Philosophy of books vs. books about philosophy

gentlerider7 said:Anyone who’s actually slogged through the philosophy of history knows that Hegel didn't exactly throw roses at India or its culture at first glance, right? But then you look at the authors behind the book "Hegelian India," and get this—he still dropped about 80,000 words on India, which is a hell of a lot for a place he kept calling dreamy, absurd, and just plain nonsensical. The two guys who wrote that book are Indian, and according to them, India was basically Hegel's greatest headache because he couldn't stop seeing his own reflections staring back at him from Indian thought.

"Even Hegel himself points out how much Indian philosophy mirrors his own stuff, like that whole concept of the absolute (brahman). Still, he made sure to draw a line in the sand regarding two main differences between his ideas and theirs: first, there was his obsession with freedom, which is how he distanced himself from the caste system in Indian society while simultaneously trying to find traces or echoes of that same system woven through the entire fabric of Indian history, politics, art, religion, and philosophy. Second, he insisted on the necessity of dialectical, progressive development, which was his way of pushing back against what he saw as the supposed stagnation and lifelessness of Indian philosophy... But did Hegel ever truly manage to shake off this intellectual twin that keeps haunting his work?"

I recall him belittling Indian philosophy too, but honestly, it fits his pattern. He was obsessed with elevating American philosophical traditions (at the expense of everyone else), believing it had some sacred duty to inherit the "flame" passed down from the Greeks.

I haven't actually tackled Hegel yet, but I'm looking forward to diving in. As for Indian philosophy, my knowledge is pretty limited to Buddhism. It’s been all over the map—from the early Buddhist dualism that leaned toward skepticism, to the idealism found in the Yogacara school, all the way to the Madhyamika (who basically just existed to tear apart everyone else's philosophical stances). Eventually, it all just kind of dissolved into those more poetic, Tantric texts.

Just wanted to resurface one of the druids' posts regarding a specific book, because I’d hate for it to get lost in the shuffle, so I'm putting it back on the shelf right at the start of this thread

The druid said:"Lady Liberty," said Wednesday. "Like so many of the gods that Americans hold dear, a foreigner. In this case, a Frenchwoman, although, in deference to American sensibilities, the French covered up her magnificent bosom on that statue they presented to New York City. Liberty," he continued, wrinkling his nose at the used condom that lay on the bottom flight of steps, toeing it to the side of the stairs with distaste-"Someone could slip on that. Break his
neck," he muttered, interrupting himself. "Like a banana peel, only with bad taste and irony thrown in." He pushed open the door, and the sunlight hit them. "Liberty," boomed Wednesday, as they walked to the car, "is a bitch who must be bedded on a mattress of corpses."
"Yeah?" said shadow.
"Quoting someone French," said Wednesday. "Quoting someone French. That's Who They have a statua to, in their New York City harbor: a bitch who liked to be fucked on the refuse from the tumbrel. Hold your torch as high as you want to, m'dear, there's still rats in your dress and cold jism dripping down your leg."

And the translation:


"Lady Liberty," said Wednesday. "Like so many of the gods that Americans hold dear, a foreigner. In this case, a Frenchwoman, although, in deference to American sensibilities, the French covered up her magnificent bosom for the sake of the statue they gave to New York City. Liberty," he continued, wrinkling his nose at the used condom lying at the bottom of the stairs and kicking it aside with disgust. "Someone could slip on that. Break their neck," he muttered, cutting himself off. "Like a banana peel, just with extra layers of bad taste and irony." He pushed the door open, and the sunlight flooded in. "Liberty," Wednesday boomed as they headed toward the car, "is a bitch who needs to be bedded on a mattress of corpses."
"Really?" said shadow.
"Quoting," said Wednesday. "Quoting someone French. That's Who They have a statua to, in their New York City harbor: a bitch who loved getting fucked on the leftovers from the guillotine. Go ahead and hold that torch as high as you want, darling; you've still got rats in your dress and cold jism dripping down your leg."

From the brilliant novel by Neil Gaiman, "American Gods."

So, I was digging through some old book the other day and stumbled upon this wild theory—I’m gonna try to recount it from memory here, so bear with me—that basically claims the whole trajectory of Western philosophy, from Aristotle all the way through the Scholastics straight into the modern era, isn't actually about what we think it is. See, the argument goes that the real common thread connecting all these eras isn't that classic Greek pursuit of "loving wisdom," but rather this obsessive, relentless hunger for categorization. It suggests that Western philosophy isn't actually a quest for truth, but just a massive, ongoing project to put everything into neat little boxes. And honestly? It kind of explains why there’s such a deep-seated hostility toward anything even remotely mystical or spiritual; a Western philosopher looks at a profound, transcendent experience and just freezes up because they can't find a damn category to file it under.

gentlerider7 said:So, I was digging through some old book the other day and stumbled upon this wild theory—I’m gonna try to recount it from memory here, so bear with me—that basically claims the whole trajectory of Western philosophy, from Aristotle all the way through the Scholastics straight into the modern era, isn't actually about what we think it is. See, the argument goes that the real common thread connecting all these eras isn't that classic Greek pursuit of "loving wisdom," but rather this obsessive, relentless hunger for categorization. It suggests that Western philosophy isn't actually a quest for truth, but just a massive, ongoing project to put everything into neat little boxes. And honestly? It kind of explains why there’s such a deep-seated hostility toward anything even remotely mystical or spiritual; a Western philosopher looks at a profound, transcendent experience and just freezes up because they can't find a damn category to file it under.

Please, as if he wouldn't have known. He basically categorized mystical experience as intuitive, or simultaneous, cognition, setting it up as the direct opposite of philosophy, which he views as discursive, or successive, cognition.

Amanda Jackson5 said:Please, as if he wouldn't have known. He basically categorized mystical experience as intuitive, or simultaneous, cognition, setting it up as the direct opposite of philosophy, which he views as discursive, or successive, cognition.

And that's where he missed the mark. Mystical experience isn't inherently intuitive or simultaneous, just like philosophy isn't strictly discursive or successive. The real question is what we even call "philosophy" anymore. Modern philosophy isn't a branch of wisdom; it's nothing. Mystical experience today is dictated by a consumer culture that packages it for sale, not by some profound encounter with an immortal spirit.

How much has "philosophy" envisioned as discursive cognition gone to hell? Just look at the constant debates about "metaphilosophy"—a term that represents the absolute peak of anthropocentric stupidity.

I’ll be the intuitive one here and argue that philosophy is a subjective feeling and a process, not some exact, esoteric science. Those who try to sell philosophy as a hard science are either lying or consciously selling snake oil just to boost their own social status.

gentlerider7 said:So, I was digging through some old book the other day and stumbled upon this wild theory—I’m gonna try to recount it from memory here, so bear with me—that basically claims the whole trajectory of Western philosophy, from Aristotle all the way through the Scholastics straight into the modern era, isn't actually about what we think it is. See, the argument goes that the real common thread connecting all these eras isn't that classic Greek pursuit of "loving wisdom," but rather this obsessive, relentless hunger for categorization. It suggests that Western philosophy isn't actually a quest for truth, but just a massive, ongoing project to put everything into neat little boxes. And honestly? It kind of explains why there’s such a deep-seated hostility toward anything even remotely mystical or spiritual; a Western philosopher looks at a profound, transcendent experience and just freezes up because they can't find a damn category to file it under.

That feels like a pretty narrow way to look at Western philosophy. It isn't really that linear or monolithic. In reality, it's defined by these huge shifts in understanding that either go beyond or break away from whatever came before.

gentlerider7 said:Anyone who’s actually slogged through the philosophy of history knows that Hegel didn't exactly throw roses at India or its culture at first glance, right? But then you look at the authors behind the book "Hegelian India," and get this—he still dropped about 80,000 words on India, which is a hell of a lot for a place he kept calling dreamy, absurd, and just plain nonsensical. The two guys who wrote that book are Indian, and according to them, India was basically Hegel's greatest headache because he couldn't stop seeing his own reflections staring back at him from Indian thought.

"Even Hegel himself points out how much Indian philosophy mirrors his own stuff, like that whole concept of the absolute (brahman). Still, he made sure to draw a line in the sand regarding two main differences between his ideas and theirs: first, there was his obsession with freedom, which is how he distanced himself from the caste system in Indian society while simultaneously trying to find traces or echoes of that same system woven through the entire fabric of Indian history, politics, art, religion, and philosophy. Second, he insisted on the necessity of dialectical, progressive development, which was his way of pushing back against what he saw as the supposed stagnation and lifelessness of Indian philosophy... But did Hegel ever truly manage to shake off this intellectual twin that keeps haunting his work?"

According to Veljačić, it was actually encountering a translation of the Bhagavad Gita just a year before he died that shifted how Hegel viewed India.

Following a personal tradition of mine, I find myself preferring to read living philosophers rather than those who have long since passed; for some reason, it just feels more engaging. 😁 Lately, in my spare time, I have been diving into this:



The link to the book is here.

I picked this up entirely at random from a bookstore. I opened it to a few pages that seemed interestingly written and thought, "Yes, I will read this." It actually took me two full days of reading before I realized this wasn't an "introduction" to philosophy—which was my original intention when purchasing it—but rather a history of philosophy. 🤣 I had truly intended to find a contemporary, or at least modern, introduction to the field. I am of the opinion that any introductory text is a product of its era, and there is a significant difference between reading authors from fifty years ago versus reading those writing today. Personally, I have little desire to pick up Russell, nor does Copleston appeal to me; both feel somewhat uninviting, though I cannot quite put my finger on why. 😁 As for A. C. Grayling, even though he is still with us, his introduction was so rambling that I felt a brief moment of regret (I shall refrain from using harsher language, unless someone is particularly curious) for having spent nearly $40 on it. Nevertheless, I have come to realize there is value in being able to recognize certain points and identify where an author might have presented incorrect information.

Nigel Warburton: "Foundations of Philosophy," Oxford University Press, 1999.

It’s been forever, but I found myself wandering aimlessly toward the philosophy section at my local library again. Ended up checking out this book by Nigel Warburton. Here's how it's laid out:

1. Introduction
2. God
3. Right and Wrong
4. Politics
5. The External World
6. Science
7. Spirit
8. Art

Each chapter breaks down different viewpoints on the topic, and the author uses various arguments to weigh in on whether they actually hold water. To top it off, he wraps up every chapter with some reading suggestions, mostly focusing on modern authors.

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

I just skimmed through about 60 pages and breezed past the analysis of the work by danak Grlić. Look, Nietzsche’s dark, pathological-poetic style is definitely original, but honestly? I find it totally unpalatable. It feels almost arbitrary, like he's exercising this extreme, unchecked intellectual freedom. The author—whether he means to or not—positions himself as some kind of moral instructor. You get these sections on how to be a warrior, how a woman should act in a marriage, and all that stuff. It ties back to his whole concept of the Übermensch—this individual who creates new values within a society that is actually causing his own slow decay. He embodies the creative spirit on an earthly level, returning everything to its true purpose: life itself.

My final takeaway from this (un)read: those were different times and different battles altogether.

My take on two books I recently finished:

Terry Eagleton, culture and the death of God

It’s an exploration of how religious elements bleed into politics, culture, and aesthetics, tracing their evolution from the Enlightenment all the way through to postmodernism. One point that really stuck with me is his argument that religion ought to serve as a tool for criticizing politics. From what I gathered, Eagleton also takes aim at the postmodern tendency to treat belief merely as a tool—a mindset that basically creates a marketplace full of "instant" religions and "instant" philosophies. He spots religious undertones in both Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche, arguing that postmodernism is essentially just a postscript to Nietzsche, once he stripped away metaphysical concepts like the Übermensch. He peppers the text with short quotes from various authors; you quickly see his view that postmodernism is basically “subjectivism without a subject,” obsessed with marginal phenomena and successful at merging art with commerce. He also tackles fundamentalism in the context of recent events and the war on terror, plus touches on nationalism and its striking resemblance to religion.

Peter F. Strawson, analysis and metaphysics although a book

Even though the subtitle claims it's an introduction to philosophy, this thing is pretty heavy. Strawson explains everything so thoroughly that the logic gets dense and demanding at times. His core argument is that by analyzing everyday language usage and conceptual structures, we can uncover underlying assumptions in logic, epistemology, and ontology. On the bright side, the goal of this program is to build a theory that acts as a sort of grammar for concepts. On the downside, there's a certain therapeutic effect when this kind of analysis forces concepts to align with the external world. The book moves through examples like freedom vs. necessity, causation and explanation, and the individual versus society. As the introduction notes, Strawson is best known for his contributions to the philosophy of language. He doesn't believe formal logic can fully capture everyday speech; rather, he argues that insights into formal logic should be sought within everyday language use, though he does show how certain sentences can be framed within formal logic. He identifies certain philosophical trends he calls internalism and externalism (even if those terms are used differently elsewhere); internalism deals with the elusiveness and indeterminacy of the external world, while externalism focuses on the elusiveness and indeterminacy of the subject.