Linda Hughes88 said:well if that's the case, why are you asking me for a quick rundown on the credit crunch? Come on, lay some real expertise on us—give us your honest, non-robotic, non-news-anchor take on what actually happened...
Look, I noticed you have this sort of... unadulterated enthusiasm for capitalism. It’s actually quite impressive how you manage to stay so serious while tossing out media buzzwords and newsroom explanations for what is basically just plain old crime—except it isn't "crime" because, at the moment it all started, there weren't any rules. If someone wants to be polite about it, or find a fancier name for the phenomenon, they might call it "creative accounting." What we're looking at here is money-moving mechanics that feel pretty similar to how Enron handled their books. And since bookkeeping in the US is fairly liberal (unlike, say, over in Europe), it's possible to pull funds off the balance sheet to save on taxes and regulatory capital. Then, those same funds get cycled back into a bank through securitization via unregulated, unchecked
mortgage companies, and then they're packaged again as derivatives. It's all the same money, just repackaged a few times. And the second the scheme snaps, you lose a few billion. Don't get me wrong, in an ideal scenario, the interest rate on senior securitization tranches can hit 25%. But as time goes on, you realize there are way too many variables that could not only eat into the interest on a CDO but sink the entire setup. Unfortunately, that's just how modern investment banking works these days—lending managers hunt for creative financial products, accountants try to figure out how to even record such complex transactions, and credit analysts just shrug their shoulders. Meanwhile, the only people making real money are the lawyers drafting the facility documentation.