James Lee77 said:I mean, I totally get why a teleological view feels almost unavoidable when you're describing stuff in the living world.
Does my comment actually make sense compared to what you said in purposeful?.
Maybe that’s just your starting assumption, but it definitely isn't mine, and honestly, I try to avoid it. If that were the case, you could argue the Sun has intentions too, just because that's the default setting you haven't disproven yet. That's not really how things work.
But it's not just me, though. I guess the most influential biology book from the last few decades—that Dawkinsian Selfish Gene—is basically built on one massive anthropomorphism. Giving genes "selfishness" is way more anthropomorphic than saying a seagull intends to eat a fish. 🤷
Still, I feel like it's a bit of a stretch to equate what I'm saying here with some kind of cosmic intention, like the Sun having a plan or something. I'm just comparing the feeding behavior of one mammal (a human) to another mammal (a fox). It seems like a huge leap to say we're as different from our relatives as the Sun is from, say, an architect.
So what's your metric for tossing out anthropomorphism in all those cases you claim are so common?🤷
Empirical failure, I guess. Like, if I assume a monkey can do what a human does—move boxes from one room to another to build a platform to reach bananas... and then it just doesn't happen, no matter how hungry it gets or how many boxes are right there... then yeah, it's pretty clear there's a gap between monkey consciousness and human consciousness.
Also, what you wrote about the rabbit was actually pretty convincing.
And like I mentioned, how do you explain rabbits, snakes, frogs, and all those other animals where you can observe this behavior, even if it leads to serious limitations? You can draw analogies, sure, but they fall apart pretty fast.
Fair enough. But I'm not out here drawing endless analogies.
I'm just saying that—unless there's proof otherwise—the most logical answer to "why does a fox cache food" is simply "to eat later."
I don't think "saving food for later" requires high intelligence or self-awareness. I mean, even a total idiot or someone who's lost their mind might save food for later, and that doesn't necessarily mean they're acting out of some rational, self-aware purpose.🤷
Alright, I’ll concede that regarding the biological world, dodging a teleological view is a tall order. However, in your blog post, you suggest that "purposive" explanations are tossed aside because they aren't scientific, which just isn't quite right. In biology, adaptationism serves as the primary framework for explaining why, say, a giraffe evolved such an elongated neck in the first place. It’s much the same in cognitive science; once you move past strict behaviorism, people talk about beliefs, desires, and willpower as perfectly standard components of the conversation.
It’s not just my own bias, either. One of the most influential biology books penned in recent decades—the Dawkinsian Selfish Gene—rests entirely on a single, glaring anthropomorphism. Attributing selfishness to genes feels significantly more anthropomorphic than suggesting a seagull has some sort of conscious intent to snatch up a fish. 🤷
Though, if memory serves, he clarifies right at the start of the book that genes aren't actually selfish; it's merely a metaphor, as they don't possess a sense of self.
Still, it feels like a bit of a stretch to equate what I wrote on this thread with some kind of cosmic intention, like that of the Sun. My point was comparing the foraging habits of one mammal, a human, to those of another, like a fox. To suggest our dietary differences make us as fundamentally distinct from our relatives as the Sun is from, say, an architect, seems a little excessive.
Fair enough, perhaps I pushed the Sun analogy a bit too far, but I was really just trying to find where the line is drawn. Given that certain corners of the philosophy subforums are populated by folks who swear by astrology, I figured there might be some outliers out there who believe the Sun, Jupiter, or Neptune possess actual intentions. 😁
That’s an empirical failure. For instance, suppose I assume a monkey can—much like a human—move boxes from one room to another to build a makeshift platform to reach some bananas... and if that simply doesn't happen, no matter how hungry the creature gets or how many boxes are lying around, then it becomes clear there is a profound difference between the consciousness of a monkey and that of a human.
Also, what you mentioned regarding the rabbit was quite compelling.
But I wouldn't go quite so far in equating the consciousness of humans and monkeys. They might share a similar level of intentionality, though even that seems like a leap. You’re never going to see this kind of recursive thought process among primates: Majmun1 wants Majmun2 to realize that Majmun1 wants Majmun2 to believe Y.
Fair enough. But I’m certainly not going to sit here and churn out an endless stream of analogies.
My point is simply this—barring some groundbreaking evidence to the contrary—that if you ask why a fox caches its food, the most logical, straightforward answer is "to eat later."
You're right about that, but we aren't actually asking the same question. The real crux of the matter is whether the fox hides food because it possesses a conscious awareness of a potential future, or if it’s simply hardwired to cache food in the same way a computer processor is engineered to perform calculations.
It seems to me that "saving food for later" doesn't necessarily demand high intelligence or self-awareness; frankly, even someone who is completely irrational or deeply confused might leave food behind for a later time, and that action wouldn't inherently prove they are acting as a rational or self-aware being. 🤷
I agree with you there, but again, that doesn't lead us to conclude that the individual is consciously aware of the future in any way that we can define or recognize.