#1 ·
Can every autobiographical statement—this proliferation of identity within a narrative method—be understood as a technique that owes its existence to Descartes' logical maxim? We could actually argue that rationalism begins with a confessional turn, an account of the self. In his work, Samuel Beckett portrays a man wandering through a forest, stripped of his limbs, using the persona of a police inspector as a field to re-examine thought and language itself. Beckett is essentially a Cartesian who pushes Cartesianism to its absolute limit, reducing the rigid structure of rationalism to the very impossibility of thinking. In this search for truth, which takes the form of a police investigation, we see a spirit performing an inspection of itself. But Beckett ultimately suggests, "I invent, therefore I am not," which is effectively a play on the futility of language and the disintegration of the *cogito*—the very structure of the narrator. Identity, at its core, is the structure of an obsessive. We are always chasing ourselves, and we are always slipping away.
Joyce shattered this logical structure of coherent language in Finogenov's vigil. He showed that language might be rational, yet it remains fundamentally uncommunicative—standing at the edge of an abyss where vocabulary dissolves into a spray of verbs and a private linguistic sphere. But the game stops there, because games require rules. It is similar to the central paradox found in Alice Carroll’s work: when meaning is pushed to its extreme intensity, it breaks apart, and nonsense emerges on the surface. The counter-effect, of course, is the production of meaning.
Is meaning something we cannot escape, or are we simply condemned to it? Is the gaze behind the mirror a chance in the game of individualization? Is psychosis a choice made by genius, or merely a coincidence—a fate from which virtue might be forged, if nothing else can be made from illness?
In I. Fichte's aesthetics, the following is noted: "Those who suffered from overt clinical schizophrenia included: Tasso, Newton, Hölderlin, Swedenborg, van Gogh, Gogol, and Strindberg; those with paranoia: Russians and Pascal; those with ideas that poisoned them: Mozart; hysterics: Flaubert and Molière; those who died of paralysis: Schumann, Nietzsche, Maupassant, and Baudelaire; from arteriosclerosis: Kant, Keller, and Stendhal; from Faraday: Wagner; suicides: van Gogh; and those who lived asexual lives: Kant, Spinoza, and Newton." And so on. This isn't a list intended for comfort or to establish a necessary link between mental illness and the act of creation; rather, it serves as an example of the tautological nature of the human being as a vessel for creativity. Ultimately, the fact that one weaves autobiography into the interpretation of an artwork is not an aesthetic moment worthy of admiration. But what is this nihilism within a person if not a struggle on unknown terrain, an investigation of all the limits of experience that is the duty of any thinking person?
There is another factor in the interplay between madness and genius: social context and personality, as witnessed by Lang and the anti-psychiatry movement. Or more pointedly, Konstantinovic in his Philosophy of the Barracks: "Madness is the world because the world is chaos. A genius is always a genius of madness, because a genius is the genius of a world like this chaos. Therefore, mocking a genius as a madman in the practical world of the barracks always mixes with awe—the same awe felt by tribal societies, which look at the madman as an embodiment of a non-world, or perhaps a different world entirely, one that is unreachable to their consciousness and which their experience will never know."
Or elsewhere: "In the world of the barracks, it is more important to stick to established custom than to be an individual. Anything too personal or individualistic is undesirable, primarily because it represents the promise of the world—as a pure negation of the barracks. It promises stylistic polyvalence, which, to the spirit of the barracks, is nothing more than the embodiment of cacophony, the music of hell itself."
Joyce shattered this logical structure of coherent language in Finogenov's vigil. He showed that language might be rational, yet it remains fundamentally uncommunicative—standing at the edge of an abyss where vocabulary dissolves into a spray of verbs and a private linguistic sphere. But the game stops there, because games require rules. It is similar to the central paradox found in Alice Carroll’s work: when meaning is pushed to its extreme intensity, it breaks apart, and nonsense emerges on the surface. The counter-effect, of course, is the production of meaning.
Is meaning something we cannot escape, or are we simply condemned to it? Is the gaze behind the mirror a chance in the game of individualization? Is psychosis a choice made by genius, or merely a coincidence—a fate from which virtue might be forged, if nothing else can be made from illness?
In I. Fichte's aesthetics, the following is noted: "Those who suffered from overt clinical schizophrenia included: Tasso, Newton, Hölderlin, Swedenborg, van Gogh, Gogol, and Strindberg; those with paranoia: Russians and Pascal; those with ideas that poisoned them: Mozart; hysterics: Flaubert and Molière; those who died of paralysis: Schumann, Nietzsche, Maupassant, and Baudelaire; from arteriosclerosis: Kant, Keller, and Stendhal; from Faraday: Wagner; suicides: van Gogh; and those who lived asexual lives: Kant, Spinoza, and Newton." And so on. This isn't a list intended for comfort or to establish a necessary link between mental illness and the act of creation; rather, it serves as an example of the tautological nature of the human being as a vessel for creativity. Ultimately, the fact that one weaves autobiography into the interpretation of an artwork is not an aesthetic moment worthy of admiration. But what is this nihilism within a person if not a struggle on unknown terrain, an investigation of all the limits of experience that is the duty of any thinking person?
There is another factor in the interplay between madness and genius: social context and personality, as witnessed by Lang and the anti-psychiatry movement. Or more pointedly, Konstantinovic in his Philosophy of the Barracks: "Madness is the world because the world is chaos. A genius is always a genius of madness, because a genius is the genius of a world like this chaos. Therefore, mocking a genius as a madman in the practical world of the barracks always mixes with awe—the same awe felt by tribal societies, which look at the madman as an embodiment of a non-world, or perhaps a different world entirely, one that is unreachable to their consciousness and which their experience will never know."
Or elsewhere: "In the world of the barracks, it is more important to stick to established custom than to be an individual. Anything too personal or individualistic is undesirable, primarily because it represents the promise of the world—as a pure negation of the barracks. It promises stylistic polyvalence, which, to the spirit of the barracks, is nothing more than the embodiment of cacophony, the music of hell itself."