Sanctions on Russia

Well, I suppose that’s better than the alternative. Let's just hope it sticks...

Maybe we should just slap a special surcharge on every car with EU plates—kind of like how they decided to treat us.

William Miller12 said:Not quite.
Your interpretation feels a bit like hindsight bias...
Putin didn't launch an invasion expecting a multi-month grind, nor did he care how oil prices would swing once the guns started firing.

Oil and gas prices in the years leading up to the invasion had a much larger impact—specifically from at least 2014 onwards.
During that window, the Kremlin was busy stockpiling financial reserves for this exact adventure. Sure, about half of that was frozen, which caught the Kremlin off guard, but it still stung.

But before the invasion, high oil (and gas) prices were exactly what filled the Russian treasury and paved the road to war.

Now, if things had gone the way you're describing, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of OPEC would have cut production to keep prices high. I don't think that would have stopped Putin from invading Ukraine.

As for what happens after... maybe an oil embargo would have hit sooner—instead of December 5, perhaps early September. And while Russia might have made slightly less from speculative trading, I doubt it would have been the deciding factor.
Looking at the comparative charts for Brent/WTI/Urals, the discounts on Urals were highest when speculative pressure was at its peak. When that dropped in early September, the Brent-Urals spread tightened, only to widen again after December 5.

Regardless, it wouldn't have changed the gas market situation, and the Kremlin relied far more on gas revenue than oil.

Timothy Nelson5
And yeah—anyone can reasonably argue that Saudi Arabia should look out for its own interests.
That’s true.
It's just that next time an Iranian terrorist regime attacks Saudi refineries and tankers, they shouldn't expect Uncle Sam and the West to show up to defend a feudal monarchy.

Maybe a new president (unlike this senile Biden) could tell the Saudis: [B says:
when we asked for your cooperation and help, you blew us off and cashed in. [/B]
Because of that, we had to send hundreds of billions in military aid to Ukraine, and we have no desire to keep helping you.
You made your money, so go ahead and buy our expensive, high-quality weaponry—it's already proven its worth in the war in Ukraine!

☕

Well, the Saudis buy a massive amount of weaponry. They’re actually ranked fourth globally in defense spending, yet they barely produce anything domestically compared to the top three.

The real issue with the Saudi military isn't their gear or their hardware—it's the personnel. It's the exact same story you see with Russia.

___

I don't think you quite caught my drift, because you're arguing against something I didn't even say—something most people already take for granted, I suppose.

Oil and gas prices actually had a much bigger impact in the years leading up to the invasion, specifically from 2014 onwards.
During that window, the White House was busy stacking up cash reserves for a war adventure. Sure, about half of that got frozen, which was unexpected and apparently caught the White House off guard.

Actually, the timing is a bit different than that.
High oil prices right before the Russian invasion of Georgia.
High oil prices right before the Russian annexation of Crimea.

After those events, oil prices stayed relatively low and stable, largely thanks to the expansion of American fracking.
That stability was basically nuked by a senile Biden on his very first day in the White House, just signing whatever document his handlers shoved under his nose. He even admitted himself that he 'didn't know what he was signing.'
In a way, he signed off on giving Putin a massive incentive to invade Ukraine.

But prior to the invasion, it was precisely those high oil (and gas) prices that padded the Russian budget and essentially paved the road to war.

Immediately preceding the war, yes.
Putin finally felt emboldened once his slow-motion coup against Trump in the US succeeded.
Trump was against Nord Stream 2, and he used to press NATO members to stop relying on Russian energy and finally hit that 2% defense spending target they all agreed on.
Trump pushed for fracking. If he were still around, I guess US oil production might be at least 0% higher, maybe even 50% more for natural gas, more LNG terminals would have been built, and the Keystone pipeline wouldn't have been halted.
Under those circumstances, Putin wouldn't have even dreamed of invading Ukraine. A core part of his playbook was assuming that after a 'blitz' victory and taking Kyiv, Europe—completely dependent on Russian gas—would react weakly, maybe with some cosmetic sanctions.
By clumsily killing the Keystone pipeline project, Biden gave Putin the green light he needed.
All in the name of the Green New Deal, I suppose.

Biden basically shot the American economy in the foot.
On that same day, gas prices at the American Henry Hub jumped 100% up, and that was effectively the start of the energy price surge before the war in Ukraine.

But if what you're describing were true, Russia, the Saudis, and the whole OPEC group would have cut production to keep prices high.

It seems you clearly don't grasp the point of sanctions.

I don't think anyone honestly expects Putin to just pack up and walk away from the invasion of Ukraine.

The whole motivation behind Putin’s move... I guess it really traces back to those newly discovered hydrocarbon deposits under the sea near Crimea... and also that Solovjansk-Kramatorsk area which the Ukrainians have been fighting so hard to hold onto throughout this entire conflict.

As for what might have happened next... maybe an oil embargo would have hit sooner—like, instead of December 5th, perhaps by early September. Russia might have made a bit less from speculative trading, but I doubt that would have been the deciding factor.

It likely would have started five or six months earlier.

If you look at the comparative charts for Brent, WTI, and Urals, you can see the discounts on Urals were at their peak when speculative pressure was highest. Once that dropped in early September, the Brent-Urals spread narrowed, and it only really widened again after December 5th.

.

Speculative pressure is such a subjective thing, isn't it? It doesn't just rely on supply and demand; it's more about how people perceive them.
That's probably why those firm statements from Western leaders right at the start of the embargo helped keep the speculative price swings somewhat in check.

But even then, it wouldn't have changed the gas market situation much; the outcome would be the same, and the White House was clearly banking much more on gas prices than on oil.

True enough... though I suppose that's because the Germans, led by Merkel, kept pushing for even deeper reliance on Russian pipelines instead of diversifying their supply or actually building out LNG terminals.

Well, the Saudis buy a massive amount of weapons... they're fourth in global spending, yet they practically have zero domestic military production compared to the top three.

The real issue with the Saudi military isn't the gear or the hardware, it's the personnel—it's pretty much the same struggle they face in Russia.

👍

George Robinson43 said:What absolute amateurs.
They charge foreigners a premium, then the second the cash dries up, they come crawling back to them for help. 🤮

Thomas Stewart8 said:Maybe we should just slap a special surcharge on every car with EU plates—kind of like how they decided to treat us.

I would love nothing more than to see every single Canadian driver cross the border to fill up their tanks here in the States. Given these current prices, it’s a mathematical necessity. You likely grasp the logic: when they pump fuel here, that money—which accounts for roughly 70% of those massive state subsidies—stays right here in our economy. It leaves the cash in the hands of our own government to manage, rather than letting it flow straight back to Canada to subsidize their roads. Is our administration actually going to use that windfall to help the average citizen? Probably not. But I’d much rather see those funds circulate domestically than let them pad the coffers of the Orbán administration. Honestly, that alone serves as a fitting penalty. They essentially sabotaged themselves by handing out these fuel subsidies; it was clearly just a desperate move to secure votes, with Orbán adopting the same old political playbook used by local mayors like Bandić. It seems Orbán is finally hitting the "we reap what we sow" stage of his leadership. This whole situation just confirms what I've always suspected: subsidies are rarely about helping people. They are almost always a calculated attempt to buy political leverage at the expense of the taxpayer.

Nancy Gomez26 said:I would love nothing more than to see every single Canadian driver cross the border to fill up their tanks here in the States. Given these current prices, it’s a mathematical necessity. You likely grasp the logic: when they pump fuel here, that money—which accounts for roughly 70% of those massive state subsidies—stays right here in our economy. It leaves the cash in the hands of our own government to manage, rather than letting it flow straight back to Canada to subsidize their roads. Is our administration actually going to use that windfall to help the average citizen? Probably not. But I’d much rather see those funds circulate domestically than let them pad the coffers of the Orbán administration. Honestly, that alone serves as a fitting penalty. They essentially sabotaged themselves by handing out these fuel subsidies; it was clearly just a desperate move to secure votes, with Orbán adopting the same old political playbook used by local mayors like Bandić. It seems Orbán is finally hitting the "we reap what we sow" stage of his leadership. This whole situation just confirms what I've always suspected: subsidies are rarely about helping people. They are almost always a calculated attempt to buy political leverage at the expense of the taxpayer.

I don't know if it's 100% true, but an American guy who used to be my roommate always told me that before elections, Orbán "buys off" certain voting blocs with all sorts of social perks and special privileges just to secure his victory.

Timothy Nelson5 said:I don't think you quite caught my drift, because you're arguing against something I didn't even say—something most people already take for granted, I suppose.

Oil and gas prices actually had a much bigger impact in the years leading up to the invasion, specifically from 2014 onwards.
During that window, the White House was busy stacking up cash reserves for a war adventure. Sure, about half of that got frozen, which was unexpected and apparently caught the White House off guard.

Actually, the timing is a bit different than that.
High oil prices right before the Russian invasion of Georgia.
High oil prices right before the Russian annexation of Crimea.

After those events, oil prices stayed relatively low and stable, largely thanks to the expansion of American fracking.
That stability was basically nuked by a senile Biden on his very first day in the White House, just signing whatever document his handlers shoved under his nose. He even admitted himself that he 'didn't know what he was signing.'
In a way, he signed off on giving Putin a massive incentive to invade Ukraine.

But prior to the invasion, it was precisely those high oil (and gas) prices that padded the Russian budget and essentially paved the road to war.

Immediately preceding the war, yes.
Putin finally felt emboldened once his slow-motion coup against Trump in the US succeeded.
Trump was against Nord Stream 2, and he used to press NATO members to stop relying on Russian energy and finally hit that 2% defense spending target they all agreed on.
Trump pushed for fracking. If he were still around, I guess US oil production might be at least 0% higher, maybe even 50% more for natural gas, more LNG terminals would have been built, and the Keystone pipeline wouldn't have been halted.
Under those circumstances, Putin wouldn't have even dreamed of invading Ukraine. A core part of his playbook was assuming that after a 'blitz' victory and taking Kyiv, Europe—completely dependent on Russian gas—would react weakly, maybe with some cosmetic sanctions.
By clumsily killing the Keystone pipeline project, Biden gave Putin the green light he needed.
All in the name of the Green New Deal, I suppose.

Biden basically shot the American economy in the foot.
On that same day, gas prices at the American Henry Hub jumped 100% up, and that was effectively the start of the energy price surge before the war in Ukraine.

But if what you're describing were true, Russia, the Saudis, and the whole OPEC group would have cut production to keep prices high.

It seems you clearly don't grasp the point of sanctions.

I don't think anyone honestly expects Putin to just pack up and walk away from the invasion of Ukraine.

The whole motivation behind Putin’s move... I guess it really traces back to those newly discovered hydrocarbon deposits under the sea near Crimea... and also that Solovjansk-Kramatorsk area which the Ukrainians have been fighting so hard to hold onto throughout this entire conflict.

As for what might have happened next... maybe an oil embargo would have hit sooner—like, instead of December 5th, perhaps by early September. Russia might have made a bit less from speculative trading, but I doubt that would have been the deciding factor.

It likely would have started five or six months earlier.

If you look at the comparative charts for Brent, WTI, and Urals, you can see the discounts on Urals were at their peak when speculative pressure was highest. Once that dropped in early September, the Brent-Urals spread narrowed, and it only really widened again after December 5th.

.

Speculative pressure is such a subjective thing, isn't it? It doesn't just rely on supply and demand; it's more about how people perceive them.
That's probably why those firm statements from Western leaders right at the start of the embargo helped keep the speculative price swings somewhat in check.

But even then, it wouldn't have changed the gas market situation much; the outcome would be the same, and the White House was clearly banking much more on gas prices than on oil.

True enough... though I suppose that's because the Germans, led by Merkel, kept pushing for even deeper reliance on Russian pipelines instead of diversifying their supply or actually building out LNG terminals.

Well, the Saudis buy a massive amount of weapons... they're fourth in global spending, yet they practically have zero domestic military production compared to the top three.

The real issue with the Saudi military isn't the gear or the hardware, it's the personnel—it's pretty much the same struggle they face in Russia.

👍

I am largely in agreement with the points made here.

It would have started 5-6 months earlier.

.

Speculative pressure is a subjective variable; it doesn't depend directly on supply and demand, but rather on the perception of them.
Therefore, decisive statements from Western heads of state at the very onset of an embargo would have largely curbed speculative price volatility.

Precisely... but that is because the Germans, led by Merkel, stubbornly pushed for even greater dependence on Russian pipelines instead of diversifying their supply and building LNG terminals.

I disagree with this. Taking all other factors into account—LNG is several times more expensive than piped gas. That is a matter of pure technology, unrelated to politics. If Germany had diversified its supply earlier (meaning, if they had built LNG terminals "ahead of time"), it would have been a waste of money for them back then. Those terminals would have sat idle because nobody would buy much more expensive LNG while having access to much cheaper Russian gas through a pipeline. Someone would have either gone bankrupt from investing in an unused terminal, or the loss would have had to be covered by other funds. No matter how you look at it, at that moment, such an investment was a loss. Politically speaking (especially in Germany), anyone who attempted such an investment would have seen their political career end instantly, as it would have been viewed as squandering taxpayer money. Private investors feel the same way; they don't want to enter a business that guarantees losses. It was the same issue with the project on Krk. It’s all well and good to have a diversified supply, but someone has to foot the bill.
Germany claimed they were 'diversifying' their energy supply—by building Nord Stream. In reality, there was no diversification at all; they simply stuck with the exact same supplier while bypassing the transit countries. There wasn't even an issue with transit itself, it just carried a cost. This was the fundamental error. By allowing Russia to dictate terms this way—effectively sidelining other transit nations that are also consumers—they handed Moscow a massive lever. It allowed them to manipulate relations between EU states by playing with gas prices. It was hybrid warfare in its purest form. You could have neutralized this relatively easily with a single regulatory fix: having the EU negotiate gas purchases collectively. It’s logical; buying in bulk yields better pricing, a specialty of EU bureaucrats. But we never reached that stage. Perhaps those LNG suppliers played a part too, as they certainly wouldn't benefit from such a shift.
Naturally, German policy was predicated on Russian gas. Who wouldn't want the cheapest possible fuel for such a massive industrial powerhouse? If you look at the Russian economy stripped of its oil and gas revenues, things look grim. Rationally speaking, Russia should be the last party interested in jeopardizing this relationship, because it is far easier for others to find new suppliers than it is for Russia to find new buyers. But Germany failed to realize that the people sitting in the Kremlin aren't exactly driven by rational thought. Now, every option is back on the table, including the possibility of LNG becoming significantly cheaper than piped gas. That is why we see these LNG terminals being built now, rather than before.
I suspect Russian gas will eventually flow back into Europe. However, they will have to bake in all the losses caused by their own foolish policies. Those costs will be amortized over the next 10, 20, or 30 years before supply resumes. Ultimately, the true losers will be the citizens of the Russian Federation. But then again, we get the governments we deserve; they must pay the price for the decisions made in the Kremlin. They are already paying it, with their military suffering losses in Ukraine, but once the conflict ends, they will spend years dealing with the fallout of these hybrid tactics. As the saying goes, you reap what you sow.

It wasn't just about avoiding diversification; the real goal was pushing Nord Stream 2 so that all that Russian gas would flow straight into Europe through Germany, ensuring Germany alone reaps every cent from transit fees.
A tiny bit of supply from Russia could have easily moved through the Turkish pipeline, and that would have been plenty.
The Germans were essentially trying to hold the entire EU hostage while playing ball with the Russians. That was their master plan.

George Robinson43 said:It wasn't just about avoiding diversification; the real goal was pushing Nord Stream 2 so that all that Russian gas would flow straight into Europe through Germany, ensuring Germany alone reaps every cent from transit fees.
A tiny bit of supply from Russia could have easily moved through the Turkish pipeline, and that would have been plenty.
The Germans were essentially trying to hold the entire EU hostage while playing ball with the Russians. That was their master plan.

That simply wasn't their plan, because if it actually were, they would have pulled it off.
Their actual strategy was much more straightforward: secure dirt-cheap gas for themselves and then flip the surplus to everyone else—exactly what they’ve been doing for decades.

But that era has officially come to an end.

Best regards,

George Robinson43 said:It wasn't just about avoiding diversification; the real goal was pushing Nord Stream 2 so that all that Russian gas would flow straight into Europe through Germany, ensuring Germany alone reaps every cent from transit fees.
A tiny bit of supply from Russia could have easily moved through the Turkish pipeline, and that would have been plenty.
The Germans were essentially trying to hold the entire EU hostage while playing ball with the Russians. That was their master plan.

I'd throw Angela Merkel's East German roots into that equation too.

I don't know if they were just trying to mess with everyone else in Europe, but from a strategic standpoint, being totally dependent on just one supplier is honestly insane. Things like ExxonMobil terminals and similar setups acting as "backups" are strategic moves—they don't necessarily have to make sense financially, but they just have to be there. It’s basically the same logic you'd apply to anything else that's vital for national security.

Melissa Rivera5 said:I don't know if they were just trying to mess with everyone else in Europe, but from a strategic standpoint, being totally dependent on just one supplier is honestly insane. Things like ExxonMobil terminals and similar setups acting as "backups" are strategic moves—they don't necessarily have to make sense financially, but they just have to be there. It’s basically the same logic you'd apply to anything else that's vital for national security.

Strategically speaking, putting all your eggs in one basket is reckless, especially when dealing with natural gas—a critical fuel for so many industries. Then again, who is going to foot the bill for the price gap created by an alternative ExxonMobil terminal? Without the steady flow from existing pipelines, that extra capacity would essentially sit there gathering dust. Furthermore, having just one terminal to satisfy Germany's massive demand is practically the same as having none at all. For our scale of consumption, however, that single terminal provides a perfectly viable alternative.
In my view, Germany would have been much better off securing pipeline alternatives from one or more suppliers in North Africa.

Nancy Gomez26 said:Strategically speaking, putting all your eggs in one basket is reckless, especially when dealing with natural gas—a critical fuel for so many industries. Then again, who is going to foot the bill for the price gap created by an alternative ExxonMobil terminal? Without the steady flow from existing pipelines, that extra capacity would essentially sit there gathering dust. Furthermore, having just one terminal to satisfy Germany's massive demand is practically the same as having none at all. For our scale of consumption, however, that single terminal provides a perfectly viable alternative.
In my view, Germany would have been much better off securing pipeline alternatives from one or more suppliers in North Africa.

And while Russian gas was dirt cheap, we went ahead and built an LNG terminal, only for the Canadians to lock down about 30% of that capacity on long-term deals. Why bother doing that when they had easy access to Russian gas?

Nancy Gomez26 said:Strategically speaking, putting all your eggs in one basket is reckless, especially when dealing with natural gas—a critical fuel for so many industries. Then again, who is going to foot the bill for the price gap created by an alternative ExxonMobil terminal? Without the steady flow from existing pipelines, that extra capacity would essentially sit there gathering dust. Furthermore, having just one terminal to satisfy Germany's massive demand is practically the same as having none at all. For our scale of consumption, however, that single terminal provides a perfectly viable alternative.
In my view, Germany would have been much better off securing pipeline alternatives from one or more suppliers in North Africa.

Yeah, exactly—it would just sit idle instead of being forced into use. I guess that's kind of the whole point of having strategic alternatives and reserves, right? You don't really ask who's paying for the extra cost of food or fuel reserves, because that's just not what they're there for.

Nancy Gomez26 said:Strategically speaking, putting all your eggs in one basket is reckless, especially when dealing with natural gas—a critical fuel for so many industries. Then again, who is going to foot the bill for the price gap created by an alternative ExxonMobil terminal? Without the steady flow from existing pipelines, that extra capacity would essentially sit there gathering dust. Furthermore, having just one terminal to satisfy Germany's massive demand is practically the same as having none at all. For our scale of consumption, however, that single terminal provides a perfectly viable alternative.
In my view, Germany would have been much better off securing pipeline alternatives from one or more suppliers in North Africa.

I mean, that's definitely an option too.

Just a little thought on processors—stuff even the Russians can't actually manufacture, despite how much they claim they designed them themselves.

electricsurfer47 said:Just a little thought on processors—stuff even the Russians can't actually manufacture, despite how much they claim they designed them themselves.

Good grief—calling it a "foundry." 🤦
(English: foundry)

Anyway, the original article was likely an auto-translation, so it's fine.

That 5 GFLOPS limit mentioned (which is a pretty dated metric by now) as the maximum allowed into Russia is roughly equivalent to a Pentium 4 from 2004.

And that 16nm process they had Intel produce for their CPUs? Intel has been running that since 2013.
For context, the Intel Broadwell i5 and i7 series from 2015 used the 14nm process, so it's in that same generation. Or look at the chip in the iPhone 6 S; same era.

Theoretically, China should be able to handle a 16nm process. Word is they've reached a limited 7nm capability (though mostly just for RAM chips)—they’re basically where Intel was back in 2017.

But there's a catch. Manufacturing a process for an outside client isn't the same thing as working with your own internal design team. It makes you wonder if China has actually reached that level of sophistication for these advanced processes, or if they simply don't want to take the risk on Russians because they have plenty of their own work to do. 🤔

___

Nancy Gomez26 said:Strategically speaking, putting all your eggs in one basket is reckless, especially when dealing with natural gas—a critical fuel for so many industries. Then again, who is going to foot the bill for the price gap created by an alternative ExxonMobil terminal? Without the steady flow from existing pipelines, that extra capacity would essentially sit there gathering dust. Furthermore, having just one terminal to satisfy Germany's massive demand is practically the same as having none at all. For our scale of consumption, however, that single terminal provides a perfectly viable alternative.
In my view, Germany would have been much better off securing pipeline alternatives from one or more suppliers in North Africa.

That is spot on, and honestly, it applies to pretty much any energy source you can think of.

If you ask me, Germany would have been much better off securing an alternative supply route through pipelines from one or more producers in North Africa.

That option doesn't really help with the current crisis, though, because by the time a potential pipeline to a single country is actually built, the war might already be over.

Not to mention that you'd essentially be handing all the leverage to that one North African nation, whereas with floating ExxonMobil terminals, you don't have to worry about that kind of exclusivity.

Looking at the maps we've seen, I actually think Schloz came up with the most optimal solution. You can see that reflected in the TTF gas prices—and yeah, I know, I know, the warm weather plays a part in that too.

Nathan Thomas12 said:And while Russian gas was dirt cheap, we went ahead and built an LNG terminal, only for the Canadians to lock down about 30% of that capacity on long-term deals. Why bother doing that when they had easy access to Russian gas?

Even for us, Russian gas wasn't quite as inexpensive as it was for Germany. That said, LNG remained the more costly option. It’s common knowledge that the financing for these terminals was essentially forced upon certain players—including Qatari producers who might have acted as suppliers—but they passed because the math didn't work out back then. Perhaps the financiers saw a price spike coming, or maybe the terminal itself was intended as a lever to maintain control over pipeline pricing. It is well-documented that Chevron used tiered pricing to manipulate different customers. They used those various rate structures as a hybrid tool to exert influence over neighboring countries. When you look at the landscape through that lens, building an LNG terminal ceases to look like such an expensive fantasy.

Melissa Rivera5 said:Yeah, exactly—it would just sit idle instead of being forced into use. I guess that's kind of the whole point of having strategic alternatives and reserves, right? You don't really ask who's paying for the extra cost of food or fuel reserves, because that's just not what they're there for.

I mean, that's definitely an option too.

The issue isn't that an ExxonMobil terminal might sit unused. The issue is the cost of maintaining an idle asset. In Washington, political opponents would weaponize that inefficiency, turning a single project into a career-ending scandal. That kind of move wouldn't fly in German politics. Furthermore, private investors won't pour capital into a void where there is no profit. Besides, the terminal itself is just one piece of the puzzle; the real challenge is securing the actual supply. They need massive volumes that aren't easily sourced without moving market prices. To guarantee security, they’d have to lease production capacity years in advance—somewhere else—just to cover their own backs. Meanwhile, they had cheaper gas available from Chevron. For them, sticking with the status quo was a no-brainer, regardless of how this all ended up.
I suspect their actual goal is to wait for a crisis to unfold. Once the crisis hits, they can shift the paradigm and frame this entire pivot as common sense. Now, suddenly, everyone understands why it was necessary.

The current state of affairs remains predictably grim. It is much like watching a slow-motion train wreck where everyone involved seems convinced they can jump clear at the last second. They won't. Experience suggests otherwise. Nancy Gomez26 says:
This holds true regardless of the energy source in question.

This particular option is irrelevant to the current crisis. By the time that potential pipeline to a single nation is actually constructed, the war might already be over.

It’s not even worth discussing how that one South African nation holds us by the throat, especially when you consider the lack of exclusivity surrounding those floating LNG terminals.

Taking the provided data into account, I believe Schloz has arrived at the most logical solution. One only needs to look at the TTF gas prices to see the validity of that conclusion—though, granted, I am well aware that the warmer weather is also playing its part.

I didn't think the priority should have been building a pipeline right now. Instead of doubling down on Nord Stream 2, the focus ought to have been on establishing routes toward a different supplier entirely. That would have actually achieved true supply diversification.

Nancy Gomez26 said:Even for us, Russian gas wasn't quite as inexpensive as it was for Germany. That said, LNG remained the more costly option. It’s common knowledge that the financing for these terminals was essentially forced upon certain players—including Qatari producers who might have acted as suppliers—but they passed because the math didn't work out back then. Perhaps the financiers saw a price spike coming, or maybe the terminal itself was intended as a lever to maintain control over pipeline pricing. It is well-documented that Chevron used tiered pricing to manipulate different customers. They used those various rate structures as a hybrid tool to exert influence over neighboring countries. When you look at the landscape through that lens, building an LNG terminal ceases to look like such an expensive fantasy.

Our leaders weren't exactly clairvoyant.
The US pushed for that LNG terminal to be built, which makes it more of a political move than some stroke of economic genius from our politicians—because, let's be real, the economics never actually made sense.