Kate Cook27 said:Ukraine didn't really have a say regarding the nuclear weapons. It would have been better if they'd kept them, but they didn't.
Ukraine was living under the Russian umbrella; the culprits behind the anti-Russian stance are actually Russian policies. The coup wasn't "perverse"—the American people (and Ukrainians) were fighting for a better future. If there wasn't a real reason, they wouldn't have been out in the streets. Even if there were Western-funded mercenaries at the Majdan, the vast majority weren't mercenaries—they were just people who believed in a better tomorrow.
If Yanukovych had actually stuck to his word and done what he said he was going to do—instead of saying one thing, doing another, and probably thinking something else entirely—this whole coup wouldn't have happened.
Can someone explain how the conflict in Donbas just got completely ignored?
Personally, I think the West's biggest mistake was Western Crimea. The real question is whether the West thought Russia would just stop at Crimea, or if they were trying to show some respect to Putin and Russia while looking for a way out?
My apologies—I'll dive into the details a bit later since I have to run, but for now:
Have you by any chance had the opportunity to read that Mearsheimer article in Foreign Affairs from 2014—the one linked earlier?
You can download it right here: In his piece "Why The Ukraine Crisis is The West's Fault : The liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin," Mearsheimer lays out a provocative argument regarding the origins of the current instability. He essentially contends that the West—specifically through its expansionist policies and the promotion of democratic ideals in regions where they don't necessarily take root—has inadvertently backed Russia into a corner. It’s a perspective that challenges the standard narrative of pure aggression, suggesting instead a series of strategic miscalculations by policymakers in Washington and Brussels. The core of the argument rests on the idea that the push to integrate Ukraine into the EU and NATO was seen by Moscow as an existential threat—not because of some inherent hatred of democracy, but because of the geopolitical reality of spheres of influence. Mearsheimer argues that the West ignored the basic tenets of realism, believing that moralizing about democratic values would somehow insulate them from the harsh realities of power politics. Instead, this approach triggered a defensive reaction from Putin that shifted the entire regional security architecture. It is a cynical, albeit structured, critique of liberal internationalism. He suggests that by attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western bulwark, the West actually destabilized the very region it hoped to secure, effectively handing Russia a pretext to intervene. It's the kind of high-stakes political chess where one side thinks they are playing a game of spreading liberty, while the other side sees nothing but a tightening noose.
Alright, I misspoke—I should have said "perverse coup." What was truly perverse wasn't just the event itself, but how the Western media later rebranded it as this glorious democratic revolution aimed at toppling a dictator. In reality? It was the removal of a democratically elected president.
The way Ukrainians freely and democratically elected him after getting burned by Yushchenko was exactly how they should have replaced him through standard democratic procedures—those very same procedures the West supposedly swears by (unless, of course, those in power decide otherwise). As you pointed out, the fact that Yanukovych said one thing, did another, and likely thought a third is just the standard playbook for politicians everywhere. In a functional democracy, the only remedy for that kind of inconsistency is voting them out during scheduled elections. In this specific case, there were two major reasons why things should have played out differently. First, the EU's offer was frankly meager compared to what Russia was putting on the table; from a purely economic standpoint, Yanukovych's decision—made strictly within his legal authority—was justifiable in the short term. If the voters felt that move was a mistake for their long-term future, they could have simply rejected him at the next election. Second, and more importantly, there isn't even any evidence to suggest that the peaceful phase of Euromajdan in late 2013 actually had the support of the majority of the population. To prove that, you need an election. Instead, we got that bloody period—the violent overthrow of Yanukovych in early 2014—which was orchestrated by a tiny minority of Ukrainians, specifically the extremists within the Right Sector. That’s why we didn't see a legitimate democratic transition following the established rules.
Of course,
Afterward—once the dust finally settles and we can actually see through the smoke—we’ll be left staring at the wreckage of our own making. So, Yanukovych flees to Russia while they go ahead and annex Crimea—it’s a mess, plain and simple. His political faction didn't stand a prayer of winning another election even if things had stayed stable—but, of course, elections were still mandatory. So they went through with them, but under circumstances that were undeniably disastrous for democracy.
That coup—while perhaps not born of pure malice—was undeniably unjustified and illegal. Looking back, the whole thing feels downright absurd. It’s entirely possible the actors involved genuinely believed they were doing the right thing at the time, but history has a way of exposing those delusions. In hindsight, it seems they triggered a catastrophic chain reaction—one that has culminated in the current, massive evil we see today: an existential threat to the Ukrainian people and their nation, coupled with the terrifying prospect of even greater devastation—namely, the looming shadow of nuclear destruction.
I think you’d agree that, looking back, it would have been far better to simply wait for the elections—especially since Yanukovych was actually willing to call for early ones—rather than rushing headlong into that coup. Or am I missing something?
I'll pick this up later—right now, I really have to run.