Habermas: The future of human nature
in Philosophy ·
In the preface, the author traces the lineage of the central inquiry driving this entire booklet, which asks:
Is philosophy permitted to maintain a 'basis of restraint' when addressing gender ethics?
Before posing such a daring question, the text introduces the concept of this restraint in the basis of restraint, referring specifically to the refusal to adopt a post-metaphysical stance when debating what constitutes a good or flourishing life. Habermas builds his defense of this restraint by drawing a distinction between Kant's theory of justice and Kierkegaard's ethics of the individual.
However, prompted by the dilemmas raised by 'genetic engineering,' Habermas arrives at a counter-question (which is bolded and previously mentioned)
Is philosophy permitted to maintain a 'basis of restraint' when addressing gender ethics?
And there we have it. I encourage any reader who isn't feeling particularly restrained to sit with this for a moment, and if anything remains unclear, please do bring those points to light...
Is philosophy permitted to maintain a 'basis of restraint' when addressing gender ethics?
Before posing such a daring question, the text introduces the concept of this restraint in the basis of restraint, referring specifically to the refusal to adopt a post-metaphysical stance when debating what constitutes a good or flourishing life. Habermas builds his defense of this restraint by drawing a distinction between Kant's theory of justice and Kierkegaard's ethics of the individual.
However, prompted by the dilemmas raised by 'genetic engineering,' Habermas arrives at a counter-question (which is bolded and previously mentioned)
Is philosophy permitted to maintain a 'basis of restraint' when addressing gender ethics?
And there we have it. I encourage any reader who isn't feeling particularly restrained to sit with this for a moment, and if anything remains unclear, please do bring those points to light...