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Posts by placidranger

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Laptop recommendations? in IT Support ·
Gary Wells52 said:hey, I'm new here and just have one question—does anyone know why my laptop won't install Adobe Flash Player? I download the file, double-click it to start the installation, and... nothing. Just dead silence.
thanks

Which version of Windows are you running?
Are you using Chrome, Firefox, or IE?
Power supply cable issues in IT Support ·
Laptop or desktop? Are you positive it's the cable? Maybe try swapping it out for another one first.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:The thing is, you're operating from your specific perspective while simultaneously tapping into a universal one. It’s all part of that single concept where the universal and the particular meet. They aren't separate; the essence of the individual is woven into the essence of the universal. It works both ways—objective meaning is contained within subjective meaning, and vice versa. When I argue that logic describes reality, I’m not suggesting that reality itself requires someone to perceive logical connections; rather, I mean that reality is fundamentally composed of those logical relations (which we then happen to perceive). A possible reality doesn't need to include the act of perceiving logic, but it absolutely must contain logical structures.

Actually, that's exactly my point. If sensory experiences weren't grounded in logic, math and logic wouldn't be nearly as successful at explaining them as they are.

In that case, we probably ought to ditch terms like 'subjective' and 'objective' altogether. They only exist in relation to one another; they define each other through their opposition. If I'm following your train of thought, you're suggesting that logic isn't about a priori truths—like math, moving from axioms to theorems to reach valid conclusions—but is instead an empirical study of what likely leads from premises to conclusions. I have to disagree there. That brand of logical psychologism you're leaning on treats logic as a theory of how the human mind functions, which is essentially just subjective relativism in disguise. Of course, no serious logician actually buys into that (and while I realize that's not a formal rebuttal, it's certainly telling). What you're describing is a 'model,' which aligns more with what > calls the "semantic conception of truth," or what we've called "possible worlds" since the 60s (a term borrowed from >). Logic, however, is a meta-theory—it's the underlying structure of any possible theory, and by extension, the structure of reality itself.

Not quite, though. That’s a pretty messy and naive way to look at it. For starters, I’m not even sure what you mean by "concept" here. Usually, a concept implies a "model," whereas I tend to use it to mean a "notion"—that intersection where the universal, the particular, and the individual meet. It maintains its identity through change—since you decided to bring time into the equation—it shifts, yet remains itself. But it seems you’re using it to describe the thing that organizes stimuli to make understanding possible, which is actually just logical categories—essentially a meta-theory describing potential (or necessary) relationships in the broadest sense. It’s what Husserl called the "field" or the "manifold," a term later adopted by logicians.

Well, at least you managed to squeeze that one out between your teeth, even if you were clearly reluctant to do so.😁

Defining a concept as a mere union between the universal and the particular? That’s a lazy definition—nothing more. Concepts aren't some fixed, cosmic architecture. They are subjective constructs—fragile things stitched together from context through the messy process of communication.
Let’s not beat around the bush—perspectives aren't universal. They can't be. Unless we're talking about some hypothetical super-intelligence or a higher power, there is no such thing as a "universal" point of view. Everything is filtered through the individual.

Quincy:
That’s exactly my point. It follows logically—if we're being honest—that mathematics and logic would fall completely short if they tried to argue that sensory experiences lack a logical foundation.
Something like that.
Quincy:
Then we have to ditch terms like "subjective" and "objective." They’re useless here—they only exist in relation to one another, through opposition. In other words, they essentially define each other into existence. If I’m following your train of thought correctly—and I usually am—you’re suggesting that logic doesn't deal with a priori truths like mathematics does. You're arguing it isn't about moving from axioms to theorems to reach certain conclusions. Instead, you see it as an empirical study of what likely leads from premises to conclusions based on probability. A bit messy, really—but that seems to be where you're landing. I can't say I agree. The logical psychologism you’re leaning on suggests that logic is merely a theory regarding how the human mind functions—which, at its core, is just subjective relativism. Of course, no serious logician actually buys into that concept—I realize that isn't an argument per se, but it is symptomatic of the problem. The model is something else entirely. We’re talking about what Tarski zvati calls the "semantic conception of truth," or what has been referred to since the 1960s as "possible worlds"—a term borrowed from Leibniz. Logic is a meta-theory; it is the underlying structure of any possible theory, and by extension, reality itself.
I have no idea where you're getting that from.

Logic—much like mathematics—is built upon certain systematic observations, regularities, and patterns. It isn't even up for debate that these rules exist independently of our sensory perceptions—they exist "out there," regardless of whether we happen to be looking at them.
Quincy:
Fine, you finally spit it out—even if it felt like pulling teeth. 😁
If you buy into direct realism—the idea that everything we project onto the world actually exists out there in the wild—then you have to accept that logic exists there, too. But let’s be honest: it’s blindingly obvious that this entire sensory and conceptual landscape is just something we construct inside our own heads. That might be one of the primary functions of consciousness—manufacturing the illusion that there is an "I" occupying a "space," and subsequently convincing ourselves that there’s some inherent logic or mathematics waiting outside for us to find.

Or just a pile...
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:I’m not entirely sure how you managed to stumble onto that particular conclusion, but I suppose it doesn't really matter. What exactly is so confusing about the idea that logic serves as the underlying blueprint for any conceivable reality? If you strip away all the unnecessary noise and isolate the essential core of any possible scenario, you're always going to find logic sitting right there at the bottom of it all. That isn't to say that every single description of reality actually has to be logical, though. You can certainly have descriptions of reality that are completely nonsensical—think of the chaotic internal monologue of someone experiencing a psychotic break, the surrealist landscapes in a modern art gallery, or even certain fringe theories in science. Honestly, those illogical depictions are usually much more entertaining than the strictly logical ones. After all, humor pretty much thrives on that exact moment when a person catches onto something being fundamentally illogical.

Look, which part are we even talking about here? Logical relations aren't just matters of perception; they are necessary relations. You perceive sensory stimuli, sure, but what you’re arguing sounds like pure psychologism to me. There was once a psychological interpretation of mathematics floating around, but that got ground into dust long ago, and no serious thinker touches it anymore. You might perceive five apples or ten pebbles, but the numbers five or ten are universal—they don't care what kind of stuff you're counting. Even if you fail to perceive those five apples, they’re still sitting there. We could go down the rabbit hole and claim "five" is just some byproduct of our brains that doesn't exist "out there," but honestly, that just doesn't hold water for me. Everyone counts exactly five of something. It’s not like one person counts five, another counts six, and a third person counts nothing at all. If that were the case, reality would be a total mess. The relationships between these basic universals remain identical whether you're looking at nature or the mind or consciousness—call it whatever you want. That’s because we’re dealing with form, while the apples and stones are just content. You can't have content without form. Logic is simply the most fundamental, universal form there is. This is exactly what Aristotle was getting at when he suggested that the rules of thought are the same as the rules of being. Or take Hegel, who argued that whatever is actual is rational, and the rational is actual. Neural pathways are completely irrelevant to this; they can be abstracted away because these same necessary relations show up everywhere, including well outside of brain matter. Brain activity is just content.

Alright. Look, I hear you, and I truly respect your commitment to having absolutely no sense at all.

But then what actually grants anything its claim to objectivity? What makes it objective—other than just being the opposite of subjective? If we follow that logic, then subjectivity becomes whatever isn't objective, which doesn't really get us anywhere. Objective reality has to be either inherently knowable through logic—since that’s the only conclusion we can reasonably draw—or it simply isn't. If it isn't, then we’re forced to look for something else to stitch everything together into a coherent whole, whether you want to call that metaphysics or religion. Even the mere appearance of an "objective reality" can't be purely subjective; if it were, we wouldn't even have a framework to discuss it in the first place. The very fact that objectivity manifests at all suggests it is something objective, universal, or at the very least, intersubjective.

Mechanism is really just a logical category at its core. It’s essentially derived from cause and effect, which are themselves just more logical categories. If we accept that logic serves as the universal framework, then you can't exactly claim there's some higher "metalogic" or a kind of metaphysics of metaphysics sitting above it. You can't be more logical than logic itself. It’s a bit like trying to argue that something could be more actual than actuality—which is usually just a fancy way of circling around that unknowable, noumenal thing.
It’s basically just a slippery slope leading straight into an infinite regression—the kind of bottomless pit you really don't want to fall into.

You could basically argue that their definition is just poorly constructed and blurry within the confines of your own mind, rather than being an objective failure. And if we assume that understanding nature is actually about grasping its essence—rather than just cataloging every single isolated event and phenomenon that happens to pop up—then you’re in for a pretty rough ride, considering you don't seem to have any clue what essence even is.

Exactly. We're part of the system, after all. It's this constant loop where we project our ideas onto reality, and then reality hits us right back in the face.

Sure, you can use logic or math to describe any conceivable reality, but you're inherently doing it from your own perspective. Some realities don't even involve perceiving logical relationships.

Quincy:
Really? Which part? Logical relationships aren't perceptions; they are necessary relations. Perceptions are sensory stimuli. What you're describing is pure psychologism. There was once a psychologistic interpretation of mathematics, but it was ground into dust and ash long ago—no serious thinker touches it anymore. You might perceive five apples or ten stones, but "five" or "ten" are universal; they don't depend on what they're attached to. You might not perceive five apples, but they're still there. We could even argue that "five" itself is just a byproduct of our brains and isn't "out there," but honestly, that makes no sense to me. Everyone shows up and counts five of something. No one counts five, then someone else counts six, and a third person counts nothing. That would be an illogical reality. And the relationships between those basic universals remain the same whether we're talking about nature, the mind, or consciousness—whatever you want to call it. It's about form, whereas apples and stones are just content. You can't have content without form. Logic is simply the most basic, universal form. That’s what Aristotle meant when he suggested the rules of thought are the same as the rules of being. Or Hegel, when he argued that whatever is actual is rational, and whatever is rational is actual. Brain circuits are irrelevant here. They can be abstracted away, because those same necessary relations show up everywhere—including outside of brain matter. Brain circuits are just content.
Math and logic are definitely products of the brain. They aren't just products of the brain, though, because they are constructed specifically to explain other sensory experiences. For instance, if you remove an apple from a group, there will be one fewer, and those sensory experiences rely on external events.

Quincy:
But then what provides objectivity to anything? By what standard is something "objective"—that it is objective? Is it just because it isn't subjective? If so, the inverse must hold—subjective is whatever isn't objective. Objective reality is either fundamentally knowable—meaning it's logical, since that's the conclusion we are forced to draw—or it isn't. In that case, there must be something else that unifies everything into a whole, such as some transcendent realm—metaphysics or religion. Even the appearance of an "objective reality" cannot be purely subjective, otherwise, we wouldn't even be able to discuss it. The emergence of the objective is objective, or universal, or at the very least intersubjective.
There is no such thing as true objectivity. Everything is just a subjective model of "the thing out there," and most of them end up riddled with inconsistencies, failing to account for all observations, or clashing with other "objective" models and so on...

Quincy:
Mechanism is a logical category—period. It’s derived from cause and effect, which are themselves logical categories. If logic is the universal form, then there can't be some "super-logic" or a "metaphysics of metaphysics" sitting above it. You can't be more logical than logic itself. It’s like claiming something can be more actual than actuality (which, if you follow that rabbit hole, just ends up at some unknowable noumenal thing).
That’s just sliding into an infinite regress—a bad kind of infinity, if you ask me.
Think about how a computer builds logical functions out of raw electrical signals. That’s the process I’m talking about, just happening inside the brain. There aren't any logical functions at the lower levels of the nervous system—not in simple neural circuits, nor in physiological computations. Logical functions are abstractions built upon "concepts." Those concepts are abstractions of multisensory experiences over time. And those experiences are just abstractions of single-sensory moments. It's all layers deep. Given the physical makeup of the nervous system, we know logic is a product of the brain. But we could argue—in a sort of direct realism sense—that logic exists "out there," simply because that’s how we perceive it.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:Fair enough, I see your point. It's the same deal with logic—it serves as a description for any possible reality. So why did you claim earlier that the brain houses a "logical categorizer" that cranks out logical categories?

Okay, sure. But when we talk about subjective reality, we're usually implying that it isn't the whole picture—that there's this supposed objective reality standing on the other side. My point, however, is about total reality, which encompasses both the subjective and the objective. What bridges the gap between those two realms is logic, which remains consistent across both. It’s precisely because of that logic, because the actual state of things is rational, that these two realities can actually interact with one another.

I'm not seeing how that matters?

Logic doesn't "happen" in the brain. Logic is the very structure of reality. It’s the abstract description of the necessary relationships inherent in anything that exists.

...therefore, says matter, therefore, says objective reality.

You mentioned that "neural phenomena are reality," and you backed that up by saying:
The whole reason we chose the neuron level is pretty straightforward: those neural currents actually line up with what’s happening in the outside world.
So, you’re suggesting that if we consider "neural phenomena" to be an objective reality, but then I turn around and claim there are only subjective realities and then the thing itself, we’ve somehow stumbled into a two-tiered universe. You're asking me to explain this supposed dualism, or perhaps you're wondering if you've just misread my entire point. It's a fair question, really—whether truth criteria even apply to the realm of the subjective, and whether we shouldn't define "truth" simply as the moment where our internal perception finally lines up with the external world.

Look, by their very definition and the way they’re built, these things are essentially the embodiment of natural phenomena, whether anyone actually likes that description or not. I get that some people might take issue with calling them an "essence"—probably because they don't quite grasp what that word actually implies—but I honestly don't see how that disagreement changes the underlying reality of the situation.

I wouldn't go so far as to say math is subordinate to logic, but rather that logic serves as the essential foundation for mathematics. If we’re using logic to build models that attempt to map out how things actually happen in the world, then we’re essentially making the assumption that the universe itself operates on a logical basis.

So, logic is the description of any possible reality? Does that mean every description of reality *has* to be "logical"? I’m not sure—it depends on how you're framing it.

Since logical relationships are part of perception, and perception is a product of neural circuits, there has to be some section of the brain tasked with perceiving those logical relations. Whether you call it a "categorizer," a "filter," or some other function—that’s for computational neuroscience to figure out and build a model for.

Quincy:
Fine. But when we talk about subjective reality, we’re implying it isn’t the whole picture—that there’s an assumed objective reality standing against it. I’m talking about the total reality, which encompasses both the subjective and the objective. What binds them together is logic; it remains constant in both. It’s because of this logic—because actuality is rational—that these two realities can, let's say, interact.
Saying logic unites two realities doesn't make sense to me. In fact, it doesn't even make sense to treat them as two separate realities.

There are countless subjective realities—everyone has their own. And then there is whatever exists outside of us. We can construct models of this "objective reality," but since we are always speaking from a subjective standpoint, we are really only ever discussing our *models* of it. Take forces and atoms, for instance—nobody has actually seen them. They are just abstract models used to explain our experiences.

Quincy:
I don't see why that matters.
Those beings don't experience the world as something logical—unlike humans. Well, certain humans. This implies that the human perception of logic is necessarily a biological byproduct. Naturally, there might be an analogy between what the brain constructs and the external reality it relies upon, but it’s entirely possible that logic is merely emergent—much like other natural laws (per Laughlin). Essentially, it's just a product of the human mind. There could be something more fundamental than logic—say, pure mechanics—from which logic emerges.

Quincy:
Logic doesn't happen in the brain. Logic is the structure of reality itself. It is the abstract description of the necessary relationships of anything that exists.
Maybe logic is the structure of reality if you're looking at it through a human lens. If there are perspectives that don't involve logic because they are primitive, then perhaps there are also perspectives that exist "above" logic.
Quincy said "neural phenomena are reality," justifying it by claiming:
"The neuronal level was selected because neural currents correlate with external phenomena"
So, if "neural phenomena" constitute objective reality, yet you maintain there are only subjective realities and the "outside"—aren't we looking at two different realities? Explain this dualism—unless I'm misinterpreting it. If truth criteria don't apply to subjective reality, isn't our standard for truth simply the alignment between the subjective and the objective?
Every subjective reality exists independently of any other subjective reality; in that sense, every subjective reality exists objectively. Brain signals exist objectively and give rise to subjective reality.
Objective reality isn't "reality" in the way people usually mean it. Our choice of words is sloppy—it's an old leftover from dualistic thinking.

But those things are, by definition and inherent nature, the essences of natural phenomena—regardless of whether anyone likes the terminology. It's clear this claim bothers someone who doesn't grasp what an essence actually is, but I fail to see how that's relevant here.

In science, all that matters is using specific terms and models to understand nature. "Essences" contribute nothing—their definitions are vague and useless.

I'm not subordinating mathematics to logic, but rather logic to mathematics—using math as the foundation. And if we use logic to build models of worldly phenomena, it implies that the phenomena themselves are logical.

I suspect we’re just projecting logic onto the world we observe.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:If the brain is linked to reality, is there a "reality generator" sitting in there? Or if it’s tied to our perception of time, do we have a built-in "temporalizer"? 😁
The brain relates to logical categories in the same way everything else relates to logic—it's just part of the framework.

But there isn't a direct link, is there? The brain isn't inherent to the concept; it’s not essential for logical categories to exist, much like it isn't essential for existence itself—since "existence" is just another logical category.

Okay, and? What’s the point? What defines "true" reality then? I’m looking for the actual logical criterion used to distinguish "real" from "fake" reality.

Are you suggesting physical laws are illogical? Physical laws are essentially the result of abstraction. Like I said before, a physical law is the very essence of a natural phenomenon. Logic isn't some redundant add-on; it's the main ingredient.

At its heart, invariance is a purely logical concept that doesn't really make sense unless you're already comfortable with the logical categories of identity and essence. You could say essence stays invariant while appearance shifts. Honestly, there isn't any way to pull off true abstraction without leaning heavily on logic.

Not necessarily. Just because someone displays "intelligence" doesn't mean there’s some localized "intelligence generator" sitting inside their brain—much like how being aggressive doesn't imply there's a specific "aggression module" tucked away in the gray matter. Intelligence is simply a description of behavior—an observation of how one acts—not an internal physical structure that dictates those actions.

The brain is essentially just a generator for subjective reality—nothing more. There isn't some external force crafting this experience for us; it’s all just the brain running its own internal programming.

There also needs to be a physical component within the brain dedicated to perceiving logical relationships—though it likely spans multiple regions given that logic operates on various levels of abstraction. The bottom line is this: there are organisms out there that simply don't perceive or generate logical relationships at all.

The brain is fundamentally tied to logical categories—mostly because everything else is. Logic is the baseline.

Our reasoning is rooted in logic—which means any reasoning regarding the brain has to be logical by extension. But here’s the catch: logic doesn't just float around the entire brain indiscriminately; it happens within specific, localized regions. How exactly that process unfolds is the real question—and honestly, we'll likely have to wait for breakthroughs in neuroscience and AI before we get a straight answer.

There isn't even a direct link to the brain here. It’s not inherent—in fact, it isn't essential at all for logical categories. It's much like how the brain isn't essential for existence itself—since "existence" is also just a logical category.

... or so my brain tells me. 🤷

So what? What does that actually change? I’m looking for a logical benchmark here—how do we even distinguish between "true" reality and a "false" one? Give me some actual criteria.

I’m not sure if I was actually referring to "true" reality—that was your phrasing, not mine. There are only subjective realities and then there is whatever exists outside of them. Concepts like truth or falsehood simply don't apply to that realm. You might be able to apply those criteria to hallucinations or something similar, but that’s about it.

Are physical laws illogical? Not even close. They’re just the result of abstraction. Like I've mentioned before—laws of physics represent the very essence of a natural phenomenon. Logic isn't some redundant extra tacked on at the end—it's the primary ingredient.

Physical laws are just mathematical models—human constructs, really—that happen to be quite good at predicting and explaining certain phenomena. I don't see any practical value in treating these laws as some kind of fundamental essence.
Invariance is a purely logical term—it’s essentially incomprehensible unless you grasp the logical categories of identity and essence. Essence remains invariant relative to appearance. There is simply no way to achieve any level of abstraction without relying on logic.

It’s also a mathematical term. Now, if you want to lump mathematics under the umbrella of logic—fine—we use logic to build better models of how things actually manifest in the world.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:I’m lost here. Are you asking for their GPS coordinates? It’s more like what we call reality is just the sum total of those logical categories.

😕
So, according to this, true reality—whatever that implies—isn't just a pile of atoms or even individual neurons, but these collections of neurons? If that's the case, why wouldn't the entire brain, being the ultimate massive collection of neurons, be considered "true reality"?

Not really. Logic applies to rocks too; it's just that a rock isn't aware enough to realize it.

I’d love to see someone attempt the act of abstraction without relying on logical categories. 😁The logical categories themselves are the abstractions.

Yeah, I mean spatial coordinates. If the brain actually has something to do with logical categories, does that mean there's some sort of "logical categorizer" sitting inside the skull? It seems unlikely to me—logic and biology aren't usually on speaking terms. That’s why the whole theory feels off.

😕
So, true reality (whatever that implies) isn't just a pile of atoms or individual neurons anymore, but collections of neurons? By that logic, why wouldn't the entire brain—as the ultimate cluster of neurons—be considered "true reality"?

Subjective experiences—the stuff people report while their neural activity is being recorded—correlate with groups of neurons firing, rather than just single units.

It doesn't. It applies to rocks too, even if a rock isn't aware of it.

Physical laws govern rocks. Logic is just an unnecessary extra.

I'd love to see someone attempt abstraction without relying on logical categories. 😁 Logical categories themselves are abstractions.

One way to abstract is by looking for invariants. For instance, a series of equilateral triangles of varying sizes remains invariant regarding scale.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Zachary Mendoza2 said:If the mind is constructing something based on external phenomena, then those phenomena aren't just white noise; they carry information. That implies the external world possesses some level of organization. I agree that our perception is qualitatively different and much more complex than what we actually see—we simply recognize certain patterns and conceptualize them. For instance, if there is a chair, you could argue it is nothing more than a collection of atoms, but that isn't the full picture because I am here, and it isn't just a chair. I can sit on those atoms, so I am not wrong to call it a chair. Furthermore, Sigmund could use those atoms as a weapon, or he could use them for heat, or even to dry laundry. You cannot claim it is merely a mental construct when a planned action can be performed with those "mere atoms" to produce an expected result. It may be a mental construct, but it remains consistent with reality.

I'm not drifting into solipsism here. Obviously, there is "something" out there that our perception interacts with in a consistent manner.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:But why focus specifically on neural processes? Why settle on the neuronal level instead of looking at something deeper—say, the subatomic scale—or perhaps something broader than just neurons? From where I’m sitting, this specific level seems somewhat arbitrary, whereas logical categories seem to permeate every single layer because they are universal.

What does that actually have to do with logic? It’s like arguing that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. Sure, nothing exists—but for the rock.

We could slice any system into an arbitrary number of layers if we felt like it, so what’s the actual point of making that distinction?

Because they are logical.

I have to disagree with you there.

So, where exactly do these "logical categories" reside?

The neuronal level was selected because neural currents actually correlate with external phenomena—it just makes more sense to deal with clusters of neurons. Since an individual neuron introduces a certain amount of signal noise during transmission, you neutralize that static by averaging out larger groups of neurons. These aggregate values are what correlate with external magnitudes.

What does that have to do with logic? It’s like claiming that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. True, nothing exists—but not for the rock.

So logic is only applicable to humans, then.

We could slice everything into any number of arbitrary layers. So what?

We can test anything in neuroscience and hunt for evidence both for and against a specific thesis. The nervous system is organized into layers that are functionally and topologically distinct—plenty of research in the field supports that. If we accept that the brain produces the mind, then we have to accept that it does so through abstraction, not through some inherent set of logical categories.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Zachary Mendoza2 said:Actually, I took a closer look at what you wrote to Aphex. There is no need to reply. Though, I am still struggling to see where the disagreement lies—perceptions exist, and the mind organizes them, perhaps because they are inherently organized rather than chaotic. There is an underlying structure to reality that the mind attempts to mirror. This structure isn't some external entity; it exists because things exist as they do. It shapes and organizes them, becoming part of their essence. If one grasps all things, one grasps their structure as well. When Aphex discusses perceptions, I don't believe he is referring to white noise, but to perceptions as they truly are: ultimately organized, since they emerge from an organized reality.

My take? The mind isn't trying to mirror the structure of reality. It constructs its own version of reality—one that certainly relies on external phenomena, but is qualitatively different from those phenomena themselves.

Something along those lines.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:So, how does the brain build reality out of raw neural data? It uses logical categories. Without them, perception would just be white noise or some chaotic pile of stimuli. You’re left with a messy multiplicity of form and content, which the brain smooths out using logic. It injects universality and necessity into the chaos. (Hegel suggests that the "I" is a melting pot, a fire that burns away multiplicity to reduce it to a single unity). This system of logical categories provides the conceptual framework. In other words, perception only becomes objective through these logical categories. Kant actually agreed with the empiricists that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge, except he argued that this knowledge wouldn't relate to absolute truths, but would merely be knowledge of appearances. Now, if universality and necessity aren't found in experience, where do they come from? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations, or concepts of understanding, are what constitute the objectivity of experiential knowledge. They generally contain relations and connections, without which you couldn't even form synthetic a priori judgments (those fundamental relationships between opposing elements). Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't have objectivity in the sense that they are given directly through perception; rather, he felt they belong to thought, making them subjective in that specific sense (if I'm following your point correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness feels as though the things it perceives through the senses exist independently, as things-in-themselves. Thought, on the other hand, is viewed as something dependent. But in reality, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are the truly independent and primary elements. In that sense, Kant called those things belonging to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective elements.

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" issue? Well, first you have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept that it is, then you're claiming to accurately perceive your surroundings. If you then turn around and say that this perception only gives you knowledge of appearances, rather than what a thing truly is ("in itself," rather than "for you" or "according to you"), you've hit a contradiction—you're claiming to have accurate perception yet arriving at false cognition. On the other hand, if you don't accept experience as the foundation of knowledge, you've fallen into radical skepticism, and any further discussion about perception or knowledge effectively hits a dead end because there’s nothing coherent left to say.

It’s actually a bit more straightforward than it sounds. I used to explain this using a friend as an example: if you have someone you call a friend, but they never actually act like one, then they aren't really a friend. It comes down to a question of identity—of being true to oneself. You have to keep in mind that a concept is essentially the unity of the individual, the particular, and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have predicates or objects to begin with.
Here is how Hegel puts it in his "Encyclopedic" logic:
By truth, one understands at first that I know (wisse) how something is. Yet this is truth only in relation to consciousness or the formal truth, mere correctness. In contrast to this, truth in the deeper sense consists in this, that objectivity is identical with the concept. It is truth in this deeper sense that is at stake if, for example, one is speaking of a true state or of a true work of art. These objects (Gegenstande) are true if they are what they should be, that is to say, if their reality corresponds to their concept. So construed, the untrue is the same as what is otherwise also called 'the bad'. A bad human being is one who is not truly human, i.e. a human being who does not behave in keeping with the concept or determination of a human being. Nothing, meanwhile, can subsist utterly without the identity of the concept and reality. Even something bad and untrue is only insofar as its reality still behaves somehow in conformity with its concept. Something thoroughly bad or at odds with the concept is, precisely for this reason, something collapsing in itself. It is the concept alone through which things have their standing in the world. - When speaking of the idea, one must
not imagine something remote and other-worldly by this. The idea is instead what is thoroughly present, and so too it is to be found in every consciousness, even if muddled and stunted.


Actually, that perspective does exist. It's called logic. Logic has to hold up regardless of your vantage point. This is what I was touching on earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary aspect, which is thought. Rational thought is the thing that bridges all perspectives. No matter where you're standing, you're still dealing with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, causality, quantity, form, content, essence, the concept, and so on.

Not quite. It just means that individual opinions clash, and more often than not, they aren't universal truths or absolute necessities. At the end of the day, a single person's perspective rarely maps perfectly onto the entire concept they're trying to describe. What I'm getting at is—nobody's perfect.

Neural phenomena *are* reality. Logical categories aren't some fundamental organizer. There are plenty of beings out there that don't perceive logical relationships or concepts. There are much more primitive realities than human ones—which means there are far more basic foundations for constructing reality than mere logical categories.

Think about it: the human nervous system is layered. You have the first layer dealing directly with correlates of external variables. Then you have the next layer handling invariants built from copies of signals from that first layer. This repeats several times until you reach concepts—maybe even more layers beyond that.

Besides, you can't just claim that logical categories are identical for everyone. On what basis?
Kant agreed with empiricism that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge—except that such knowledge wouldn't pertain to truths, but would merely be knowledge of phenomena. Now, where do universality and necessity come from if they aren't found in experience? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations or concepts of understanding constitute the objectivity of empirical knowledge. They generally contain relations; without them, synthetic a priori judgments (those original relations between opposing elements) couldn't be formed. Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't possess objectivity in the sense of being given in perception. Rather, he felt they belonged to thought, making them subjective in that sense (if I'm following you correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness perceives the things standing against it as if they exist independently—as "things-in-themselves." Thought, however, isn't seen as independent; it’s viewed as dependent on something else. But actually, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are truly independent and primary. In that regard, Kant called what belongs to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective element.

I don't see anything particularly useful in that. 🤷
Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" business? Well, you first have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept it is, then you're essentially saying you perceive your surroundings accurately.So, if you’re claiming that your perception only gives you insight into phenomena—rather than what a thing actually *is* (its "thing-in-itself," as opposed to how it appears "to you")—then you've hit a contradiction. You'd be claiming to have accurate perception while simultaneously arriving at false conclusions. On the other hand, if you refuse to accept experience as the bedrock of knowledge, you've drifted into radical skepticism. At that point, any further debate regarding perception or epistemology is dead in the water—there's nothing left of substance to discuss.

That doesn't follow. Experience is indeed the foundation of knowledge and cognition, but it isn't the *only* thing.

It's simpler than you're making it. I used my friend as an example earlier. If you have a friend who doesn't act like a friend toward you, then they aren't a friend. It comes down to identity—the concept of being identical to oneself. One has to keep in mind that a concept is a unity of the particular and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have propositions or objects.

That makes no sense to me. If we're talking about the concept of a "true friend," that's just a linguistic construct with its own set of attributes defining what makes someone a true friend. If we're talking about a specific person, that's a different kind of construction entirely—a collection of traits, memories of their behavior, and so on. There is no "identity with oneself" happening here; rather, two things are being compared, or perhaps individuals are simply being categorized by the degree to which they qualify as "true friends"...

That perspective exists. That's logic. Logic has to hold up across all perspectives. That’s what I was referring to earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary component, which is thought. Rational thought unifies all perspectives. Within any given perspective, you still deal with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, cause, quantity, form, content, essence, concepts, and so on.

I don't think those categories exist in every perspective. They certainly don't exist in most non-human perspectives. They don't even exist in children. And later on, they don't even exist in some adults.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:I’m assuming that by "external non-neuronal phenomena," you’re talking about nature—that objective reality you previously argued doesn't actually exist. If we’re playing by those rules, then there isn't exactly anything left to perceive, is there?

I didn't even go as far as saying he actually employs them. Look, Hegel makes this distinction between "accuracy" and "truth." To him, being "true" is really just about whether the content aligns with itself—basically, if it matches its own concept. It’s like saying someone is a real friend only when their actual behavior lines up with what we define as "friendship." You could apply that logic to pretty much any phenomenon, though obviously, no finite being ever quite hits that mark perfectly. Absolutely. If you look at it through his lens—or even just using that universal definition we often default to—everything carries its own truth "outside of itself." It’s all about how things relate to the totality, or the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, depending on which philosopher you're trying to impress at a cocktail party. That’s why he argues that "truth is the whole." Essentially, the truth of any single thing is just its specific placement within that grand, overarching puzzle. It feels pretty similar to the coherence theory of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in whether a collection of statements or claims happens to line up logically; for him, truth is an inherent property of concepts or objects themselves.

I’m personally obsessed with finding that one grand perspective that manages to unify every other viewpoint under a single umbrella. Honestly, anything else isn't even true philosophy; it’s just psychological navel-gazing. I mean, let's face it: noumena don't exist. If someone actually wants to explain what a noumenon is, they might as well just call it some mystical "beyond" or a spiritual afterlife. In that framework, phenomena would essentially just be its "emanations." It reminds me of how Nietzsche famously dismissed Christianity as nothing more than "Platonism for the masses." Following that logic, if a noumenal thing could actually be integrated into our total understanding of reality, then we could call it true. But since the whole point of a noumenal object is that it's fundamentally severed from our ability to perceive or know it, it can't be true. Anything that is inherently unknowable is, by definition, untrue.
Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing raw perceptions here. I’m experiencing thoughts, judgments, and the like. Think of perceptions as nothing more than raw material; they don't actually mean anything until those logical categories step in to organize them. Since those categories are universal, the whole argument for subjective idealism just falls apart. They hold true across every single one of the perspectives you brought up.

The laws of nature are the essence. You don't derive an essence from a concept; if anything, a concept is a much higher and more advanced logical category than an essence. Saying there's an "essence of an essence" would be like trying to perform a double negative.

The actual subject of perception is neural phenomena. Or, more accurately, all perceptions are neural phenomena. You never actually perceive anything outside the nervous system; everything you see around you is just a mental construction. That construction relies, in some way, on what lies outside—something we can only discuss through models and assumptions. Honestly, a naive realist stance is often quite useful here.

I didn't even say Hegel uses them. Hegel distinguishes between "accuracy" and "truth." For him, being "true" means a content coincides with itself—that is, it aligns with its own concept.

You were quoting Hegel's critique regarding the untruth of perception, where he utilizes truth and falsehood.

Coincidence of *what* with itself? How do you differentiate content from a concept? Are you suggesting there is something a concept refers to that isn't identical to the concept itself, and then you compare the two?

For instance, someone is a true friend when their behavior aligns with the concept of "friendship." It's the same for any phenomenon, though no finite being is entirely in accord with its concept (or the universal one). Therefore, everything possesses its truth "outside itself"—meaning in relation to the totality, the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, if you prefer. This is why he says "truth is the whole." The truth of something is essentially its place within the whole. It's similar to the "coherence theory" of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in the truth of statements or propositions; for him, truth is a property of concepts or objects.

That theory of truth makes no sense to me. There is nothing true or false about concepts themselves. You can have a relationship between two concepts relative to the whole, or one relative to another, but a lone concept holds no truth or falsehood. It is always just a mental construction.

I'm interested in the perspective that unifies all perspectives. That is the only thing of philosophical significance. Anything else isn't philosophy; it's just psychology. Noumena don't exist. I'd love for someone to tell me what a noumenon actually is. It’s just mystical otherworldly nonsense. And phenomena would merely be its "emanation." It’s the same thing Nietzsche said about Christianity: "Platonism for the masses." Following the logic from the previous section, we could say that if a noumenon can be integrated into the totality of reality, then it is true. But since a noumenal thing is postulated as being severed from the possibility of cognition, it cannot be true. That which is unknowable is untrue.

Such a perspective doesn't exist. You can imagine it, build a model for it, and then try to test or analyze how useful that model is. There is no other way to grow knowledge. Truth cannot pertain to such models or their relationship to the noumenal; it can only pertain to the relationships within the model itself.

Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing perceptions here. I experience thoughts, judgments, and so on. Perceptions are merely raw material—meaningless junk without the logical categories used to organize them. Since those categories are universal, subjective idealism falls apart. They hold true across every single perspective you mentioned.

No, by definition, perceptions encompass everything you experience. You perceive every thought as a verbal sensation, a visual impression, or something similar. And frankly, I haven't seen any proof that certain logical categories remain valid across all perspectives.

Natural laws are essence. You don't derive essence from a concept. A concept is a far higher, more advanced logical category than essence itself. The "essence of an essence" would be something akin to a double negative.

So, the system is contradictory.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Zachary Mendoza2 said:Neuroscience touches upon the concept of "archetypes," which roughly corresponds to the notion of essence. They speak of an archetypal ego or an archetypal mother; psychology explores similar themes. They haven't fully fleshed out the details, and they tend to get defensive when you start asking difficult questions. But essentially, they are discussing essences.

To be brief, I largely agree with everyone here, except for the claim that it is impossible to calculate—because we aren't dealing with quantity. It is true that we aren't dealing with quantity, yet the way things are calculated today focuses solely on quantities. However, calculation is not impossible. One simply needs to change the method of computation. If a thing can be conceptualized, it can be calculated. As I mentioned previously, the issue isn't the math itself, but rather the difficulty of obtaining reliable input data. If we wanted to calculate the essence of your chair, we would need access to the contents of your mind, and we currently lack a way to retrieve that directly, quickly, or accurately.

Yes, this. 👍

Archetypes might serve as the essence of certain personality types—mythological ones, perhaps—but the concept of an essence applies to everything. Take the essence of a door, for instance (if we're being pedantic about the German terminology)—it's essentially "that which is not the phenomenon." You can invent whatever you want within that negation. Technically, it could be a "pattern recognizer," a "categorizer," or some kind of mental switch 🤷 Neither neuroscience, philosophy, nor AI has actually figured out how to build a machine that functions that way. We're still waiting on what would qualify as true "computational understanding."

Amanda Jackson5 said:Look, I’ve already told you why that just doesn't work. If we follow your logic, we end up with only one single reality. Now, I’m perfectly fine with the idea that there is only one reality—one that essentially bridges the gap between the subjective and the objective. That position is actually logically coherent. Your approach, on the other hand, isn't; you're picking one side of the subjective/objective opposition and just deleting the other one entirely, which is, unfortunately, a logical impossibility. That said, you probably aren't trying to be nonsensical; you're likely just struggling to articulate what you actually mean. You're probably trying to argue that humans can only ever experience phenomena, leaving the Kant's noumenal "thing-in-itself" forever out of reach. But I've pointed this out before: even that stance falls apart under scrutiny. It's like telling someone they are perceiving the world around them with perfect accuracy, yet somehow, that perfectly accurate perception is fundamentally false. As Hegel would put it, it's a total non-sequitur. It’s a classic case of *contradictio in adjecto*—a fancy way of saying someone is trying to marry two ideas that just plain refuse to live in the same house. It’s like ordering a "dry martini" from a bartender who thinks salt is a primary flavor profile, or claiming you want a "silent rock concert." You’re essentially building a house out of nothing but contradictions and wondering why the roof keeps falling in on your head.You’re essentially talking about an empty abstraction that lacks any actual determinism—which is exactly what you’re baselessly claiming about essence. It would be like me arguing that the world is inherently irrational and unknowable, or suggesting that something like science is a total impossibility. That kind of logic is more aligned with a schizophrenic mind or the deep subconscious than anything resembling reality. If we follow your line of reasoning, what happens to the laws of nature? In a world like that, laws simply can't exist. The reality is that if something is truly unknowable, it isn't true. You can't even apply a criterion of truth to something like that, so it can't logically occupy a state we would recognize as existence. Sure, we can imagine a thing that exists entirely detached from its own being, but we wouldn't call that a "thing"—we'd just call it a possibility.

I’m struggling to wrap my head around this one—are atoms and fundamental forces actually objective realities, or just subjective constructs? It feels a bit arbitrary to grant them some kind of privileged status in our understanding of the world. If you're going to be truly consistent with your own logic, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, if we follow that thread to its logical conclusion, you can't really argue for the existence of objects, material reality, or nature itself. All you're left with is a collection of ideas, which basically drags us straight into the territory of absolute subjective idealism.

So, are we really suggesting that objective reality is just some subset of subjective reality? I've already laid out why that logic falls apart above. Honestly, does anyone have a single rational argument for why subjective experience shouldn't be considered an integral part of the objective world?

Why stop at just atoms? You literally just argued that atoms themselves are useful abstractions. Essences function the exact same way—they're just another layer of abstraction. The only real difference on that abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (assuming they even exist in a way we can actually perceive?), whereas essences act as the counterpoint to those phenomena. What I'm getting at is that a phenomenon without an essence is just an absurdity. If you strip away essence, you effectively strip away the laws of nature too. Does a chair contain subatomic particles? Or molecules?

If I believed the world was irrational and unknowable, I wouldn't bother with science. Hegel's critique misses the mark here. Nobody is claiming perception is simultaneously true and false. Truth and falsehood aren't even applicable terms when discussing perception. Perceptions are, for all intents and purposes, neural correlates of external, non-neural phenomena. The light intensity hitting a point on the retina correlates with the frequency of the impulse traveling from that point. Those two things—light intensity and pulse frequency—cannot exist in a relationship of "truth" or "falsehood."

It's similar to what happens in a schizophrenic mind or the subconscious. But then what happens to natural laws? In such a world, laws couldn't exist. The issue is that if something is unknowable, it is untruthful. You can't apply the criteria of truth to something like that, so such a thing couldn't logically exist in a state we call existence. We can imagine a thing separated from its existence, but we wouldn't call it a "thing"—we'd call it a "possibility."

Well, there it is—I’ve finally put my thoughts down. So why does Hegel utilize truth and untruth as tools for critique?

I don't quite follow—are atoms and forces objective or subjective? Why grant them special status? If you want to be consistent with your own position, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, you can't even claim that objects, material reality, or nature itself exists. You can only say that ideas exist—which leads us straight into absolute subjective idealism.


It depends on which angle you take.

From your own perspective, you can't experience anything except perceptions—in other words, everything you encounter is just perception. There’s some consciousness in your head doing the perceiving. Your personal world is pure absolute subjective idealism.

If you step back into a hypothetical third-person view, you see that everyone is trapped in their own absolute subjective idealism.

So, it isn't that we can't build a model, or that the noumena can't be conceptualized and modeled—it's just that what we actually experience isn't the noumena.

So, is objective reality just a subset of subjective reality? I already explained the incoherence of that above. Is there any rational reason why subjective reality wouldn't be a part of objective reality?

Both are true if we shift our definitions—essentially, we're discussing two different concepts from two different perspectives.

In the first person, the objective world is modeled within the subjective mind. It is constructed there.

In the third person, everything is objective—meaning it is objectively true that many subjective worlds exist.

Why focus solely on atoms? You said yourself that atoms are useful abstractions. Essences are also useful abstractions. The only difference on an abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (if they even exist? since we can't actually see them), whereas essences are the opposition to phenomena. What I mean is: a phenomenon without an essence is absurd. Without essence, there are no natural laws. Are there subatomic particles in a chair? Or molecules?

Atoms and forces are useful abstractions because they allow us to predict a massive number of phenomena. But saying there are no natural laws without essence?? Can't a natural law have its own essence? That's a single concept; it would have to possess its own essence.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Amanda Jackson5 said:But let me ask you this: is the existence of things outside of our subjective reality acceptable to you? By using the phrase "subjective reality," you’ve essentially invited an "objective reality" to the party as its logical opposite. Once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a mathematical necessity. Your only other option is to find some other rational way to dismantle that duality entirely.

It isn't. Nothing we can actually discuss as a "thing" exists outside our subjective reality. The moment we start talking about objects, we are inevitably discussing perceptions—or abstractions of those perceptions. There is no other way to frame it.

We might claim that atoms or physical forces exist objectively, but those are just our models of an objective reality—abstract concepts that no one has ever truly witnessed. They’re incredibly useful, sure, but they remain trapped within subjective reality. There is no escape from perception.

Quincy:
By using the term "subjective reality," you've implicitly invoked "objective reality" as its opposite. And once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a logical necessity. Your only alternative is to find some other rational way to dismantle that dichotomy.
Objective reality isn't the opposite of subjective reality. It is necessarily a subjective model of "something"—which makes it part of that same subjective framework.

As for essences... essences are imputed, not inherent, regardless of how convincing they seem. At the end of the day, there's nothing in a chair but atoms.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
I found it impossible to accept any concept that exists outside of a person's own subjective reality.
How many grains make a heap? in Philosophy ·
Now we’re getting into philosophical territory. A heap is whatever you decide constitutes a heap. A dozen is twelve of something—precise. Five is just the number of fingers on your hand. But a heap? That’s mostly an indeterminate amount of something—just enough to be more than what you can easily count.

Amanda Jackson5 said:Or, to put it in modern terms—a heap is an emergence.

🤦
The Psychology of the Crowd in Psychology ·
feralharbor8 said:Wait, how can social behavior be considered asocial?

On that note, here is a practical experiment regarding herd mentality:


By the way, a recent replication of the Milgram experiment looked at people who refused to shock others to death under authority. They found these were mostly asocial rebels who don't conform to society. The only group that didn't shock anyone was women who had experience organizing factory strikes. Normal, well-adjusted people who fit into society perfectly all followed orders and shocked the subject to death.

It’s likely more about the desire to belong than enjoying the torture itself.

Actually, it comes down to one-on-one influence from an authority figure.

Just a minor correction here—in the Milgram experiment, they explicitly told the participants that the most intense shocks wouldn't actually cause any harm:
"Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please go on." "
The One I Love (2014) in Movies ·
I was honestly about to fast-forward just to see if anything actually worthwhile happened—then the plot finally kicked in. I haven't encountered a setup quite like that before. Though, I have to say, the ending felt a bit telegraphed—pretty much from the moment they showed up in matching outfits.

It gives me major Stephen King vibes.
Raspberry Pi projects in Programming ·
Jeffrey Anderson84 said:Hey there... I've been messing around with Arduino for a few months now and I'm getting the hang of it—at least with the basic stuff. But here's the snag: I want to run two or more different programs at once, and I'm stuck. For example, I want one part to handle Bluetooth commands from a device while another part handles inputs from a keyboard. If anyone knows how to merge these so they run simultaneously, I'd appreciate the help... 🤷🤷 🤷

The loop function runs continuously—that's just how it works. Just drop both the Bluetooth logic and the keyboard polling inside that loop, one after the other. Alternatively, you could set up the keyboard using interrupts (check this out: http://www.arduino.cc/en/Reference/AttachInterrupt). It's much cleaner.
Raspberry Pi projects in Programming ·
Give this code a shot:
Code:
void loop() {
if (Genotronex.available()){
BluetoothData=Genotronex.read();
Genotronex.println(BluetoothData);
}
delay(100);// prepare for next data ...
}

Update:
I see you updated the post—glad to hear it finally worked. Cheers, 👍