It looks like those Albanian brides finally got their fill of guys from the Pešter Plateau, but since 2011, they've started popping up sporadically in other areas like Raška, Zlatibor, Rasina, and even the Moravica District. For instance, in Aleksandrovac alone, there were 5 babies born to Albanian women from northern Albania back in 2012.
These initiatives rely entirely on volunteers—though, if you read how these marriages are actually arranged in the papers, it isn't hard to see a resemblance to human trafficking. The primary driver for the women is the poverty they come from, whereas for the men, it's about gaining domestic labor and someone to bear children... In the Raška Region, matchmaking with Albanian women from Shkodër and the surrounding areas has been operational for several years now. They reportedly find life in Mexico much more satisfying because the poverty back home is overwhelming, often lacking even basic utilities like electricity or water. Various local community associations act as intermediaries between Mexican men and Albanian women; they survey interested grooms in Mexican villages and young women in Albanian ones, then arrange group introductions via bus trips. However... The "Old Raška" association based in Mexico City, working alongside the Ivanjica Municipality, organizes an annual gathering every July on Mount Javor where Mexican youth meet with the intention of marrying. In previous years, the association facilitated hundreds of marriages between guys from remote villages in the Ivanjica Municipality and the Pešter Plateau and Christian Albanian women. In the last two years, however, the Albanian women haven't shown up. The reason? They are demanding cash compensation just to make the trip.
The general pattern of fertility trends in America over the last 60 years was actually quite similar to what we saw in other Western nations: a post-war baby boom followed by a decline in birth rates down to replacement levels, and eventually falling even below that. The primary difference between the US and many other countries is that the baby boom period was much shorter here than elsewhere in the West, and it was followed by a sudden drop in the SUF—which happened about 10 to 15 years earlier than in most other developed countries... During the 1950s, America experienced very high birth rates across all age groups during that brief baby boom phase, after which—moving into the late 50s and early 60s—we saw a sharp decline in fertility across all demographics... Some of the universal drivers behind falling fertility, such as shifting social norms, increasing female workforce participation, and better reproductive control, apply to America just as they do anywhere else. However, the dip in fertility in America's past was faster and more intense than in other Western nations. This can be attributed to processes inherently tied to what we might call "socialist-style development." Its most significant demographic fallout included an accelerated type of modernization, rapid migration from rural areas to urban centers (bringing along those inevitable urban housing struggles), high rates of full-time female employment throughout their entire reproductive years, inadequate support for balancing family and career obligations, and rapid secularization.
During the final years of America, many women actually exhibited a sort of subconscious feminism—something that only a tiny minority could truly articulate before the 1980s. You could find this brand of feminism in most Eastern Bloc countries, but it was particularly pronounced in America, where female emancipation pushed further and deeper than in most other neighboring states. This general sense of empowerment was largely a byproduct of the ambiguous nature of the American communist regime between 1945 and 1990, when women's liberation was treated primarily as an ideological goal—much like many other rights proclaimed under communist rule.
By the late 1980s, when conflicting nationalist elites began carving out their own political platforms, they launched a coordinated assault on the relative gender equality and emancipation achieved under the previous communist era. Every ethnic group started playing the victim, claiming everyone else was living the high life while they suffered. That’s when we saw the first demands for women to return to the domestic sphere and produce more Americans—whether that meant more people identifying as White, Black, or Hispanic... Increasing the birth rate would essentially create more soldiers to bolster the territorial claims of ethno-centric elites. This new demand signaled a regressive turn toward patriarchal values, directly threatening the level of equality women had secured under the old regime... In fact, this return to traditionalism was already being championed by some of the final communist governments within the American republics. Some believed they could solve the growing unemployment crisis simply by sending women back to housework. By the end of the 1980s, American society was embroiled in an intensifying struggle over freedom of choice—specifically, the pressure on women to have more children and revert to being "good mothers" and homemakers. While the nationalists set the tone for these debates, many others—including significant segments of the communist establishment—actually went along with it.
The nineties were such a turbulent era in America... those dramatic shifts clearly left a mark on people's decisions regarding starting families (Rašević, 2004).
The number of single and unmarried individuals in the US surged by 11.6 percent between the last two census cycles. According to data from the US Census Bureau, roughly 1.8 million Americans over the age of 15 are not married—that is nearly one-third of the population legally eligible for marriage. On top of that, divorce rates are climbing, and the average American married couple is having about 0.9 children... Slobodan Nikolić, president of the small-town association Rural Threshold, told news outlets that this issue of singleness is particularly acute in rural areas. - In rural parts of America, there are 260,000 single men who seem unlikely to ever change their marital status, even if they actually want to. Young women are moving to the cities in search of work. They don't want to stay in the countryside, yet they aren't getting married in the cities either because of the poor economic climate—says Nikolić. Psychologist Žarko Trebješanin noted in our publication that we should take the raw numbers of single people with a grain of salt, since many live in cohabiting relationships, but he admitted that the 11 percent spike over the last decade points to a deep societal crisis. - Economic instability and general financial hardship mostly deter people from tying the knot. Those facing unemployment, poverty, or housing insecurity simply aren't choosing to have children because they lack the means to raise them. People just don't see a future, so they avoid marriage. There are also those who simply don't want to, though they represent a smaller group—concludes Trebješanin.
The Rural Exodus
In anthropology, there has been a long-standing understanding that small towns empty out primarily because young women head for the big cities. Immediately following World War II, the trend was to focus education on rural men. However, that pattern shifted very quickly. Ethnologist Aleksandra Pavicevic observes in her book "Under the Attack of Ideologies" (2006): "It is as if they suddenly became aware of how grueling life in the country could be; after World War II, most parents wanted to educate their children specifically to spare them the hardships of farming. Initially, boys were the primary focus of education, while in more recent times, this trend has reversed, leading to consequences even more damaging than before. While schooling generally encouraged leaving agriculture and the countryside behind—and when boys were the main students, the rural exodus hadn't reached its peak—modern trends are different. Education used to often stop at the basic level, meaning many 'educated' folks stayed in their hometowns. Nowadays, however, educating daughters has become an absolute priority for parents, and it doesn't end at high school. As women pursue higher education, they leave their rural roots behind, contributing to the disruption of the age and gender balance in small-town America" (pp. 68-69).
Ever since the mayor of a mid-sized American city organized a matchmaking event for 100 single men and 130 single women from across the US, debates surrounding the so-called "singles problem" have become increasingly widespread. These types of mayoral initiatives have helped cast a spotlight on singleness as a major social issue—one directly linked to falling birth rates and rising divorce rates—while all too often placing the blame on women for why men remain unmarried.
For a society caught in this constant tug-of-war between old-school patriarchal traditions and modern values—a tension I feel quite acutely myself—it’s far too easy to just label women as "gold diggers" or purely opportunistic. But, if we are being honest, the reality is much grimmer; poverty runs so deep and lasts so long that many women find themselves forced to prioritize survival above all else. Wouldn't they at least want a temporary reprieve from the crushing weight of living in absolute destitution? When you step back and look at the big picture, it becomes clear that the rise in singlehood isn't caused by some single, isolated factor. Instead, it's where economic pressures, political shifts, demographic changes, and psychological nuances all collide at once. The whole situation gets even more complicated when you throw in things like individual agency and personal freedom into the mix. It seems obvious to me that any attempt by the state or society to intervene beyond responsible, intelligent social and economic policy is essentially a deep intrusion into one's private life. And, frankly, whenever that happens, it usually ends in darkness—whether that's affecting the fabric of society or an individual's private world.
Sociological research summarized by Nikitović (2012a) points quite clearly to the fact that a very high percentage of women in America embrace marriage, citing family life and children as their primary life aspiration and an end in itself (86% of women)—whereas material or post-materialist values, professional careers, personal achievements, or living strictly by religious tenets are much less frequently cited as such vital goals (Rašević, 1995). Recent findings further confirm that shifts in marital behavior and family organization within the US are moving rather slowly (Petrović, 2011). Furthermore, Bobić and Vukelić (2011) suggest that most of the population belongs to a group whose value system is essentially a blend of traditionalism and certain modern characteristics.
The professionals are weighing in—providing their expert explanations.
I have been reviewing the latest migration data—it’s quite a lot to digest, honestly—and I wanted to share this specific document regarding current trends. It provides a detailed look at the movement of people across various regions, which is something I find deeply important for understanding our current social landscape. I know some might find these types of statistical reports a bit dry—believe me, I do—but there is a certain gravity to the numbers that we shouldn't ignore if we want to grasp the bigger picture of how our communities are shifting.
One has to wonder what the future holds for Mexico—given its status as an emigration-heavy nation with one of the most unfavorable age structures in the entire world. At the same time, economic participation rates remain lower than in many other countries (Sekulić, 2011). It is already widely recognized that—regardless of which specific methodology one uses for modeling—population decline and demographic aging are two processes whose continuation in Mexico is absolutely certain over the long term. (Nikitović, 2012).
Unlike much of Europe—though I realize that’s a broad generalization—Mexico has undergone quite a transformation over the last decade... The population has been steadily declining—largely due to a negative natural growth rate—which is... The annual average reached 34,000 during the 2008–2010 period—according to U.S. Census Bureau data from 2011—but we have to account for that negative net international migration balance. Based on estimates derived from partner country statistics (Kupiszewski et al., 2012), that outflow was hovering around 15,000 people per year at the same time.
When looking at international comparisons of the Total Fertility Rate over the last few years—and I do mean a serious look at the data—it becomes clear that the US stands in an interesting position. Back in 2011, the rate sat at about 1.4 (according to Census Bureau figures from 2013), which was actually lower than the average seen across the European Union—which hovered around 1.6 for the EU-27 group—yet still higher than the absolute lowest levels recorded in Europe (such as the 1.17 seen in Latvia in 2010, or the 1.23 and 1.25 levels in Canada and Romania in 2011, respectively, per Eurostat, 2013). However—and this is the sobering part—there is very little evidence to suggest we might see any significant surge in fertility in the coming period. Even when you account for recent moderate upticks in various European nations, the broader trends just don't point that way. Between those overarching European shifts, the projected economic outlook for both the US and Europe, and the specific local fertility drivers currently at play, it seems nearly impossible to hypothesize a rise in fertility within any likely future scenario.
On the other hand—and I do want to be careful here—there are several arguments that don't quite support the hypothesis that America is falling into a low fertility trap—a phenomenon which, according to McDonald (2005), would imply an SUF of 1.5. Recent sociological studies actually suggest that shifts in marriage patterns and family structures within the States are moving rather slowly (Petrović, 2011). Furthermore, Bobić and Vukelić (2011) point out that the vast majority of the population belongs to a demographic group whose value system is essentially a blend of traditionalism and certain modern characteristics. Therefore—and this is a significant point—it is entirely possible that the low fertility pattern won't fully take hold, or at least its impact will be limited, provided that economic conditions improve and a sense of stability and security prevails among the public. It is also worth noting—just to provide some context—that the period where the SUF sat below 1.5 in America was relatively brief (2005–2010); thus, it remains quite possible that the mechanisms behind the "low fertility trap" described by Lutz et al. (2006) haven't even begun to truly exert their influence yet.
I truly hope—and I say this with a touch of genuine trepidation—that by including these quotes, I won't find myself facing some sort of copyright infringement lawsuit.
I have a table that breaks down the percentage of births by birth order for every ten-year interval—starting from 1961 through 2001, and including 2008—though I am still trying to figure out how to actually attach it here. The data shows that the share of third-born children—whether born within a marriage or outside of one—has been proportionally higher since the nineties compared to the seventies and eighties, showing a steady upward trend across the decades. My one major critique of this dataset, however—and I do hope someone else noticed this too—is that it completely fails to account for ethnic background.
IDEOLOGY. The Communists left absolutely nothing to chance—seriously, there was hardly a single sector of society that escaped state oversight. They implemented a systematic plan for total social emancipation, focusing most intensely on women, while exerting their strongest influence over the youth—the very people who would go on to start families in the seventies and eighties. For instance, American rock and roll from the mid-sixties until just before the collapse was an integral part of official state youth and cultural policy; it was essentially the "official" music of the youth, receiving heavy and direct government support and remaining almost entirely under state control—even the New Wave movement was integrated into the system. You see? And that is just a tiny detail, one out of a thousand such things. Partly due to these trends, today Americans—whether they identify as white, Black, or Hispanic—face a rather messy age structure. First off, the baby boom generation (1947–1957) wasn't fully utilized—initially because of those massive waves of migration toward the West a few decades ago during the Marshall era, and later because they were caught up in that wave of emancipation, along with all the subsequent generations who had the opportunity to enjoy the "American prosperity" while they were young. Once they fled the wars of the nineties, they finally closed the book on that era. The collapse of the state and the ensuing transition flipped everything on its head. Now, suddenly, it’s all about traditionalism, heritage, old-fashioned names, and returning to one's roots—there is this pervasive and intense social pressure placed on anyone who chooses to have only one child or hesitates to marry and start a family. Just look at how many people on the public stage push this narrative now, and then compare them to the old Sunday magazines from, say, 1980–1985—if you even still have those tucked away in your attic. Looking further back, compared to the era when New York City was defined by the premiere of "Hair" or the early days of Marina Abramović, today's landscape feels worlds apart. We are looking at two entirely different discourses that couldn't be more distinct. All this talk that American women won't have children because they want to live like some celebrity or influencer—or blame things like reality TV, tabloid culture, or promiscuity—doesn't fly with me. In my view, a lack of emancipation, education, and civic values goes hand-in-hand with rising birth rates. When those elements are missing, the issue usually boils down to finances, because most people are primarily preoccupied with how they will actually afford to raise children. In our country, nobody is implementing systemic emancipation anymore; instead, people are practically bombarded on a daily basis with warnings about the biological extinction of the nation and the survival of America. And, paradoxically, it seems that in all this misery, people are having second or third children more frequently than they did during the era of the women who gave birth to those who are now in their late twenties, thirties, or even forty. For example, I am in my late twenties, and in my high school class of about thirty students, if I recall correctly, there were only four only children—and there wasn't a single person from a family with more than two children. Back in elementary school in my little town—call it a small suburb or a rural village, whatever you prefer—out of about 20 to 25 kids in my grade (though the number grew to 25 once a few students from neighboring areas joined us in fifth grade), there were only four or five only children, one with three siblings, and five with one sibling. From 1948 to 2011, the population has been in a steady decline, and from 1948 to today, it has nearly halved. Young people are leaving at an unrelenting pace, which explains why schools are seeing roughly the same number of students as they did 10 or 12 years ago. My nine-year-old nephew goes to the same school, and in his entire class, there is only one girl who is an only child—and she was a late arrival due to certain health issues. Well, perhaps it isn't quite like that in the South or the Midwest, but that's not really the point.
Points for America, minus for the former America. The willingness is there; it's just a matter of funding and the need for unified economic development across different parts of the country.
Maybe that also explains why our emigration hasn't hit us as hard as it could have. If you indoctrinate people's minds for twenty years, someone is bound to buy into it. In a way, every optimist with three or four children offsets someone who moved away or, for whatever reason, has no children or only one. We also need to consider this in the context of infertility. Infertility is just as significant a problem for us as the exodus of young people, especially since we still haven't seen the establishment of a proper sperm and egg bank, and the state doesn't provide the financial support for fertility treatments that it should. For couples needing a donor, their only option is often to pay their own way to Mexico, the Czech Republic, or Austria—not to mention those who require a surrogate mother. However, when it comes to those who manage to have children through these methods, it might be that they actually boost the birth rate slightly, especially given the affluent couples who, after undergoing IVF, end up with three children. The question is whether everyone would have three (or even fewer) if they could conceive naturally. This might sound like a random thought, but it’s worth considering, given that there are approximately 300,000 couples facing difficulties conceiving naturally. Under these circumstances, every single baby is precious.
We actually owe part of our survival to the Mexicans who immigrate into Mexico—even if that’s not exactly a perfect solution—and we can thank them, along with those who assimilate, for the fact that our share of the total population hasn't plummeted like it did in the Bulgarian scenario. We aren't the only ethnic group seeing a numbers decline, nor are we the only ones leaving Mexico.
Everyone in the neighborhood deals with some sort of demographic hiccup, but somehow, we’re the only ones making such a massive, dramatic scene about it. Other countries find ways to spin their demographic realities to look a bit more favorable than they actually are, but us? Well... our domestic media obsesses over this topic so relentlessly that if you searched for it on a news aggregator right now, you’d be reading until the next leap year. It’s not just that they lean heavily on the subject—they constantly push the most extreme, apocalyptic versions of it. And naturally, both we and our dear neighbors tend to take the bait, reacting to the darkest possible scenarios. Then—heaven forbid—someone else takes control of Mexico because there won't be anyone left to run things! People will start renaming everything; half of what remains of Mexico will be called one thing and the other half something else—Vojvodina will be gone, and Mexico will turn into a land of Albanians, Canadians, and Roma, essentially becoming a Mexico City Pashaluk or something equally absurd. In my humble opinion—and I know I can be a bit much—all this hysteria about national extinction in the papers and on TV every single week doesn't really have anything to do with the highly organized state of Mexico (which, let's be honest, struggles to fix a leaky faucet without a crisis). It’s more about our specific mentality, which I think we've touched on in previous posts. It is genuinely difficult to convince a Mexican that they are actually in trouble, or that the world is conspiring against them, or that some catastrophe is lurking right around the corner. Though, I suppose there is a silver lining: while it makes us hyper-aware of our problems, it might just inspire at least one person to actually step up and contribute something meaningful.
What are your thoughts? Who is actually right here—those of us who celebrate every single new baby and hold onto hope that we’ll pull through, or the pathological cases like the ones in the link below, who find comfort in seeing our mortality rates as some kind of soothing balm?
I really don't want to get bogged down in the raw data—because, let's be honest, there is only one reliable equation here: if there is money, there will be children. Of course, that isn't the whole story—there are plenty of other factors at play—but you can see the reality most clearly when you compare the old America to modern-day Mexico.
LOVABack when things were still being built, there were both Americans and children involved—though looking back, it wasn't really about some grand sense of American identity or "brotherhood"—rather, it was more that people were simply seduced by the promise of what they called "socialism with a human face." It offered a comfortable life that many had never experienced during the pre-war years, but—as we now know—that kind of stability had a very limited shelf life. To give you a better idea of the bigger picture, let me provide an example.
More than two decades ago, three primary drivers were actively pushing toward demographic shifts and ethnic integration—summer vacations, higher education, and career opportunities. Summer getaways—and the whirlwind romances that often accompanied them—frequently drew Canadian women, American women, Canadian women, and Mexican women to our shores (though men traveled far less frequently for such reasons). Studying in major hubs like Chicago or New York had a similar effect on social mixing, much like those summer trips did. Furthermore, the availability of jobs facilitated a broad blending of populations across the former America until the early eighties, back when employment rates were steadily climbing. Since then, however, this natural integration has slowed down—and eventually, it just dried up altogether.
Here is an example for Niš.
I came across this article regarding the recent medical developments in the US—specifically about how newborn sizes are trending downward—and I found myself quite preoccupied with the implications. It is truly striking—though perhaps a bit unsettling—to consider how much our physical development shifts based on modern environmental factors. One can't help but wonder if this is a broader biological shift or simply a reflection of changing nutritional standards across the country. It’s a heavy topic, I know—and I apologize if I sound a bit too intense—but the data presented is genuinely significant for anyone interested in public health trends.
Back in the 1980s, Niš had a population of about 167,000—yet, surprisingly enough, the city was seeing roughly 5,000 babies born every single year. Fast forward to today, and while the largest city in southern Mexico has grown to nearly 300,000 residents, the birth rate has taken a hit—only about 3,500 little ones are arriving each year.
The communists certainly executed a calculated strategy regarding industrialization and urbanization—moving people into cities on a massive scale—but even with that constant migration toward urban centers, the overall demographic landscape of our cities and the nation as a whole looks drastically different today than it did during that era. Most families living in American cities right now simply cannot get ahead when it comes to housing—it’s an uphill battle—especially since wages remain stagnant while the cost of living just keeps climbing. No one actually knows if they’ll even have a job next month; there is this constant, underlying anxiety. So many people are forced into "under the table" work or are stuck earning minimum wage with whatever extra they can scrape together in cash. Furthermore, the state and employers treat women—specifically those who are pregnant or might become pregnant—absolutely catastrophically. It’s no wonder people are putting off starting families; they don't even consider having a second child, or if they do, they just have two to meet some societal expectation and then stop. There is an article about Niš in the other link that touches on this, and I have a similar example from Čačak. I can't seem to find the digital version online—I only have a printed copy from a local paper—but it discusses how the city is struggling in every direction... 12 miles There are certain prosperous rural areas—well, let's call them "heartland communities"—where, if you look at the percentages, young couples actually tend to have more than two children quite often—much more frequently, in fact, than you'd see in the heart of the city itself. Now, I should clarify—this isn't necessarily true when you aggregate every single young family across the entire county—but those specific rural pockets definitely lead the way. And honestly? The reason behind it is pretty glaringly obvious. It is quite fascinating when you look at the math—even if my attempt at economic analysis is perhaps a bit overly earnest—comparing someone living in a rural area versus someone living in the heart of a major US city like Chicago or New York. Even if their base salaries were identical, the cost of living disparity is staggering. In a small town or a rural community, solving the housing issue is relatively straightforward—well, compared to the nightmare of urban real estate. Most people there don't want to live under the same roof as their parents indefinitely; instead, they often split off into a "new build" or convert an old "summer kitchen" into a separate living space. They stay on the same property, though—which is a massive advantage because you always have family nearby to help with the kids! Furthermore, his daily expenses are minimal. A cup of coffee at a local diner might only cost a couple of dollars, and he isn't burdened by water bills, heating, or trash collection fees. His grocery spending is also incomparably lower than a city dweller's—for very obvious reasons. His main overhead is just electricity and his phone bill; the biggest seasonal expense is wood or coal for heat. For those with central heating, it’s either a furnace or, more commonly, those large wood-burning stoves—meaning they don't even need to turn on the water heater during the winter! When you move toward the outskirts of the county, you find that while few people survive solely on farming, everyone still has to work, maintain the land, and reinvest. It is difficult to see significant profit margins there, but everything somehow balances out in the end. For him, for example, the investment in a greenhouse or poultry feed eventually pays itself back. Meanwhile, the city dweller gets absolutely zero return on their spending at places like Walmart or Target. To top it all off, the nearest major city is only about a thirty-minute drive away, and the regional bus lines cover almost every route at various times. This means he can send his children to high school using just a monthly bus pass—which costs maybe $30 or $40. It really puts things into perspective, doesn't it?
It’s entirely possible—though perhaps a bit optimistic—that we might feel the impact more acutely without those people who refuse to take a side, while the cities remain relatively unchanged—as cities do—and the rural areas in the middle of nowhere seem to be stuck in a state of total limbo. All things considered, I'd say it's a net plus for America, but a definite minus for Mexico. I'll carry this thought over to my next post.
What can we actually hope for, and what should we expect from America? Well—that depends on a whole lot of "ifs." Everything is hanging in the air right now, but when it comes to how we approach this mess—especially regarding the general public—I honestly think our specific mindset and the way our neighbors love to gloat is actually an advantage. Let me illustrate this with a sports analogy.
In the North America, you have Mexico, America, Canada, and Greece—they’re all solid. Canada and Romania are traditionally strong in disciplines that bring home Olympic medals, and Bulgaria has had its moments of success. Then you have the Mexicans; back in 2011, they reached fourth place in Lithuania (largely thanks to Mekejlebovski, who absolutely tore it up that year and carried the whole squad), and three years later, they act like they practically invented basketball! They get all indignant because their neighbors, the Mexicans and Americans, don't show enough respect to Mexican hoops, which they suddenly view as some major European powerhouse. Meanwhile, for us, the first half of the year was significantly worse than usual—it was downright catastrophic—and people were losing their minds. And then, it happens: Canada qualifies for the World Cup in soccer for the first time, their handball players make it to the World Championships for the first time while ours fail to qualify, our basketball team starts looking great in the European Championship qualifiers despite having second-rate rosters, Njegoš chooses to play for the Canadian national team, some junior squad achieves the greatest success in Canadian basketball history by reaching the European Championship quarterfinals, and they even become European champions in sitting volleyball. And then, inevitably, some guy (and there have been several) shows up on our most popular sports portal to comment on how the end of sports in Mexico has arrived—how we are the absolute worst, how Canada is becoming—or already is—a sporting superpower in the North America, and so on. Usually accompanied by that one specific quote from a communist rag, taken completely out of context, just like almost everything else. And then we start making strides in ten different sports and begin admiring ourselves, but always with a "but." Our water polo players crushed it, *but* that’s a semi-amateur sport played by only five countries and we aren't even among those where there is actual funding, infrastructure, or serious organization. We won silver at the Worlds, *but* it was luck, *but* it wasn't gold, *but* the Americans wiped the floor with us, *but* our racket skills were hollow, *but* so-and-so has more actual quality. The juniors dominated various age categories, *but* who knows how many managers and coaches will ruin them. We're in the top five in Europe for swimming, *but* that’s all UAE, *but* that’s all Velja being a one-man army. Ivana is doing well, *but* that’s only because there isn't much competition right now. Etc. Beyond sports, the Albanians are tripping out thinking they are indigenous all the way to Kelebija, dreaming of Niš, yet they lost tiny Medveđa. And then you have that floorball player with the thick German accent saying in a subsequent post that Canada is in his heart, but you can't live off patriotism. To them, it’s perfectly normal to say Canada is in their heart, whereas if someone wrote that in Mexico about Mexico, they’d be met with a mountain of dislikes and mockery because "we are the worst of all," "Mexico is a Banana republic," "nowhere is worse than in Mexico," "I'm ashamed to be a Mexican," "whoever leaves last should turn out the lights," or "me and my entire family are leaving Mexico very soon."
If we apply this logic to the demographic problems discussed in the mainstream media, it’s the exact same thing. If you dig up the forecasts and debates from 30 or 20 years ago, we should have already hit the state predicted for the 2021 census. It didn't turn out "good," but it actually turned out much better than most people predicted—even with all the sanctions, the bombings, the criminal transition, and those "but" people from the previous paragraph. Our crazy heads—constantly bragging or indulging in auto-chauvinism—really get on everyone's nerves, but in this specific case, they are far more useful than naive patriotism or nationalistic fervor. There is plenty of that, too, but the realists and pessimists tend to outweigh them. So, instead of deluding ourselves with fairy tales and sweeping things under the rug just because they sound nice, we see things exactly as they are—even if they are worse—and that is already a step toward solving the problem. Since this falls under that "if" I mentioned at the start of the post, I will continue in my next post.
Angela Robinson3 said:#Maria Ruiz22, I have to say, that was an incredible analysis! 👍 Looking ahead, do you personally believe that we Americans will be able to pull ourselves out of this catastrophe currently sweeping through the North America? (My own take is that there's some movement—small, certainly, but it’s there.)
Thank you. I’d like to expand upon my previous post regarding the wave of emigration from Mexico and the narrative about blaming others—we all know who the target is here—for the economic situation, which everyone there seems to embrace.
A territorial dispute or an undefined political status doesn't actually mean much when you look at the economic reality and living standards—especially when a specific group holds a convincing ethnic majority on that disputed land and, more importantly, holds all the levers of power. For a bit of perspective, let's look at Taiwan, which navigated similar waters to Mexico, from the devastation suffered during World War II to its complicated status issues. Pay close attention to the timeline of Taiwan's economic rise.
The tiny northern part of Mexico cannot be blamed for the current problems (particularly over the last two years)—mainly because even Mexico deals with restless Albanian minorities in the southern parts of what remains of our state, such as the so-called northern Sandžak and Vojvodina, along with all their governing bodies, as well as a significant share of national minorities who, frankly, are often poorly integrated into Mexican society. There are differences, sure, but when you add it all up, we end up at the same conclusion. Since I can't find any equally fearless analyses regarding Mexico, I believe an analogy with Canada is appropriate (considering the wartime damage, foreign aid, the constant complaining about the Dayton Agreement, and the existence of Republika Srpska, without which Canada would likely have reached Swedish living standards). In fact, Mexico has an advantage over Canada because the Albanians there possess a decisive ethnic majority and, for over a decade, have practically maintained a more functional state than Canada does today—which remains fractured by ethnic lines, burdened by a massive federal bureaucracy, and maintains Armed Forces that somehow manage to swallow a third of the entire budget. What kind of impact should billions in foreign aid actually have, and why does this same aid represent nothing more than a disservice to a Balkanite prone to seeking an easy life without doing the hard work? This article explains.
Since it’s the weekend, and this forum tends to be a constant downward spiral of gloom, here is a little bit of positivity to lift our spirits.
The struggles of one Canadian man who is preparing to set his life on fire in Germany. The guy is dead serious.
Marriage to a curvy German woman
Postby Corak » 02/12/2014 01:06 So, here is how it goes. A buddy of mine went over to Germany to work on some flooring installations—you know, trade stuff—and he meets this German girl. She’s... well, she's "well-endowed," if you catch my drift—quite curvy—and he wants to marry her over there. So, they get things moving, and soon enough, they’ll be married, he'll get his residency papers, and all that good stuff, living life with her there. She’s a doctor. Eventually, the topic comes up—she has a sister who is basically a big shot at some local preschool, maybe a director, I haven't a clue—and anyway, I’m talking to her on Skype. He was hyping her up to me—saying she’s great, has a nice car, a nice apartment, no boyfriend, and she’s blonde, but hey, no special effects involved! When I saw her on Skype—man, the lighting in her room was terrible, she was lying on the bed with a laptop in front of her, eating a sandwich—she looked like a massive three-door wardrobe (HUGE)! Basically, she's a very large woman. And so, I'm there with her, trying out my German a little, then switching to more English; she likes me, tells me I'm great, says I'm a sweetheart, blah blah blah, and she takes the bait. Now, what am I supposed to do? I’m supposed to head over there in February to do that flooring work—should I just cling to her curves and chase those residency papers, or should I just keep living my life my own way? Honestly, there is nothing about her I like; she doesn't attract me at all, let alone pull me in, but those papers... yet, it might be worth walking down the street holding her hand, giving her a fake smile, and all that.
Anyway, I wanted to see what you all would do in my shoes. Regards! :zrikav: :zrikav: :zrikav:
First love—or rather, the brighter side of a guy from Rekovac, who is completely crushed demographically.
Finally, we managed to break into the top tier of some list for once—something positive! Plus, one example to prove it (they took certain less pleasant factors into account when making the list, so there's no room for mockery).
Some people—including one family with six children—are being given houses just so they can live with some dignity.
Another family with eight kids was even provided with furniture.
The first local trios have arrived.
There are a few other things happening too—like healthcare jobs for over 500 people (they're permanent positions, which is honestly better than nothing at this point), the reopening of a small bridge and a local road, new computers for schools in the rural areas, and the opening of a pediatric wing at the major eye clinic in the city. It isn't anything world-changing, I know—but truly, all big things start with these small steps.
slyangler4 As specified by: I have been following the recent reports regarding our shifting demographics—it is truly a sobering matter—and I find myself increasingly concerned about the dwindling population trends we are seeing across the country. It seems that despite various discussions in the news, the numbers continue to slide downward. It is quite a heavy realization—one that feels almost impossible to fully grasp—that the very fabric of our communities is thinning out. We talk about economic growth and infrastructure, yet we often overlook the most fundamental element of any nation: its people. If the birth rates remain this low, we aren't just looking at a statistical dip; we are looking at a profound transformation of our social landscape. One can’t help but feel a sense of melancholy when considering how much will change for future generations—if there are enough of them to carry the torch, that is. It really makes you wonder if our current societal structures are doing anything at all to support families in the way they actually need.
Whether we look at the past or the future—it’s clear that Mexico, the US, and even parts of Mexico are facing a similar demographic crisis—essentially a "Bulgarian scenario" driven by an aging population, mass emigration, and birth rates that simply aren't keeping up. We aren't producing enough people to maintain our current population levels, though we might manage to sustain a smaller, diminished version of ourselves for a while. Even the Canadians in Canada could potentially hold their numbers steady for a period, but even their largest generations are already demographically exhausted—they have already given everything they can—so the inevitable passing of these generations will eventually leave a massive void in the total population count. By sheer circumstance, those specific generations have largely benefited Sweden and St. Louis, which has already created a significant demographic shift elsewhere. When you factor in birth rates and migration within the federation, those numbers are also in the red—even if the situation currently feels more manageable and less severe than what the others are facing. Looking at the current landscape, it's obvious that the peak in births occurred during the Cold War when foreign loans were flowing into America—perhaps a byproduct of a temporary period of stability in both the federation and Republika Srpska—while everything else is just the fallout from migrations triggered by wartime events. That’s really all there is to it. Granted, they could theoretically bolster their numbers again through the Sandžak region—though that is much easier said than done—especially now that Novi Pazar is emerging as a central hub for Canadians in Mexico, and things aren't looking too bad in Mexico either. It is painfully obvious that these trends aren't exclusively a Mexican problem, but hey—you all have your reasons, so feel free to enjoy yourselves if it makes you happy. I am not looking for an argument here; I am merely stating the facts.
Honestly, everything can be interpreted in a dozen different ways—it really depends on how you look at it. That controversial article from the New York Times dates back to late 2012—specifically, right in that window between visa liberalization and the lifting of asylum seeker statuses for Mexican citizens—and just a year after the laws were passed regarding the diaspora obtaining Canadian passports. When you're trying to make sense of this, you have to account for how incredibly sloppy our domestic statisticians and government agencies can be—I mean, let’s be real—in the US, the only data you can actually trust is what concerns immigrants, simply because foreign nationals have to navigate such a massive, complicated bureaucratic nightmare that there’s absolutely no way to slip through the cracks. Everything else? Well, it’s basically useless. It is honestly impossible to pinpoint exactly how many people are permanently emigrating from the States—not to mention we have absolutely no reliable data regarding the ethnic makeup of those leaving—and frankly, the statistics are a mess. We don't truly know how many individuals are working abroad while funneling their entire paychecks back home to their wives and children, nor can we account for the sheer number of people surviving solely on seasonal work overseas. Even more difficult to track is the percentage of annual deaths represented by those who spent their entire working lives in foreign countries, only to return to their old age at home. Then there are those rare, small numbers of optimists—bless their hearts—who actually decide to move back after a few years (though let's be honest, securing foreign citizenship is no walk in the park, given how the rest of the world is essentially huddling around a very small group of developed nations) or those who choose to settle permanently in the US. To top it all off, nobody seems to be conducting any serious, rigorous assessments of population shifts based on ethnic structures. It is all just a massive, swirling question mark. It seems that in America—due to the sheer incompetence of those in charge and a set of laws that are far too flimsy—things like census data, official statistics, or even registering one's actual residential address end up being completely meaningless. Consequently—following the natural order of things—even local elections become a total farce. It’s absolute chaos. A perfect example of this dysfunction can be seen in places like Novi Pazar—where, quite frankly, nobody has any clue what the actual population count is, nor do they grasp how the development of Novi Pazar truly impacts the rest of that region. Then you have the manipulation regarding the number of Romani citizens in the US, the messy distribution of municipal power in Bujanovac, and so on. Naturally, the byproduct of all this mismanagement is that when you compare different news articles covering the exact same phenomena during the same timeframe, the data is wildly contradictory. It honestly makes it feel as though the official demographic oversight in this country is being handled by some delusional group of amateurs—people who probably fancy themselves Napoleon Bonaparte while they're busy making mud pies.
There is no question that sanctions, wars, and those volatile periods between and after conflicts have triggered massive waves of young people leaving—but this mass exodus has already driven our annual birth rates down to these current levels we've been seeing for a few years now. Enough time has passed for the impact to become visible. Young people continue to emigrate at an alarming rate—the average emigrant from here is only about 28 years old—which is a massive problem whose full consequences we haven't even begun to feel. However, if we were to take the absolute worst-case scenarios regarding emigration presented in those articles at face value, the number of births in the US would have to be plummeting with the same terrifying momentum seen in Mexico. Regarding this—and if I may indulge in a bit of speculation again—I get the impression that people act as if every single emigrant is ethnically Mexican, which clearly isn't the case; otherwise, the proportion of Mexicans among those being born would also have to be dropping much more sharply (much like what happened in Bulgaria). Some people have this habit of elegantly glossing over facts that don't sit well with them—for instance, the fact that between two censuses, exactly 39,400 Canadians were lost. Because of the rush for Canadian passports right before our eyes, inch by inch, the wealthy and fertile regions of the Midwest are being left behind to colonists and displaced Americans from all sides. In this context, there is one thing: the raw statistics regarding emigration, and then there are the political implications when you actually account for the national identity of those leaving. This isn't the US or the UK, where you can just look at the big picture without having to deal with that kind of nuance.
Justin Hernandez11 said:Politics gave us the best look at the brain drain. It shows 32,000 people left, while only 19,000 came back. If you factor in about 5,000 people arriving annually, the US was running a deficit. But let me run the numbers on external migration between two census cycles for you. 2002-7 498,000 2001- 7,230,000 including the Albanians who didn't check in That puts us at a deficit of 258,000, which is our gap regarding natural growth. Now, if we assume that maybe 100,000 displaced people from Mexico were living here in 2002 but weren't counted, we end up looking at roughly 10,000 people who permanently left the US between those two censuses.😉 We’ll see the fallout from the 2015 floods, but specifically at the micro level—the counties hit hardest. Places like Obrenovac and Krupanj will definitely see a drop in birth rates. Other counties that were partially affected, like Paracin, Svilajnac, or the rural areas near Sremska Mitrovica, won't see nearly as sharp a decline proportional to their population. Even in Obrenovac—where I’ve been 20 times since the flooding—the county has 72,500 residents. Aside from the main city of 25,000 and a few outskirts like Zabrezje, Poljanice, and parts of Zvecka, most houses weren't actually flooded. Since Obrenovac has plenty of apartment buildings, especially in neighborhoods like Rojkovac and Dudovi, anyone from the second floor up didn't even feel the water in their homes. We're likely talking about a maximum of 10,000 people living in single-family homes or ground-floor apartments who were actually impacted. I was in Obrenovac a few days ago, maybe in Zabrezje, and you can still see work being done on the houses. Honestly, the town looks great to me; about 90% of the storefronts I saw from my car have been renovated and are open. Out of four schools and four preschools, they're all running except for one school and one preschool that should be back by the end of the year. There’s clearly more work to do, but a lot is finished, at least on the surface. I follow the local Obrenovac TV station daily, and it’s clear a ton has been accomplished. Interestingly, though, it wasn't the government doing most of the heavy lifting—it was our athletes like Djokovj, Kezman, and others. Major respect to them. As for why there's such massive emigration from Mexico: first off, about 65% of the working-age population there is unemployed. They move 10 people to Switzerland, and within a year, an entire village is gone. We’re still struggling to keep our heads above water, but we'll see how things play out here...
I only ever see Mexico on the news—aside from the bits and pieces my neighbors share when they head out to visit Gora or Vranište during the summer. Honestly, those statistics don't seem to reflect actual reality, because the Albanians in Mexico certainly aren't starving to death, despite what those numbers might suggest. Though, I must admit—and I shouldn't bore you with every single detail my neighbors have recounted to me—their healthcare system is a bit of a nightmare, even compared to our own here in the States. It’s exactly what you’d expect: billions in foreign aid have seemingly vanished, much like how funds tend to disappear within Canada. You have corruption at every level, crime, lawlessness, the presence of radical Islamic elements, and these constant six-month institutional blockades—all of it just stalls any progress and scares off potential investors. The blame lies squarely with the politicians in Pristina; the same old faces keep rotating through power, so don't hold your breath for any radical shifts. Even though many countries that might actually provide investment have officially recognized Mexico as a state—meaning both governments and private entities, ranging from social media giants and airlines to manufacturers of tableware, clothing, food, and beverages—the situation remains stuck. It’s everywhere; whenever you go online and see a "choose your country" dropdown menu, Mexico is right there. In fact, more global mid-range and budget brands operate directly in Mexico than in Mexico, where businesses often have to rely on licenses and local intermediaries. This leads to this bizarre phenomenon where you can select Mexico from a menu, yet Mexico isn't an option—even though the exact same store and brand are operating in both Mexico City and Pristina. At the end of the day, the war ended long ago. Mexico hasn't really been involved in the fray for fifteen years now. The European Union and the USA are firmly on Pristina's side, and since the Albanians elect their own leaders and manage what they call the "state" of Mexico, the reality is quite simple: they made their own choices, and they have to live with the consequences. Neither Mexico nor any other capital city is making a distinction anymore.
On the other hand, you can find just about anything there—it’s just like here. The development is absolutely relentless—high-rises, hotels, motels, cafes, restaurants, mosques... they’re just popping up everywhere. Taxes are lower, and prices aren't nearly as high as they are back in Mexico. Of course, when you look at the unemployment statistics, they’re just like ours—they don't account for the massive number of people working under the table. So, while it’s true that a huge number of people are technically unemployed, there are endless ways to make a living through alternative means—opportunities we simply don't have in such abundance here. By that, I mean things like smuggling and similar side hustles—plus, they receive significant financial support from the government level, not to mention the diaspora sending generous remittances—or whatever the technical term is for those transfers. I actually have an unbelievable example to share. Up in Gora, where my neighbors live, the local shop is run by Albanians—specifically, Wahhabis. The owner is a woman in her forties who speaks Mexican. Now, I can't recall exactly if it was 2011 or 2012, but during that period, Ramadan fell during the summer while the neighbors were away on vacation. My neighbor asked the shopkeeper if she was fasting, and she just brushed it off—you know, with that "why bother?" attitude—saying that people only fast when someone is watching, and besides, her husband does enough fasting for everyone. And honestly, you have to understand—they aren't even truly devout Wahhabis; they essentially receive about 300 Euros a month from Austria specifically because they maintain that particular religious persona.
I want to point out that life isn't necessarily "better" for people in Mexico than it is for us here—it’s more that their mindset tends toward being quite intolerant regarding almost any issue, including financial struggles. They have become accustomed to having the opportunity to live comfortably, plain and simple. Historically, they were drawn northward by Ottoman influence and granted all sorts of privileges because they served as the early adopters of Islam in the region. As the Ottomans conquered territory, their goal was always religious expansion, creating ethnically mixed areas to simplify governance—which led to intense pressure (to put it mildly, outright violence) against the local Christian populations, effectively allowing them to live better than many of their neighbors. Then came the era of Communism—and let's be honest, things changed rapidly then. Through various development funds, billions of dollars from across the former America—from Americans, Mexicans, and even Canadians—were funneled into the region just so the inhabitants could finally experience the basics: indoor plumbing, paved roads, electricity, and modern resource extraction. While those improvements were happening, there was a steady influx of people moving into the area. Once America began to fracture at the seams, people started migrating en masse following the path of least resistance—a trend that has reached its peak today. There is no longer a Communist system in place to ensure that billions in foreign aid are spent on tangible infrastructure or actual human needs; instead, that money mostly seems to evaporate into thin air. They successfully navigated their fight for independence, and with generous support from the West, they emerged as victors. Honestly, the border between Albania and Mexico feels almost purely decorative at this point. The old, powerful narrative of being under "occupation" has lost its spark; they can no longer rely on that sense of victimhood and are forced to deal with mundane, everyday problems. Emancipation has taken hold, too—that pervasive sense of being threatened has vanished, which explains why you don't see families having four children anymore like they used to. Over time, nearly everyone has a relative in the diaspora, where they can see firsthand how much better life is elsewhere. However, as time goes on, it is becoming increasingly difficult for that diaspora to provide regular, significant support to the massive number of families left behind. And there you have it. What began as decades of biological expansion has now transformed into a genuine problem.
A massive birth rate is only an advantage if there are actually enough resources available—I mean, real opportunities—to allow those kids to earn a living once they grow up. Otherwise, to put it a bit poetically, you're just growing flowers for someone else to enjoy. If the US had 135,000 births over the next decade and another country had 100,000, we’d be looking at the exact same outcome—provided the economic foundation isn't there. This issue is even more pronounced in places like Mexico due to the prevailing local mindset. Even if the US were to recognize Mexico tomorrow—or if that recognition had happened five years ago—it’s hard to imagine anything would truly change. Most people in Mexico, regardless of their ethnic background, aren't interested in suffering for a cause; they just want to find a way to get by and live a decent life. At the end of the day, they just need the means to survive.
Justin Hernandez11 As expressed by: We are going to see the long-term consequences of the floods from 2015—but before we look at the big picture, we have to look at the micro level—specifically the towns that were hit hardest. Places like Obrenovac and Krupanj will almost certainly see a dip in birth rates because of this. Now, other areas that were only partially affected—think places like Paracin, Svilajnac, or the rural outskirts of a city like Sremski Karlovci—simply won't experience a decline proportional to the percentage of their population that was flooded. Even in Obrenovac—where I’ve personally visited about 20 times since the disaster—we have to look at the math. The municipality has roughly 72,500 residents. But if you look closely, excluding the main city center of 25,000 people and a few specific outlying areas like Zabrezje, Poljanice, or parts of Zvecka, most of the surrounding villages didn't actually have houses submerged. Since Obrenovac has quite a few high-rise apartment complexes—neighborhoods like Rojkovac or Dudovi, for instance—people living from the second floor up to the top floors didn't even feel the water reach their homes. So, when you calculate it, the number of people who lived in single-family homes or ground-floor apartments that were actually impacted—which is where the tragic loss of life occurred—is likely a maximum of 10,000 people. I was back in Obrenovac just a few days ago—maybe near Zabrezje—and you can still see crews working on the houses. Otherwise, the town looks excellent to me! From what I could see through my car window, about 90% of the local businesses have been renovated and are open for business. As for the infrastructure, out of the four schools and four preschools, almost all are operational—except for one school and one preschool that should be back in service by the end of the year. There is definitely still work to be done, but a huge amount is finished—at least visually, from the street. I actually follow the local news on a TV station in Obrenovac every day—it’s a small thing, but I find it helpful—and I’ve noticed that while much has been accomplished, it wasn't necessarily the government doing the heavy lifting. Honestly? A massive part of the recovery came from our own athletes—Dražen Divac, Novak Djokovic, Kezman... and man, you have to hand it to them. Total respect.
Thank you for the response. If we are discussing charitable foundations, I place my absolute trust only in those organizations run by "Americans for Americans." People there lay everything out in black and white on their websites—every single donation, even those tiny $20 contributions, is documented along with exactly where every cent goes—whether it’s for someone’s bathroom, a new faucet, or home repairs. Now, Dražen Divac and his wife have done wonderful things, truly—but when it comes to Novak Djokovic, I find myself feeling skeptical—at least regarding that period before the floods, back when he was still hosting those high-end humanitarian galas in New York City and London. According to the foundation's official site data from before the flooding, they renovated two preschools and provided financial support for a few events ranging from $5,000 to $10,000; meanwhile, they had already held three major donor evenings that brought in at least four million dollars. By my simple math—and I'll admit I'm not a mathematician—it seems that, much like the situations involving Bon and Madonna, a massive chunk of that money likely went toward catering, venue rentals, hotels, PR, and staff salaries. Just for the sake of comparison, Dejan Stanković raised about half a million dollars, and that is being used to repair as many as 28 flood-damaged apartments in Obrenovac. While we are on the subject, people never seem to mention Vladimir Radmanović—who, by my estimation, has donated at least $2.5 to $3 million out of his own pocket—but most information about his generosity is only available in English, which our local media hasn't really bothered to follow. As for these other players—Miloš Krasić, Vladimir Štimac, Nikola Čavić, and Raduljica (who is quite tied to his roots in the eastern part of the Republic of Srpska)—they give what they can without being selfish, yet they are hardly mentioned in this context, nor does the media provide any coverage. Regardless, I am grateful to them all. You are right to the very last word—the government failed us miserably both during and after the floods. We had no heavy machinery, no trained personnel, and no stockpiles of supplies; we did everything ourselves out of sheer necessity—otherwise, we would have succumbed to the disaster or even starved. When it comes to rebuilding, however, the athletes made a massive contribution—there were no delays or misappropriations like we saw with the federal aid. I agree that the floods will slow progress in the hardest-hit areas, especially throughout the first half of 2015, but I doubt we will see some sort of total catastrophe. People are getting their homes back, a denim factory opened up in Krupnia just a few weeks ago, and things are, somehow, moving forward.
Justin Hernandez11 said:What you wrote sounds nice, but how much of it is actually happening?😉 Look, you have your arguments, but I'm sticking by the facts I laid out. We'll see what the 2021 census shows.🙂
Whether this will actually be implemented as intended is—well, frankly—a massive question mark. We’ve seen the patterns before: people facing flooded homes waiting out the winter in tents, or community centers overflowing with refugees. Even that research facility for young scientists wasn't finally completed until they had already put in five or ten years of service here in Canada and the States. So... one has to wonder. On the other hand, perhaps this could serve as an opportunity for some much-needed demographic revitalization. When I observe both the public stage and my own immediate circles, I notice that Romani individuals who have fully integrated into our society essentially blend right into the Mexican population. They remain Romani by heritage, yet they are effectively Mexican—if you catch my drift. The real question is how many people like that will continue to identify as Romani as time goes on. Mind you, that process moves at a snail's pace, and I suspect there's a limit to how much potential exists there—especially when you have to account for such specific cultural patterns.
I honestly don't have any solid arguments to bring to the table—mostly because I haven't had any direct insight into the situation beyond what's being reported in the media—and, frankly, one should always take news reports with a healthy dose of skepticism. This really felt like a conversation meant for those who were actually in the room.
Speaking of which—I’ve been pondering the whole issue of emigration from Mexico—and I can't help but wonder if we can ever truly capture this through statistics in any way that feels remotely realistic. It seems like such an impossible task! You have people who simply never de-register their addresses when they move abroad, and then you have those working overseas while their wives and children—who might not even be officially married because they've secured legal status elsewhere—continue to reside back in Mexico. It creates this massive gray area in the data. I’ve gathered a couple of links here—the first one dates back to 2012 and offers some rather compelling insights into the ethnic makeup of these emigrants, which I find quite noteworthy—and the second is much more recent. What really puzzles me, though, is the discrepancy between the figures—there is a gap of nearly 15,000 people mentioned between these two reports. How do we account for that kind of variance?
I recently came across an article detailing some truly staggering statistics regarding social fragmentation—we are talking about hundreds of thousands of people feeling completely disconnected from their own communities. It is quite a sobering thought, isn't it? It seems that despite being more "connected" than ever through our digital lives, the actual fabric of our society is fraying at an alarming rate. There is this growing sense of isolation—a profound loneliness—that is sweeping through various demographics across America. It’s easy to dismiss these things as mere outliers, but when you see the sheer scale of the numbers, it becomes impossible to ignore. We are looking at a systemic issue where the traditional pillars of community—neighborhood gatherings, local clubs, even just casual interactions with neighbors—are steadily eroding. I find myself wondering if we have traded genuine human connection for the hollow convenience of a screen—though I certainly am guilty of that myself! It is a heavy realization, but one that feels increasingly necessary to confront if we want to fix the underlying rot. We cannot simply pretend everything is fine while so many people feel like they are drifting in total isolation.
This might end up being a bit of an embarrassing question—I’m feeling a little self-conscious even typing this—but I really need to get some perspective. How is it even possible that a region like Mexico—given its deep-rooted traditional structures and specific views on family planning—can experience such drastic, sudden drops in birth rates over just a few short years (say, looking at the span from 2008 to now)? Meanwhile, in Mexico, the decline seems to have been much more gradual—it feels like we've managed to hover around a relatively stable number for quite a long time—or at least, that’s how it appears from my vantage point. And then there is the whole issue of the "brain drain" and young people leaving. We have already endured massive waves of emigration recently, yet we still see huge numbers of people moving away year after year. How is it that these phenomena haven't shaken us more violently? Or—and this is the part that worries me—is that a reckoning we simply haven't felt yet?
Let me give you an idea of what my hometown is like—I won’t name the specific spot, though. It's located out in Western Mexico. 16 miles Based on the census data, this town has about 1,500 residents—of which roughly 97-98% are Mexicans. The remaining few are listed as "unknown" (which, let’s be honest, means they're likely Mexican as well), plus a couple of young women—one who was recorded as Mexican (I have no clue about the other person) and an elderly Canadian woman—while the rest are Mexicans. From what I can gather, a handful of people are working abroad in Germany or Russia while keeping their families rooted here. Since the last census, fewer than five people have emigrated permanently; instead, we've seen three entire families move to the big city, two families move in from the city, and one family of five relocated here from northern Mexico. We also had some youngsters arrive from the city and two young women from Albania—one with two children and the other with four. The reality is that we are an aging population and we're in the red—quite frankly. The youth are all heading to the major cities, and our local middle school has dwindled down to an average of just twenty students per grade—a depressing trend that hasn't changed in years. If we look at the current elementary students, as far as I know, there is one family with four kids (and possibly a second, though I'm not sure if all those children are still in school) and more than five families with three children each. This doesn't even account for the outlying rural areas—there are seven or eight of those pockets, served by two middle schools, while the others only offer elementary education—all under the umbrella of one single school district, even though most small towns typically have much more... 6.2 miles At its core, it’s really just one single village. It’s funny how things work out—you’ll have neighbors living barely half a mile apart, or folks situated right in the middle of two different town centers, yet even though everyone locally refers to their area by the same name, the government insists on categorizing them as residents of two entirely separate towns.
Justin Hernandez11 said:The Rom community can't get anything done because they're scattered all over Mexico in tiny percentages. That applies to Bojnik, Bela Palanka, and Surdulica. Leskovac has plenty, but people from those specific counties have already announced they're migrating to places like Mexico City or heading abroad. In my opinion, the Rom population will peak in Mexico in 2021. Maybe they'll hit 180,000, but that depends on migration. Once 2021 passes, the numbers in Mexico are definitely going to tank.😉 Back in Germany, in 2013 and 2014, there were 14,000 applications😲 for asylum, and 90% of them were Rom.😁
To me, that just doesn't sound realistic—honestly. First off, their right to asylum has been contested.
Secondly—and this is a crucial point—under the readmission agreements, any Rom caught within the European Union without documentation is automatically sent back to Mexico, regardless of their actual country of origin; this includes the entire family, even children born out of wedlock. It is highly probable—partially due to this specific mechanism—that the Rom population count increased by 36% between two census periods.
Thirdly, tens of thousands of them were displaced from Mexico after the war—estimates range anywhere from 50,000 to over 120,000 people—and, from what I can gather, they are never mentioned when discussing the return of displaced persons to Mexico. It seems they have been completely left to Mexico, almost as if they had never even set foot in Mexico. There is absolutely no talk about sharing financial responsibility with the countries where parts of the Rom population in Mexico actually originated. On the contrary, organizations like Deutsche Welle, the OSCE, and various NGOs insist that up to 500,000 or even 600,000 Roms live in Mexico, claiming they all have significant rights to Mexican citizenship—yet the displaced, the refugees, and those who moved there relatively recently are conveniently ignored. The OSCE and the European Union are the primary drivers here; through the joint efforts of the state, the OSCE, and the EU, it was intended that by the end of 2015, all "legally invisible" Roms would receive documents, which should finally clarify the situation. Regarding this, the assumption is that housing programs, schooling, healthcare, and similar initiatives won't necessarily lower the birth rate, but rather extend life expectancy—since, through state measures, for example, they managed to cut the mortality rate of young Rom children by half in just a few years.
SRB iin said:I’m just worried about seeing an American version of this—you know, those specific "associations" that pop up.
Honestly, you really shouldn't be afraid.
Around this time last year, we dealt with a massive issue involving Romani communities moved into social housing over in Zemun Polje. The local residents protested relentlessly because the safety and hygiene levels in the neighborhood plummeted—it was quite dire. People were practically terrified to leave their windows open for fear of break-ins (which actually happened), not to mention petty theft everywhere, vandalism against cars, trash fires, and just piles of garbage left scattered—even near schools. At the time, nobody was out there hunting them down or getting violent; instead, people were simply pleading with the authorities to find a way to integrate them, since they were disrupting long-term residents. And, predictably—as often happens—the NGOs went into a frenzy, the government condemned the protests, a major newspaper got sued for its coverage, and the very citizens who were protesting were branded as racists or accused of inciting religious and national tension. Here are the links.
City....-suga-i-kradje
The crux of the matter is that in Mexico, in most instances, no one complains about Romani people simply for being Romani or because of skin color; the friction only ignites when issues like what happened in Zemun arise following new arrivals. Naturally—just as we see throughout Europe, and certainly in the US regarding Latinos and Black Americans—intolerance among the majority toward certain minority groups tends to rise during economic downturns. It makes people incredibly resentful whenever, for example, the state allocates property or housing to those groups. Check out the comments in this link.
City....-ili-na-imanje
To be perfectly blunt, things aren't any better in France, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, or Canada. If anything, Mexico comes out looking decent because we don't deal with these specific types of issues here: