Posts by Nancy Gomez26

Melissa Rivera5 said:Yeah, exactly—it would just sit idle instead of being forced into use. I guess that's kind of the whole point of having strategic alternatives and reserves, right? You don't really ask who's paying for the extra cost of food or fuel reserves, because that's just not what they're there for.

I mean, that's definitely an option too.

The issue isn't that an ExxonMobil terminal might sit unused. The issue is the cost of maintaining an idle asset. In Washington, political opponents would weaponize that inefficiency, turning a single project into a career-ending scandal. That kind of move wouldn't fly in German politics. Furthermore, private investors won't pour capital into a void where there is no profit. Besides, the terminal itself is just one piece of the puzzle; the real challenge is securing the actual supply. They need massive volumes that aren't easily sourced without moving market prices. To guarantee security, they’d have to lease production capacity years in advance—somewhere else—just to cover their own backs. Meanwhile, they had cheaper gas available from Chevron. For them, sticking with the status quo was a no-brainer, regardless of how this all ended up.
I suspect their actual goal is to wait for a crisis to unfold. Once the crisis hits, they can shift the paradigm and frame this entire pivot as common sense. Now, suddenly, everyone understands why it was necessary.

Nathan Thomas12 said:And while Russian gas was dirt cheap, we went ahead and built an LNG terminal, only for the Canadians to lock down about 30% of that capacity on long-term deals. Why bother doing that when they had easy access to Russian gas?

Even for us, Russian gas wasn't quite as inexpensive as it was for Germany. That said, LNG remained the more costly option. It’s common knowledge that the financing for these terminals was essentially forced upon certain players—including Qatari producers who might have acted as suppliers—but they passed because the math didn't work out back then. Perhaps the financiers saw a price spike coming, or maybe the terminal itself was intended as a lever to maintain control over pipeline pricing. It is well-documented that Chevron used tiered pricing to manipulate different customers. They used those various rate structures as a hybrid tool to exert influence over neighboring countries. When you look at the landscape through that lens, building an LNG terminal ceases to look like such an expensive fantasy.

Melissa Rivera5 said:I don't know if they were just trying to mess with everyone else in Europe, but from a strategic standpoint, being totally dependent on just one supplier is honestly insane. Things like ExxonMobil terminals and similar setups acting as "backups" are strategic moves—they don't necessarily have to make sense financially, but they just have to be there. It’s basically the same logic you'd apply to anything else that's vital for national security.

Strategically speaking, putting all your eggs in one basket is reckless, especially when dealing with natural gas—a critical fuel for so many industries. Then again, who is going to foot the bill for the price gap created by an alternative ExxonMobil terminal? Without the steady flow from existing pipelines, that extra capacity would essentially sit there gathering dust. Furthermore, having just one terminal to satisfy Germany's massive demand is practically the same as having none at all. For our scale of consumption, however, that single terminal provides a perfectly viable alternative.
In my view, Germany would have been much better off securing pipeline alternatives from one or more suppliers in North Africa.

Timothy Nelson5 said:I don't think you quite caught my drift, because you're arguing against something I didn't even say—something most people already take for granted, I suppose.

Oil and gas prices actually had a much bigger impact in the years leading up to the invasion, specifically from 2014 onwards.
During that window, the White House was busy stacking up cash reserves for a war adventure. Sure, about half of that got frozen, which was unexpected and apparently caught the White House off guard.

Actually, the timing is a bit different than that.
High oil prices right before the Russian invasion of Georgia.
High oil prices right before the Russian annexation of Crimea.

After those events, oil prices stayed relatively low and stable, largely thanks to the expansion of American fracking.
That stability was basically nuked by a senile Biden on his very first day in the White House, just signing whatever document his handlers shoved under his nose. He even admitted himself that he 'didn't know what he was signing.'
In a way, he signed off on giving Putin a massive incentive to invade Ukraine.

But prior to the invasion, it was precisely those high oil (and gas) prices that padded the Russian budget and essentially paved the road to war.

Immediately preceding the war, yes.
Putin finally felt emboldened once his slow-motion coup against Trump in the US succeeded.
Trump was against Nord Stream 2, and he used to press NATO members to stop relying on Russian energy and finally hit that 2% defense spending target they all agreed on.
Trump pushed for fracking. If he were still around, I guess US oil production might be at least 0% higher, maybe even 50% more for natural gas, more LNG terminals would have been built, and the Keystone pipeline wouldn't have been halted.
Under those circumstances, Putin wouldn't have even dreamed of invading Ukraine. A core part of his playbook was assuming that after a 'blitz' victory and taking Kyiv, Europe—completely dependent on Russian gas—would react weakly, maybe with some cosmetic sanctions.
By clumsily killing the Keystone pipeline project, Biden gave Putin the green light he needed.
All in the name of the Green New Deal, I suppose.

Biden basically shot the American economy in the foot.
On that same day, gas prices at the American Henry Hub jumped 100% up, and that was effectively the start of the energy price surge before the war in Ukraine.

But if what you're describing were true, Russia, the Saudis, and the whole OPEC group would have cut production to keep prices high.

It seems you clearly don't grasp the point of sanctions.

I don't think anyone honestly expects Putin to just pack up and walk away from the invasion of Ukraine.

The whole motivation behind Putin’s move... I guess it really traces back to those newly discovered hydrocarbon deposits under the sea near Crimea... and also that Solovjansk-Kramatorsk area which the Ukrainians have been fighting so hard to hold onto throughout this entire conflict.

As for what might have happened next... maybe an oil embargo would have hit sooner—like, instead of December 5th, perhaps by early September. Russia might have made a bit less from speculative trading, but I doubt that would have been the deciding factor.

It likely would have started five or six months earlier.

If you look at the comparative charts for Brent, WTI, and Urals, you can see the discounts on Urals were at their peak when speculative pressure was highest. Once that dropped in early September, the Brent-Urals spread narrowed, and it only really widened again after December 5th.

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Speculative pressure is such a subjective thing, isn't it? It doesn't just rely on supply and demand; it's more about how people perceive them.
That's probably why those firm statements from Western leaders right at the start of the embargo helped keep the speculative price swings somewhat in check.

But even then, it wouldn't have changed the gas market situation much; the outcome would be the same, and the White House was clearly banking much more on gas prices than on oil.

True enough... though I suppose that's because the Germans, led by Merkel, kept pushing for even deeper reliance on Russian pipelines instead of diversifying their supply or actually building out LNG terminals.

Well, the Saudis buy a massive amount of weapons... they're fourth in global spending, yet they practically have zero domestic military production compared to the top three.

The real issue with the Saudi military isn't the gear or the hardware, it's the personnel—it's pretty much the same struggle they face in Russia.

👍

I am largely in agreement with the points made here.

It would have started 5-6 months earlier.

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Speculative pressure is a subjective variable; it doesn't depend directly on supply and demand, but rather on the perception of them.
Therefore, decisive statements from Western heads of state at the very onset of an embargo would have largely curbed speculative price volatility.

Precisely... but that is because the Germans, led by Merkel, stubbornly pushed for even greater dependence on Russian pipelines instead of diversifying their supply and building LNG terminals.

I disagree with this. Taking all other factors into account—LNG is several times more expensive than piped gas. That is a matter of pure technology, unrelated to politics. If Germany had diversified its supply earlier (meaning, if they had built LNG terminals "ahead of time"), it would have been a waste of money for them back then. Those terminals would have sat idle because nobody would buy much more expensive LNG while having access to much cheaper Russian gas through a pipeline. Someone would have either gone bankrupt from investing in an unused terminal, or the loss would have had to be covered by other funds. No matter how you look at it, at that moment, such an investment was a loss. Politically speaking (especially in Germany), anyone who attempted such an investment would have seen their political career end instantly, as it would have been viewed as squandering taxpayer money. Private investors feel the same way; they don't want to enter a business that guarantees losses. It was the same issue with the project on Krk. It’s all well and good to have a diversified supply, but someone has to foot the bill.
Germany claimed they were 'diversifying' their energy supply—by building Nord Stream. In reality, there was no diversification at all; they simply stuck with the exact same supplier while bypassing the transit countries. There wasn't even an issue with transit itself, it just carried a cost. This was the fundamental error. By allowing Russia to dictate terms this way—effectively sidelining other transit nations that are also consumers—they handed Moscow a massive lever. It allowed them to manipulate relations between EU states by playing with gas prices. It was hybrid warfare in its purest form. You could have neutralized this relatively easily with a single regulatory fix: having the EU negotiate gas purchases collectively. It’s logical; buying in bulk yields better pricing, a specialty of EU bureaucrats. But we never reached that stage. Perhaps those LNG suppliers played a part too, as they certainly wouldn't benefit from such a shift.
Naturally, German policy was predicated on Russian gas. Who wouldn't want the cheapest possible fuel for such a massive industrial powerhouse? If you look at the Russian economy stripped of its oil and gas revenues, things look grim. Rationally speaking, Russia should be the last party interested in jeopardizing this relationship, because it is far easier for others to find new suppliers than it is for Russia to find new buyers. But Germany failed to realize that the people sitting in the Kremlin aren't exactly driven by rational thought. Now, every option is back on the table, including the possibility of LNG becoming significantly cheaper than piped gas. That is why we see these LNG terminals being built now, rather than before.
I suspect Russian gas will eventually flow back into Europe. However, they will have to bake in all the losses caused by their own foolish policies. Those costs will be amortized over the next 10, 20, or 30 years before supply resumes. Ultimately, the true losers will be the citizens of the Russian Federation. But then again, we get the governments we deserve; they must pay the price for the decisions made in the Kremlin. They are already paying it, with their military suffering losses in Ukraine, but once the conflict ends, they will spend years dealing with the fallout of these hybrid tactics. As the saying goes, you reap what you sow.

George Robinson43 said:What absolute amateurs.
They charge foreigners a premium, then the second the cash dries up, they come crawling back to them for help. 🤮

Thomas Stewart8 said:Maybe we should just slap a special surcharge on every car with EU plates—kind of like how they decided to treat us.

I would love nothing more than to see every single Canadian driver cross the border to fill up their tanks here in the States. Given these current prices, it’s a mathematical necessity. You likely grasp the logic: when they pump fuel here, that money—which accounts for roughly 70% of those massive state subsidies—stays right here in our economy. It leaves the cash in the hands of our own government to manage, rather than letting it flow straight back to Canada to subsidize their roads. Is our administration actually going to use that windfall to help the average citizen? Probably not. But I’d much rather see those funds circulate domestically than let them pad the coffers of the Orbán administration. Honestly, that alone serves as a fitting penalty. They essentially sabotaged themselves by handing out these fuel subsidies; it was clearly just a desperate move to secure votes, with Orbán adopting the same old political playbook used by local mayors like Bandić. It seems Orbán is finally hitting the "we reap what we sow" stage of his leadership. This whole situation just confirms what I've always suspected: subsidies are rarely about helping people. They are almost always a calculated attempt to buy political leverage at the expense of the taxpayer.

Timothy Nelson5 As stated by wearytrucker22:
The cold reality remains: the Saudi people have calculated their next move with clinical precision. They’ve refused to ramp up production, opting instead to signal that they will do everything in their power to crush this price volatility.
The data from Statista tells a story we’ve seen before. Oil prices are dropping, and it isn't just some random market fluctuation; it's the result of shifting tectonic plates in global energy politics. We look at the numbers and see a downward trend, but the reality is far more complex than a simple line graph. Consider the current landscape. Between the massive production shifts coming out of the US and the volatile decisions made by OPEC, the supply side is becoming increasingly unpredictable. It’s like watching a game of chess where the players keep changing the rules mid-move. You have the heavy hitters in Saudi Arabia trying to maintain price floors while domestic US shale production acts as a massive, unrelenting pressure valve. Then there is the geopolitical weight. The ongoing tensions involving Russia and its influence on global energy flows create a constant state of anxiety. Even as we talk about transitioning toward a Green New Deal, the world remains tethered to the barrel. The volatility isn't just about supply and demand; it's about how much leverage certain nations can exert over the global economy. When you factor in the instability in the Middle East and the way China’s industrial appetite fluctuates, you realize that "stability" is a polite fiction we tell ourselves to sleep at night. The numbers suggest a cooling period, but history teaches us that in this industry, calm is often just the eye of the storm.

Looking at this graph, the pattern is unmistakable. They were looking out for nothing but their own bottom line. It’s clear they intentionally throttled production to manufacture market instability, essentially clearing the path for speculators to drive prices through the roof.

If they had just announced a commitment to ramping up production and stabilizing prices, this whole chaotic mess wouldn't have happened in the first place.

The reasoning behind this is simple: the USA ramped up production.
The latest projections for the US economy are out, and they paint a picture that’s hard to ignore if you're paying attention. We’re looking at the numbers for upcoming economic expectations, and frankly, the outlook feels like watching a slow-motion collision. It’s predictable, yet unsettling. One can't help but draw parallels to how markets react when the foundation starts to shift. Much like an old engine struggling to maintain RPMs under a heavy load, the indicators suggest we are fighting against significant headwinds. There’s a certain level of friction between current policy directions and the reality on the ground—a gap that keeps widening. If you look at the trajectory, it isn't just about one single metric; it's the cumulative weight of inflation, interest rate uncertainty, and the general volatility in global energy markets. It feels less like a smooth flight and more like navigating a storm through thick fog. You know something is off, but the instruments are giving you conflicting readings. We have seen this pattern before. When the expectations deviate this sharply from the historical norm, the correction is rarely gentle. It’s a measured, deliberate slide toward a new reality, whether the powers that be in Washington are ready to admit it or not. Expect more turbulence ahead..

And everyone else? They did everything they possibly could.
It’s simply too low to allow this to continue. To all those EU politicians and Putin-like mercenaries out there: quit pointing fingers at the USA and start looking toward Saudi Arabia instead.

Senile Biden is the primary architect behind this entire disastrous mess, including the war in Ukraine. It comes down to him and those clueless green extremists—their obsession with the Green New Deal, their veto of the Keystone pipeline, and their crusade against fracking on federal lands.
Had we kept a protectionist like Donald Trump in office, US fracking production would have surged to somewhere around 16 or 17 million barrels per day—at least according to the projections. Under those circumstances, Vladimir Putin wouldn't have had the nerve to gamble on a war.

And what exactly would be the downside to that?

The chaotic surge in energy prices during the first half of the year essentially handed Russia a massive subsidy to fund their war in Ukraine.
If the world actually practiced any sense of solidarity—if those with the capacity to ramp up production had simply stepped up to stabilize the market—we wouldn't be dealing with these runaway prices right now. Imposing sanctions on Russia and slapping price caps on their oil and gas supplies would be an even more aggressive move.
Russia would have run out of war funds long ago.If things had gone differently, we might actually be sitting at a negotiating table discussing a permanent peace right about now.
A reduction of 100,000 lives.

And let’s be honest—anyone could make a perfectly valid case that Saudi Arabia is simply looking out for its own interests.
That is exactly right.
Then let them sit in silence. When that Iranian terrorist regime eventually strikes at Saudi refineries or tankers, they shouldn't be looking to Uncle Sam or the West to come running to the rescue of a feudal monarchy.

Maybe some future president—someone other than this senile Biden—will finally have the guts to tell the folks in Saudi Arabia... When we actually reached out to you for cooperation and asked for your assistance, you blew us off just to line your own pockets.
We were forced to funnel hundreds of billions in military aid toward Ukraine, and frankly, we have neither the capacity nor the desire to continue supporting you.
So you've managed to stack up some cash? Fine. Go ahead and buy our high-end weaponry for yourselves. It’s premium gear, battle-tested and proven on the front lines in Ukraine.

☕

As long as Saudi Arabia continues to price their oil exclusively in US Dollars, they’ll remain best friends with the USA. Once they pivot away from that mechanism—or even just start questioning its necessity in public—we are going to see absolute chaos. And let's be honest: the USA serves as their primary security guarantee against Iran, an offer nobody else is willing to put on the table. You could argue Turkey might act as a weak regional substitute, but without heavy backing from Uncle Sam, they're far too limited to matter. Ultimately, everything still hinges back to the USA.
Regarding Saudi Arabia—there is a power shift currently underway. We are witnessing a genuine generational handover within the kingdom's leadership. As the primary figurehead representing this new era, Mohammed bin Salman isn't part of the old guard that maintains those cozy, predictable ties with the USA. He has already demonstrated a knack for making moves that catch everyone off guard. Given his relative youth, he will likely hold onto power for a long time and exert it aggressively, provided he officially ascends to the throne—which, in all likelihood, he will. Interesting times lie ahead.

Nathan Thomas12 said:Hmm. So how does that logic account for Japan and South Korea? Or even China?

Try attempting to purchase a non-Japanese vehicle in Japan, and you will quickly grasp the reality of domestic market protectionism. On the other hand, look at the European Union; they still maintain those specific tariffs on Japanese imports—wasn't it around 5% on all vehicles arriving from Japan? Even the Japanese struggled to move units in the USA until they began establishing local assembly plants; only then did they qualify as "domestic products." That is their version of a "free" and "open" market: everything is permitted, provided it doesn't dismantle the local manufacturer. Ultimately, massive swaths of domestic production simply migrated to China because the cost differential was too steep to resist.
The situation with the Chinese person is a different matter entirely, given that the entire system operates under the rule of a single political party—which is essentially a euphemism for slavery. Anything falling outside their ideological framework is either imprisoned or forced into exile. Those who remain are compelled to follow the party line, receiving subsistence wages for maximum labor. No matter how brutal that appears by modern standards, it is still considered progress compared to their circumstances fifty years ago.

Sam Alvarez4 said:So many contradictions in your comment... it's just impossible to follow.

If it was unreadable, how did you manage to read it in the first place?

Nathan Thomas12 said:Right from the jump, I’ve been saying this: no developed nation ever truly made it without the West and the dollar—not even China.
Let's be real—no country is ever going to actually make it without the West and the dollar backing them up.
Those Kremlin suck-ups were all over us—full of hot air—insisting that Russia was totally self-sufficient and that the West had basically shot itself in both feet.
Of course Europe didn't freeze over.

That argument is only half-right. Historically, colonial powers built their wealth by exploiting colonies, not by relying on the West or the USD. They secured initial capital through extraction, then shuttered their domestic markets to protect themselves from cheaper foreign goods—though global trade wasn't nearly as interconnected or competitive back then. Once they outpaced everyone else, they opened their borders and demanded the same from developing nations, allowing them to continue looting resources via exports while ensuring their partners could never truly compete economically. It is virtually impossible to build an industrial base when your market is wide open to cheap imports from already established powers.

anamoonaj As stated by wearytrucker22:
What if this war drags on indefinitely?🤔
I suspect that regardless of how long this conflict drags on, Russia has effectively burned its bridges. They’ve squandered whatever credibility they had left, making it nearly impossible to believe—or even expect—that things will ever simply revert to the status quo once the dust settles.

Propane.

Gas prices will eventually catch up with us—and when they do, the cost won't just be reflected at the pump; we'll have to factor in the massive price of rebuilding broken trust. At the end of the day, it all boils down to the bottom line. Russia will be paying for this war for decades to come, though perhaps through more indirect channels than most realize. Ultimately, someone's individual paranoia and greed is going to exact a heavy toll.

Carl Lee27 said:I’m not sure if anyone has brought this up yet, but the United States Senate just passed an amendment that would actually allow Ukraine to seize and repurpose those frozen assets belonging to sanctioned Russian individuals and entities—you know, mostly all those oligarchs. And get this, they did it unanimously! Next on their hit list? Those massive central bank reserves from Russia that have been sitting there under lock and key.
https://twitter.com/apmassaro3/statu...90046930046976

I haven't quite dug up the exact total for how much money is currently tied up in those oligarch accounts across the West, but my gut tells me we're looking at hundreds of billions of dollars. Of course, there might be some holdouts—places like Switzerland might not be totally on board with handing over that kind of cash to Ukraine—but honestly, I’d bet anything that Ukraine is going to see the lion's share of it coming in over the next few years.
When you factor in those hundreds of billions from the oligarchs on top of the $300 billion held in the Russian central bank reserves, things get really wild. If they manage to pull all of that off and redirect it toward Ukraine, we could be talking about them receiving somewhere in the ballpark of $400 to $500 billion in the coming years.

It strikes me as odd that they targeted private property first, leaving state assets for later. Logically, one would assume they’d freeze everything immediately—which they have—and then go straight for the state funds, given that the Russian state is the entity responsible for initiating this war. Private money can be seized, certainly, but it triggers endless litigation as these individuals argue they have no connection to the state. Perhaps there is a different logic at play here: using these oligarchs to squeeze Putin, while keeping the state funds untouched for now acts as a lure to get him to back down before the hammer finally falls.
Regardless of the motive, China is undoubtedly watching these developments regarding the Russian foreign exchange reserves with intense interest.

dustyowl29 said:Because there’s zero profit to be made from that.

When you sell exclusively to your own people at home, you run out of hard currency. And hard currency matters; it's what builds luxury yachts and buys high-end cars—the kind of things an average American citizen can rarely afford. Foreign reserves create a convenient illusion of national prosperity. But that's a dangerous game. It breeds a heavy reliance on the global market, leaving you vulnerable the moment your policy decisions stop making sense.

Let’s be realistic. There are plenty of other things that should be prioritized for Americans before we even think about subsidizing natural gas. Judging by how the US military is performing over in Ukraine, they have a massive amount of groundwork to cover before energy comfort becomes an issue. Besides, increased comfort brings a certain level of complacency, which leads people to actually question the purpose of their existence. In an environment where living standards are higher, more people might start asking why they have this kind of government—or why these "special military operations" exist in the first place. Honestly, it’s probably better if the vast majority continues to live in absolute poverty. If life were actually decent, how many would still be lining up to volunteer for these "special operations"? As it stands, those who did sign up are just clinging to the hope that they'll finally get to own some high-end tech they can currently only stare at through a store window.

Regarding egg prices—it comes down to feed. Chickens eat corn and soy, both of which have surged by nearly 100% over the last few years. Grain costs began their climb long before the conflict in Ukraine, though the war certainly acted as an accelerant later on. What strikes me as odd is how egg prices remained stagnant on grocery shelves for so long. It suggests producers were likely tethered to outdated contracts with big-box retailers—who, predictably, enjoyed the margins while the farmers took the hit. Now, we’re all just feeling the delayed impact of those squeeze tactics.

electricsurfer47 said:Honestly, I don't think Aleksandar Vučić is actually planning anything with those Rafale jets. It felt like nothing more than media hype just to make them look important, especially since I'm personally eyeing some Rafale models for myself. When the time actually comes, as long as Vučić is still calling the shots, they’ll probably just go with Russian aircraft because he's way too cozy with Moscow.
If you recall, he even said Kherson would be the next Stalingrad, which basically means he views the Russians as the victims and the Ukrainians as the aggressors.

By the time Trump makes a decision, any offer for Russian planes will have evaporated, so that's a dead end. Whether they pick Raffelson or something else entirely isn't about strategy; it’s just about whoever requires political pandering at that specific moment. RF will be "out and over" for the RS. A weakened Russia holds zero political value for Mexico.

Scott Cruz4 said:Ursula von der Leyen: We are working on the ninth round of sanctions against Moscow.
https://www.nytimes.com/world/news/sanctions-update-link

... we are preparing the fifty-sixth round of sanctions against Moscow...
...we are getting ready for the one hundred and thirty-third round of sanctions against Moscow...🤦
...
Honestly, how pathetic are we? It’s embarrassing—we just can't seem to hit Moscow with the kind of decisive sanctions they actually deserve, right when they deserve them.

The objective isn't to hammer them with everything at once on the first attempt. It's about a gradual tightening. You always have to leave room to squeeze a little harder next time. Sanctions are a messy business; much of their impact doesn't register immediately. It looks like nothing is happening, but then, much later, the blow lands with full force. That’s why you tighten the screws slowly, with advance notice—giving those targeted a moment to reconsider their actions and perhaps back down from further escalation (thereby avoiding the sanctions altogether). The goal of threatening sanctions is to deter specific political behavior. Ideally, the threat alone suffices to correct the course, without the measures ever actually being implemented.

Donna Harris11 said:Not everyone has the budget for a Black Hawk or an F-35.
Honestly, if they actually had the cash, most of them would probably just grab a Mi-8 or some kind of Sukhoi, but they aren't allowed to. Just look at what happened with Huawei

In geopolitics, I guess market laws and basic economic logic just don't really matter.

And what good is a Sukhoi—which is likely a solid aircraft—when a government acts so recklessly that they isolate themselves? Once you're cut off, you can't source parts, and without maintenance, those advanced jets become expensive paperweights. It doesn't matter how capable or cheap they are; without a supply chain, they expire almost immediately. Even Mexico—traditionally a verbal ally of Russia—isn't looking at Sukhoi anymore; they're eyeing the Rafale. They understand which way the wind is blowing. You can have great design and all the technical advantages in the world, but if politics nullifies them, the advantage is gone. When you factor that in, the Sukhoi is obsolete before the tender even opens.

Everyone who actually wants to leave—and possesses the means, the connections, or the fluency to make it happen—is heading out. It isn't just a matter of "talent" leaving; it’s anyone with an exit strategy. These people are certainly skilled at one thing: finding the door. Their other talents? That's a different story entirely.
My view is that national progress hinges on creating a stable, predictable environment, which is fundamentally a task for policymakers. If you can convince people that their surroundings are secure, stable, and conducive to both labor and commerce, you don't just entice those who left to come back; you attract a whole new wave of innovators and thinkers.

brightheron64 said:Well, whenever I see the price of flour at the grocery store, my mind immediately jumps to how much everything is shifting... 😉

Though, maybe I'm just overthinking things...

The price of flour sitting on a supermarket shelf isn't really dictated by the total acreage of farmland in America; it’s driven by global wheat prices. If you believe that increasing domestic acreage will boost global supply enough to force worldwide prices down—well, then maybe you'll see an impact on that flour price.
The days of cheap corn and wheat are likely gone for good. It’s a cycle. When corn hits $2.50 a bushel (with wheat climbing even higher), you’ll find oil sitting at $100 a barrel and Uriah hovering around $2500/ton, and so on. You get the point; it’s all interconnected. The only issue is that for me, as a producer, it’s mostly a wash—but for someone living on a fixed salary, nothing is the same as it used to be.

Noah Martin2 said:Didn't they just sign some sort of deal with Mexicans recently?

Even if they did sign something, what’s the actual worth of it? It's all just a waiting game to see who manages to screw over whom first.