The philosopher who claims he doesn't exist

So, I heard a while back about this philosopher who supposedly wrote a book or an article where he makes this really intense, well-reasoned argument claiming that he doesn't actually exist. Not that the world is some illusion or anything like that, but specifically that *he* isn't there. The catch is I can't for the life of me remember his name or what the piece was called. Anyone have a clue who I'm thinking of?

Seriously... are there actually still people out there who doubt the obvious fact that they don't exist?

I can't quite pin down the details, but I'm pretty sure we're talking about some 20th-century philosopher from the States. It was on some show—maybe half hour culture or the second format—where they mentioned how this guy XY actually wrote a book claiming he doesn't even exist.

It’s actually a pretty broad claim—even if they rarely say it out loud—that you see popping up among radical skeptics and positivists. Their whole deal is arguing that since they can't make genuine decisions, they aren't held morally accountable for anything, mostly because they believe everything is predetermined. When you tack on their other favorite talking point—that consciousness is just some kind of illusion—you end up at the logical conclusion that you don't even exist.

I think the philosopher you're looking for was basically just arguing that he himself didn't exist, rather than claiming everyone else was a figment of his imagination or some other thing like that.

Since there isn't one single, definitive answer to the question "who am I?", the very nature of our existence—or whether we even truly *exist* at all—hinges entirely on how one chooses to answer that query.

Take mereological nihilism, for instance—a rather extreme flavor of atomism... it essentially denies the reality of anything that can be broken down into more fundamental components. Under this view, "I" don't actually exist; there are merely the most basic subatomic particles that happen to make up my structure.

Then there is eliminativism, which suggests that things like consciousness, beliefs, and desires should be stripped away from any serious discussion of existence—viewing them as nothing more than mental constructs we use to obscure the blunt fact that everything is just purely physical processes occurring within the brain.

Or, we could look at existential monism, which posits that there is only one indivisible, absolute reality... implying that anything more granular or elementary than that single entity simply does not exist.

Jonathan Brooks8 said:Since there isn't one single, definitive answer to the question "who am I?", the very nature of our existence—or whether we even truly *exist* at all—hinges entirely on how one chooses to answer that query.

Take mereological nihilism, for instance—a rather extreme flavor of atomism... it essentially denies the reality of anything that can be broken down into more fundamental components. Under this view, "I" don't actually exist; there are merely the most basic subatomic particles that happen to make up my structure.

Then there is eliminativism, which suggests that things like consciousness, beliefs, and desires should be stripped away from any serious discussion of existence—viewing them as nothing more than mental constructs we use to obscure the blunt fact that everything is just purely physical processes occurring within the brain.

Or, we could look at existential monism, which posits that there is only one indivisible, absolute reality... implying that anything more granular or elementary than that single entity simply does not exist.

I tend to read things through a meteorological lens... 🙂

It seems clear enough that we are discussing the very nature of existence itself.
But suppose he views Existence as something indestructible and permanent—something that simply cannot vanish or fade away—and then, if he perceives his own existence as merely fleeting, he might conclude that he doesn't truly exist at all. In a practical sense, one could argue he essentially doesn't exist if, for instance, he were viewing himself from the perspective of the distant future when he will eventually be gone.

What are your thoughts?
Is it not a bit strange why he would view his own existence as nonexistent? (It’s much like how the mere arrangement of words in a sentence can expose its futility: when concepts mutually exclude one another and contradict themselves, the sentence becomes illogical, which is really the core struggle of philosophy—unless, of course, the entire discipline is just designed to condition the masses).

Sam Thomas said:I tend to read things through a meteorological lens... 🙂

It seems clear enough that we are discussing the very nature of existence itself.
But suppose he views Existence as something indestructible and permanent—something that simply cannot vanish or fade away—and then, if he perceives his own existence as merely fleeting, he might conclude that he doesn't truly exist at all. In a practical sense, one could argue he essentially doesn't exist if, for instance, he were viewing himself from the perspective of the distant future when he will eventually be gone.

What are your thoughts?
Is it not a bit strange why he would view his own existence as nonexistent? (It’s much like how the mere arrangement of words in a sentence can expose its futility: when concepts mutually exclude one another and contradict themselves, the sentence becomes illogical, which is really the core struggle of philosophy—unless, of course, the entire discipline is just designed to condition the masses).

Regarding this explanation? I suspect that if I were to say "as if I don't exist," I would, by extension, be affirming my existence. That little "as if..." phrase acts as a subtle, indirect assertion of being.

Saying "my existence is unimportant" seems to point more toward the importance of Existence—with a capital "E," as you put it. It implies a relationship, a connection of sorts...

brighteagle26 said:So, I heard a while back about this philosopher who supposedly wrote a book or an article where he makes this really intense, well-reasoned argument claiming that he doesn't actually exist. Not that the world is some illusion or anything like that, but specifically that *he* isn't there. The catch is I can't for the life of me remember his name or what the piece was called. Anyone have a clue who I'm thinking of?

Language, Truth, and Logic
Alfred Jules Ayer criticized Descartes' Cogito... though I wouldn't say he proves I don't exist, since he isn't really proving *what* I am, right? Just the things that are thinking...
The flaw lies in the fact that the argument doesn't even align with a standard skeptical approach...
Instead, he suggests that rather than saying I think, we should say there are thoughts, because perhaps thoughts can exist independently of a thinker.
The error is in the very structure of our language—the way I could be functionally identical to it, where that "it" carries no actual meaning, much like I think / it is raining.
🤷

Kenneth Sullivan2 said:Language, Truth, and Logic
Alfred Jules Ayer criticized Descartes' Cogito... though I wouldn't say he proves I don't exist, since he isn't really proving *what* I am, right? Just the things that are thinking...
The flaw lies in the fact that the argument doesn't even align with a standard skeptical approach...
Instead, he suggests that rather than saying I think, we should say there are thoughts, because perhaps thoughts can exist independently of a thinker.
The error is in the very structure of our language—the way I could be functionally identical to it, where that "it" carries no actual meaning, much like I think / it is raining.
🤷

Lacan touched on something pretty similar when he suggested, "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think," referring to that fundamental split within the subject. Basically, the unconscious is doing the thinking in the places where the ego isn't present. Or, looking at it from the other side, the "I"—that conscious, linguistic ego—exists exactly where the "it," the unconscious subject, isn't thinking.

Kenneth Sullivan2 said:Language, Truth, and Logic
Alfred Jules Ayer criticized Descartes' Cogito... though I wouldn't say he proves I don't exist, since he isn't really proving *what* I am, right? Just the things that are thinking...
The flaw lies in the fact that the argument doesn't even align with a standard skeptical approach...
Instead, he suggests that rather than saying I think, we should say there are thoughts, because perhaps thoughts can exist independently of a thinker.
The error is in the very structure of our language—the way I could be functionally identical to it, where that "it" carries no actual meaning, much like I think / it is raining.
🤷

It’s hardly surprising that Sisyphus was giving me a hard time in another thread with all those proofs regarding free will, given the state of things here.
First off, saying "I think, therefore I am" is really an observation about self-awareness—that specific awareness a human has of their own existence, unlike, say, a houseplant which exists but isn't consciously aware of its own being (at least, not in the way a human is, though I can't know for sure).
To claim that thinking doesn't prove existence—arguing, rather, that one can only think if one already exists—is just another way of looking at the same problem. It's as circular as saying that the mere existence of a creature doesn't prove its essence; those are two entirely different concepts.
Then we have Ayer essentially contradicting himself when he proposes replacing "I think" with "there are thoughts," under the assumption that thoughts might exist independently of a thinker.
Might?!!
Where is the actual PROOF in that? How does one go about proving the mere possibility of such a thing? And yet, Ayer treats this possibility as a more credible path toward proving—what, exactly?—absolutely nothing. At least not within the context of his critique of Descartes.
And the logic doesn't stop there. Even if we grant that thoughts could exist without a thinker, how does that ever answer the question of what *I* am? Because that is precisely the gap where he challenges the validity of Descartes' reasoning.

There are thoughts, therefore I exist?

Amanda Jackson5 said:Lacan touched on something pretty similar when he suggested, "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think," referring to that fundamental split within the subject. Basically, the unconscious is doing the thinking in the places where the ego isn't present. Or, looking at it from the other side, the "I"—that conscious, linguistic ego—exists exactly where the "it," the unconscious subject, isn't thinking.

From what I’ve gathered through various interpretations—rather than reading Lacan directly—for him, this represents the very locus of self-awareness. It goes so far as to suggest that self-awareness itself is marked as an external object, or perhaps the *objet petit a* (that elusive object of human desire, the phantasmatic goal we can never quite grasp).
To that extent, this "point cast out from the center"—self-awareness—serves to mark and represent the existence of distance; after all, if there were no distance (which self-awareness itself produces), how could one "think where they are not, yet be where they do not think"? If it were possible to come to a standstill, to finally reach that point and collapse the distance, we would exist precisely where we think, but aren't we always positioned as being against, towards, or in opposition to the reality and the world we perceive?
Is it possible that this distance is dissolved during sleep?

Regardless, I am not entirely sure how all of this correlates with the philosopher's claim in the opening post—the idea that he does not exist?
He wouldn't exist if he were one with the world (though one has to wonder if the world as we see it exists without the relationship established by that distance) or, more simply, if self-awareness did not exist.
And so, Descartes is everywhere: "I think, therefore I am."
I intentionally avoided saying "I think, therefore I *am*" because of that peculiar Copernican shift suggested by Lacan above.

What conclusions can we draw by weighing Descartes against Lacan?
One cannot really derive from Lacan's claim that "being" and "existing" are identical, though existence remains a necessary and unquestionable condition. The question is merely where one is, or is not. It is much like sitting in a social circle and "listening" absentmindedly to someone speaking while your mind is drifting somewhere else entirely. Then, noticing your distraction, the person asks, "Hey, where did you go just now?"

So, the argued claim by that certain philosopher mentioned earlier might, as I see it, relate to what Jonathan Brooks8 suggested: that there is no single answer to the question "who am I?" Or perhaps that the "I" is indeterminate (emerging instead as a defining element within a relation or interaction), which, if I recall correctly, traces back to Jung.

Sam Thomas said:It’s hardly surprising that Sisyphus was giving me a hard time in another thread with all those proofs regarding free will, given the state of things here.
First off, saying "I think, therefore I am" is really an observation about self-awareness—that specific awareness a human has of their own existence, unlike, say, a houseplant which exists but isn't consciously aware of its own being (at least, not in the way a human is, though I can't know for sure).
To claim that thinking doesn't prove existence—arguing, rather, that one can only think if one already exists—is just another way of looking at the same problem. It's as circular as saying that the mere existence of a creature doesn't prove its essence; those are two entirely different concepts.
Then we have Ayer essentially contradicting himself when he proposes replacing "I think" with "there are thoughts," under the assumption that thoughts might exist independently of a thinker.
Might?!!
Where is the actual PROOF in that? How does one go about proving the mere possibility of such a thing? And yet, Ayer treats this possibility as a more credible path toward proving—what, exactly?—absolutely nothing. At least not within the context of his critique of Descartes.
And the logic doesn't stop there. Even if we grant that thoughts could exist without a thinker, how does that ever answer the question of what *I* am? Because that is precisely the gap where he challenges the validity of Descartes' reasoning.

There are thoughts, therefore I exist?

Thanks for the critique of Descartes and Ayer. I'm curious, though—do you actually have a solution to the problem?
What did you mean by "how things are playing out here"? I wasn't criticizing anyone or pushing my own views... I simply offered a possible answer and the title of a work, which is what this topic is about, that's all.🙂

Sam Thomas said:From what I’ve gathered through various interpretations—rather than reading Lacan directly—for him, this represents the very locus of self-awareness. It goes so far as to suggest that self-awareness itself is marked as an external object, or perhaps the *objet petit a* (that elusive object of human desire, the phantasmatic goal we can never quite grasp).
To that extent, this "point cast out from the center"—self-awareness—serves to mark and represent the existence of distance; after all, if there were no distance (which self-awareness itself produces), how could one "think where they are not, yet be where they do not think"? If it were possible to come to a standstill, to finally reach that point and collapse the distance, we would exist precisely where we think, but aren't we always positioned as being against, towards, or in opposition to the reality and the world we perceive?
Is it possible that this distance is dissolved during sleep?

Regardless, I am not entirely sure how all of this correlates with the philosopher's claim in the opening post—the idea that he does not exist?
He wouldn't exist if he were one with the world (though one has to wonder if the world as we see it exists without the relationship established by that distance) or, more simply, if self-awareness did not exist.
And so, Descartes is everywhere: "I think, therefore I am."
I intentionally avoided saying "I think, therefore I *am*" because of that peculiar Copernican shift suggested by Lacan above.

What conclusions can we draw by weighing Descartes against Lacan?
One cannot really derive from Lacan's claim that "being" and "existing" are identical, though existence remains a necessary and unquestionable condition. The question is merely where one is, or is not. It is much like sitting in a social circle and "listening" absentmindedly to someone speaking while your mind is drifting somewhere else entirely. Then, noticing your distraction, the person asks, "Hey, where did you go just now?"

So, the argued claim by that certain philosopher mentioned earlier might, as I see it, relate to what Jonathan Brooks8 suggested: that there is no single answer to the question "who am I?" Or perhaps that the "I" is indeterminate (emerging instead as a defining element within a relation or interaction), which, if I recall correctly, traces back to Jung.

The thing is, self-consciousness isn't the objet petit a; rather, the objet petit a is what happens when the subject splits between self-consciousness and the unconscious. It emerges from that nagging sense that something is missing within the symbolic order. You can think of it simply as that persistent, underlying feeling every person carries—this sense that there’s a void in their life. The objet petit a is simultaneously that emptiness, the split, and whatever temporary fix we chase to fill that gap, even though we know deep down it can never truly be filled (desire).

Sam Thomas said:From what I’ve gathered through various interpretations—rather than reading Lacan directly—for him, this represents the very locus of self-awareness. It goes so far as to suggest that self-awareness itself is marked as an external object, or perhaps the *objet petit a* (that elusive object of human desire, the phantasmatic goal we can never quite grasp).
To that extent, this "point cast out from the center"—self-awareness—serves to mark and represent the existence of distance; after all, if there were no distance (which self-awareness itself produces), how could one "think where they are not, yet be where they do not think"? If it were possible to come to a standstill, to finally reach that point and collapse the distance, we would exist precisely where we think, but aren't we always positioned as being against, towards, or in opposition to the reality and the world we perceive?
Is it possible that this distance is dissolved during sleep?

Regardless, I am not entirely sure how all of this correlates with the philosopher's claim in the opening post—the idea that he does not exist?
He wouldn't exist if he were one with the world (though one has to wonder if the world as we see it exists without the relationship established by that distance) or, more simply, if self-awareness did not exist.
And so, Descartes is everywhere: "I think, therefore I am."
I intentionally avoided saying "I think, therefore I *am*" because of that peculiar Copernican shift suggested by Lacan above.

What conclusions can we draw by weighing Descartes against Lacan?
One cannot really derive from Lacan's claim that "being" and "existing" are identical, though existence remains a necessary and unquestionable condition. The question is merely where one is, or is not. It is much like sitting in a social circle and "listening" absentmindedly to someone speaking while your mind is drifting somewhere else entirely. Then, noticing your distraction, the person asks, "Hey, where did you go just now?"

So, the argued claim by that certain philosopher mentioned earlier might, as I see it, relate to what Jonathan Brooks8 suggested: that there is no single answer to the question "who am I?" Or perhaps that the "I" is indeterminate (emerging instead as a defining element within a relation or interaction), which, if I recall correctly, traces back to Jung.

Well, the truth is, you aren't anywhere specific. Subjectivity is a constant, moving process. According to Lacan, you can't have self-consciousness without an unconscious, nor an unconscious without self-consciousness; they basically build each other. He argues that self-consciousness isn't some byproduct of a person successfully adapting to their environment, but rather a result of "dis-adaptation." Since self-consciousness relies on the symbolic order, and since the unconscious is structured linguistically, it follows that humans are fundamentally alienated by language. That’s just the price you pay for having a self-consciousness.

Sam Thomas said:From what I’ve gathered through various interpretations—rather than reading Lacan directly—for him, this represents the very locus of self-awareness. It goes so far as to suggest that self-awareness itself is marked as an external object, or perhaps the *objet petit a* (that elusive object of human desire, the phantasmatic goal we can never quite grasp).
To that extent, this "point cast out from the center"—self-awareness—serves to mark and represent the existence of distance; after all, if there were no distance (which self-awareness itself produces), how could one "think where they are not, yet be where they do not think"? If it were possible to come to a standstill, to finally reach that point and collapse the distance, we would exist precisely where we think, but aren't we always positioned as being against, towards, or in opposition to the reality and the world we perceive?
Is it possible that this distance is dissolved during sleep?

Regardless, I am not entirely sure how all of this correlates with the philosopher's claim in the opening post—the idea that he does not exist?
He wouldn't exist if he were one with the world (though one has to wonder if the world as we see it exists without the relationship established by that distance) or, more simply, if self-awareness did not exist.
And so, Descartes is everywhere: "I think, therefore I am."
I intentionally avoided saying "I think, therefore I *am*" because of that peculiar Copernican shift suggested by Lacan above.

What conclusions can we draw by weighing Descartes against Lacan?
One cannot really derive from Lacan's claim that "being" and "existing" are identical, though existence remains a necessary and unquestionable condition. The question is merely where one is, or is not. It is much like sitting in a social circle and "listening" absentmindedly to someone speaking while your mind is drifting somewhere else entirely. Then, noticing your distraction, the person asks, "Hey, where did you go just now?"

So, the argued claim by that certain philosopher mentioned earlier might, as I see it, relate to what Jonathan Brooks8 suggested: that there is no single answer to the question "who am I?" Or perhaps that the "I" is indeterminate (emerging instead as a defining element within a relation or interaction), which, if I recall correctly, traces back to Jung.

It always shows up in relation to something else. There is no "I" without the Other, whether that's another person or a secondary "Other" within the subject themselves. Self-consciousness is essentially the awareness of oneself as an object, which means there has to be another entity present who is aware of themselves (and, by extension, aware of you).

He isn't actually American, he's German. But he does lecture at major US universities.
Thomas Metzinger: Being no One.

Kenneth Sullivan2 said:Thanks for the critique of Descartes and Ayer. I'm curious, though—do you actually have a solution to the problem?
What did you mean by "how things are playing out here"? I wasn't criticizing anyone or pushing my own views... I simply offered a possible answer and the title of a work, which is what this topic is about, that's all.🙂

That was just a little joke regarding the idea that "thinking doesn't prove existence" (is the problem of proof resurfacing again, much like the debate over free will?), which is, of course, Ayer's perspective rather than yours. Everything I wrote was in response to what you attributed to Ayer.
It seems clear to me now, however, that when Ayer looks at the Cartesian Cogito, his primary concern is the question of "who" or "what" is doing the thinking, because without that specific definition, he argues the Cogito lacks any real credibility.
It makes me wonder: what would Ayer say to the statement "I breathe, therefore I exist"? Would breathing itself fail to prove existence in his eyes, simply because it fails to define *what* I am, leaving me as nothing more than a thing that breathes?
In that sense, the Cartesian Cogito acts as an additional layer of argument; we are fundamentally distinct from mere objects precisely because we possess thought, even if everything were made of the same substance.
When he suggests that thoughts might exist independently of a thinker, one could perhaps view that through the lens of a pool of the Unconscious—perhaps what some call the Collective Unconscious—but in that context, "independent" would merely be synonymous with "unconscious."

How does this tie back to the question of "who or what am I; you?" We are certainly each a living possibility, an incarnation of potential whose lifespan is woven into all times and into the thoughts of other thinkers.
And so, we arrive at the crux of the issue with Descartes: his definition of thought as something absolutely non-extended, whereas thought inherently possesses extension (which aligns quite well with Lacan's concept of thought).

How would I solve this?
I wouldn't.
I don't see any inherent problem with the fact that I exist (myself, whatever that may be).
I am not you, and therefore, I exist (as myself). 🙂

Amanda Jackson5 said:The thing is, self-consciousness isn't the objet petit a; rather, the objet petit a is what happens when the subject splits between self-consciousness and the unconscious. It emerges from that nagging sense that something is missing within the symbolic order. You can think of it simply as that persistent, underlying feeling every person carries—this sense that there’s a void in their life. The objet petit a is simultaneously that emptiness, the split, and whatever temporary fix we chase to fill that gap, even though we know deep down it can never truly be filled (desire).

Well, the truth is, you aren't anywhere specific. Subjectivity is a constant, moving process. According to Lacan, you can't have self-consciousness without an unconscious, nor an unconscious without self-consciousness; they basically build each other. He argues that self-consciousness isn't some byproduct of a person successfully adapting to their environment, but rather a result of "dis-adaptation." Since self-consciousness relies on the symbolic order, and since the unconscious is structured linguistically, it follows that humans are fundamentally alienated by language. That’s just the price you pay for having a self-consciousness.

It always shows up in relation to something else. There is no "I" without the Other, whether that's another person or a secondary "Other" within the subject themselves. Self-consciousness is essentially the awareness of oneself as an object, which means there has to be another entity present who is aware of themselves (and, by extension, aware of you).

🙂 I follow that logic.
However, as I mentioned before, based on my memory of how he understood it at the time, I wrote it down according to my own interpretation—which might have been flawed, but I was hoping to revisit the original text for clarity. I've been hunting through my files for it, though I haven't had any luck so far, and it seems to have vanished from the internet entirely.
Generally speaking, the language used in postmodernism and post-structuralism is quite dense for me (though certainly intriguing given the subject matter), so it’s entirely possible I may have missed the mark a bit.

Sam Thomas said:That was just a little joke regarding the idea that "thinking doesn't prove existence" (is the problem of proof resurfacing again, much like the debate over free will?), which is, of course, Ayer's perspective rather than yours. Everything I wrote was in response to what you attributed to Ayer.
It seems clear to me now, however, that when Ayer looks at the Cartesian Cogito, his primary concern is the question of "who" or "what" is doing the thinking, because without that specific definition, he argues the Cogito lacks any real credibility.
It makes me wonder: what would Ayer say to the statement "I breathe, therefore I exist"? Would breathing itself fail to prove existence in his eyes, simply because it fails to define *what* I am, leaving me as nothing more than a thing that breathes?
In that sense, the Cartesian Cogito acts as an additional layer of argument; we are fundamentally distinct from mere objects precisely because we possess thought, even if everything were made of the same substance.
When he suggests that thoughts might exist independently of a thinker, one could perhaps view that through the lens of a pool of the Unconscious—perhaps what some call the Collective Unconscious—but in that context, "independent" would merely be synonymous with "unconscious."

How does this tie back to the question of "who or what am I; you?" We are certainly each a living possibility, an incarnation of potential whose lifespan is woven into all times and into the thoughts of other thinkers.
And so, we arrive at the crux of the issue with Descartes: his definition of thought as something absolutely non-extended, whereas thought inherently possesses extension (which aligns quite well with Lacan's concept of thought).

How would I solve this?
I wouldn't.
I don't see any inherent problem with the fact that I exist (myself, whatever that may be).
I am not you, and therefore, I exist (as myself). 🙂

It strikes me as a rather nonsensical sentiment. If one intends to establish existence simply by noting that they are breathing, one first has to rely on sensory perception to make that observation—which stands in stark contrast to the Cartesian formulation that avoids such sensory dependency entirely—and, as we all know, our senses are notoriously prone to deception.

feralranger said:It strikes me as a rather nonsensical sentiment. If one intends to establish existence simply by noting that they are breathing, one first has to rely on sensory perception to make that observation—which stands in stark contrast to the Cartesian formulation that avoids such sensory dependency entirely—and, as we all know, our senses are notoriously prone to deception.

But even then, there’s still a reliance on perception; you perceive the act of thinking itself. Self-awareness implies that you are experiencing yourself as an object. It is consciousness turned inward upon consciousness; otherwise, we would just call it "consciousness"—which is what dogs, cats, or birds possess—rather than "self-awareness." Every statement, including that whole "I think, therefore I am" bit, is directed toward someone else. Even when a person is just talking to themselves, they are essentially talking to an "other." Any kind of speech assumes there is a listener present, even if that listener is purely imaginary.

Amanda Jackson5 said:But even then, there’s still a reliance on perception; you perceive the act of thinking itself. Self-awareness implies that you are experiencing yourself as an object. It is consciousness turned inward upon consciousness; otherwise, we would just call it "consciousness"—which is what dogs, cats, or birds possess—rather than "self-awareness." Every statement, including that whole "I think, therefore I am" bit, is directed toward someone else. Even when a person is just talking to themselves, they are essentially talking to an "other." Any kind of speech assumes there is a listener present, even if that listener is purely imaginary.

I follow your logic, but while Descartes' axiom stands independent of sensory input, this "I breathe, therefore I am" concept relies heavily on it, which makes it utterly nonsensical...

I struggle to imagine a scenario where I could think without existing, yet, conversely, I cannot say with any absolute certainty that I even possess lungs capable of breathing.