Posts by James Lee77

restlessgull11 said:I think you're being way too presumptuous here, and honestly, you've got it wrong.

...but, since you mentioned it once before (in that 'atheism' thread)—it seems pretty obvious that you view believers as a single category of 'idiots' who aren't even worth your time, right?

Dialogue always has value... regardless of your specific definitions, whatever methodology you think falls under that, etc., etc...

Besides, it seems like you don't quite grasp the significance of certain things within the current socio-political climate the world is going through right now... because if you did, an atheist's conversation with a believer wouldn't seem the way you're trying to portray it...

And one more thing, these constant threads about stuff like 'are we always being honest,' 'what counts as an insult,' 'us vs. them,' or 'how to talk to each other' are basically just part of a sort of hygienic social game... let's stop overanalyzing everything with all these unnecessary stage directions...

🤔 Can I get a link? I don't think I ever said that. You might be misremembering something.

ironmarlin1 said:I suspect that’s exactly what’s happening here. In fact, I’d go so far as to suggest there’s a certain counterproductive element to aggressive argumentation; when you hammer home your side too hard, the other person immediately feels cornered, which triggers a defensive reflex that shuts down any real dialogue. 🤷

I mean, that’s kind of the whole point of being that aggressive, right? You basically just manufacture an enemy so you have a reason to keep acting like a fighter. I guess it's all about justifying your own existence.
I mean, what’s even the point of having combat skills if you don't have an actual opponent to face? It’s like this Manichaean standoff where neither side is willing to budge even an inch. Honestly, it's kind of perfect for fighters like that. I guess if either side actually won, it would just end up destroying both of them anyway. 😉
So, I guess you could say aggressive atheists and religious zealots are basically just feeding off each other at this point. 🤷

It’s like this Famous Person is a perfect example of how the "antifa" crowd and the far-right extremists in America just end up creating each other. It's a total loop, honestly. They both feed off the same drama, and meanwhile, the rest of the normal world—the people who don't need either side's nonsense—is just left watching. I guess it's just one big cycle of manufactured outrage. Nemanja:

I don't know, man, why is that crowd so obsessed with this whole red versus black thing? It’s like the ultimate American grudge match, right? They act like it's this massive, built-in rivalry that defines everything else we fight about in society. I guess they just see every single social conflict through that one specific lens, but I don't know, maybe it's just how they're wired.

Look, this has been explained a million times around here, and honestly, the answer hasn't changed: they’re just fueling that whole conflict. They lean on this fake ideological divide between the left and the right as their core lie, mostly because it’s how they keep their grip on power. It makes them feel indispensable. I guess as long as they can point to an extremist threat on one side, they can claim they're the only thing standing in the way. As long as there's a perceived threat from the far left, Thompson will always have an audience to sing about legends like Juriti and Boban.
That’s exactly why they keep backing Thompson. He’s basically the reason they even exist—it’s this whole vicious cycle. You’ve got Sony Music dropping insane amounts of money for his concert at Yankee Stadium; then next season, they'll probably have Mark headlining the main square in D.C. Even NBC will air some watered-down footage of the show—this notorious fake where they totally gloss over the fact that the first two rows at Yankee Stadium were packed with people in those extremist hats. It all serves the same purpose, though. It’s just a way to play the "anti-fascist" card. They want to snatch away that crucial liberal-democratic argument from anyone who actually gets it—you know, the idea that modern America isn't built on an anti-fascist foundation, but on an anti-totalitarian one. That's the real paradigm: condemning both sides of totalitarianism, whether it's the far-left or the far-right.

Look, if things were different—if this country wasn't so split down the middle between two massive, outdated ideological evils from the last century, or just totally torn apart by two parties clinging to those old traditions—then maybe we’d see something else. If both sides were actually sidelined for once, and there was finally some breathing room for actual civic politics to exist in its full democratic glory, then this whole generation would be in trouble. I mean, most people in this generation basically view America like Noah's Ark, mostly because they’ve been caught in the crossfire and scrutinized by both the left and the right. Honestly, if you even consider the difference between those two sides, it's pretty much just one big, messy political amalgam. Their real fear isn't just a few symbolic condemnations of some old-school communists who are long gone; it's about delegitimizing an entire political mindset. It's about preventing America from ever truly moving past the shadow of the mid-1940s and finally stepping away from that old-world totalitarian vibe into the modern, liberal democratic world of the West. That's the real fear.

and also

RED & BLACK

One of those things that just keeps looping in our society is this whole "Red vs. Black" conflict—it’s basically this massive ideological fantasy that defines the American landscape. It's fundamental because people try to frame it as the main event, like every single social issue can be boiled down to this one fight. I guess my take on why this keeps happening is twofold. On one hand, maybe it’s just how the American political establishment stays in power. Like, as long as there’s a threat of far-right extremism, they need an anti-fascist buffer to justify their spot. And as long as any old spark of old-school partisan zeal remains, Thompson probably feels like he’s still got a reason to write songs, if nothing else. But on the other hand, by constantly obsessing over these two extreme leftovers from the past, it kills any chance of a real centrist or civic movement ever taking root. These old ghosts basically hog the entire political field, leaving zero room for anyone who actually wants to talk about civic issues. Honestly, it feels like they're being intentionally suffocated. They basically create themselves out of necessity—one side needs the other just to prove they still matter. What I'm really wondering is, can we even call out this fantasy? When you realize there isn't even a real "civic class" left—not just socially, but even as an informed political force—because its space has been totally hijacked by this endless grudge match that gets forced on us as the only reality in the country, how do you even debunk it? How do you go beyond just talking about it and actually shut it down politically?
...
So, here’s my question: How do we break this illusion? This lie that structures all of American reality and forces this Red vs. Black dialectic on us as our only destiny since 1941? I mean, sure, you could say "just vote," but that's not what I'm getting at. The real problem is that most Americans actually know that the old battle between the far-left and the far-right isn't the defining contradiction of our country anymore, yet everyone acts like it still is!
...
The whole Left versus Right thing—or the social versus national divide, or the old partisan battles—those should really just be descriptive terms. They shouldn't be treated as these absolute, essential truths. Since the difference between the big parties is actually pretty tiny and mostly driven by outside pressures—which, let's face it, is the main driver in American politics—they just project all that anger onto the past. It makes it look like we're still fighting communists versus fascists, even though we all know deep down that neither group exists like that anymore. Those old labels are just projections used to fill the void where actual meaningful conflict should be. It's really just two different groups fighting for special treatment in society. Since there’s no real principled difference between them, they just dress it up as a continuation of that old-school antagonism.

ironmarlin1 said:What I truly struggle to wrap my head around is how anyone could even attempt to argue against the existence of God through the lens of religion. It seems fundamentally flawed to me. Honestly,
Sisyphus would probably just laugh at those kinds of futile efforts.

Well, if that were true, it would mean Sisyphus totally misread what those "proof-seekers" are actually after. 😉
See, their whole goal isn't really to prove God doesn't exist. It’s more about making believers look irrational so they can feel superior. Most people coming out of those debates walk away thinking, "Ha! Look how stupid they are" (or, let's be real, "Heh, look how smart I am"). So, I guess their behavior is actually pretty calculated—it's all about feeding that ego and feeling intellectually superior.

A conversation only really matters when both sides are actually willing to question what they believe. 🤷

amberviper said:I feel like you're oversimplifying things here, and while I won't judge you for it, your arguments aren't exactly consistent...
If you've ever watched how animals care for their young, you could just as easily argue they have the intention to protect their offspring. But if you look closer at those reactions, you'll see it's all driven by instinct and the genetic programming hardwired into them. If a baby animal dies, the mother often doesn't even realize it's gone; she'll just carry it around in her mouth for a while until survival instinct finally forces her to move on.

It's the same deal with hunger, which is the ultimate driving force. Animals act on instinct to provide for themselves. Some animals, like cats, try to bury food they can't eat right away, but that isn't "intention"—it's pure instinct. They go back to that spot without any actual certainty that the food is still there; they're simply following "natural causality," or instinct.

Unlike animals, a human—specifically your tennis player—actually thinks and makes split-second decisions through "intention" when returning the ball. Whether he actually pulls it off every time is a different story, but he's trying. Animals are intelligent to a certain degree because they possess "anima animalis," but they don't have those six "wheels" of human consciousness unity that I've laid out in several of my posts. So, maybe give those a read before circling back... if you want to!

I feel like you're refuting way more than what I'm actually claiming. Out of those six points, I'm really only focused on one: instinct. I'm not even arguing against the other five.

I'm just trying to figure out how you're using that word. 🤷 And from what I can tell—though I might be missing something, so please correct me if I'm wrong—you seem to use it for cases like this: ''An animal acts in a way we'd call intentional if it were a human, but since animals don't have true intentionality, only humans do, then it's something else. I call that 'something else' instinct.''
So, basically, you're saying instinct is like a quasi-intentionality. 😕

Question for you: do humans have instincts too? In what situations would you say a person is acting on instinct rather than intention? Where do you draw that line? 🤷

ironmarlin1 said:From where I'm standing, it seems like you’re leaning heavily on some kind of teleological worldview to make sense of things. Perhaps that functions as your primary lens, but it certainly isn't mine, and frankly, I make a conscious effort to steer clear of it. If one follows your logic, one could argue even the > possesses intentions, simply because that would be the default assumption one would then have to work to disprove. But that just isn't how reality operates. I'm curious, though—what exactly is your metric for discarding anthropomorphism in those instances you claim are so numerous?🤷
And to circle back to my previous point: how do you account for rabbits, snakes, frogs, and the rest of the animal kingdom? While you might attempt to view them through this lens, doing so creates massive intellectual blind spots. You can try to draw parallels, sure, but those analogies tend to fall apart under the slightest bit of scrutiny.

I mean, I totally get why a teleological view feels almost unavoidable when you're describing stuff in the living world.
Does my comment actually make sense compared to what you said in purposeful?.

Maybe that’s just your starting assumption, but it definitely isn't mine, and honestly, I try to avoid it. If that were the case, you could argue the Sun has intentions too, just because that's the default setting you haven't disproven yet. That's not really how things work.

But it's not just me, though. I guess the most influential biology book from the last few decades—that Dawkinsian Selfish Gene—is basically built on one massive anthropomorphism. Giving genes "selfishness" is way more anthropomorphic than saying a seagull intends to eat a fish. 🤷

Still, I feel like it's a bit of a stretch to equate what I'm saying here with some kind of cosmic intention, like the Sun having a plan or something. I'm just comparing the feeding behavior of one mammal (a human) to another mammal (a fox). It seems like a huge leap to say we're as different from our relatives as the Sun is from, say, an architect.

So what's your metric for tossing out anthropomorphism in all those cases you claim are so common?🤷

Empirical failure, I guess. Like, if I assume a monkey can do what a human does—move boxes from one room to another to build a platform to reach bananas... and then it just doesn't happen, no matter how hungry it gets or how many boxes are right there... then yeah, it's pretty clear there's a gap between monkey consciousness and human consciousness.
Also, what you wrote about the rabbit was actually pretty convincing.

And like I mentioned, how do you explain rabbits, snakes, frogs, and all those other animals where you can observe this behavior, even if it leads to serious limitations? You can draw analogies, sure, but they fall apart pretty fast.

Fair enough. But I'm not out here drawing endless analogies.
I'm just saying that—unless there's proof otherwise—the most logical answer to "why does a fox cache food" is simply "to eat later."

I don't think "saving food for later" requires high intelligence or self-awareness. I mean, even a total idiot or someone who's lost their mind might save food for later, and that doesn't necessarily mean they're acting out of some rational, self-aware purpose.🤷

ironmarlin1 said:Look, you’re certainly entitled to your anthropomorphisms, but let’s be honest: they aren't justified. I honestly struggle to understand how you account for the behavior of rabbits, snakes, frogs, and all those other animals that become utterly impossible to explain if you view them through your specific lens. Most researchers in those fields would find themselves fundamentally at odds with your premises. By that same flawed logic, you could look at a fish with vaguely human-like facial features and attribute a whole suite of human traits to it, which really just highlights a fascinating psychological quirk in humans rather than anything biological. If I had to label it, I'd call it feeding one's own prejudices and relying on poor intuition.

I don't think you're seeing my point.
What I'm getting at is that anthropomorphism is always our starting assumption. We never actually approach anything with a completely blank slate. It's actually the opposite—we almost always start out with an anthropomorphic bias.
It's only once we have actual evidence—which happens a lot—that we drop that initial assumption.
But again, I'm saying it's only *after* we have a reason to change our minds.

ironmarlin1 said:Your explanation doesn't quite hold water for me. It doesn't necessarily follow that they held a conscious intention to use that food later; you really need actual evidence for that. To prove it, you have to demonstrate a consequence that stems from the claim that they believe they will need it later. With humans, proving this is trivial—you simply ask them why they put the food in the fridge. However, I don't see any evidence of such beliefs in foxes, nor can I see the behavioral consequences that would exist if such beliefs were actually present.

So, we are left with that framework I mentioned previously:

X is rational, and if X believes p, and p implies q, then X must also believe q because they are rational. This is something that requires empirical verification. That is how we determine whether we should adopt an intentional stance or opt for some other approach.

Okay, look, imagine you're an anthropologist visiting some remote tribe where you don't speak the language at all.
You watch them stash away food, and then you see them coming back for it later.
What would you honestly think?

Wouldn't you just assume, "Hey, they're saving this for later"? I mean, would you really be like, "I won't assume anything until I have hard evidence"?

ironmarlin1 said:I wouldn't necessarily label that second lens as "conscious"; if I were being precise, I’d call it intentional. My point wasn't that animals or computer programs are devoid of anything else, but rather that the perspective you choose depends entirely on the explanatory power you need at that moment. I didn't mean to imply that verbal communication is the sole litmus test for complexity; it really comes down to finding empirical experiments that might demonstrate, for instance, that an animal acts under the assumption that another creature possesses its own set of beliefs—behaviors that are observable and, more importantly, verifiable.

I'm still lost, though. 🤷

Let's go back to that one example:

A guy eats some salad. He eats half, then puts the rest in the fridge. Later, he comes back and finishes it.

Based on that, we could maybe set up an experiment: watch a hundred single people putting food away in their refrigerators. The hypothesis is: most of them will come back later to eat it. Say the data actually proves the hypothesis is right.

The explanation would be: those people have this concept—maybe a super clear one, or maybe it's kind of fuzzy—that even though they aren't hungry right now, they're gonna need that food later.

If that logic holds up, why wouldn't the exact same thing apply to a fox? 🤷

ironmarlin1 said:It absolutely does. If you look at the history of psychology, behaviorism essentially hit a brick wall because it tried to explain the world without ever touching on mentalistic concepts—things like beliefs, desires, or intentions—and, frankly, it just couldn't make the math work.

I'm not sure if I'm following you correctly (I probably missed something):
- we look at human behavior through two lenses (like, one mechanical lens and one conscious one)
- but for animals and computer programs, there's really just the one (the mechanical one).

Is the reason just because we can't actually sit down and have a conversation with an animal or a line of code? Like, since we can talk to other people, we can actually discuss their beliefs and wants, but we can't really do that with animals, right?

ironmarlin1 said:That isn't what I was getting at; rather, I was questioning whether such an explanation holds any actual weight. When we look at a chess engine, should we adopt a stance that it acts because of a specific change within its code, or because it possesses an intent to make a particular move? It really comes down to the empirical utility of adopting an intentional stance versus a stance based on the software's design.

I don't see much of a distinction between a tennis player executing a shot in the moment and a seagull making its move to hunt. Of course, the difference lies in the tennis player's ability to reflect on that shot later and weigh different options—but the moment of decision itself feels identical to me: there is a perception of possibility, followed by a choice. As far as I can tell, that decision doesn't need to be verbalized.

I’m not sure what a "verbal decision" would even look like, but that’s beside the point. What matters is which perspective offers the best predictive power regarding behavior. Is it the intentional stance, or something else entirely?

But, circling back to that earlier example:

When a fox buries surplus food, it does so

a) for future use,
b) just because,
c) purely by instinct.

My money is on A, and I haven't seen anything in this thread yet that would sway me from that. From what I gather, ironmarlin1 is leaning toward B, while your argument falls under C, but I’m struggling to grasp the line you're drawing between human intentionality—which is non-verbal, after all—and animal instinct.

The distinction lies in explanatory value. It's essentially the classic divide between behaviorism and cognitivism when trying to map out human conduct. The former has largely fallen out of favor. Honestly, I'm not sure how much sense it makes to debate whether something "actually" possesses intention; it really depends on how useful that explanation becomes in practice and prediction. Whether a fox "intends" to do something is contingent upon which framework you choose to apply. If I explain the fox's actions through its intentions rather than through the evolutionary mechanisms I use to predict its behavior every single time, then the latter approach is simply more accurate.

For instance, if X is rational and X believes P, then if P implies Q, X must believe Q because they are rational. This is something that requires empirical verification. That is precisely how we determine whether we ought to adopt an intentional stance or some other model.

Does that same logic apply to people?

amberviper said:2) The external perspective: alongside our internal view, consciousness also holds an outward gaze—it’s always directed at something, or rather, it’s consciousness *of* something.
We could call this "intentionality." While we might separate them for the sake of a methodological argument, human phenomenal consciousness is truly inseparable from that sense of intentionality.
In my view, the internal perspective is actually shaped by the external one, which seems perfectly capable of existing on its own, as our various sensations clearly demonstrate. A stone, for instance, possesses neither an internal nor an external perspective...

Neither the internal nor the external perspective should be reduced to mere biological mechanics. We have the capacity to conjure up things that don't even touch us directly—whether they lack physical existence entirely or are tangible objects: think of an "unprepared dinner table," "fine Napa Valley wine," a "beautiful woman," or even purely semantic concepts like "bankrupt ideals"...

3) multifunctionality: Humans are natural generalists, whereas animals are specialists. Without consciousness, a human wouldn't stand a chance at surviving based on any single "specialization." Every animal has its niche: one is incredibly fast, like a cheetah; another is venomous like a cobra; a third has crushing jaws like a lion or a hyena, and so on...
Animals are perfectly tuned to their environments, but humans aren't; instead, we reshape the environment to fit our needs. Yet, whatever falls outside the reach of animal senses remains on the periphery or stays completely out of their field of vision. Humans, however, take responsibility for everything...

A tennis player sprints toward a ball they can barely reach and catches a glimpse out of the corner of their eye that their opponent has rushed the net. The tennis player hits a lob and passes them.

Did the tennis player think, "Aha, there he is at the net, that leaves space behind him—I just need to lob it and the point is mine!" after seeing the opponent?

I don't think so. It feels more like something completely non-verbal—they saw the opponent, realized the opportunity, and acted on that opportunity.

amberviper said:It's called natural affect, or instinct! A fox isn't making intentional choices; it's just acting on instinct. There's really no need for an anthropocentric interpretation here. I laid out the differences between human and animal consciousness for you, so maybe give that a read before you jump to your next response. I couldn't get to this yesterday because the forum was acting up...

A seagull flies over the ocean and spots a fish. It dives deep. (I would say "it dives deep to catch the fish"—but for some reasons I don't quite get, you and ironmarlin1 don't agree that it's okay to say the seagull dives with the intention of catching the fish it saw, or for the purpose of catching the fish it spotted.)

I don't see any difference between the tennis player making a split-second play and the seagull diving for prey. Sure, the difference comes in that the tennis player can reflect on the move later and look for different options—but the moment of decision itself seems the same to me: there's an insight into a possibility, and then a decision. As far as I can tell, that decision isn't verbal.

So, it seems totally fair to say a seagull has the intention to catch a fish, just like a tennis player has the intention to pass their opponent.

When we're talking about planning for the future, yeah, language clearly lets humans do way more than animals that can't talk.

But, going back to that earlier example:

When a fox buries extra food, it buries it

a) for later
b) just because
c) instinctively.

My answer is a), and I haven't seen anything in this thread yet to change my mind. From what I gather, ironmarlin1's answer is b), and yours is c), but I just don't see the distinction between human intentionality (since it's non-verbal) and animal instinct.

@James Lee77

I'm not totally sure I'm following you, so let me try to break this down:

When a fox buries extra food and then digs it up later, I feel like the process goes something like this—and honestly, I guess we have to project some human feelings onto them since most of us don't actually know what it's like to be a fox:
- while burying it: "now I don't need this food," vs. "later I'm gonna need it,"
- while digging it up: "I buried food right here before, now I need it."

From what I gather, you're saying there isn't any thought of "I buried food right here before," but rather just "the food is here now," without any memory of how it got there or even knowing why they think it's there. But even if I bought that, I still don't get how you explain why they bother hiding food at all if they don't have any concept of the future.

And look, even if I were to accept that (pretty weird to me) description of what happens when they dig stuff up, I'd probably need a way deeper explanation than just one of the top researchers in the field says. Because, looking at post #9, it seems like even citing a big-name expert doesn't fly with you if what they're saying doesn't line up with your own experience and how you see the world.

ironmarlin1 said:Well, strictly speaking, if you're referring to the capacity to store information and then retrieve it for practical use, then yes, absolutely.

Quincy:

Do they have any sort of premonitions or gut feelings?

Like what, specifically? ☕

Quincy:

If having memory implies they have a "past," does that follow?

Not necessarily.

Quincy:

If they have these hunches, does that imply they have a "future"?

No.

Quincy:

So, do they have a past and a future even without possessing grammar?

As far as we know, there just isn't any evidence to support that line of reasoning. ☕

Like what and like what.

Thread pulled from Grammatical Proof of God's Existence!
moderator

So, here's what I'm wondering: is our whole concept of past, present, and future just a byproduct of how grammar works? Like, does the distinction actually come *from* language? I mean, would beings that don't have any grammar at all even have anything we could call a "past" or a "future"?
Take animals, for instance. Do they actually have memory? Do they get those weird gut feelings or premonitions? If they can remember things, does that basically mean they have a "past"? And if they have hunches about what's coming, does that imply a "future"? Basically, do they still experience a past and a future even without having grammar?

🤷

Žižek says:

Every once in a while—totally out of nowhere, totally unpredictable, and completely outside what we can actually perceive about the struggle [you know, about what’s actually happening and how things really are, the actual State of Affairs]—this Event happens. It's like it belongs to a whole different dimension.
Take late 18th-century society in France, for example: you could study the social classes, the economic clashes, the political beef, etc.—all of that is stuff we can actually wrap our heads around. But no matter how much data you collect, you'll never be able to predict or explain the truly unexplainable event called the ''French Revolution''. That's just how an Event works; it shows up ex nihilo...

To go deeper: the Event

Here's the kicker: if anyone looks at a bunch of random ''facts'' from a specific moment in history and sees them as One single Event, they're actually participating in that Event. Like, for the French aristocracy back then, what we now call the French Revolution was probably just seen as ''just another little riot...'' But honestly, everyone who decided to see it as something New—something that breaks the old status quo—became part of that Event just by doing that. If a critical mass of people hadn't realized it was this Totally New thing, this Event, then nothing new would have actually happened.
History is basically made by the people who believe in it. 🤷

It's kind of the same with 9/11: if enough people decide it's an Event that fundamentally reshapes global relationships, then it actually becomes one. On the flip side, if most people just write it off as another media circus staged by imperialist leaders, then it isn't an Event; it's just more of the same.

The big takeaway from postmodern politics is this idea that there are no Events—that ''nothing actually happens,'' that the truth event is just some fleeting, illusory glitch, a fake identification that eventually fades away when things settle back to normal, or at best, a passing promise of redemption that we should stay far away from to avoid those scary ''totalitarian'' vibes. But against all that structural skepticism, Badiou is totally right to insist that—using his term in its full theological weight—a miracle occurs...
So, I guess you can see why a truth event is ''undecidable'': from the perspective of the System, or the ontological ''state of affairs,'' it's undecidable. ...You can only identify it from the standpoint of what Badiou calls an ''explanatory intervention''—basically, if you speak from a position of subjective engagement. Or, to put it more formally, if the act of naming the situation is actually part of the situation itself. Those chaotic happenings in late 18th-century France can only be identified as the ''French Revolution'' by the people who are willing to take the ''bet'' that such an Event exists. Badiou formally defines an intervention as ''any action where a multiplicity is recognized as one event''—so, ''it will always remain uncertain whether there was even an event, except for the intervenor [l'intervenant] who decided to commit to the situation.''

🤷