Posts by amberviper

Kenneth Peterson5 said:I don't know, I really don't know, Aganore1, but from what little I do know, you're being way too stubborn when you talk about what animals can and can't do.

I'll give you two more examples involving dogs—since I'm talking about my own pets here, so I'm speaking from firsthand experience.

There was this four-month-old puppy, totally trained, that I gave to a friend of mine who's a vet. At his place, the pup was eating meat, sleeping wherever he wanted, had company all day, a huge backyard, and plenty of walks.
Within a month, my friend handed the puppy right back to me because first, he started peeing everywhere he shouldn't, then he stopped listening, then he started tearing things up, and finally, he actually started biting.
Once the puppy was back home with me, he went right back to behaving perfectly.

Then there's my two dogs—both pretty old, and one has a limp. The other one, as soon as he realized the first guy's limp was acting up a bit more, starts faking a limp himself whenever the first one is nearby.
If that isn't intentional, then I have no clue what is.

Davor000;14766919 said:

There’s no trophy here. A functioning system is just one that manages to survive in today's environment...

Of course there's a win here, because nothing is more ridiculous than watching an amateur try to lecture an expert. You can't even answer my question, which is your loss, and everything else you're saying is just old news.

There’s no point arguing with you because every time I answer one thing, you immediately pivot to something else instead of sticking to the topic. You claimed computers can't be creative, then when I gave you an example where they could, you suddenly switched gears to talk about consciousness. It's pointless, so I'm out. It's impossible to have a real debate with someone who dodges concrete questions by talking nonsense.

It isn't helpful to just parrot things back without realizing how wrong you are. My point remains: computers cannot be creative, because true creation requires something entirely new. No computer is capable of bringing anything truly novel into existence since it's strictly limited by its creator, which is a human being. A machine only operates based on the code written by its specialist.
Computers alone aren't creative and they don't create anything new! Is that clear? Only humans possess the power of creation! Not some machine, and certainly not some computer!

Keith Lee2 said:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1P8Nwl7FAJk

You guys have probably seen this already, but watching these crows... I feel like there's
something more going on than just pure instinct.🤷

ironmarlin1 said:How else would I have concluded that we possess an internal, external, and semantic world? If I hadn't reached that conclusion, I wouldn't be here, but *you* are the one who arrived there, not me. You're conflating entirely different concepts. Please, explain to me: how exactly did the creative Bach break the rules of logic? You speak as if the two are mutually exclusive, which is, quite frankly, ridiculous. Or as if intuition serves as some kind of counter-argument to logic. It's just silly.
Since you seem to perceive the world through a lens that ignores logic entirely, pray tell, how do you grasp the truth value of a statement where both $p$ and $\neg p$ are asserted? Either way, you end up in a contradiction, flipping-flopping between one point and its opposite. Sadly, you really ought to make a choice. You can't claim to have five fingers on your hand while simultaneously claiming you don't, or can you? 🤷

ironmarlin1;14765764 said:

Is a guy with liver cancer healthy? No, his body isn't functioning properly.

You can't just dodge the point like that, ironmarlin1! You didn't actually answer what I asked... sure, a man with liver cancer isn't "healthy," but that doesn't mean he isn't a "functioning organism," and you're using that as your whole argument! It's clear you don't really grasp what that term implies...😁

It’s obvious you haven't kept up with AI research. Computers are perfectly capable of creative problem-solving, like through evolutionary algorithms.

I wouldn't say I'm an expert, but unfortunately, you're even further behind... My point stands, though—you simply cannot extract more information from these machines than what you've already poured into them, and that's an unshakeable fact. Have you even considered why that is?
Look, ironmarlin1, humans build these systems, which is exactly why they remain imperfect, unconscious, and devoid of emotion, even if we manage to give them the illusion of having those human qualities...
Your references are completely meaningless!

Kenneth Peterson5 said:Aganor1,
If animals just operated on pure instinct like you’re claiming, then a dog wouldn't straight-up stop eating out of grief after being separated from an owner they actually loved.

James Lee77 said:Okay, look, imagine you're an anthropologist visiting some remote tribe where you don't speak the language at all.
You watch them stash away food, and then you see them coming back for it later.
What would you honestly think?

Wouldn't you just assume, "Hey, they're saving this for later"? I mean, would you really be like, "I won't assume anything until I have hard evidence"?

James Lee77 said:A tennis player sprints toward a ball they can barely reach and catches a glimpse out of the corner of their eye that their opponent has rushed the net. The tennis player hits a lob and passes them.

Did the tennis player think, "Aha, there he is at the net, that leaves space behind him—I just need to lob it and the point is mine!" after seeing the opponent?

I don't think so. It feels more like something completely non-verbal—they saw the opponent, realized the opportunity, and acted on that opportunity.

A seagull flies over the ocean and spots a fish. It dives deep. (I would say "it dives deep to catch the fish"—but for some reasons I don't quite get, you and ironmarlin1 don't agree that it's okay to say the seagull dives with the intention of catching the fish it saw, or for the purpose of catching the fish it spotted.)

I don't see any difference between the tennis player making a split-second play and the seagull diving for prey. Sure, the difference comes in that the tennis player can reflect on the move later and look for different options—but the moment of decision itself seems the same to me: there's an insight into a possibility, and then a decision. As far as I can tell, that decision isn't verbal.

So, it seems totally fair to say a seagull has the intention to catch a fish, just like a tennis player has the intention to pass their opponent.

When we're talking about planning for the future, yeah, language clearly lets humans do way more than animals that can't talk.

But, going back to that earlier example:

When a fox buries extra food, it buries it

a) for later
b) just because
c) instinctively.

My answer is a), and I haven't seen anything in this thread yet to change my mind. From what I gather, ironmarlin1's answer is b), and yours is c), but I just don't see the distinction between human intentionality (since it's non-verbal) and animal instinct.

ironmarlin1 said:The standard interpretations of quantum mechanics work perfectly fine, and as far as anyone knows, they don't contain any contradictions—any physicist worth their salt would tell you the same thing. If you’re feeling skeptical, feel free to head over to the natural sciences subforum and try to point out a contradiction there. 🤷
So far, you haven't actually demonstrated any legal conflict within the laws of physics suggesting that a value can be both A and non-A. You've just been rambling about the scope of definitions, which is a rather obscure way to approach the problem.

Davor000;14756055 said:

Nah, I wouldn't go that far... despite what Jack naively thinks, physical structures don't necessarily need some magical "consciousness substance" inside them. It’s just like being healthy—you don't need a literal "health liquid" coursing through your veins, you just need your body to function correctly. Consciousness works the exact same way...

Could you actually break down what you mean by "certain functionality of the organism?" What does that look like in practice?

All you've done here is prove that running an algorithm isn't enough to create consciousness, but nobody ever claimed it was. For a machine to be conscious, it needs to utilize its memory intelligently for its own sake, rather than just serving a user (like a standard PC does). Intelligent memory usage implies the machine has its own needs—something your computer example lacks. Plus, it needs sensors to recognize relevant stimuli and so on. Your examples are just descriptions of basic tools. You really need to demonstrate that a Microsoft machine can't even theoretically simulate a brain, rather than just pointing out that today's computers aren't conscious...

That just proves you can't get more information out of a device than what you put into it. But a human isn't a device, or a computer, or some kind of machine! We generate that information ourselves! That's the fundamental difference. A human is a self-aware being capable of producing more from within than what was originally fed into us...🙂
Is this a paradox, or just some version of Murphy's Law?

ironmarlin1 said:No, that’s simply not how it works; contrary to what naive _Ljubo_ seems to think, not every physical structure needs to be infused with some magical substance called consciousness. It is much like health: being healthy doesn't require you to contain a specific "health substance" within you; rather, it requires a certain functional state of the organism. The exact same principle applies to consciousness.

Explaining consciousness through an algorithmic lens is inadequate, since that is precisely how computers and other types of hardware operate, and they clearly lack consciousness.

All you’ve managed to demonstrate here is that the mere existence of an algorithm isn't a sufficient condition for consciousness, but then again, nobody ever claimed it was. What a conscious machine actually requires is the intelligent application of memory for its own internal purposes, rather than for a user (which is how modern computers function). Intelligent memory usage implies that the machine must have its own inherent needs—something we can't say about your computer example. Additionally, a machine needs sensors and the ability to recognize relevant stimuli, and so on. Your examples are merely descriptions of ordinary tools. What you really ought to be attempting to prove is that a Turing machine cannot, in principle, simulate a brain, rather than pointing out that today's laptops aren't sentient.

I see no consistency in this claim whatsoever. The semantic world exists as a realm of abstraction and fantasy, not one governed by logic and rationality.
Why is that so difficult to grasp?

I have to ask you: is the judgment "Kerber = unicorn" true? Since you’ve asserted that the rules of identity don't apply in this semantic world, you can't actually claim the judgment is false. Consequently, you lose the ability to distinguish between any concepts within it at all.
And yes, a world stripped of logic and rationality isn't just difficult to comprehend—it is utterly impossible to understand. 🤷

ironmarlin1 said:The thing is, that isn't actually an example of a contradiction. ☕
The various interpretations of quantum mechanics don't contain any inherent logical contradictions themselves. Sure, if they were contradictory, we wouldn't be able to formalize them mathematically—but we can. You would have to demonstrate that within such a system, a judgment is simultaneously true (both A and not-A). And I find myself returning to the same question: without the principle of identity, how could you even begin to distinguish one concept from another, or more simply, claim that Kerber isn't a unicorn?

ironmarlin1;14756055 said:

Yeah, honestly, a world stripped of logic and rationality isn't just hard to wrap your head around... it's actually impossible to grasp.

Take a look at this classic science brain-breaker: light behaves as both a particle and a wave! I mean, how is anyone supposed to logically visualize that...

ironmarlin1;14749529 said:

When you look at an apple, it isn't true, as you suggest, that you have some internal mental image of that apple; you’re simply perceiving it. What you’re describing sounds more like a television broadcast than a model of consciousness. Brentano doesn't say anything about the subjective feeling of being conscious, just how intentionality works...

You write as if consciousness were something distinct from the essence of our soul. Consciousness isn't just a property of our physical bodies, because physics alone is just pure matter without any spirit or soul.
What does that actually mean? Well, here’s the thing: if you believe this is just a property of "physics"—meaning the neurophysiology of the central nervous system—then every single system with even a moderately developed CNS would have to possess consciousness and self-awareness. And they don't. Especially those without a CNS at all. I mean, what kind of consciousness does a bacterium have, exactly? Besides, by that logic, every physical structure should possess consciousness, much like our friend _Ljubo_ suggests in his unforgettable mantras... which isn't exactly a serious scientific stance.

If you could just explain what you meant by: "Brentano says nothing about the subjective feeling of consciousness, just how intentionality works?" Because, honestly, that sentence is semantically incomprehensible...

You talk about an itch as if it's some binary concept that either exists within the Cartesian theater—that is, within consciousness—or it doesn't. In reality, sensations like an itch or pain are dependent on various interpretations and contexts that you simply can't pull out of your theater of pure consciousness.

Trying to explain consciousness through algorithms just doesn't work, because that's exactly how computers and other machines operate, and they aren't conscious.

In that case, you have no idea what you're talking about when you bring up unicorns. If someone asks whether a unicorn is the same thing as Kerber, you can't answer them, because that ad hoc, imaginary semantic world lacks rules of identity, contradiction, or the law of excluded middle. Basically, words lose their meaning because you can't actually know what you're discussing.

I don't see any consistency in that argument at all. The semantic world exists as a realm of abstraction and fantasy, not one governed strictly by logic and rationality...
Why is that so hard to grasp?

ironmarlin1 said:To pick back up on our discussion regarding the divide between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom, here is how Marc Hauser frames it:

...Whenever nature has created systems that seem to be open-ended and generative, they've used some kind of system with a discrete set of recombinable elements. The question you can begin to ask in biology is, what kind of systems are capable of those kinds of computational processes. For example, many organisms seem to be capable of quite simple statistical computations, such as conditional probabilities that focus on local dependencies: if A, then B. Lots of animals seem capable of that. But when you step up to the next level in the computational hierarchy, one that requires recursion, you find great limitations both among animals and human infants. For example, an animal that can do if A then B, would have great difficulty doing if A to the N, then B to the N. We now begin to have a loop. If animals lack this capacity, which we believe is true, then we have identified an evolutionary constraint; humans seem to have evolved the capacity for recursion, a computation that liberated us in an incredible way.

It’s the very thing that lets us tackle complex mathematics just as easily as we handle language. This whole mechanism—taking distinct, individual pieces and shuffling them together—is essentially what provides the open-ended architecture found in genetics and chemistry. When you look at the pattern this way, you're left with a fascinating puzzle: what specific selective pressures drove the evolution of a recursive system in the first place? Why does it appear that humans are the sole organisms on this planet, the only natural system, possessing this particular capability? What were the environmental or social forces that forced this breakthrough?

...

Marc Hauser, a cognitive neuroscientist, serves as a professor within the departments of Psychology and the Program in Neurosciences at Harvard, where he also holds a fellowship in the Mind, Brain, and Behavior program. He is the author of The Evolution of Communication, The Design of Animal Communication (co-authored with M. Konishi), and Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think.

ironmarlin1;14747536 said:

"Quote:"

You’re spot on when you say we're dealing with subjective research once we start looking at things from a first-person perspective. But honestly, that's exactly my point... a subjective impression isn't nearly as reliable as people tend to think; it's just a feeling, not an objective fact. And trying to draw a direct comparison between chimpanzees and crows? It's just a non-starter, since they're two completely different species with entirely different adaptations for their own specific environments...

Maybe you’ve got a point there. But the whole idea is to put two animals in a situation where they actually have to solve something! Since that drive to find food is so incredibly primal, we just make things difficult for them—create these high-stakes scenarios where getting a meal isn't easy—and then hand them tools to work with. The animal that grasps the concept of a "tool"—and if you consider the mind itself to be a tool, I'd include that too—and applies it more effectively to the problem, is objectively showing superior resourcefulness and intelligence... and that's how it starts. Honestly, crows, ravens, and parrots are outperforming primates in these tests; the scientific data is right there, and you see it in documentaries all the time. Just go look it up on YouTube!

"Quote:"

If things were any different, it wouldn't even be red... it would be something else entirely.

I’m not entirely sure what exactly we were strictly talking about here... maybe the subjective experience of the color red? If that’s the case, then I have to ask you again—why on earth do we even have this sensation of redness in the first place? What is it, really, when it doesn't actually exist in the physical world like that...

"

No, that’s just not how it works. I don't actually go around constructing concepts while I'm conscious... if anything, I'm just throwing words around subconsciously, using concepts without ever really intending to define their specific meanings. Concepts only truly gain their meaning through the way we interact with one another in the world, rather than through some sort of deliberate, conscious planning...

Creations that aren't conscious simply don't exist! So what if you "automate" them and use them as mere reflexes or habits... that doesn't mean anything in terms of actual conscious creation. Unconscious creations just aren't a thing...

"Quote:"

No, I reject Qualia entirely because the whole concept is just absurd... Talking about things that have no cause, things we can neither describe nor actually uncover, is essentially the same as talking about things that don't exist at all. The idea that you could "see" something that isn't material—something that lacks any physical trigger in the brain yet somehow manages to spark physical reactions in people—is pure nonsense. Even though it supposedly moves matter around, neurologists know better because there simply aren't any non-material forces operating inside the brain, so it's an absurd notion where Dennett's path is clearly the right one... denying Qualia altogether.

Denying Qualia is basically the sickness of a materialist-atheist worldview. Non-physical experiences prove quite clearly that consciousness exists and isn't just some material byproduct... Telepathy does too. The spirit directs matter, not the other way around...

"Quote:"

Nah, that subjective feeling is right up there with unicorns, because it’s just as much of a subjective sensation... and we could honestly just say that such a thing doesn't exist, just like unicorns don't.

You can't just declare terms to be in the same category if they aren't actually analogous... Semantics demands precision, ironmarlin1, so I really hope you'll come up with some sharper analogies for your future arguments.
Cheers!

ironmarlin1;14745717 said:
"Quote:"

You’ve got it wrong. He isn't thinking about a physical object like a table or anything... he's thinking about an object of consciousness. In your case, that itch is the object of consciousness. Take a sentence like "Mark Twain's hand itches." That judgment doesn't necessarily prove a physical object—like a hand—actually exists; think about phantom limb syndrome where someone feels something that simply isn't there. It also doesn't guarantee that the statement "Mark will scratch himself" is true. And thirdly, if you swap out "hand" for some other synonym, "X," the truth of the judgment doesn't change: "Mark Twain's X itches." So, it satisfies all three of Chisholm's criteria for intentionality. That judgment is intentional, and according to your own logic, it won't be reducible to mere physical states...

Of course! That’s exactly what I was getting at. Brentano defines intentionality by suggesting that mental phenomena act as "objects" within our consciousness. If you're staring at an apple, you don't just see color; you hold a representation of that apple in your mind. It might be ripe, it might be rotten, you might want to grab a bite, or you might just toss it aside... In that moment, the apple exists in your consciousness as an external object rather than an internal sensation like an itch. And this is where Brentano really pushes the envelope, because that specific type of objectivity just doesn't square with a raw physical sensation like a random itch. It only works when you have that directed conscious action—that sense of "objecthood"—like when you're feeling love, or hatred, or any other targeted emotion...

"Quote:"

Swap out the verb "to believe" for things like desiring, feeling, wanting, or seeking... The idea is to aim for a criterion that’s broader than just belief, since that’s really just one specific flavor of intentionality anyway...

I’m honestly not sure what point you’re trying to make here... Both "to want" and "to believe" are inherently intentional verbs. As far as I can tell, your whole argument just boils down to some pretty shaky analogies on your part...

"

The whole point of setting such rigid criteria for intentionality is to prevent any kind of messiness... it’s about seeing if we can actually reduce intentional states down to mere physical ones...

If I’ve understood your argument correctly, you can't just reduce those types of systems or lump them in with these supposed, non-existent "physical conscious-unconscious states"... because once you strip away the subjective experience from a system, it simply isn't conscious anymore. Take a worm, for instance... it doesn't possess Qualia, so it isn't conscious. But if you were to strip away its instinctual drives too, you'd be left with nothing but dead matter—just an ordinary mass...

"Quote"

I’m not sure I follow you... are you actually suggesting that something which doesn't exist somehow does? If that's the case, then you're walking straight into a contradiction. Still, I have to admit, I tend to be a bit of a dogmatist when it comes to the law of excluded middle...

That’s exactly my point! Your "unicorn" isn't a physical thing sitting in a field somewhere, but it absolutely exists within your semantic framework—and because it lives there, it doesn't have to play by the rules of identity, contradiction, or the law of excluded middle... It belongs to the realm of abstraction and fantasy rather than being an intentional property of consciousness itself. You can't really claim it doesn't exist anymore, because if you can't even conceptualize something semantically, then it truly lacks existence. We can even wrap our heads around "Nothingness"... which is just another part of our semantic world, not the actual, physical one...

ironmarlin1;14737913 said:

Claiming we objectively can't study consciousness is a massive leap, and honestly, I haven't heard a single solid argument for it that isn't just some half-baked intuitive guess... And as for comparing the intelligence of primates to birds, I really don't see how that even works. 🤷

I mean, how exactly are you supposed to investigate the consciousness of a client? Or even your own—if you even bother to look at it—since it's exclusively accessible to you, which makes the whole thing a subjective investigation regardless of how much we try to make it objective...
As for bird intelligence, specifically parrots, crows, or ravens, we can actually test that through problem-solving tasks in new environments. You see crows in New Caledonia
crafting "tools" out of twigs or agave leaves just to pull larvae out of tree bark. In research labs, we test this by providing them with objects like wire. I once saw a raven adapt to a situation by bending a straight wire into a hook just to fish out a little dish filled with meat. Chimps just aren't as quick to pivot when things change, so they actually lag behind these birds.

Qualia could be explained in a way that makes their existence a non-issue. The only thing left to explain regarding Qualia is why people are so convinced they see what they see, even though there are endless ways to demonstrate how fallible our perception actually is.

The point with Qualia isn't really about convincing us of what we see, but rather about the actual sensation that arises from it... Why does the perception of the color red feel exactly like *that*, and not something else, or why do we have that feeling at all?

It’s questionable to say that consciousness creates concepts. A person can toss around terms like Washington, D.C. entirely unconsciously without consciousness needing to first construct the concept and the semantics. If it did, consciousness would have to create the concept of the concept itself, and so on, until nothing is left of the concept. That’s basically a version of Ryle's regress, following the philosopher G. Ryle, who wrote a great book called The Concept of Mind.

Our minds create concepts, and that action is strictly possible only within a conscious state. We can even create concepts while dreaming, but dreaming is still a form of consciousness...
In unconscious states, there is no creation whatsoever, because creation is a "creative" act, which is inherently a conscious process.

The problem remains unsolved simply because there is no problem. There's only a problem if you assume dualism, which is scientifically discredited unless you want to tell neuroscientists they're blind just because they can't detect immaterial forces in the brain.

Dennett just rejects Qualia because he doesn't see a way to solve them through science—you know, via standard physicalism.

Yeah, that’s basically what Dennett calls heterophenomenology. It’s just like how someone might empirically believe in the existence of Qualia—it's a conviction, much like believing in unicorns, without even getting into all the optical illusions and whatnot...

Just another flawed analogy here. Saying "unicorns" exist isn't the same thing as saying Qualia exist. One is just fantasy and abstraction, whereas with Qualia, you actually have the subjective experience tied to the process itself. Got it?

ironmarlin1;14737554 said:

Back in the 19th century, F. Brentano was already laying down the law by distinguishing between physical and mental phenomena. He argued that mental states possess this quality called intentionality—a concept he actually picked up from the Scholastics. It’s much like what you were saying, really; consciousness is always inherently directed toward something. If you have a desire, you have a desire *for* something. If you hold onto hope, you’re hoping *that* something specific happens... But the real kicker, the part that actually matters here, is his point that this mental orientation doesn't require the object of that focus to actually exist in the real world...

Maybe Brentano pushed his explanation a bit too far... For him, intentionality isn't really about "intent" in the way we usually think of it, but rather an inherent "aboutness"—as if every single mental state carries some kind of object within itself. That idea that every psychological phenomenon contains an object just doesn't square with reality, because you can have a sensation like a simple itch that is purely a mindless, objectless process, whereas love definitely isn't... The difference lies entirely in the feeling: an itch isn't directed toward anything, while love is fundamentally oriented toward an object. An itch is a primary, raw conscious sensation, whereas love is more complex and secondary, which is to say, it's directed... Animals don't possess this specific type of intentionality, even if they can be incredibly devoted, though that's really just instinct.

Second off, intentionality doesn't mean an intentional judgment is actually true or false. For instance, if I say, "I believe it’s going to rain tomorrow," that doesn't automatically make the proposition "It will rain tomorrow" true or false... And then there's this third criterion: saying "Mark believes he's looking at Danica" doesn't imply anything about the truth of the statement "Mark believes he's looking at Venus."

Why on earth would anyone suggest these examples illustrate intentionality? They’re clearly just cases about whether our perceptions and statements happen to be true or false...

Even though Venus and Danica are actually talking about the exact same thing, this distinction was originally laid down by Chisholm...

I just don't see the point of this line of reasoning, especially given the examples laid out above...

It’s worth pointing out that this kind of distinction doesn't just land us back in that old, sterile debate between phenomena and entities... instead, we're really looking at a divide between the language of the mental and the language used by the physical sciences...

Could you walk me through the actual distinction between those two "languages"...?

But here’s where you’re tripping up when you claim this can't be naturalized... because saying something doesn't exist isn't the same thing as suggesting it somehow does, no matter how much you try to imply otherwise. There is a massive difference between simply believing something isn't there and then letting that belief drive your behavior, versus actually asserting that something exists when it clearly doesn't...

Look, if you turn your own argument into some kind of absolute truth, then you’re just being a dogmatist yourself. I mean, the second you claimed that "it’s just saying something exists when it actually doesn't," you basically turned your statement into an unassailable dogma that's immune to any actual criticism... making it "absolute." And honestly, that's exactly the mistake you're trying to pin on me...🙂