#21 ·
ruggedraven36 said:I don't see it that way at all. It just means that real philosophical problems can't be proven—but they aren't unspeakable either. They’re baked right into human nature. They'll always be relevant, regardless of Wittgenstein's "wise" advice to just shut up about them. At the end of the day, you have to philosophize if you want to be human.
That’s early Wittgenstein we’re talking about. Later Wittgenstein isn't looking at language as some rigid system of symbols; he sees it as an activity. He’s moved past the obsession with ideal language or metalanguage and is much more interested in everyday, common speech. By doing this, he shifts away from pure logic and moves toward "language games." Sentences aren't just meaningful or meaningless to him anymore (as they were in the Tractatus); instead, he categorizes them based on narrow and broad contexts, specific speaking situations, and the sheer variety of how words are actually used (Philosophical Investigations). It’s a massive leap. Whereas he previously viewed philosophical texts as nonsensical—sentences where we failed to assign meaning because we lacked a referent or a physical object in the world to anchor them—he now argues that the meaning of a word depends entirely on its specific use within a linguistic game. Russell wasn't happy about this at all; he dismissed this interpretation as mysticism, and honestly, he had a point. Up until then, Wittgenstein had been precise, analytical, and thorough, but suddenly he’s leaving everything shrouded in fog. Still, he essentially laid the groundwork for what we call the pragmatic theory of meaning today. Language is full of synonyms, homonyms, and polysemy. How we interpret a sentence like "Mountain mountain mountain" doesn't depend on a dry definition, but on the placement, the context, and who is doing the talking...