How many grains make a heap?

Am I seeing things, or is that just a mountain of red cards?
How many red cards does it actually take to make a pile?

Amanda Jackson5 said:The actual question was: how many grains make a heap? Or, where exactly does the line fall between a heap and a non-heap? For a more technical breakdown, check out:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox
Like I mentioned back in post #3, we’re dealing with the indeterminate limit of predicate application (which you pointed out yourself), and this concept actually extends beyond simple predicates; it eventually evolved in analytical philosophy into the idea of "vagueness". So, the heap itself isn't really the point; it’s just a convenient little exercise for testing logic, demonstrating that when formal logic hits a wall, you inevitably have to bring in dialectical reasoning or "fuzzy" logic to make sense of things.

I might have glossed over some details in my previous explanation, but now I'm not quite sure what you're getting at. Are you suggesting that emergence is somehow nonexistent or just an illusion? If you think quality is an illusion, then emergence is an illusion too. In fact, quantity would be an illusion as well, since they're just mutually defining binary oppositions. A heap isn't the same thing as a grain, because a heap possesses a different quality than a single grain. If the quality of the heap differs from that of the grain because its properties have changed, then that is precisely what emergence is.

I do not believe emergence is non-existent. Whether it is illusory is a separate matter, but I would argue it is no more illusory than anything else.

From my understanding of our previous discussion regarding the chair—which likely applies here to the heap—you believe emergence creates something entirely new, a whole that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. This is where we differ. To me, this is simply the formation of a new concept, one whose components are derivable from the parts themselves. If you take all the parts of a heap and perform a statistical analysis, examining their spatial configuration and other vital metrics, the results are clear. The size of the heap is derived from the number of grains. The volume is derived from their size and arrangement. The weight of the heap is derived from the weight of all individual grains.

The qualitative property of the heap that seems different from the sum of its parts does not spontaneously manifest; rather, it is something you attribute to a new concept in order to create (or "emerge") it. You simply decide that you will no longer count these grains individually and instead say, "that is a heap." Any such collection of items that defies exact counting will be labeled a heap. Thus, the concept emerges because you created it, not because the grains themselves underwent a transformation.

It appears I included several contradictions in my previous post 🤔
I must learn to write with more precision. I ask my readers to compensate by reading more carefully so that my intended meaning might become clear. 🙂

Zachary Mendoza2 said:I do not believe emergence is non-existent. Whether it is illusory is a separate matter, but I would argue it is no more illusory than anything else.

From my understanding of our previous discussion regarding the chair—which likely applies here to the heap—you believe emergence creates something entirely new, a whole that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. This is where we differ. To me, this is simply the formation of a new concept, one whose components are derivable from the parts themselves. If you take all the parts of a heap and perform a statistical analysis, examining their spatial configuration and other vital metrics, the results are clear. The size of the heap is derived from the number of grains. The volume is derived from their size and arrangement. The weight of the heap is derived from the weight of all individual grains.

The qualitative property of the heap that seems different from the sum of its parts does not spontaneously manifest; rather, it is something you attribute to a new concept in order to create (or "emerge") it. You simply decide that you will no longer count these grains individually and instead say, "that is a heap." Any such collection of items that defies exact counting will be labeled a heap. Thus, the concept emerges because you created it, not because the grains themselves underwent a transformation.

Sure, a concept is formed, but it also exists objectively outside of our own mental reflection. If we don't acknowledge that, we’re forced into a purely psychologistic view of logic, which would basically make any kind of actual knowledge impossible because you'd be stuck in that radical subject-object dualism. It’s pretty obvious that the components of a heap of grain are derivable from the individual grains themselves. Those single grains aren't anything other than the building blocks, the parts of the whole. The whole directly implies the parts, and vice versa. When you claim we're just forming a new concept, it sounds like you're suggesting the unity between the whole and its parts isn't inherent, but is instead something created by external reflection—though, in reality, it’s both. That essential relationship is what bridges the gap between immanence and external reflection (and by "essential relation," I mean that every concept is a unity of itself, of another, and of the unity between itself and that other). If you focus too much on negative unity, you end up seeing the whole and the parts as separate entities. From that perspective, the whole becomes nothing more than a reflected self-subsistence, or just a momentary postulate—which seems to be your angle. In that case, the whole is alienated from itself, existing only in "the other." But the truth is that the relationship between the whole and its parts is conditional; you simply can't have one without the other.
Common sense tells us a whole is equal to the sum of its parts, yet the whole isn't quite the same as those parts. The whole represents a reflected unity. The parts essentially say, "we aren't the whole." It should be fairly intuitive to see that the relationship between the whole and its parts is tied to the nature of appearance itself, leading to the realization that existence and appearance exist within that aforementioned essential relation. Existence is the whole, while appearances are the parts. You could broadly say that any attempt to isolate a single abstracted moment of a whole will inevitably be undermined by the re-emergence of another moment within it.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:I do not believe emergence is non-existent. Whether it is illusory is a separate matter, but I would argue it is no more illusory than anything else.

From my understanding of our previous discussion regarding the chair—which likely applies here to the heap—you believe emergence creates something entirely new, a whole that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. This is where we differ. To me, this is simply the formation of a new concept, one whose components are derivable from the parts themselves. If you take all the parts of a heap and perform a statistical analysis, examining their spatial configuration and other vital metrics, the results are clear. The size of the heap is derived from the number of grains. The volume is derived from their size and arrangement. The weight of the heap is derived from the weight of all individual grains.

The qualitative property of the heap that seems different from the sum of its parts does not spontaneously manifest; rather, it is something you attribute to a new concept in order to create (or "emerge") it. You simply decide that you will no longer count these grains individually and instead say, "that is a heap." Any such collection of items that defies exact counting will be labeled a heap. Thus, the concept emerges because you created it, not because the grains themselves underwent a transformation.

Of course. Those are all quantitative measurements—just a summation of parts. However, the pile as a whole possesses a quality that is fundamentally distinct from any individual grain within it.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:I do not believe emergence is non-existent. Whether it is illusory is a separate matter, but I would argue it is no more illusory than anything else.

From my understanding of our previous discussion regarding the chair—which likely applies here to the heap—you believe emergence creates something entirely new, a whole that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. This is where we differ. To me, this is simply the formation of a new concept, one whose components are derivable from the parts themselves. If you take all the parts of a heap and perform a statistical analysis, examining their spatial configuration and other vital metrics, the results are clear. The size of the heap is derived from the number of grains. The volume is derived from their size and arrangement. The weight of the heap is derived from the weight of all individual grains.

The qualitative property of the heap that seems different from the sum of its parts does not spontaneously manifest; rather, it is something you attribute to a new concept in order to create (or "emerge") it. You simply decide that you will no longer count these grains individually and instead say, "that is a heap." Any such collection of items that defies exact counting will be labeled a heap. Thus, the concept emerges because you created it, not because the grains themselves underwent a transformation.

I didn't create it. Concepts actually exist in reality; we just give them labels. This applies to every single thing that truly exists—whether it's a subatomic particle, a freight train, Frogger, the entire universe, or the absolute. A concept is just a reflected unity of real relationships that can all be traced back to one essential connection. Every concept carries its own internal tension, some kind of contradiction or insufficient definition that forces it to evolve beyond itself. An emergent property or a new quality is simply the byproduct of those underlying relations. So, it's pretty obvious that nothing just "creates itself." Nothing in this world does.

I found it impossible to accept any concept that exists outside of a person's own subjective reality.

placidranger said:I found it impossible to accept any concept that exists outside of a person's own subjective reality.

But let me ask you this: is the existence of things outside of our subjective reality acceptable to you? By using the phrase "subjective reality," you’ve essentially invited an "objective reality" to the party as its logical opposite. Once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a mathematical necessity. Your only other option is to find some other rational way to dismantle that duality entirely.

It’s more of a linguistic thing, I guess. If we can see the exact number of grains right away, we might say there are, say, seven of them. But if we can't count them instantly—like if there are thirteen—we just call it a pile. I think psychologists suggest that for most people, that threshold for quick counting sits somewhere around seven to nine items.

John Palmer9 said:It’s more of a linguistic thing, I guess. If we can see the exact number of grains right away, we might say there are, say, seven of them. But if we can't count them instantly—like if there are thirteen—we just call it a pile. I think psychologists suggest that for most people, that threshold for quick counting sits somewhere around seven to nine items.

And what about that example regarding baldness?

@Amanda Jackson5: I mostly agree with you, though I still get the impression you view emergence as something mystical and beyond calculation. You described how concepts emerge quite accurately. It is true they exist in reality, and also in consciousness through our recognition and naming of them. They derive from relationships with other concepts, which were formed by the same process.
There is an element here that is difficult to calculate, but my sense is that you aren't just talking about difficulty; you seem to believe emergence is inherently unpredictable. How is a whole greater than its parts? Because it possesses properties beyond its components—specifically, its relations to things outside itself. If the entire universe consisted only of those specific parts, the whole would simply equal the universe. But that isn't the case. We recognize distinct wholes and assign them names because we perceive their mutual relationships, not just the internal connections of their constituent parts.

To return to the part that is hard to calculate—which I don't see you identifying as the actual issue, even though that is where the problem lies, rather than in this silly logic of "let me limit the whole to its parts and see if I have a whole, oh, I don't."
It is difficult to calculate what constitutes a pile or a chair for you, versus what it is for me, or for a Japanese person or a Martian.
While your chair, my chair, and his chair all physically exist, we recognize them differently in reality. For me, a chair is roughly something mobile, designed for one person to sit on comfortably, among other traits. It could be wood or metal, with or without a back, in any variety. I have a mental framework, so I recognize certain objects as chairs. Since our conceptual structures differ slightly, the objects you identify as chairs won't perfectly match mine. Those Japanese people prefer to sit differently, so their chairs are different. And Martians have entirely different anatomy, so we wouldn't consider their seating to be chairs, nor would they consider ours. This is what is difficult to calculate, but it isn't mystical. If you understand reality, and if you understand someone else's conceptual structure (which is the problematic part), then you can deduce how a concept emerges for them to correspond to an object or a whole within reality.

Amanda Jackson5 said:And what about that example regarding baldness?

I suppose that’s why we have different ways to describe hair loss. You’ve got thick hair, thinning hair, receding hairlines, or just being totally bald... If anyone actually feels the need to get pedantic about it, I guess they'll eventually come up with an even more specific term. Language seems to define things only as deeply as there's a practical reason to do so, I guess.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:@Amanda Jackson5: I mostly agree with you, though I still get the impression you view emergence as something mystical and beyond calculation. You described how concepts emerge quite accurately. It is true they exist in reality, and also in consciousness through our recognition and naming of them. They derive from relationships with other concepts, which were formed by the same process.
There is an element here that is difficult to calculate, but my sense is that you aren't just talking about difficulty; you seem to believe emergence is inherently unpredictable. How is a whole greater than its parts? Because it possesses properties beyond its components—specifically, its relations to things outside itself. If the entire universe consisted only of those specific parts, the whole would simply equal the universe. But that isn't the case. We recognize distinct wholes and assign them names because we perceive their mutual relationships, not just the internal connections of their constituent parts.

To return to the part that is hard to calculate—which I don't see you identifying as the actual issue, even though that is where the problem lies, rather than in this silly logic of "let me limit the whole to its parts and see if I have a whole, oh, I don't."
It is difficult to calculate what constitutes a pile or a chair for you, versus what it is for me, or for a Japanese person or a Martian.
While your chair, my chair, and his chair all physically exist, we recognize them differently in reality. For me, a chair is roughly something mobile, designed for one person to sit on comfortably, among other traits. It could be wood or metal, with or without a back, in any variety. I have a mental framework, so I recognize certain objects as chairs. Since our conceptual structures differ slightly, the objects you identify as chairs won't perfectly match mine. Those Japanese people prefer to sit differently, so their chairs are different. And Martians have entirely different anatomy, so we wouldn't consider their seating to be chairs, nor would they consider ours. This is what is difficult to calculate, but it isn't mystical. If you understand reality, and if you understand someone else's conceptual structure (which is the problematic part), then you can deduce how a concept emerges for them to correspond to an object or a whole within reality.

No, I’ve never claimed anything was mystical, nor do I hold any sort of private, occult beliefs. Honestly, I’m a spiritual child of the Enlightenment. But it’s also a mistake to assume that everything which defies calculation is inherently mystical. You can't reduce everything down to mere math or pure quantity. It’s pretty straightforward—quantity is essentially meaningless without its counterweight: quality. You see this even in the concept of "magnitude," which is really just the marriage of quantity and quality.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:@Amanda Jackson5: I mostly agree with you, though I still get the impression you view emergence as something mystical and beyond calculation. You described how concepts emerge quite accurately. It is true they exist in reality, and also in consciousness through our recognition and naming of them. They derive from relationships with other concepts, which were formed by the same process.
There is an element here that is difficult to calculate, but my sense is that you aren't just talking about difficulty; you seem to believe emergence is inherently unpredictable. How is a whole greater than its parts? Because it possesses properties beyond its components—specifically, its relations to things outside itself. If the entire universe consisted only of those specific parts, the whole would simply equal the universe. But that isn't the case. We recognize distinct wholes and assign them names because we perceive their mutual relationships, not just the internal connections of their constituent parts.

To return to the part that is hard to calculate—which I don't see you identifying as the actual issue, even though that is where the problem lies, rather than in this silly logic of "let me limit the whole to its parts and see if I have a whole, oh, I don't."
It is difficult to calculate what constitutes a pile or a chair for you, versus what it is for me, or for a Japanese person or a Martian.
While your chair, my chair, and his chair all physically exist, we recognize them differently in reality. For me, a chair is roughly something mobile, designed for one person to sit on comfortably, among other traits. It could be wood or metal, with or without a back, in any variety. I have a mental framework, so I recognize certain objects as chairs. Since our conceptual structures differ slightly, the objects you identify as chairs won't perfectly match mine. Those Japanese people prefer to sit differently, so their chairs are different. And Martians have entirely different anatomy, so we wouldn't consider their seating to be chairs, nor would they consider ours. This is what is difficult to calculate, but it isn't mystical. If you understand reality, and if you understand someone else's conceptual structure (which is the problematic part), then you can deduce how a concept emerges for them to correspond to an object or a whole within reality.

It’s difficult, or rather impossible, to calculate because we aren't talking about quantity here. Pure quantity is basically the negation of being. What we're dealing with is essence, not just a conceptual structure itself. I actually went into quite a bit of detail about this in that other thread on emergence, where I was unsuccessfully trying to explain the concept to Aphex Twin:

Essentially, for something to exist, it has to be determined. Existence is only possible in the form of a determined being. For any existence to be genuine, actual, or real, it must be rational; in other words, actuality is the union of existence and essence (or reflection; actuality is the realization of formal possibility, or the concretization of an idea). Actual things are the unity of appearance and essence (which implies that contingent or irrational things aren't truly "real," even if they can manifest as appearances). Appearances are fleeting, whereas essences are enduring (or at least relatively more stable). Put simply—though it's not particularly helpful—essence is that which is not an appearance within a thing; that is, it is what does not merely "appear" (even though the very nature of an essence is to manifest, at which point it ceases to be purely essence). Essence is internal, while appearance is external. Essence is what people claim varies subjectively across different cultures when discussing chairs or similar objects. If essence were determined to the same degree as appearance, it would merely be its correlate. Instead, essence is what a thing truly is—its thing-in-itself. By that same logic, a law of nature is also an essence.

Amanda Jackson5 said:But let me ask you this: is the existence of things outside of our subjective reality acceptable to you? By using the phrase "subjective reality," you’ve essentially invited an "objective reality" to the party as its logical opposite. Once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a mathematical necessity. Your only other option is to find some other rational way to dismantle that duality entirely.

It isn't. Nothing we can actually discuss as a "thing" exists outside our subjective reality. The moment we start talking about objects, we are inevitably discussing perceptions—or abstractions of those perceptions. There is no other way to frame it.

We might claim that atoms or physical forces exist objectively, but those are just our models of an objective reality—abstract concepts that no one has ever truly witnessed. They’re incredibly useful, sure, but they remain trapped within subjective reality. There is no escape from perception.

Quincy:

By using the term "subjective reality," you've implicitly invoked "objective reality" as its opposite. And once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a logical necessity. Your only alternative is to find some other rational way to dismantle that dichotomy.

Objective reality isn't the opposite of subjective reality. It is necessarily a subjective model of "something"—which makes it part of that same subjective framework.

As for essences... essences are imputed, not inherent, regardless of how convincing they seem. At the end of the day, there's nothing in a chair but atoms.

"A heap" refers to anything in the plural. It doesn't actually matter how much you're talking about; it could be two apples, twenty apples, or two hundred apples. It's all a matter of perception, really—as long as you define the term through the lens of plurality, you're technically always on solid ground. ☕

Amanda Jackson5 said:No, I’ve never claimed anything was mystical, nor do I hold any sort of private, occult beliefs. Honestly, I’m a spiritual child of the Enlightenment. But it’s also a mistake to assume that everything which defies calculation is inherently mystical. You can't reduce everything down to mere math or pure quantity. It’s pretty straightforward—quantity is essentially meaningless without its counterweight: quality. You see this even in the concept of "magnitude," which is really just the marriage of quantity and quality.

It’s difficult, or rather impossible, to calculate because we aren't talking about quantity here. Pure quantity is basically the negation of being. What we're dealing with is essence, not just a conceptual structure itself. I actually went into quite a bit of detail about this in that other thread on emergence, where I was unsuccessfully trying to explain the concept to Aphex Twin:

Essentially, for something to exist, it has to be determined. Existence is only possible in the form of a determined being. For any existence to be genuine, actual, or real, it must be rational; in other words, actuality is the union of existence and essence (or reflection; actuality is the realization of formal possibility, or the concretization of an idea). Actual things are the unity of appearance and essence (which implies that contingent or irrational things aren't truly "real," even if they can manifest as appearances). Appearances are fleeting, whereas essences are enduring (or at least relatively more stable). Put simply—though it's not particularly helpful—essence is that which is not an appearance within a thing; that is, it is what does not merely "appear" (even though the very nature of an essence is to manifest, at which point it ceases to be purely essence). Essence is internal, while appearance is external. Essence is what people claim varies subjectively across different cultures when discussing chairs or similar objects. If essence were determined to the same degree as appearance, it would merely be its correlate. Instead, essence is what a thing truly is—its thing-in-itself. By that same logic, a law of nature is also an essence.

I’d argue that a "heap" is defined far more by its quality than by its sheer number. Think about it—if we claimed a heap of sand was defined solely by count, what happens when a significant amount is scattered across space or time? In other words, they must be unified in one place at one single moment. Furthermore, the contents of a heap need to be of the same kind—they need a common denominator. A heap of trash means that the pile consists entirely, or at least predominantly, of garbage. There isn't exactly room for junk in a pile of cash, for instance...

If a heap were defined purely quantitatively, I suppose I would say the requirement is simply having more than one item (meaning, two grains or more) in the same spot. Of course, there will always be those who disagree, so it wouldn't be an objective metric. Therefore, in terms of raw amount, it remains a subjective, arbitrary number—one where we reach a consensus, establishing a standard through agreement, which then becomes our objectified measure.

Neuroscience touches upon the concept of "archetypes," which roughly corresponds to the notion of essence. They speak of an archetypal ego or an archetypal mother; psychology explores similar themes. They haven't fully fleshed out the details, and they tend to get defensive when you start asking difficult questions. But essentially, they are discussing essences.

To be brief, I largely agree with everyone here, except for the claim that it is impossible to calculate—because we aren't dealing with quantity. It is true that we aren't dealing with quantity, yet the way things are calculated today focuses solely on quantities. However, calculation is not impossible. One simply needs to change the method of computation. If a thing can be conceptualized, it can be calculated. As I mentioned previously, the issue isn't the math itself, but rather the difficulty of obtaining reliable input data. If we wanted to calculate the essence of your chair, we would need access to the contents of your mind, and we currently lack a way to retrieve that directly, quickly, or accurately.

placidranger said:It isn't. Nothing we can actually discuss as a "thing" exists outside our subjective reality. The moment we start talking about objects, we are inevitably discussing perceptions—or abstractions of those perceptions. There is no other way to frame it.

We might claim that atoms or physical forces exist objectively, but those are just our models of an objective reality—abstract concepts that no one has ever truly witnessed. They’re incredibly useful, sure, but they remain trapped within subjective reality. There is no escape from perception.

Quincy:

By using the term "subjective reality," you've implicitly invoked "objective reality" as its opposite. And once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a logical necessity. Your only alternative is to find some other rational way to dismantle that dichotomy.

Objective reality isn't the opposite of subjective reality. It is necessarily a subjective model of "something"—which makes it part of that same subjective framework.

As for essences... essences are imputed, not inherent, regardless of how convincing they seem. At the end of the day, there's nothing in a chair but atoms.

Yes, this. 👍

placidranger said:It isn't. Nothing we can actually discuss as a "thing" exists outside our subjective reality. The moment we start talking about objects, we are inevitably discussing perceptions—or abstractions of those perceptions. There is no other way to frame it.

We might claim that atoms or physical forces exist objectively, but those are just our models of an objective reality—abstract concepts that no one has ever truly witnessed. They’re incredibly useful, sure, but they remain trapped within subjective reality. There is no escape from perception.

Quincy:

By using the term "subjective reality," you've implicitly invoked "objective reality" as its opposite. And once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a logical necessity. Your only alternative is to find some other rational way to dismantle that dichotomy.

Objective reality isn't the opposite of subjective reality. It is necessarily a subjective model of "something"—which makes it part of that same subjective framework.

As for essences... essences are imputed, not inherent, regardless of how convincing they seem. At the end of the day, there's nothing in a chair but atoms.

Look, I’ve already told you why that just doesn't work. If we follow your logic, we end up with only one single reality. Now, I’m perfectly fine with the idea that there is only one reality—one that essentially bridges the gap between the subjective and the objective. That position is actually logically coherent. Your approach, on the other hand, isn't; you're picking one side of the subjective/objective opposition and just deleting the other one entirely, which is, unfortunately, a logical impossibility. That said, you probably aren't trying to be nonsensical; you're likely just struggling to articulate what you actually mean. You're probably trying to argue that humans can only ever experience phenomena, leaving the Kant's noumenal "thing-in-itself" forever out of reach. But I've pointed this out before: even that stance falls apart under scrutiny. It's like telling someone they are perceiving the world around them with perfect accuracy, yet somehow, that perfectly accurate perception is fundamentally false. As Hegel would put it, it's a total non-sequitur. It’s a classic case of *contradictio in adjecto*—a fancy way of saying someone is trying to marry two ideas that just plain refuse to live in the same house. It’s like ordering a "dry martini" from a bartender who thinks salt is a primary flavor profile, or claiming you want a "silent rock concert." You’re essentially building a house out of nothing but contradictions and wondering why the roof keeps falling in on your head.You’re essentially talking about an empty abstraction that lacks any actual determinism—which is exactly what you’re baselessly claiming about essence. It would be like me arguing that the world is inherently irrational and unknowable, or suggesting that something like science is a total impossibility. That kind of logic is more aligned with a schizophrenic mind or the deep subconscious than anything resembling reality. If we follow your line of reasoning, what happens to the laws of nature? In a world like that, laws simply can't exist. The reality is that if something is truly unknowable, it isn't true. You can't even apply a criterion of truth to something like that, so it can't logically occupy a state we would recognize as existence. Sure, we can imagine a thing that exists entirely detached from its own being, but we wouldn't call that a "thing"—we'd just call it a possibility.

placidranger said:It isn't. Nothing we can actually discuss as a "thing" exists outside our subjective reality. The moment we start talking about objects, we are inevitably discussing perceptions—or abstractions of those perceptions. There is no other way to frame it.

We might claim that atoms or physical forces exist objectively, but those are just our models of an objective reality—abstract concepts that no one has ever truly witnessed. They’re incredibly useful, sure, but they remain trapped within subjective reality. There is no escape from perception.

Quincy:

By using the term "subjective reality," you've implicitly invoked "objective reality" as its opposite. And once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a logical necessity. Your only alternative is to find some other rational way to dismantle that dichotomy.

Objective reality isn't the opposite of subjective reality. It is necessarily a subjective model of "something"—which makes it part of that same subjective framework.

As for essences... essences are imputed, not inherent, regardless of how convincing they seem. At the end of the day, there's nothing in a chair but atoms.

I’m struggling to wrap my head around this one—are atoms and fundamental forces actually objective realities, or just subjective constructs? It feels a bit arbitrary to grant them some kind of privileged status in our understanding of the world. If you're going to be truly consistent with your own logic, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, if we follow that thread to its logical conclusion, you can't really argue for the existence of objects, material reality, or nature itself. All you're left with is a collection of ideas, which basically drags us straight into the territory of absolute subjective idealism.

placidranger said:It isn't. Nothing we can actually discuss as a "thing" exists outside our subjective reality. The moment we start talking about objects, we are inevitably discussing perceptions—or abstractions of those perceptions. There is no other way to frame it.

We might claim that atoms or physical forces exist objectively, but those are just our models of an objective reality—abstract concepts that no one has ever truly witnessed. They’re incredibly useful, sure, but they remain trapped within subjective reality. There is no escape from perception.

Quincy:

By using the term "subjective reality," you've implicitly invoked "objective reality" as its opposite. And once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a logical necessity. Your only alternative is to find some other rational way to dismantle that dichotomy.

Objective reality isn't the opposite of subjective reality. It is necessarily a subjective model of "something"—which makes it part of that same subjective framework.

As for essences... essences are imputed, not inherent, regardless of how convincing they seem. At the end of the day, there's nothing in a chair but atoms.

So, are we really suggesting that objective reality is just some subset of subjective reality? I've already laid out why that logic falls apart above. Honestly, does anyone have a single rational argument for why subjective experience shouldn't be considered an integral part of the objective world?

placidranger said:It isn't. Nothing we can actually discuss as a "thing" exists outside our subjective reality. The moment we start talking about objects, we are inevitably discussing perceptions—or abstractions of those perceptions. There is no other way to frame it.

We might claim that atoms or physical forces exist objectively, but those are just our models of an objective reality—abstract concepts that no one has ever truly witnessed. They’re incredibly useful, sure, but they remain trapped within subjective reality. There is no escape from perception.

Quincy:

By using the term "subjective reality," you've implicitly invoked "objective reality" as its opposite. And once you establish an opposition like that, their inherent unity becomes a logical necessity. Your only alternative is to find some other rational way to dismantle that dichotomy.

Objective reality isn't the opposite of subjective reality. It is necessarily a subjective model of "something"—which makes it part of that same subjective framework.

As for essences... essences are imputed, not inherent, regardless of how convincing they seem. At the end of the day, there's nothing in a chair but atoms.

Why stop at just atoms? You literally just argued that atoms themselves are useful abstractions. Essences function the exact same way—they're just another layer of abstraction. The only real difference on that abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (assuming they even exist in a way we can actually perceive?), whereas essences act as the counterpoint to those phenomena. What I'm getting at is that a phenomenon without an essence is just an absurdity. If you strip away essence, you effectively strip away the laws of nature too. Does a chair contain subatomic particles? Or molecules?

Zachary Mendoza2 said:Neuroscience touches upon the concept of "archetypes," which roughly corresponds to the notion of essence. They speak of an archetypal ego or an archetypal mother; psychology explores similar themes. They haven't fully fleshed out the details, and they tend to get defensive when you start asking difficult questions. But essentially, they are discussing essences.

To be brief, I largely agree with everyone here, except for the claim that it is impossible to calculate—because we aren't dealing with quantity. It is true that we aren't dealing with quantity, yet the way things are calculated today focuses solely on quantities. However, calculation is not impossible. One simply needs to change the method of computation. If a thing can be conceptualized, it can be calculated. As I mentioned previously, the issue isn't the math itself, but rather the difficulty of obtaining reliable input data. If we wanted to calculate the essence of your chair, we would need access to the contents of your mind, and we currently lack a way to retrieve that directly, quickly, or accurately.

Yes, this. 👍

Look, I’m not claiming to have some profound grasp of why everything can’t just be boiled down to a series of calculations, nor am I trying to lecture anyone on the actual mechanics of the age of emergence. But, if I’m being honest, my gut tells me that this kind of heavy-handed reductionism just doesn't hold water. I find myself frequently leaning on Robert B. Laughlin and his book, A Different Universe (Reinventing physics), and there's a particular idea in there that feels incredibly relevant to what we're discussing right now:

Quincy:

Thinking about all this—specifically this whole idea of emergence mentioned by Amanda Jackson5—really makes you wonder which set of rules actually holds more weight: the granular details that make up the foundation, or the transcendent, emergent laws that those very details end up generating. It’s a semantic rabbit hole, so you aren't going to find some absolute, definitive answer, but it feels like a primitive version of that classic moral dilemma we face when we assume the laws of biology are somehow subordinate to the laws of chemistry and physics. It serves as a sort of allegory for how easily a person can master one layer of reality while remaining completely oblivious to the other. The barrier preventing us from seeing the full picture isn't some mystical veil; it's just a fundamental physical limitation. The clash between these two ways of looking at things—the laws governing the individual parts versus the laws governing the collective whole—is an ancient tug-of-war that you aren't going to settle with a few minutes of pondering or some casual chat over coffee. It’s more like a fundamental tension between two opposing poles of thought. Throughout history, one side might seem to hold all the cards for a while, but that dominance is always temporary; the real heart of the matter lies in the conflict itself. It’s kind of funny how the very success of reductionism ended up paving the road toward its own downfall. For a long time, we thought if we just squinted hard enough at the microscopic pieces of the puzzle, we could solve everything. But as our quantitative studies got more sophisticated, we started realizing that—even on a pretty basic level—those collective principles of organization aren't just some interesting side show. They actually seem to be the whole point; they are the true source of physical laws, perhaps even the most fundamental ones we've ever encountered. Our measurements have become so precise that we can confidently report on how the hunt for one single, ultimate truth has effectively hit a dead end. Instead, nature is revealing itself to be this massive tower of truths, where every new layer emerges from the one beneath it and then moves right past it as we scale up our observations. As we transition into the age of emergence, the old myth about the absolute authority of mathematics is finally starting to crumble. It’s a stubborn delusion, unfortunately, still deeply embedded in our culture—you see it everywhere in the media and those pop-science books that insist searching for a single, ultimate law is the only way to do "real" science. They ignore the massive, overwhelming mountain of experimental evidence suggesting that reality works in the exact opposite way. We can dismantle this reductionist fantasy quite easily by simply proving that while certain rules might be technically accurate, they are practically useless; if we ask some of the brightest minds in the country to actually use those rules to predict the future, they’ll fail miserably. Their inability to make sense of the chaos is pretty much like the Wizard of Oz trying to figure out how to get Dorothy back home to Kansas. In practice, it’s actually the exact opposite of that myth about collective behavior being dictated by law. Realistically, laws are just the patterns that emerge from how things behave collectively—which includes everything from logic to mathematics. The reason our brains can actually make sense of the physical world and predict what's coming next isn't because we're some kind of geniuses; it's simply because nature makes life easier for us by organizing itself into predictable rules.

You’re misinterpreting my point as reductionism. It isn't. In fact, that quote from Robert B. Laughlin suggests exactly the opposite. Reductionism belongs to the era of classical physics—the pre-quantum age. Today, it's clear that such an approach is neither sufficient nor accurate.

If I may interject with a bit of physics. I assume you're familiar with the double-slit experiment. What does it actually demonstrate? That there is no "electron-in-itself." There is only the "electron-as-observed." The act of detection is what defines it as such. Without detection, it would be as if the electron didn't exist at all. Therefore, we shouldn't think of it as an independent entity versus a perceived one, but rather as a single, unified phenomenon.

Perhaps I am misreading your position, though. Let me ask: didn't Hegel dismantle Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself? You seem to argue that essence is this thing-in-itself. While you claim it isn't phenomenal, you still treat it as real. You suggest essence belongs to the object, which contradicts placidranger's view that humans project essence onto the object. Am I following you correctly? Throughout your work, you speak of overcoming dualities and how one side cannot exist alone, yet here, you seem stuck on essence, favoring only the side of the thing-in-itself.

Amanda Jackson5 said:Sure, a concept is formed, but it also exists objectively outside of our own mental reflection. If we don't acknowledge that, we’re forced into a purely psychologistic view of logic, which would basically make any kind of actual knowledge impossible because you'd be stuck in that radical subject-object dualism. It’s pretty obvious that the components of a heap of grain are derivable from the individual grains themselves. Those single grains aren't anything other than the building blocks, the parts of the whole. The whole directly implies the parts, and vice versa. When you claim we're just forming a new concept, it sounds like you're suggesting the unity between the whole and its parts isn't inherent, but is instead something created by external reflection—though, in reality, it’s both. That essential relationship is what bridges the gap between immanence and external reflection (and by "essential relation," I mean that every concept is a unity of itself, of another, and of the unity between itself and that other). If you focus too much on negative unity, you end up seeing the whole and the parts as separate entities. From that perspective, the whole becomes nothing more than a reflected self-subsistence, or just a momentary postulate—which seems to be your angle. In that case, the whole is alienated from itself, existing only in "the other." But the truth is that the relationship between the whole and its parts is conditional; you simply can't have one without the other.
Common sense tells us a whole is equal to the sum of its parts, yet the whole isn't quite the same as those parts. The whole represents a reflected unity. The parts essentially say, "we aren't the whole." It should be fairly intuitive to see that the relationship between the whole and its parts is tied to the nature of appearance itself, leading to the realization that existence and appearance exist within that aforementioned essential relation. Existence is the whole, while appearances are the parts. You could broadly say that any attempt to isolate a single abstracted moment of a whole will inevitably be undermined by the re-emergence of another moment within it.

Of course. Those are all quantitative measurements—just a summation of parts. However, the pile as a whole possesses a quality that is fundamentally distinct from any individual grain within it.

I didn't create it. Concepts actually exist in reality; we just give them labels. This applies to every single thing that truly exists—whether it's a subatomic particle, a freight train, Frogger, the entire universe, or the absolute. A concept is just a reflected unity of real relationships that can all be traced back to one essential connection. Every concept carries its own internal tension, some kind of contradiction or insufficient definition that forces it to evolve beyond itself. An emergent property or a new quality is simply the byproduct of those underlying relations. So, it's pretty obvious that nothing just "creates itself." Nothing in this world does.

Now, let’s say we have a pile of piles.
In that case, that meta-pile would supposedly have a quality identical to its individual components (the original piles)

Zachary Mendoza2 said:Neuroscience touches upon the concept of "archetypes," which roughly corresponds to the notion of essence. They speak of an archetypal ego or an archetypal mother; psychology explores similar themes. They haven't fully fleshed out the details, and they tend to get defensive when you start asking difficult questions. But essentially, they are discussing essences.

To be brief, I largely agree with everyone here, except for the claim that it is impossible to calculate—because we aren't dealing with quantity. It is true that we aren't dealing with quantity, yet the way things are calculated today focuses solely on quantities. However, calculation is not impossible. One simply needs to change the method of computation. If a thing can be conceptualized, it can be calculated. As I mentioned previously, the issue isn't the math itself, but rather the difficulty of obtaining reliable input data. If we wanted to calculate the essence of your chair, we would need access to the contents of your mind, and we currently lack a way to retrieve that directly, quickly, or accurately.

Yes, this. 👍

Archetypes might serve as the essence of certain personality types—mythological ones, perhaps—but the concept of an essence applies to everything. Take the essence of a door, for instance (if we're being pedantic about the German terminology)—it's essentially "that which is not the phenomenon." You can invent whatever you want within that negation. Technically, it could be a "pattern recognizer," a "categorizer," or some kind of mental switch 🤷 Neither neuroscience, philosophy, nor AI has actually figured out how to build a machine that functions that way. We're still waiting on what would qualify as true "computational understanding."

Amanda Jackson5 said:Look, I’ve already told you why that just doesn't work. If we follow your logic, we end up with only one single reality. Now, I’m perfectly fine with the idea that there is only one reality—one that essentially bridges the gap between the subjective and the objective. That position is actually logically coherent. Your approach, on the other hand, isn't; you're picking one side of the subjective/objective opposition and just deleting the other one entirely, which is, unfortunately, a logical impossibility. That said, you probably aren't trying to be nonsensical; you're likely just struggling to articulate what you actually mean. You're probably trying to argue that humans can only ever experience phenomena, leaving the Kant's noumenal "thing-in-itself" forever out of reach. But I've pointed this out before: even that stance falls apart under scrutiny. It's like telling someone they are perceiving the world around them with perfect accuracy, yet somehow, that perfectly accurate perception is fundamentally false. As Hegel would put it, it's a total non-sequitur. It’s a classic case of *contradictio in adjecto*—a fancy way of saying someone is trying to marry two ideas that just plain refuse to live in the same house. It’s like ordering a "dry martini" from a bartender who thinks salt is a primary flavor profile, or claiming you want a "silent rock concert." You’re essentially building a house out of nothing but contradictions and wondering why the roof keeps falling in on your head.You’re essentially talking about an empty abstraction that lacks any actual determinism—which is exactly what you’re baselessly claiming about essence. It would be like me arguing that the world is inherently irrational and unknowable, or suggesting that something like science is a total impossibility. That kind of logic is more aligned with a schizophrenic mind or the deep subconscious than anything resembling reality. If we follow your line of reasoning, what happens to the laws of nature? In a world like that, laws simply can't exist. The reality is that if something is truly unknowable, it isn't true. You can't even apply a criterion of truth to something like that, so it can't logically occupy a state we would recognize as existence. Sure, we can imagine a thing that exists entirely detached from its own being, but we wouldn't call that a "thing"—we'd just call it a possibility.

I’m struggling to wrap my head around this one—are atoms and fundamental forces actually objective realities, or just subjective constructs? It feels a bit arbitrary to grant them some kind of privileged status in our understanding of the world. If you're going to be truly consistent with your own logic, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, if we follow that thread to its logical conclusion, you can't really argue for the existence of objects, material reality, or nature itself. All you're left with is a collection of ideas, which basically drags us straight into the territory of absolute subjective idealism.

So, are we really suggesting that objective reality is just some subset of subjective reality? I've already laid out why that logic falls apart above. Honestly, does anyone have a single rational argument for why subjective experience shouldn't be considered an integral part of the objective world?

Why stop at just atoms? You literally just argued that atoms themselves are useful abstractions. Essences function the exact same way—they're just another layer of abstraction. The only real difference on that abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (assuming they even exist in a way we can actually perceive?), whereas essences act as the counterpoint to those phenomena. What I'm getting at is that a phenomenon without an essence is just an absurdity. If you strip away essence, you effectively strip away the laws of nature too. Does a chair contain subatomic particles? Or molecules?

If I believed the world was irrational and unknowable, I wouldn't bother with science. Hegel's critique misses the mark here. Nobody is claiming perception is simultaneously true and false. Truth and falsehood aren't even applicable terms when discussing perception. Perceptions are, for all intents and purposes, neural correlates of external, non-neural phenomena. The light intensity hitting a point on the retina correlates with the frequency of the impulse traveling from that point. Those two things—light intensity and pulse frequency—cannot exist in a relationship of "truth" or "falsehood."

It's similar to what happens in a schizophrenic mind or the subconscious. But then what happens to natural laws? In such a world, laws couldn't exist. The issue is that if something is unknowable, it is untruthful. You can't apply the criteria of truth to something like that, so such a thing couldn't logically exist in a state we call existence. We can imagine a thing separated from its existence, but we wouldn't call it a "thing"—we'd call it a "possibility."

Well, there it is—I’ve finally put my thoughts down. So why does Hegel utilize truth and untruth as tools for critique?

I don't quite follow—are atoms and forces objective or subjective? Why grant them special status? If you want to be consistent with your own position, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, you can't even claim that objects, material reality, or nature itself exists. You can only say that ideas exist—which leads us straight into absolute subjective idealism.

It depends on which angle you take.

From your own perspective, you can't experience anything except perceptions—in other words, everything you encounter is just perception. There’s some consciousness in your head doing the perceiving. Your personal world is pure absolute subjective idealism.

If you step back into a hypothetical third-person view, you see that everyone is trapped in their own absolute subjective idealism.

So, it isn't that we can't build a model, or that the noumena can't be conceptualized and modeled—it's just that what we actually experience isn't the noumena.

So, is objective reality just a subset of subjective reality? I already explained the incoherence of that above. Is there any rational reason why subjective reality wouldn't be a part of objective reality?

Both are true if we shift our definitions—essentially, we're discussing two different concepts from two different perspectives.

In the first person, the objective world is modeled within the subjective mind. It is constructed there.

In the third person, everything is objective—meaning it is objectively true that many subjective worlds exist.

Why focus solely on atoms? You said yourself that atoms are useful abstractions. Essences are also useful abstractions. The only difference on an abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (if they even exist? since we can't actually see them), whereas essences are the opposition to phenomena. What I mean is: a phenomenon without an essence is absurd. Without essence, there are no natural laws. Are there subatomic particles in a chair? Or molecules?

Atoms and forces are useful abstractions because they allow us to predict a massive number of phenomena. But saying there are no natural laws without essence?? Can't a natural law have its own essence? That's a single concept; it would have to possess its own essence.