things.
If appearance and interiority are separate—given that one can be grasped while the other cannot—how, and by what mechanism, does the object encompass both these distinct aspects? Is there some third value at play... perhaps emergence? 🙂
If emergence is what contains both the appearance and the interiority of the object, to what extent is that emergence itself accessible to the subject?

Essentially, whatever is hidden in a way that defies mediation or division remains forever "torn away" from the shared field. Even if that hidden part possesses some form of potential existence, it is utterly irrelevant to everything else within that field. It lacks any point of contact or influence over the elements of the field. After all, if something cannot be mediated—if it cannot be made clear, accessible, useful, or functional—then it is effectively meaningless. What is the point of its potential truth if it serves no purpose? 😁

(This is the closest I’ve ever come to actually "philosophizing" 😉 ) .....
This is quite compelling.
The pacing here is excellent; you’ve managed to weave the heavy lifting of Hegelian thought—which might feel daunting at this stage—seamlessly into the fabric of everyday life. It makes the material much more accessible, almost like masking bitter medicine with strawberry juice so a child doesn't notice they aren't drinking something sweet. 🙂

Immediately following the dialectic of force, Hegel discusses consciousness, which is essentially situated in the beyond; it lives off the beyond and defends its existence.

I am looking forward to the breakdown of this and the subsequent discussion on consciousness.

In Hegel's framework, there are no higher, lower, or intermediate levels of consciousness as various mystics and amateurs from all walks of life might claim. There are simply three modes, and none of them holds precedence over the others.

🤣
Perhaps some "amateur"—and I use that term affectionately, like finding an old, forgotten trinket in an antique shop that you once held dear—will try to map these "three modes of consciousness" onto their own arbitrary hierarchies of high, middle, and low culture. 😉

What Hegel is getting at here is that the substantiality of a subject—let's take Mark, for instance—is defined by what he is "in himself" and what he is "for himself." As a being in himself, Mark is small, and as a being for himself, he truly is small. To be small "for oneself" means to possess that smallness internally, whereas being small "in oneself" means possessing that quality only as a potentiality, not yet as a reality.

So, "for itself" represents actual possession, while "in itself" remains mere possibility—the conceptualized version of oneself that hasn't been realized yet, and perhaps never will be?

For Hegel, everything we encounter or observe in our surroundings—all those "actual" events—isn't truly real unless it is mental. Only that which is mental is considered real. Consequently, anything non-mental is synonymous with the unreal or the non-existent.

This is spot on. It reinforces my own conviction that only that which possesses true value—everything we see, hear, say, and do that actually matters—is what endures; it is what truly exists. Everything else, the superfluous, the trivial, the unthinking, is essentially a glitch that won't last, a sort of mirage. One could easily draw parallels between this Hegelian truth and various Eastern spiritual texts regarding "maya," or the illusion of the transient world versus the eternal, unchanging, and mental reality that constitutes true existence.
Maybe the serious Hegelian scholars will roll their eyes at these comparisons and decide I've missed the point entirely. But even if my associations have nothing to do with his intended meaning, I believe the very fact that such connections can be made serves as proof of the philosophy's inherent value and truth. After all, only truth can be valuable, and only value can be true.Inspiration. It’s a concept people love to romanticize, usually while sitting in some overpriced coffee shop in Seattle, waiting for a lightning bolt to strike. They talk about it as if it’s this divine, mystical force that descends upon the worthy, rather than what it actually is: a fleeting byproduct of specific circumstances, often fueled by nothing more than caffeine and a temporary lack of distractions. We like to pretend there's some profound, almost spiritual connection between our inner will and the creative spark. We act as though we can summon it through sheer force of personality. But if you look at it through a more grounded lens, inspiration isn't a guest you invite over for dinner; it's more like a stray cat. You can set out the right food and clear a space on the porch, but you can't demand it shows up, and you certainly can't control what it does once it arrives. The reality is much more mundane. Most "inspired" moments are just the result of being bored enough to let your mind wander or being disciplined enough to stay in the chair until the gears finally catch. There is no magic in it—just the intersection of preparation and circumstance. To believe otherwise is to indulge in a very comfortable kind of delusion. To truly stir the soul and push the imagination toward forging deep associations or sparking entirely new ideas, one needs more than just simple inspiration. It requires a certain level of mental friction—a willingness to let disparate concepts collide until they fuse into something coherent. It isn't about waiting for a lightning bolt to strike; it’s about cultivating a headspace where the mind feels permitted to wander through the abstract without the constant tether of practical utility.

The only thing Amanda Jackson5 says that actually confuses me is:
It means we have to approach an object not merely as a substance, but as a subject—as something possessing its own internal reality rather than just being an external phenomenon presented to us. If we fail to do that, we end up stuck with that unsolvable surplus, that unreachable "thing-in-itself" that haunts Kantian thought.

How does one actually approach an object as something possessing an internal essence? To put it more plainly: how do we reach that core and truly feel it? Without a direct experience, that interiority doesn't really exist for us; it remains nothing more than an abstract theory. From my reading of secular literature, I’ve gathered that achieving this requires a specific kind of faculty—one we haven't quite developed yet—which might be called a "body of intuition." Or perhaps it's simply an extraordinarily refined empathy: the capacity to immerse oneself in another's inner world without blurring the lines between their reality and our own. We need the ability to grasp the interiority of a subject that isn't "I," effectively turning the object into something akin to a subject—something as intimately known as ourselves. Without this capacity, I don't see any way to bypass Kant’s "insoluble surplus"—that "thing-in-itself" which remains perpetually out of reach. It is that private dimension we lack the ability to consciously access, at least not in the same way we experience the most intimate parts of our own being.
In other words, I fail to see how philosophy or pure reason could ever actually grasp the internal essence of an object that exists outside the self. How can we claim to reach its true core when what we perceive is likely nothing more than a rationalized "preconception"—a mental construct that bears little to no actual resemblance to the object's true state, its color, its tone, or its fundamental reality?

Please, Daniel, keep going. Don't let any distractions throw you off course or derail your progress—your only real objective here is to finish that sequel on consciousness. 😉Just my latest little outburst. 🙂