How many grains make a heap?

Zachary Mendoza2 said:You’re misinterpreting my point as reductionism. It isn't. In fact, that quote from Robert B. Laughlin suggests exactly the opposite. Reductionism belongs to the era of classical physics—the pre-quantum age. Today, it's clear that such an approach is neither sufficient nor accurate.

If I may interject with a bit of physics. I assume you're familiar with the double-slit experiment. What does it actually demonstrate? That there is no "electron-in-itself." There is only the "electron-as-observed." The act of detection is what defines it as such. Without detection, it would be as if the electron didn't exist at all. Therefore, we shouldn't think of it as an independent entity versus a perceived one, but rather as a single, unified phenomenon.

Perhaps I am misreading your position, though. Let me ask: didn't Hegel dismantle Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself? You seem to argue that essence is this thing-in-itself. While you claim it isn't phenomenal, you still treat it as real. You suggest essence belongs to the object, which contradicts placidranger's view that humans project essence onto the object. Am I following you correctly? Throughout your work, you speak of overcoming dualities and how one side cannot exist alone, yet here, you seem stuck on essence, favoring only the side of the thing-in-itself.

I agree, and it really highlights how reality is essentially a fusion of subject and object. Nothing exists in a vacuum, or as a pure "thing-in-itself"—you can't just reduce existence to simple self-identity. Everything exists only through its relationship to something else. This is baked right into the conceptual structure, or what we might call that essential relationship.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:You’re misinterpreting my point as reductionism. It isn't. In fact, that quote from Robert B. Laughlin suggests exactly the opposite. Reductionism belongs to the era of classical physics—the pre-quantum age. Today, it's clear that such an approach is neither sufficient nor accurate.

If I may interject with a bit of physics. I assume you're familiar with the double-slit experiment. What does it actually demonstrate? That there is no "electron-in-itself." There is only the "electron-as-observed." The act of detection is what defines it as such. Without detection, it would be as if the electron didn't exist at all. Therefore, we shouldn't think of it as an independent entity versus a perceived one, but rather as a single, unified phenomenon.

Perhaps I am misreading your position, though. Let me ask: didn't Hegel dismantle Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself? You seem to argue that essence is this thing-in-itself. While you claim it isn't phenomenal, you still treat it as real. You suggest essence belongs to the object, which contradicts placidranger's view that humans project essence onto the object. Am I following you correctly? Throughout your work, you speak of overcoming dualities and how one side cannot exist alone, yet here, you seem stuck on essence, favoring only the side of the thing-in-itself.

Sure, Hegel did tear apart Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself. Kant’s whole deal was treating the unknowable, noumenal thing-in-itself as if we could acknowledge a person's perception is accurate even if it's technically "wrong." But we can rethink the thing-in-itself not as something unknowable, but as something knowable. At that point, it becomes nothing more than self-identity—which, as I mentioned before, is meaningless in isolation because identity requires difference and opposition to even exist. The opposition to essence is simply a phenomenon. And essence itself is just one of several logical categories, much like being, quantity, or existence. You can view each of these categories as a somewhat flawed attempt by human reason to define the Absolute. Because these attempts are inherently contradictory, each category eventually outgrows itself, collapsing and evolving into a higher, more complete category. This continues until you reach the concept and the Absolute Idea. So, essence is "real"—just like being or existence are real—but it's only real when it's part of a larger system, not as a standalone entity. In a way, it's actually "more" real than a phenomenon, because phenomena are fleeting while essence is enduring. Viewed in total isolation, it looks like a thing-in-itself (essentially just its identity), but the logical destiny of essence is to negate itself. It negates itself to become a phenomenon. It is the very nature of essence to manifest. There’s nothing mystical or hidden about it; it’s just a matter of logical abstraction. When I look at an object and identify it as a chair, I am recognizing its essence in that context. The essence of natural phenomena is simply natural law. The confusing part is probably that we don't perceive essence as a physical object sitting in front of us; we only see the phenomenon. But it's the same with existence itself—you don't "see" existence, you only see existing objects, which are the phenomena. You know you exist, but you don't perceive your own existence as a sensory input or a distinct, isolated identity. Existence, like phenomena, essence, and the Absolute, is a web of relations. In Hegel's framework, everything is a phenomenon from start to finish. There's nothing lurking behind the curtain.

@Amanda Jackson5
I’ve gotta head to bed now since I have an early start tomorrow. I'll get back to you in the morning.

placidranger said:Archetypes might serve as the essence of certain personality types—mythological ones, perhaps—but the concept of an essence applies to everything. Take the essence of a door, for instance (if we're being pedantic about the German terminology)—it's essentially "that which is not the phenomenon." You can invent whatever you want within that negation. Technically, it could be a "pattern recognizer," a "categorizer," or some kind of mental switch 🤷 Neither neuroscience, philosophy, nor AI has actually figured out how to build a machine that functions that way. We're still waiting on what would qualify as true "computational understanding."

If I believed the world was irrational and unknowable, I wouldn't bother with science. Hegel's critique misses the mark here. Nobody is claiming perception is simultaneously true and false. Truth and falsehood aren't even applicable terms when discussing perception. Perceptions are, for all intents and purposes, neural correlates of external, non-neural phenomena. The light intensity hitting a point on the retina correlates with the frequency of the impulse traveling from that point. Those two things—light intensity and pulse frequency—cannot exist in a relationship of "truth" or "falsehood."

It's similar to what happens in a schizophrenic mind or the subconscious. But then what happens to natural laws? In such a world, laws couldn't exist. The issue is that if something is unknowable, it is untruthful. You can't apply the criteria of truth to something like that, so such a thing couldn't logically exist in a state we call existence. We can imagine a thing separated from its existence, but we wouldn't call it a "thing"—we'd call it a "possibility."

Well, there it is—I’ve finally put my thoughts down. So why does Hegel utilize truth and untruth as tools for critique?

I don't quite follow—are atoms and forces objective or subjective? Why grant them special status? If you want to be consistent with your own position, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, you can't even claim that objects, material reality, or nature itself exists. You can only say that ideas exist—which leads us straight into absolute subjective idealism.

It depends on which angle you take.

From your own perspective, you can't experience anything except perceptions—in other words, everything you encounter is just perception. There’s some consciousness in your head doing the perceiving. Your personal world is pure absolute subjective idealism.

If you step back into a hypothetical third-person view, you see that everyone is trapped in their own absolute subjective idealism.

So, it isn't that we can't build a model, or that the noumena can't be conceptualized and modeled—it's just that what we actually experience isn't the noumena.

So, is objective reality just a subset of subjective reality? I already explained the incoherence of that above. Is there any rational reason why subjective reality wouldn't be a part of objective reality?

Both are true if we shift our definitions—essentially, we're discussing two different concepts from two different perspectives.

In the first person, the objective world is modeled within the subjective mind. It is constructed there.

In the third person, everything is objective—meaning it is objectively true that many subjective worlds exist.

Why focus solely on atoms? You said yourself that atoms are useful abstractions. Essences are also useful abstractions. The only difference on an abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (if they even exist? since we can't actually see them), whereas essences are the opposition to phenomena. What I mean is: a phenomenon without an essence is absurd. Without essence, there are no natural laws. Are there subatomic particles in a chair? Or molecules?

Atoms and forces are useful abstractions because they allow us to predict a massive number of phenomena. But saying there are no natural laws without essence?? Can't a natural law have its own essence? That's a single concept; it would have to possess its own essence.

I’m assuming that by "external non-neuronal phenomena," you’re talking about nature—that objective reality you previously argued doesn't actually exist. If we’re playing by those rules, then there isn't exactly anything left to perceive, is there?

placidranger said:Archetypes might serve as the essence of certain personality types—mythological ones, perhaps—but the concept of an essence applies to everything. Take the essence of a door, for instance (if we're being pedantic about the German terminology)—it's essentially "that which is not the phenomenon." You can invent whatever you want within that negation. Technically, it could be a "pattern recognizer," a "categorizer," or some kind of mental switch 🤷 Neither neuroscience, philosophy, nor AI has actually figured out how to build a machine that functions that way. We're still waiting on what would qualify as true "computational understanding."

If I believed the world was irrational and unknowable, I wouldn't bother with science. Hegel's critique misses the mark here. Nobody is claiming perception is simultaneously true and false. Truth and falsehood aren't even applicable terms when discussing perception. Perceptions are, for all intents and purposes, neural correlates of external, non-neural phenomena. The light intensity hitting a point on the retina correlates with the frequency of the impulse traveling from that point. Those two things—light intensity and pulse frequency—cannot exist in a relationship of "truth" or "falsehood."

It's similar to what happens in a schizophrenic mind or the subconscious. But then what happens to natural laws? In such a world, laws couldn't exist. The issue is that if something is unknowable, it is untruthful. You can't apply the criteria of truth to something like that, so such a thing couldn't logically exist in a state we call existence. We can imagine a thing separated from its existence, but we wouldn't call it a "thing"—we'd call it a "possibility."

Well, there it is—I’ve finally put my thoughts down. So why does Hegel utilize truth and untruth as tools for critique?

I don't quite follow—are atoms and forces objective or subjective? Why grant them special status? If you want to be consistent with your own position, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, you can't even claim that objects, material reality, or nature itself exists. You can only say that ideas exist—which leads us straight into absolute subjective idealism.

It depends on which angle you take.

From your own perspective, you can't experience anything except perceptions—in other words, everything you encounter is just perception. There’s some consciousness in your head doing the perceiving. Your personal world is pure absolute subjective idealism.

If you step back into a hypothetical third-person view, you see that everyone is trapped in their own absolute subjective idealism.

So, it isn't that we can't build a model, or that the noumena can't be conceptualized and modeled—it's just that what we actually experience isn't the noumena.

So, is objective reality just a subset of subjective reality? I already explained the incoherence of that above. Is there any rational reason why subjective reality wouldn't be a part of objective reality?

Both are true if we shift our definitions—essentially, we're discussing two different concepts from two different perspectives.

In the first person, the objective world is modeled within the subjective mind. It is constructed there.

In the third person, everything is objective—meaning it is objectively true that many subjective worlds exist.

Why focus solely on atoms? You said yourself that atoms are useful abstractions. Essences are also useful abstractions. The only difference on an abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (if they even exist? since we can't actually see them), whereas essences are the opposition to phenomena. What I mean is: a phenomenon without an essence is absurd. Without essence, there are no natural laws. Are there subatomic particles in a chair? Or molecules?

Atoms and forces are useful abstractions because they allow us to predict a massive number of phenomena. But saying there are no natural laws without essence?? Can't a natural law have its own essence? That's a single concept; it would have to possess its own essence.

I didn't even go as far as saying he actually employs them. Look, Hegel makes this distinction between "accuracy" and "truth." To him, being "true" is really just about whether the content aligns with itself—basically, if it matches its own concept. It’s like saying someone is a real friend only when their actual behavior lines up with what we define as "friendship." You could apply that logic to pretty much any phenomenon, though obviously, no finite being ever quite hits that mark perfectly. Absolutely. If you look at it through his lens—or even just using that universal definition we often default to—everything carries its own truth "outside of itself." It’s all about how things relate to the totality, or the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, depending on which philosopher you're trying to impress at a cocktail party. That’s why he argues that "truth is the whole." Essentially, the truth of any single thing is just its specific placement within that grand, overarching puzzle. It feels pretty similar to the coherence theory of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in whether a collection of statements or claims happens to line up logically; for him, truth is an inherent property of concepts or objects themselves.

placidranger said:Archetypes might serve as the essence of certain personality types—mythological ones, perhaps—but the concept of an essence applies to everything. Take the essence of a door, for instance (if we're being pedantic about the German terminology)—it's essentially "that which is not the phenomenon." You can invent whatever you want within that negation. Technically, it could be a "pattern recognizer," a "categorizer," or some kind of mental switch 🤷 Neither neuroscience, philosophy, nor AI has actually figured out how to build a machine that functions that way. We're still waiting on what would qualify as true "computational understanding."

If I believed the world was irrational and unknowable, I wouldn't bother with science. Hegel's critique misses the mark here. Nobody is claiming perception is simultaneously true and false. Truth and falsehood aren't even applicable terms when discussing perception. Perceptions are, for all intents and purposes, neural correlates of external, non-neural phenomena. The light intensity hitting a point on the retina correlates with the frequency of the impulse traveling from that point. Those two things—light intensity and pulse frequency—cannot exist in a relationship of "truth" or "falsehood."

It's similar to what happens in a schizophrenic mind or the subconscious. But then what happens to natural laws? In such a world, laws couldn't exist. The issue is that if something is unknowable, it is untruthful. You can't apply the criteria of truth to something like that, so such a thing couldn't logically exist in a state we call existence. We can imagine a thing separated from its existence, but we wouldn't call it a "thing"—we'd call it a "possibility."

Well, there it is—I’ve finally put my thoughts down. So why does Hegel utilize truth and untruth as tools for critique?

I don't quite follow—are atoms and forces objective or subjective? Why grant them special status? If you want to be consistent with your own position, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, you can't even claim that objects, material reality, or nature itself exists. You can only say that ideas exist—which leads us straight into absolute subjective idealism.

It depends on which angle you take.

From your own perspective, you can't experience anything except perceptions—in other words, everything you encounter is just perception. There’s some consciousness in your head doing the perceiving. Your personal world is pure absolute subjective idealism.

If you step back into a hypothetical third-person view, you see that everyone is trapped in their own absolute subjective idealism.

So, it isn't that we can't build a model, or that the noumena can't be conceptualized and modeled—it's just that what we actually experience isn't the noumena.

So, is objective reality just a subset of subjective reality? I already explained the incoherence of that above. Is there any rational reason why subjective reality wouldn't be a part of objective reality?

Both are true if we shift our definitions—essentially, we're discussing two different concepts from two different perspectives.

In the first person, the objective world is modeled within the subjective mind. It is constructed there.

In the third person, everything is objective—meaning it is objectively true that many subjective worlds exist.

Why focus solely on atoms? You said yourself that atoms are useful abstractions. Essences are also useful abstractions. The only difference on an abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (if they even exist? since we can't actually see them), whereas essences are the opposition to phenomena. What I mean is: a phenomenon without an essence is absurd. Without essence, there are no natural laws. Are there subatomic particles in a chair? Or molecules?

Atoms and forces are useful abstractions because they allow us to predict a massive number of phenomena. But saying there are no natural laws without essence?? Can't a natural law have its own essence? That's a single concept; it would have to possess its own essence.

I’m personally obsessed with finding that one grand perspective that manages to unify every other viewpoint under a single umbrella. Honestly, anything else isn't even true philosophy; it’s just psychological navel-gazing. I mean, let's face it: noumena don't exist. If someone actually wants to explain what a noumenon is, they might as well just call it some mystical "beyond" or a spiritual afterlife. In that framework, phenomena would essentially just be its "emanations." It reminds me of how Nietzsche famously dismissed Christianity as nothing more than "Platonism for the masses." Following that logic, if a noumenal thing could actually be integrated into our total understanding of reality, then we could call it true. But since the whole point of a noumenal object is that it's fundamentally severed from our ability to perceive or know it, it can't be true. Anything that is inherently unknowable is, by definition, untrue.
Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing raw perceptions here. I’m experiencing thoughts, judgments, and the like. Think of perceptions as nothing more than raw material; they don't actually mean anything until those logical categories step in to organize them. Since those categories are universal, the whole argument for subjective idealism just falls apart. They hold true across every single one of the perspectives you brought up.

placidranger said:Archetypes might serve as the essence of certain personality types—mythological ones, perhaps—but the concept of an essence applies to everything. Take the essence of a door, for instance (if we're being pedantic about the German terminology)—it's essentially "that which is not the phenomenon." You can invent whatever you want within that negation. Technically, it could be a "pattern recognizer," a "categorizer," or some kind of mental switch 🤷 Neither neuroscience, philosophy, nor AI has actually figured out how to build a machine that functions that way. We're still waiting on what would qualify as true "computational understanding."

If I believed the world was irrational and unknowable, I wouldn't bother with science. Hegel's critique misses the mark here. Nobody is claiming perception is simultaneously true and false. Truth and falsehood aren't even applicable terms when discussing perception. Perceptions are, for all intents and purposes, neural correlates of external, non-neural phenomena. The light intensity hitting a point on the retina correlates with the frequency of the impulse traveling from that point. Those two things—light intensity and pulse frequency—cannot exist in a relationship of "truth" or "falsehood."

It's similar to what happens in a schizophrenic mind or the subconscious. But then what happens to natural laws? In such a world, laws couldn't exist. The issue is that if something is unknowable, it is untruthful. You can't apply the criteria of truth to something like that, so such a thing couldn't logically exist in a state we call existence. We can imagine a thing separated from its existence, but we wouldn't call it a "thing"—we'd call it a "possibility."

Well, there it is—I’ve finally put my thoughts down. So why does Hegel utilize truth and untruth as tools for critique?

I don't quite follow—are atoms and forces objective or subjective? Why grant them special status? If you want to be consistent with your own position, you can't claim they exist objectively. In fact, you can't even claim that objects, material reality, or nature itself exists. You can only say that ideas exist—which leads us straight into absolute subjective idealism.

It depends on which angle you take.

From your own perspective, you can't experience anything except perceptions—in other words, everything you encounter is just perception. There’s some consciousness in your head doing the perceiving. Your personal world is pure absolute subjective idealism.

If you step back into a hypothetical third-person view, you see that everyone is trapped in their own absolute subjective idealism.

So, it isn't that we can't build a model, or that the noumena can't be conceptualized and modeled—it's just that what we actually experience isn't the noumena.

So, is objective reality just a subset of subjective reality? I already explained the incoherence of that above. Is there any rational reason why subjective reality wouldn't be a part of objective reality?

Both are true if we shift our definitions—essentially, we're discussing two different concepts from two different perspectives.

In the first person, the objective world is modeled within the subjective mind. It is constructed there.

In the third person, everything is objective—meaning it is objectively true that many subjective worlds exist.

Why focus solely on atoms? You said yourself that atoms are useful abstractions. Essences are also useful abstractions. The only difference on an abstract level is that atoms are phenomena (if they even exist? since we can't actually see them), whereas essences are the opposition to phenomena. What I mean is: a phenomenon without an essence is absurd. Without essence, there are no natural laws. Are there subatomic particles in a chair? Or molecules?

Atoms and forces are useful abstractions because they allow us to predict a massive number of phenomena. But saying there are no natural laws without essence?? Can't a natural law have its own essence? That's a single concept; it would have to possess its own essence.

The laws of nature are the essence. You don't derive an essence from a concept; if anything, a concept is a much higher and more advanced logical category than an essence. Saying there's an "essence of an essence" would be like trying to perform a double negative.

Amanda Jackson5 said:I’m assuming that by "external non-neuronal phenomena," you’re talking about nature—that objective reality you previously argued doesn't actually exist. If we’re playing by those rules, then there isn't exactly anything left to perceive, is there?

I didn't even go as far as saying he actually employs them. Look, Hegel makes this distinction between "accuracy" and "truth." To him, being "true" is really just about whether the content aligns with itself—basically, if it matches its own concept. It’s like saying someone is a real friend only when their actual behavior lines up with what we define as "friendship." You could apply that logic to pretty much any phenomenon, though obviously, no finite being ever quite hits that mark perfectly. Absolutely. If you look at it through his lens—or even just using that universal definition we often default to—everything carries its own truth "outside of itself." It’s all about how things relate to the totality, or the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, depending on which philosopher you're trying to impress at a cocktail party. That’s why he argues that "truth is the whole." Essentially, the truth of any single thing is just its specific placement within that grand, overarching puzzle. It feels pretty similar to the coherence theory of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in whether a collection of statements or claims happens to line up logically; for him, truth is an inherent property of concepts or objects themselves.

I’m personally obsessed with finding that one grand perspective that manages to unify every other viewpoint under a single umbrella. Honestly, anything else isn't even true philosophy; it’s just psychological navel-gazing. I mean, let's face it: noumena don't exist. If someone actually wants to explain what a noumenon is, they might as well just call it some mystical "beyond" or a spiritual afterlife. In that framework, phenomena would essentially just be its "emanations." It reminds me of how Nietzsche famously dismissed Christianity as nothing more than "Platonism for the masses." Following that logic, if a noumenal thing could actually be integrated into our total understanding of reality, then we could call it true. But since the whole point of a noumenal object is that it's fundamentally severed from our ability to perceive or know it, it can't be true. Anything that is inherently unknowable is, by definition, untrue.
Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing raw perceptions here. I’m experiencing thoughts, judgments, and the like. Think of perceptions as nothing more than raw material; they don't actually mean anything until those logical categories step in to organize them. Since those categories are universal, the whole argument for subjective idealism just falls apart. They hold true across every single one of the perspectives you brought up.

The laws of nature are the essence. You don't derive an essence from a concept; if anything, a concept is a much higher and more advanced logical category than an essence. Saying there's an "essence of an essence" would be like trying to perform a double negative.

The actual subject of perception is neural phenomena. Or, more accurately, all perceptions are neural phenomena. You never actually perceive anything outside the nervous system; everything you see around you is just a mental construction. That construction relies, in some way, on what lies outside—something we can only discuss through models and assumptions. Honestly, a naive realist stance is often quite useful here.

I didn't even say Hegel uses them. Hegel distinguishes between "accuracy" and "truth." For him, being "true" means a content coincides with itself—that is, it aligns with its own concept.

You were quoting Hegel's critique regarding the untruth of perception, where he utilizes truth and falsehood.

Coincidence of *what* with itself? How do you differentiate content from a concept? Are you suggesting there is something a concept refers to that isn't identical to the concept itself, and then you compare the two?

For instance, someone is a true friend when their behavior aligns with the concept of "friendship." It's the same for any phenomenon, though no finite being is entirely in accord with its concept (or the universal one). Therefore, everything possesses its truth "outside itself"—meaning in relation to the totality, the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, if you prefer. This is why he says "truth is the whole." The truth of something is essentially its place within the whole. It's similar to the "coherence theory" of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in the truth of statements or propositions; for him, truth is a property of concepts or objects.

That theory of truth makes no sense to me. There is nothing true or false about concepts themselves. You can have a relationship between two concepts relative to the whole, or one relative to another, but a lone concept holds no truth or falsehood. It is always just a mental construction.

I'm interested in the perspective that unifies all perspectives. That is the only thing of philosophical significance. Anything else isn't philosophy; it's just psychology. Noumena don't exist. I'd love for someone to tell me what a noumenon actually is. It’s just mystical otherworldly nonsense. And phenomena would merely be its "emanation." It’s the same thing Nietzsche said about Christianity: "Platonism for the masses." Following the logic from the previous section, we could say that if a noumenon can be integrated into the totality of reality, then it is true. But since a noumenal thing is postulated as being severed from the possibility of cognition, it cannot be true. That which is unknowable is untrue.

Such a perspective doesn't exist. You can imagine it, build a model for it, and then try to test or analyze how useful that model is. There is no other way to grow knowledge. Truth cannot pertain to such models or their relationship to the noumenal; it can only pertain to the relationships within the model itself.

Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing perceptions here. I experience thoughts, judgments, and so on. Perceptions are merely raw material—meaningless junk without the logical categories used to organize them. Since those categories are universal, subjective idealism falls apart. They hold true across every single perspective you mentioned.

No, by definition, perceptions encompass everything you experience. You perceive every thought as a verbal sensation, a visual impression, or something similar. And frankly, I haven't seen any proof that certain logical categories remain valid across all perspectives.

Natural laws are essence. You don't derive essence from a concept. A concept is a far higher, more advanced logical category than essence itself. The "essence of an essence" would be something akin to a double negative.

So, the system is contradictory.

Count however many grains you're ready for, then add one... boom, you've got a pile.

Amanda Jackson5 said:I’m assuming that by "external non-neuronal phenomena," you’re talking about nature—that objective reality you previously argued doesn't actually exist. If we’re playing by those rules, then there isn't exactly anything left to perceive, is there?

I didn't even go as far as saying he actually employs them. Look, Hegel makes this distinction between "accuracy" and "truth." To him, being "true" is really just about whether the content aligns with itself—basically, if it matches its own concept. It’s like saying someone is a real friend only when their actual behavior lines up with what we define as "friendship." You could apply that logic to pretty much any phenomenon, though obviously, no finite being ever quite hits that mark perfectly. Absolutely. If you look at it through his lens—or even just using that universal definition we often default to—everything carries its own truth "outside of itself." It’s all about how things relate to the totality, or the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, depending on which philosopher you're trying to impress at a cocktail party. That’s why he argues that "truth is the whole." Essentially, the truth of any single thing is just its specific placement within that grand, overarching puzzle. It feels pretty similar to the coherence theory of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in whether a collection of statements or claims happens to line up logically; for him, truth is an inherent property of concepts or objects themselves.

I’m personally obsessed with finding that one grand perspective that manages to unify every other viewpoint under a single umbrella. Honestly, anything else isn't even true philosophy; it’s just psychological navel-gazing. I mean, let's face it: noumena don't exist. If someone actually wants to explain what a noumenon is, they might as well just call it some mystical "beyond" or a spiritual afterlife. In that framework, phenomena would essentially just be its "emanations." It reminds me of how Nietzsche famously dismissed Christianity as nothing more than "Platonism for the masses." Following that logic, if a noumenal thing could actually be integrated into our total understanding of reality, then we could call it true. But since the whole point of a noumenal object is that it's fundamentally severed from our ability to perceive or know it, it can't be true. Anything that is inherently unknowable is, by definition, untrue.
Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing raw perceptions here. I’m experiencing thoughts, judgments, and the like. Think of perceptions as nothing more than raw material; they don't actually mean anything until those logical categories step in to organize them. Since those categories are universal, the whole argument for subjective idealism just falls apart. They hold true across every single one of the perspectives you brought up.

The laws of nature are the essence. You don't derive an essence from a concept; if anything, a concept is a much higher and more advanced logical category than an essence. Saying there's an "essence of an essence" would be like trying to perform a double negative.

What exactly do you mean by saying categories are universal? Are they truly universal, or just universal according to you? My categories don't necessarily have to align with yours, much less with the categories of someone like Marsovac.

Ultimately, every perspective is individual—even the single perspective intended to unify them all. Returning to the double-slit experiment, that serves as another lesson in this regard. Relativity teaches us the same thing. This carries further implications; for instance, we cannot rule out the possibility that you aren't actually real, but rather a product of placidranger's imagination. Or perhaps we are all part of a dream belonging to Marsovac, or living within the Matrix, or some simulation designed by an unknown entity in an unknown location.
One cannot possess any consciousness other than that which is based on—and constructed from—perception.

placidranger said:The actual subject of perception is neural phenomena. Or, more accurately, all perceptions are neural phenomena. You never actually perceive anything outside the nervous system; everything you see around you is just a mental construction. That construction relies, in some way, on what lies outside—something we can only discuss through models and assumptions. Honestly, a naive realist stance is often quite useful here.

I didn't even say Hegel uses them. Hegel distinguishes between "accuracy" and "truth." For him, being "true" means a content coincides with itself—that is, it aligns with its own concept.

You were quoting Hegel's critique regarding the untruth of perception, where he utilizes truth and falsehood.

Coincidence of *what* with itself? How do you differentiate content from a concept? Are you suggesting there is something a concept refers to that isn't identical to the concept itself, and then you compare the two?

For instance, someone is a true friend when their behavior aligns with the concept of "friendship." It's the same for any phenomenon, though no finite being is entirely in accord with its concept (or the universal one). Therefore, everything possesses its truth "outside itself"—meaning in relation to the totality, the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, if you prefer. This is why he says "truth is the whole." The truth of something is essentially its place within the whole. It's similar to the "coherence theory" of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in the truth of statements or propositions; for him, truth is a property of concepts or objects.

That theory of truth makes no sense to me. There is nothing true or false about concepts themselves. You can have a relationship between two concepts relative to the whole, or one relative to another, but a lone concept holds no truth or falsehood. It is always just a mental construction.

I'm interested in the perspective that unifies all perspectives. That is the only thing of philosophical significance. Anything else isn't philosophy; it's just psychology. Noumena don't exist. I'd love for someone to tell me what a noumenon actually is. It’s just mystical otherworldly nonsense. And phenomena would merely be its "emanation." It’s the same thing Nietzsche said about Christianity: "Platonism for the masses." Following the logic from the previous section, we could say that if a noumenon can be integrated into the totality of reality, then it is true. But since a noumenal thing is postulated as being severed from the possibility of cognition, it cannot be true. That which is unknowable is untrue.

Such a perspective doesn't exist. You can imagine it, build a model for it, and then try to test or analyze how useful that model is. There is no other way to grow knowledge. Truth cannot pertain to such models or their relationship to the noumenal; it can only pertain to the relationships within the model itself.

Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing perceptions here. I experience thoughts, judgments, and so on. Perceptions are merely raw material—meaningless junk without the logical categories used to organize them. Since those categories are universal, subjective idealism falls apart. They hold true across every single perspective you mentioned.

No, by definition, perceptions encompass everything you experience. You perceive every thought as a verbal sensation, a visual impression, or something similar. And frankly, I haven't seen any proof that certain logical categories remain valid across all perspectives.

Natural laws are essence. You don't derive essence from a concept. A concept is a far higher, more advanced logical category than essence itself. The "essence of an essence" would be something akin to a double negative.

So, the system is contradictory.

So, how does the brain build reality out of raw neural data? It uses logical categories. Without them, perception would just be white noise or some chaotic pile of stimuli. You’re left with a messy multiplicity of form and content, which the brain smooths out using logic. It injects universality and necessity into the chaos. (Hegel suggests that the "I" is a melting pot, a fire that burns away multiplicity to reduce it to a single unity). This system of logical categories provides the conceptual framework. In other words, perception only becomes objective through these logical categories. Kant actually agreed with the empiricists that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge, except he argued that this knowledge wouldn't relate to absolute truths, but would merely be knowledge of appearances. Now, if universality and necessity aren't found in experience, where do they come from? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations, or concepts of understanding, are what constitute the objectivity of experiential knowledge. They generally contain relations and connections, without which you couldn't even form synthetic a priori judgments (those fundamental relationships between opposing elements). Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't have objectivity in the sense that they are given directly through perception; rather, he felt they belong to thought, making them subjective in that specific sense (if I'm following your point correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness feels as though the things it perceives through the senses exist independently, as things-in-themselves. Thought, on the other hand, is viewed as something dependent. But in reality, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are the truly independent and primary elements. In that sense, Kant called those things belonging to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective elements.

placidranger said:The actual subject of perception is neural phenomena. Or, more accurately, all perceptions are neural phenomena. You never actually perceive anything outside the nervous system; everything you see around you is just a mental construction. That construction relies, in some way, on what lies outside—something we can only discuss through models and assumptions. Honestly, a naive realist stance is often quite useful here.

I didn't even say Hegel uses them. Hegel distinguishes between "accuracy" and "truth." For him, being "true" means a content coincides with itself—that is, it aligns with its own concept.

You were quoting Hegel's critique regarding the untruth of perception, where he utilizes truth and falsehood.

Coincidence of *what* with itself? How do you differentiate content from a concept? Are you suggesting there is something a concept refers to that isn't identical to the concept itself, and then you compare the two?

For instance, someone is a true friend when their behavior aligns with the concept of "friendship." It's the same for any phenomenon, though no finite being is entirely in accord with its concept (or the universal one). Therefore, everything possesses its truth "outside itself"—meaning in relation to the totality, the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, if you prefer. This is why he says "truth is the whole." The truth of something is essentially its place within the whole. It's similar to the "coherence theory" of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in the truth of statements or propositions; for him, truth is a property of concepts or objects.

That theory of truth makes no sense to me. There is nothing true or false about concepts themselves. You can have a relationship between two concepts relative to the whole, or one relative to another, but a lone concept holds no truth or falsehood. It is always just a mental construction.

I'm interested in the perspective that unifies all perspectives. That is the only thing of philosophical significance. Anything else isn't philosophy; it's just psychology. Noumena don't exist. I'd love for someone to tell me what a noumenon actually is. It’s just mystical otherworldly nonsense. And phenomena would merely be its "emanation." It’s the same thing Nietzsche said about Christianity: "Platonism for the masses." Following the logic from the previous section, we could say that if a noumenon can be integrated into the totality of reality, then it is true. But since a noumenal thing is postulated as being severed from the possibility of cognition, it cannot be true. That which is unknowable is untrue.

Such a perspective doesn't exist. You can imagine it, build a model for it, and then try to test or analyze how useful that model is. There is no other way to grow knowledge. Truth cannot pertain to such models or their relationship to the noumenal; it can only pertain to the relationships within the model itself.

Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing perceptions here. I experience thoughts, judgments, and so on. Perceptions are merely raw material—meaningless junk without the logical categories used to organize them. Since those categories are universal, subjective idealism falls apart. They hold true across every single perspective you mentioned.

No, by definition, perceptions encompass everything you experience. You perceive every thought as a verbal sensation, a visual impression, or something similar. And frankly, I haven't seen any proof that certain logical categories remain valid across all perspectives.

Natural laws are essence. You don't derive essence from a concept. A concept is a far higher, more advanced logical category than essence itself. The "essence of an essence" would be something akin to a double negative.

So, the system is contradictory.

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" issue? Well, first you have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept that it is, then you're claiming to accurately perceive your surroundings. If you then turn around and say that this perception only gives you knowledge of appearances, rather than what a thing truly is ("in itself," rather than "for you" or "according to you"), you've hit a contradiction—you're claiming to have accurate perception yet arriving at false cognition. On the other hand, if you don't accept experience as the foundation of knowledge, you've fallen into radical skepticism, and any further discussion about perception or knowledge effectively hits a dead end because there’s nothing coherent left to say.

placidranger said:The actual subject of perception is neural phenomena. Or, more accurately, all perceptions are neural phenomena. You never actually perceive anything outside the nervous system; everything you see around you is just a mental construction. That construction relies, in some way, on what lies outside—something we can only discuss through models and assumptions. Honestly, a naive realist stance is often quite useful here.

I didn't even say Hegel uses them. Hegel distinguishes between "accuracy" and "truth." For him, being "true" means a content coincides with itself—that is, it aligns with its own concept.

You were quoting Hegel's critique regarding the untruth of perception, where he utilizes truth and falsehood.

Coincidence of *what* with itself? How do you differentiate content from a concept? Are you suggesting there is something a concept refers to that isn't identical to the concept itself, and then you compare the two?

For instance, someone is a true friend when their behavior aligns with the concept of "friendship." It's the same for any phenomenon, though no finite being is entirely in accord with its concept (or the universal one). Therefore, everything possesses its truth "outside itself"—meaning in relation to the totality, the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, if you prefer. This is why he says "truth is the whole." The truth of something is essentially its place within the whole. It's similar to the "coherence theory" of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in the truth of statements or propositions; for him, truth is a property of concepts or objects.

That theory of truth makes no sense to me. There is nothing true or false about concepts themselves. You can have a relationship between two concepts relative to the whole, or one relative to another, but a lone concept holds no truth or falsehood. It is always just a mental construction.

I'm interested in the perspective that unifies all perspectives. That is the only thing of philosophical significance. Anything else isn't philosophy; it's just psychology. Noumena don't exist. I'd love for someone to tell me what a noumenon actually is. It’s just mystical otherworldly nonsense. And phenomena would merely be its "emanation." It’s the same thing Nietzsche said about Christianity: "Platonism for the masses." Following the logic from the previous section, we could say that if a noumenon can be integrated into the totality of reality, then it is true. But since a noumenal thing is postulated as being severed from the possibility of cognition, it cannot be true. That which is unknowable is untrue.

Such a perspective doesn't exist. You can imagine it, build a model for it, and then try to test or analyze how useful that model is. There is no other way to grow knowledge. Truth cannot pertain to such models or their relationship to the noumenal; it can only pertain to the relationships within the model itself.

Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing perceptions here. I experience thoughts, judgments, and so on. Perceptions are merely raw material—meaningless junk without the logical categories used to organize them. Since those categories are universal, subjective idealism falls apart. They hold true across every single perspective you mentioned.

No, by definition, perceptions encompass everything you experience. You perceive every thought as a verbal sensation, a visual impression, or something similar. And frankly, I haven't seen any proof that certain logical categories remain valid across all perspectives.

Natural laws are essence. You don't derive essence from a concept. A concept is a far higher, more advanced logical category than essence itself. The "essence of an essence" would be something akin to a double negative.

So, the system is contradictory.

It’s actually a bit more straightforward than it sounds. I used to explain this using a friend as an example: if you have someone you call a friend, but they never actually act like one, then they aren't really a friend. It comes down to a question of identity—of being true to oneself. You have to keep in mind that a concept is essentially the unity of the individual, the particular, and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have predicates or objects to begin with.
Here is how Hegel puts it in his "Encyclopedic" logic:

By truth, one understands at first that I know (wisse) how something is. Yet this is truth only in relation to consciousness or the formal truth, mere correctness. In contrast to this, truth in the deeper sense consists in this, that objectivity is identical with the concept. It is truth in this deeper sense that is at stake if, for example, one is speaking of a true state or of a true work of art. These objects (Gegenstande) are true if they are what they should be, that is to say, if their reality corresponds to their concept. So construed, the untrue is the same as what is otherwise also called 'the bad'. A bad human being is one who is not truly human, i.e. a human being who does not behave in keeping with the concept or determination of a human being. Nothing, meanwhile, can subsist utterly without the identity of the concept and reality. Even something bad and untrue is only insofar as its reality still behaves somehow in conformity with its concept. Something thoroughly bad or at odds with the concept is, precisely for this reason, something collapsing in itself. It is the concept alone through which things have their standing in the world. - When speaking of the idea, one must
not imagine something remote and other-worldly by this. The idea is instead what is thoroughly present, and so too it is to be found in every consciousness, even if muddled and stunted.

placidranger said:The actual subject of perception is neural phenomena. Or, more accurately, all perceptions are neural phenomena. You never actually perceive anything outside the nervous system; everything you see around you is just a mental construction. That construction relies, in some way, on what lies outside—something we can only discuss through models and assumptions. Honestly, a naive realist stance is often quite useful here.

I didn't even say Hegel uses them. Hegel distinguishes between "accuracy" and "truth." For him, being "true" means a content coincides with itself—that is, it aligns with its own concept.

You were quoting Hegel's critique regarding the untruth of perception, where he utilizes truth and falsehood.

Coincidence of *what* with itself? How do you differentiate content from a concept? Are you suggesting there is something a concept refers to that isn't identical to the concept itself, and then you compare the two?

For instance, someone is a true friend when their behavior aligns with the concept of "friendship." It's the same for any phenomenon, though no finite being is entirely in accord with its concept (or the universal one). Therefore, everything possesses its truth "outside itself"—meaning in relation to the totality, the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, if you prefer. This is why he says "truth is the whole." The truth of something is essentially its place within the whole. It's similar to the "coherence theory" of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in the truth of statements or propositions; for him, truth is a property of concepts or objects.

That theory of truth makes no sense to me. There is nothing true or false about concepts themselves. You can have a relationship between two concepts relative to the whole, or one relative to another, but a lone concept holds no truth or falsehood. It is always just a mental construction.

I'm interested in the perspective that unifies all perspectives. That is the only thing of philosophical significance. Anything else isn't philosophy; it's just psychology. Noumena don't exist. I'd love for someone to tell me what a noumenon actually is. It’s just mystical otherworldly nonsense. And phenomena would merely be its "emanation." It’s the same thing Nietzsche said about Christianity: "Platonism for the masses." Following the logic from the previous section, we could say that if a noumenon can be integrated into the totality of reality, then it is true. But since a noumenal thing is postulated as being severed from the possibility of cognition, it cannot be true. That which is unknowable is untrue.

Such a perspective doesn't exist. You can imagine it, build a model for it, and then try to test or analyze how useful that model is. There is no other way to grow knowledge. Truth cannot pertain to such models or their relationship to the noumenal; it can only pertain to the relationships within the model itself.

Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing perceptions here. I experience thoughts, judgments, and so on. Perceptions are merely raw material—meaningless junk without the logical categories used to organize them. Since those categories are universal, subjective idealism falls apart. They hold true across every single perspective you mentioned.

No, by definition, perceptions encompass everything you experience. You perceive every thought as a verbal sensation, a visual impression, or something similar. And frankly, I haven't seen any proof that certain logical categories remain valid across all perspectives.

Natural laws are essence. You don't derive essence from a concept. A concept is a far higher, more advanced logical category than essence itself. The "essence of an essence" would be something akin to a double negative.

So, the system is contradictory.

Actually, that perspective does exist. It's called logic. Logic has to hold up regardless of your vantage point. This is what I was touching on earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary aspect, which is thought. Rational thought is the thing that bridges all perspectives. No matter where you're standing, you're still dealing with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, causality, quantity, form, content, essence, the concept, and so on.

placidranger said:The actual subject of perception is neural phenomena. Or, more accurately, all perceptions are neural phenomena. You never actually perceive anything outside the nervous system; everything you see around you is just a mental construction. That construction relies, in some way, on what lies outside—something we can only discuss through models and assumptions. Honestly, a naive realist stance is often quite useful here.

I didn't even say Hegel uses them. Hegel distinguishes between "accuracy" and "truth." For him, being "true" means a content coincides with itself—that is, it aligns with its own concept.

You were quoting Hegel's critique regarding the untruth of perception, where he utilizes truth and falsehood.

Coincidence of *what* with itself? How do you differentiate content from a concept? Are you suggesting there is something a concept refers to that isn't identical to the concept itself, and then you compare the two?

For instance, someone is a true friend when their behavior aligns with the concept of "friendship." It's the same for any phenomenon, though no finite being is entirely in accord with its concept (or the universal one). Therefore, everything possesses its truth "outside itself"—meaning in relation to the totality, the entire system of reality, or the Absolute, if you prefer. This is why he says "truth is the whole." The truth of something is essentially its place within the whole. It's similar to the "coherence theory" of truth, except Hegel isn't interested in the truth of statements or propositions; for him, truth is a property of concepts or objects.

That theory of truth makes no sense to me. There is nothing true or false about concepts themselves. You can have a relationship between two concepts relative to the whole, or one relative to another, but a lone concept holds no truth or falsehood. It is always just a mental construction.

I'm interested in the perspective that unifies all perspectives. That is the only thing of philosophical significance. Anything else isn't philosophy; it's just psychology. Noumena don't exist. I'd love for someone to tell me what a noumenon actually is. It’s just mystical otherworldly nonsense. And phenomena would merely be its "emanation." It’s the same thing Nietzsche said about Christianity: "Platonism for the masses." Following the logic from the previous section, we could say that if a noumenon can be integrated into the totality of reality, then it is true. But since a noumenal thing is postulated as being severed from the possibility of cognition, it cannot be true. That which is unknowable is untrue.

Such a perspective doesn't exist. You can imagine it, build a model for it, and then try to test or analyze how useful that model is. There is no other way to grow knowledge. Truth cannot pertain to such models or their relationship to the noumenal; it can only pertain to the relationships within the model itself.

Furthermore, I’m not just experiencing perceptions here. I experience thoughts, judgments, and so on. Perceptions are merely raw material—meaningless junk without the logical categories used to organize them. Since those categories are universal, subjective idealism falls apart. They hold true across every single perspective you mentioned.

No, by definition, perceptions encompass everything you experience. You perceive every thought as a verbal sensation, a visual impression, or something similar. And frankly, I haven't seen any proof that certain logical categories remain valid across all perspectives.

Natural laws are essence. You don't derive essence from a concept. A concept is a far higher, more advanced logical category than essence itself. The "essence of an essence" would be something akin to a double negative.

So, the system is contradictory.

Not quite. It just means that individual opinions clash, and more often than not, they aren't universal truths or absolute necessities. At the end of the day, a single person's perspective rarely maps perfectly onto the entire concept they're trying to describe. What I'm getting at is—nobody's perfect.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:What exactly do you mean by saying categories are universal? Are they truly universal, or just universal according to you? My categories don't necessarily have to align with yours, much less with the categories of someone like Marsovac.

Ultimately, every perspective is individual—even the single perspective intended to unify them all. Returning to the double-slit experiment, that serves as another lesson in this regard. Relativity teaches us the same thing. This carries further implications; for instance, we cannot rule out the possibility that you aren't actually real, but rather a product of placidranger's imagination. Or perhaps we are all part of a dream belonging to Marsovac, or living within the Matrix, or some simulation designed by an unknown entity in an unknown location.
One cannot possess any consciousness other than that which is based on—and constructed from—perception.

Look, do you even grasp what logical categories actually represent? They constitute the fundamental structure of any conceivable reality. It isn't a matter of my definitions clashing with yours or anyone else's; they are absolute. To make it easier for you, here’s a condensed list, moving from the basic building blocks toward the more complex layers:

Being and Nothingness - Coming-to-Be and Ceasing-to-Be - Determinate Being - quality - something - something and an Other - Determination - Science, Logic, and Metaphysics - Finitude - Infinity - The One and the Many - Many Ones: Repulsion - Repulsion and Attraction - Pure Quantity - Continuous and Discrete magnitude - Quantum - Number - Extensive and Intensive Quantum
- Measure - Identity - Difference - Absolute Difference - Diversity - Opposition - Ground - Determinate Ground - Condition - Existence - The thing and Its Properties - Property - appearance - Essential Relation - Relation of Whole and Parts - Relation of Force and Its Expression - The Relation of Outer and Inner - The Absolute - Actuality - Contingency - Real Life, Logic and Causality - Absolute Necessity - The Absolute Relation - Formal Causality - The Determinate Relation of Causality - The Notion - The Judgment - Logic - Physics - Biology - The Realized end - Life - Genus - The Idea of The True - Analytic Cognition - Synthetic Cognition - The Idea of The Good - The Absolute Idea.

Any rational being in any possible universe would have to be able to grasp these categories, regardless of whether their senses are lying to them, whether they are trapped in a simulation, living inside Frogger's mind, or stuck anywhere else for all I care. They don't need to share the same names—names are trivial, after all; we can call them whatever we want—but they must be understood through their logical necessity and how they derive from one another, as well as their essential function within the whole system.

My apologies. I was unfamiliar with the concept of logical categories.
One could likely imagine universes lacking these specific categories, though such realms could not include us. I agree with most points, except for this:

Furthermore, my experience isn't limited to mere perception. I also experience thoughts and judgments. Perception is simply raw data; it lacks meaning without the logical categories used to organize it. Since these categories are universal, subjective idealism fails. They remain valid across all the perspectives you mentioned.

As I understand it, subjective idealism is "to be is to be perceived." This brings me back to the double-slit experiment; that is precisely what the results imply.
Regarding the universality of categories: how could one even know they exist if there were no perceptions for those categories to organize into a conceptual experience? Do you believe consciousness could be constructed from categories alone? How could it function, or even exist, without any perception at all?
Additionally, perception isn't just about receiving external stimuli. Thought is also perceived. For instance, an imagination generates the next thought, an emotion, or a reflection; it builds new concepts or reinforces existing ones, constructing the self. This process is identical whether the perception originates from the outside world or from within the mind itself.

Actually, I took a closer look at what you wrote to Aphex. There is no need to reply. Though, I am still struggling to see where the disagreement lies—perceptions exist, and the mind organizes them, perhaps because they are inherently organized rather than chaotic. There is an underlying structure to reality that the mind attempts to mirror. This structure isn't some external entity; it exists because things exist as they do. It shapes and organizes them, becoming part of their essence. If one grasps all things, one grasps their structure as well. When Aphex discusses perceptions, I don't believe he is referring to white noise, but to perceptions as they truly are: ultimately organized, since they emerge from an organized reality.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:My apologies. I was unfamiliar with the concept of logical categories.
One could likely imagine universes lacking these specific categories, though such realms could not include us. I agree with most points, except for this:

Furthermore, my experience isn't limited to mere perception. I also experience thoughts and judgments. Perception is simply raw data; it lacks meaning without the logical categories used to organize it. Since these categories are universal, subjective idealism fails. They remain valid across all the perspectives you mentioned.

As I understand it, subjective idealism is "to be is to be perceived." This brings me back to the double-slit experiment; that is precisely what the results imply.
Regarding the universality of categories: how could one even know they exist if there were no perceptions for those categories to organize into a conceptual experience? Do you believe consciousness could be constructed from categories alone? How could it function, or even exist, without any perception at all?
Additionally, perception isn't just about receiving external stimuli. Thought is also perceived. For instance, an imagination generates the next thought, an emotion, or a reflection; it builds new concepts or reinforces existing ones, constructing the self. This process is identical whether the perception originates from the outside world or from within the mind itself.

You’ve hit the nail on the head there, and that’s really where the whole thing hinges. You can't just build a consciousness out of a collection of categories alone, isolated from actual experience or anything "external." There are plenty of ways to unpack why that is, but let's look at it this way. If you tried, you'd essentially be staring at The Absolute Idea—not as a concept, but as something immediate, or perhaps mediated. It would just be an idea reflecting on itself, a closed loop of pure self-relation. Since The Logic is essentially just ideas about ideas—think of it as thought contemplating its own process—you run into a wall. For Hegel, true "being" requires being The Absolute Idea, which is entirely self-determining, meaning there’s nothing outside of it to dictate what it is. This leads to that specific moment where the highest category, The Absolute Idea, becomes indistinguishable from the most basic state of existence, or simple being. The circle closes right there. You'd end up with nothing but absolute indeterminacy, which, if we're being honest, is really just a fancy way of describing nothingness.
Secondly, we find that sense of total unity between the subject and the object once we realize that the entire conceptual framework of The Logic—which is essentially The Absolute Idea—is being mirrored back through nature itself. It’s almost like the universe needs to take a good, long look in the mirror just to feel complete, or to be fully "consumed," if you will. It’s effectively the same principle as *esse est percipi*, though it operates on a much grander scale than just some individual person staring at a single object. Finally, there's the matter of intentionality, which is a fundamental requirement for consciousness; you can't really have a conscious mind just floating around in a vacuum "for itself." It always has to be pointed toward something else, directed toward an "other."
Or, as Magee puts it:

The Absolute Idea is still nothing more than an idea. It lacks any kind of concrete reality. You could argue that The Logic provides a solid formal ontology—basically a conceptual roadmap of what being actually is—but at the end of the day, it’s just a formality, a mental construct. Even if we accept that The Absolute Idea represents a perfectly self-contained system, the entire structure remains fundamentally flawed because logical or eidetic being is inherently incomplete. On its own, The Logic is purely formal and...
It’s all just one-dimensional if you stop there. For anything to actually become a complete, living reality, The Absolute Idea has to find a way to express itself within the messy, tangible realm of space and time.

So, it’s inevitable that it has to manifest. Like I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, it’s always the same story when you're dealing with Hegel—everything eventually has to undergo this process of self-negation just to resolve itself into an appearance. There isn't some hidden, noumenal reality lurking behind the curtain or anything otherworldly waiting to be discovered; everything just unfolds right here in front of us.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:My apologies. I was unfamiliar with the concept of logical categories.
One could likely imagine universes lacking these specific categories, though such realms could not include us. I agree with most points, except for this:

Furthermore, my experience isn't limited to mere perception. I also experience thoughts and judgments. Perception is simply raw data; it lacks meaning without the logical categories used to organize it. Since these categories are universal, subjective idealism fails. They remain valid across all the perspectives you mentioned.

As I understand it, subjective idealism is "to be is to be perceived." This brings me back to the double-slit experiment; that is precisely what the results imply.
Regarding the universality of categories: how could one even know they exist if there were no perceptions for those categories to organize into a conceptual experience? Do you believe consciousness could be constructed from categories alone? How could it function, or even exist, without any perception at all?
Additionally, perception isn't just about receiving external stimuli. Thought is also perceived. For instance, an imagination generates the next thought, an emotion, or a reflection; it builds new concepts or reinforces existing ones, constructing the self. This process is identical whether the perception originates from the outside world or from within the mind itself.

It’s not the same thing. Perception is just raw data, whereas an opinion is a choice—though let's be honest, nothing is ever truly "absolutely" free because reality is full of internal contradictions that make everything more of a rough approximation than a perfect truth. An opinion essentially determines itself; it isn't dictated by outside forces, even if those forces certainly set the stage. There are endless philosophical arguments regarding free will and such, but I don't have the patience to go through them all right now.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:Actually, I took a closer look at what you wrote to Aphex. There is no need to reply. Though, I am still struggling to see where the disagreement lies—perceptions exist, and the mind organizes them, perhaps because they are inherently organized rather than chaotic. There is an underlying structure to reality that the mind attempts to mirror. This structure isn't some external entity; it exists because things exist as they do. It shapes and organizes them, becoming part of their essence. If one grasps all things, one grasps their structure as well. When Aphex discusses perceptions, I don't believe he is referring to white noise, but to perceptions as they truly are: ultimately organized, since they emerge from an organized reality.

From where I'm sitting, the crux of the matter is that Aphex is denying that reality possesses any logical or conceptual framework, arguing instead that everything is purely subjective and exists only within our own minds. They seem to reject that old-school insight—the kind you'd find in classic Western philosophy—that the structure of thought is identical to the structure of being itself. Essentially, in this subject-versus-object debate, they're picking one side and completely discarding the other, which feels logically inconsistent. According to their view, all objective reality is just a subjective construct; even if they don't outright deny that something exists outside the subject (which is another logical hiccup), they believe we can't make claims about it that we could call "true," only things that are more or less coherent. Or something like that. Honestly, I'm starting to lose my way in the weeds of this whole thing myself.

Amanda Jackson5 said:You’ve hit the nail on the head there, and that’s really where the whole thing hinges. You can't just build a consciousness out of a collection of categories alone, isolated from actual experience or anything "external." There are plenty of ways to unpack why that is, but let's look at it this way. If you tried, you'd essentially be staring at The Absolute Idea—not as a concept, but as something immediate, or perhaps mediated. It would just be an idea reflecting on itself, a closed loop of pure self-relation. Since The Logic is essentially just ideas about ideas—think of it as thought contemplating its own process—you run into a wall. For Hegel, true "being" requires being The Absolute Idea, which is entirely self-determining, meaning there’s nothing outside of it to dictate what it is. This leads to that specific moment where the highest category, The Absolute Idea, becomes indistinguishable from the most basic state of existence, or simple being. The circle closes right there. You'd end up with nothing but absolute indeterminacy, which, if we're being honest, is really just a fancy way of describing nothingness.
Secondly, we find that sense of total unity between the subject and the object once we realize that the entire conceptual framework of The Logic—which is essentially The Absolute Idea—is being mirrored back through nature itself. It’s almost like the universe needs to take a good, long look in the mirror just to feel complete, or to be fully "consumed," if you will. It’s effectively the same principle as *esse est percipi*, though it operates on a much grander scale than just some individual person staring at a single object. Finally, there's the matter of intentionality, which is a fundamental requirement for consciousness; you can't really have a conscious mind just floating around in a vacuum "for itself." It always has to be pointed toward something else, directed toward an "other."
Or, as Magee puts it:

The Absolute Idea is still nothing more than an idea. It lacks any kind of concrete reality. You could argue that The Logic provides a solid formal ontology—basically a conceptual roadmap of what being actually is—but at the end of the day, it’s just a formality, a mental construct. Even if we accept that The Absolute Idea represents a perfectly self-contained system, the entire structure remains fundamentally flawed because logical or eidetic being is inherently incomplete. On its own, The Logic is purely formal and...
It’s all just one-dimensional if you stop there. For anything to actually become a complete, living reality, The Absolute Idea has to find a way to express itself within the messy, tangible realm of space and time.

So, it’s inevitable that it has to manifest. Like I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, it’s always the same story when you're dealing with Hegel—everything eventually has to undergo this process of self-negation just to resolve itself into an appearance. There isn't some hidden, noumenal reality lurking behind the curtain or anything otherworldly waiting to be discovered; everything just unfolds right here in front of us.

It’s not the same thing. Perception is just raw data, whereas an opinion is a choice—though let's be honest, nothing is ever truly "absolutely" free because reality is full of internal contradictions that make everything more of a rough approximation than a perfect truth. An opinion essentially determines itself; it isn't dictated by outside forces, even if those forces certainly set the stage. There are endless philosophical arguments regarding free will and such, but I don't have the patience to go through them all right now.

From where I'm sitting, the crux of the matter is that Aphex is denying that reality possesses any logical or conceptual framework, arguing instead that everything is purely subjective and exists only within our own minds. They seem to reject that old-school insight—the kind you'd find in classic Western philosophy—that the structure of thought is identical to the structure of being itself. Essentially, in this subject-versus-object debate, they're picking one side and completely discarding the other, which feels logically inconsistent. According to their view, all objective reality is just a subjective construct; even if they don't outright deny that something exists outside the subject (which is another logical hiccup), they believe we can't make claims about it that we could call "true," only things that are more or less coherent. Or something like that. Honestly, I'm starting to lose my way in the weeds of this whole thing myself.

I wouldn't fully agree with the concept of freedom of thought, though I suppose it is partially free. However, it is conditioned by what already exists, which is ultimately conditioned by external perception. Without perception, there would be a tabula rasa, and a blank slate cannot think. But yes, once consciousness is established, it can think somewhat independently of external perceptions, and perhaps not entirely determined by existing knowledge. Whether we call that "free" or not, I am not sure I could 🙂

As I see it, the point is that Apple denies that reality possesses a logical or conceptual structure, claiming instead that everything is exclusively subjective and exists only within our minds. In other words, they disagree with the—still Aristotelian—insight that the structure of thought is simultaneously the structure of being (existence, reality...). Effectively, by choosing one side of the subjective/objective opposition, they negate the other, which is logically inconsistent. According to them, all objective reality is a subjective construct; even though they don't deny some form of existence outside the subject (which is also a logical inconsistency), they believe we cannot make judgments about it that could be called "true," only those that are more or less coherent. Something like that. I have lost my way in all of this myself.

Fine then, I assume you will reach an understanding. It seems to me that you are both right. 😬

piles, space, geometry... this stuff starts at 4

Amanda Jackson5 said:So, how does the brain build reality out of raw neural data? It uses logical categories. Without them, perception would just be white noise or some chaotic pile of stimuli. You’re left with a messy multiplicity of form and content, which the brain smooths out using logic. It injects universality and necessity into the chaos. (Hegel suggests that the "I" is a melting pot, a fire that burns away multiplicity to reduce it to a single unity). This system of logical categories provides the conceptual framework. In other words, perception only becomes objective through these logical categories. Kant actually agreed with the empiricists that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge, except he argued that this knowledge wouldn't relate to absolute truths, but would merely be knowledge of appearances. Now, if universality and necessity aren't found in experience, where do they come from? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations, or concepts of understanding, are what constitute the objectivity of experiential knowledge. They generally contain relations and connections, without which you couldn't even form synthetic a priori judgments (those fundamental relationships between opposing elements). Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't have objectivity in the sense that they are given directly through perception; rather, he felt they belong to thought, making them subjective in that specific sense (if I'm following your point correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness feels as though the things it perceives through the senses exist independently, as things-in-themselves. Thought, on the other hand, is viewed as something dependent. But in reality, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are the truly independent and primary elements. In that sense, Kant called those things belonging to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective elements.

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" issue? Well, first you have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept that it is, then you're claiming to accurately perceive your surroundings. If you then turn around and say that this perception only gives you knowledge of appearances, rather than what a thing truly is ("in itself," rather than "for you" or "according to you"), you've hit a contradiction—you're claiming to have accurate perception yet arriving at false cognition. On the other hand, if you don't accept experience as the foundation of knowledge, you've fallen into radical skepticism, and any further discussion about perception or knowledge effectively hits a dead end because there’s nothing coherent left to say.

It’s actually a bit more straightforward than it sounds. I used to explain this using a friend as an example: if you have someone you call a friend, but they never actually act like one, then they aren't really a friend. It comes down to a question of identity—of being true to oneself. You have to keep in mind that a concept is essentially the unity of the individual, the particular, and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have predicates or objects to begin with.
Here is how Hegel puts it in his "Encyclopedic" logic:

By truth, one understands at first that I know (wisse) how something is. Yet this is truth only in relation to consciousness or the formal truth, mere correctness. In contrast to this, truth in the deeper sense consists in this, that objectivity is identical with the concept. It is truth in this deeper sense that is at stake if, for example, one is speaking of a true state or of a true work of art. These objects (Gegenstande) are true if they are what they should be, that is to say, if their reality corresponds to their concept. So construed, the untrue is the same as what is otherwise also called 'the bad'. A bad human being is one who is not truly human, i.e. a human being who does not behave in keeping with the concept or determination of a human being. Nothing, meanwhile, can subsist utterly without the identity of the concept and reality. Even something bad and untrue is only insofar as its reality still behaves somehow in conformity with its concept. Something thoroughly bad or at odds with the concept is, precisely for this reason, something collapsing in itself. It is the concept alone through which things have their standing in the world. - When speaking of the idea, one must
not imagine something remote and other-worldly by this. The idea is instead what is thoroughly present, and so too it is to be found in every consciousness, even if muddled and stunted.

Actually, that perspective does exist. It's called logic. Logic has to hold up regardless of your vantage point. This is what I was touching on earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary aspect, which is thought. Rational thought is the thing that bridges all perspectives. No matter where you're standing, you're still dealing with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, causality, quantity, form, content, essence, the concept, and so on.

Not quite. It just means that individual opinions clash, and more often than not, they aren't universal truths or absolute necessities. At the end of the day, a single person's perspective rarely maps perfectly onto the entire concept they're trying to describe. What I'm getting at is—nobody's perfect.

Neural phenomena *are* reality. Logical categories aren't some fundamental organizer. There are plenty of beings out there that don't perceive logical relationships or concepts. There are much more primitive realities than human ones—which means there are far more basic foundations for constructing reality than mere logical categories.

Think about it: the human nervous system is layered. You have the first layer dealing directly with correlates of external variables. Then you have the next layer handling invariants built from copies of signals from that first layer. This repeats several times until you reach concepts—maybe even more layers beyond that.

Besides, you can't just claim that logical categories are identical for everyone. On what basis?

Kant agreed with empiricism that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge—except that such knowledge wouldn't pertain to truths, but would merely be knowledge of phenomena. Now, where do universality and necessity come from if they aren't found in experience? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations or concepts of understanding constitute the objectivity of empirical knowledge. They generally contain relations; without them, synthetic a priori judgments (those original relations between opposing elements) couldn't be formed. Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't possess objectivity in the sense of being given in perception. Rather, he felt they belonged to thought, making them subjective in that sense (if I'm following you correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness perceives the things standing against it as if they exist independently—as "things-in-themselves." Thought, however, isn't seen as independent; it’s viewed as dependent on something else. But actually, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are truly independent and primary. In that regard, Kant called what belongs to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective element.

I don't see anything particularly useful in that. 🤷

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" business? Well, you first have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept it is, then you're essentially saying you perceive your surroundings accurately.So, if you’re claiming that your perception only gives you insight into phenomena—rather than what a thing actually *is* (its "thing-in-itself," as opposed to how it appears "to you")—then you've hit a contradiction. You'd be claiming to have accurate perception while simultaneously arriving at false conclusions. On the other hand, if you refuse to accept experience as the bedrock of knowledge, you've drifted into radical skepticism. At that point, any further debate regarding perception or epistemology is dead in the water—there's nothing left of substance to discuss.

That doesn't follow. Experience is indeed the foundation of knowledge and cognition, but it isn't the *only* thing.

It's simpler than you're making it. I used my friend as an example earlier. If you have a friend who doesn't act like a friend toward you, then they aren't a friend. It comes down to identity—the concept of being identical to oneself. One has to keep in mind that a concept is a unity of the particular and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have propositions or objects.

That makes no sense to me. If we're talking about the concept of a "true friend," that's just a linguistic construct with its own set of attributes defining what makes someone a true friend. If we're talking about a specific person, that's a different kind of construction entirely—a collection of traits, memories of their behavior, and so on. There is no "identity with oneself" happening here; rather, two things are being compared, or perhaps individuals are simply being categorized by the degree to which they qualify as "true friends"...

That perspective exists. That's logic. Logic has to hold up across all perspectives. That’s what I was referring to earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary component, which is thought. Rational thought unifies all perspectives. Within any given perspective, you still deal with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, cause, quantity, form, content, essence, concepts, and so on.

I don't think those categories exist in every perspective. They certainly don't exist in most non-human perspectives. They don't even exist in children. And later on, they don't even exist in some adults.

Zachary Mendoza2 said:Actually, I took a closer look at what you wrote to Aphex. There is no need to reply. Though, I am still struggling to see where the disagreement lies—perceptions exist, and the mind organizes them, perhaps because they are inherently organized rather than chaotic. There is an underlying structure to reality that the mind attempts to mirror. This structure isn't some external entity; it exists because things exist as they do. It shapes and organizes them, becoming part of their essence. If one grasps all things, one grasps their structure as well. When Aphex discusses perceptions, I don't believe he is referring to white noise, but to perceptions as they truly are: ultimately organized, since they emerge from an organized reality.

My take? The mind isn't trying to mirror the structure of reality. It constructs its own version of reality—one that certainly relies on external phenomena, but is qualitatively different from those phenomena themselves.

Something along those lines.

placidranger said:Neural phenomena *are* reality. Logical categories aren't some fundamental organizer. There are plenty of beings out there that don't perceive logical relationships or concepts. There are much more primitive realities than human ones—which means there are far more basic foundations for constructing reality than mere logical categories.

Think about it: the human nervous system is layered. You have the first layer dealing directly with correlates of external variables. Then you have the next layer handling invariants built from copies of signals from that first layer. This repeats several times until you reach concepts—maybe even more layers beyond that.

Besides, you can't just claim that logical categories are identical for everyone. On what basis?

Kant agreed with empiricism that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge—except that such knowledge wouldn't pertain to truths, but would merely be knowledge of phenomena. Now, where do universality and necessity come from if they aren't found in experience? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations or concepts of understanding constitute the objectivity of empirical knowledge. They generally contain relations; without them, synthetic a priori judgments (those original relations between opposing elements) couldn't be formed. Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't possess objectivity in the sense of being given in perception. Rather, he felt they belonged to thought, making them subjective in that sense (if I'm following you correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness perceives the things standing against it as if they exist independently—as "things-in-themselves." Thought, however, isn't seen as independent; it’s viewed as dependent on something else. But actually, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are truly independent and primary. In that regard, Kant called what belongs to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective element.

I don't see anything particularly useful in that. 🤷

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" business? Well, you first have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept it is, then you're essentially saying you perceive your surroundings accurately.So, if you’re claiming that your perception only gives you insight into phenomena—rather than what a thing actually *is* (its "thing-in-itself," as opposed to how it appears "to you")—then you've hit a contradiction. You'd be claiming to have accurate perception while simultaneously arriving at false conclusions. On the other hand, if you refuse to accept experience as the bedrock of knowledge, you've drifted into radical skepticism. At that point, any further debate regarding perception or epistemology is dead in the water—there's nothing left of substance to discuss.

That doesn't follow. Experience is indeed the foundation of knowledge and cognition, but it isn't the *only* thing.

It's simpler than you're making it. I used my friend as an example earlier. If you have a friend who doesn't act like a friend toward you, then they aren't a friend. It comes down to identity—the concept of being identical to oneself. One has to keep in mind that a concept is a unity of the particular and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have propositions or objects.

That makes no sense to me. If we're talking about the concept of a "true friend," that's just a linguistic construct with its own set of attributes defining what makes someone a true friend. If we're talking about a specific person, that's a different kind of construction entirely—a collection of traits, memories of their behavior, and so on. There is no "identity with oneself" happening here; rather, two things are being compared, or perhaps individuals are simply being categorized by the degree to which they qualify as "true friends"...

That perspective exists. That's logic. Logic has to hold up across all perspectives. That’s what I was referring to earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary component, which is thought. Rational thought unifies all perspectives. Within any given perspective, you still deal with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, cause, quantity, form, content, essence, concepts, and so on.

I don't think those categories exist in every perspective. They certainly don't exist in most non-human perspectives. They don't even exist in children. And later on, they don't even exist in some adults.

But why focus specifically on neural processes? Why settle on the neuronal level instead of looking at something deeper—say, the subatomic scale—or perhaps something broader than just neurons? From where I’m sitting, this specific level seems somewhat arbitrary, whereas logical categories seem to permeate every single layer because they are universal.

placidranger said:Neural phenomena *are* reality. Logical categories aren't some fundamental organizer. There are plenty of beings out there that don't perceive logical relationships or concepts. There are much more primitive realities than human ones—which means there are far more basic foundations for constructing reality than mere logical categories.

Think about it: the human nervous system is layered. You have the first layer dealing directly with correlates of external variables. Then you have the next layer handling invariants built from copies of signals from that first layer. This repeats several times until you reach concepts—maybe even more layers beyond that.

Besides, you can't just claim that logical categories are identical for everyone. On what basis?

Kant agreed with empiricism that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge—except that such knowledge wouldn't pertain to truths, but would merely be knowledge of phenomena. Now, where do universality and necessity come from if they aren't found in experience? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations or concepts of understanding constitute the objectivity of empirical knowledge. They generally contain relations; without them, synthetic a priori judgments (those original relations between opposing elements) couldn't be formed. Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't possess objectivity in the sense of being given in perception. Rather, he felt they belonged to thought, making them subjective in that sense (if I'm following you correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness perceives the things standing against it as if they exist independently—as "things-in-themselves." Thought, however, isn't seen as independent; it’s viewed as dependent on something else. But actually, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are truly independent and primary. In that regard, Kant called what belongs to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective element.

I don't see anything particularly useful in that. 🤷

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" business? Well, you first have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept it is, then you're essentially saying you perceive your surroundings accurately.So, if you’re claiming that your perception only gives you insight into phenomena—rather than what a thing actually *is* (its "thing-in-itself," as opposed to how it appears "to you")—then you've hit a contradiction. You'd be claiming to have accurate perception while simultaneously arriving at false conclusions. On the other hand, if you refuse to accept experience as the bedrock of knowledge, you've drifted into radical skepticism. At that point, any further debate regarding perception or epistemology is dead in the water—there's nothing left of substance to discuss.

That doesn't follow. Experience is indeed the foundation of knowledge and cognition, but it isn't the *only* thing.

It's simpler than you're making it. I used my friend as an example earlier. If you have a friend who doesn't act like a friend toward you, then they aren't a friend. It comes down to identity—the concept of being identical to oneself. One has to keep in mind that a concept is a unity of the particular and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have propositions or objects.

That makes no sense to me. If we're talking about the concept of a "true friend," that's just a linguistic construct with its own set of attributes defining what makes someone a true friend. If we're talking about a specific person, that's a different kind of construction entirely—a collection of traits, memories of their behavior, and so on. There is no "identity with oneself" happening here; rather, two things are being compared, or perhaps individuals are simply being categorized by the degree to which they qualify as "true friends"...

That perspective exists. That's logic. Logic has to hold up across all perspectives. That’s what I was referring to earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary component, which is thought. Rational thought unifies all perspectives. Within any given perspective, you still deal with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, cause, quantity, form, content, essence, concepts, and so on.

I don't think those categories exist in every perspective. They certainly don't exist in most non-human perspectives. They don't even exist in children. And later on, they don't even exist in some adults.

What does that actually have to do with logic? It’s like arguing that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. Sure, nothing exists—but for the rock.

placidranger said:Neural phenomena *are* reality. Logical categories aren't some fundamental organizer. There are plenty of beings out there that don't perceive logical relationships or concepts. There are much more primitive realities than human ones—which means there are far more basic foundations for constructing reality than mere logical categories.

Think about it: the human nervous system is layered. You have the first layer dealing directly with correlates of external variables. Then you have the next layer handling invariants built from copies of signals from that first layer. This repeats several times until you reach concepts—maybe even more layers beyond that.

Besides, you can't just claim that logical categories are identical for everyone. On what basis?

Kant agreed with empiricism that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge—except that such knowledge wouldn't pertain to truths, but would merely be knowledge of phenomena. Now, where do universality and necessity come from if they aren't found in experience? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations or concepts of understanding constitute the objectivity of empirical knowledge. They generally contain relations; without them, synthetic a priori judgments (those original relations between opposing elements) couldn't be formed. Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't possess objectivity in the sense of being given in perception. Rather, he felt they belonged to thought, making them subjective in that sense (if I'm following you correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness perceives the things standing against it as if they exist independently—as "things-in-themselves." Thought, however, isn't seen as independent; it’s viewed as dependent on something else. But actually, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are truly independent and primary. In that regard, Kant called what belongs to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective element.

I don't see anything particularly useful in that. 🤷

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" business? Well, you first have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept it is, then you're essentially saying you perceive your surroundings accurately.So, if you’re claiming that your perception only gives you insight into phenomena—rather than what a thing actually *is* (its "thing-in-itself," as opposed to how it appears "to you")—then you've hit a contradiction. You'd be claiming to have accurate perception while simultaneously arriving at false conclusions. On the other hand, if you refuse to accept experience as the bedrock of knowledge, you've drifted into radical skepticism. At that point, any further debate regarding perception or epistemology is dead in the water—there's nothing left of substance to discuss.

That doesn't follow. Experience is indeed the foundation of knowledge and cognition, but it isn't the *only* thing.

It's simpler than you're making it. I used my friend as an example earlier. If you have a friend who doesn't act like a friend toward you, then they aren't a friend. It comes down to identity—the concept of being identical to oneself. One has to keep in mind that a concept is a unity of the particular and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have propositions or objects.

That makes no sense to me. If we're talking about the concept of a "true friend," that's just a linguistic construct with its own set of attributes defining what makes someone a true friend. If we're talking about a specific person, that's a different kind of construction entirely—a collection of traits, memories of their behavior, and so on. There is no "identity with oneself" happening here; rather, two things are being compared, or perhaps individuals are simply being categorized by the degree to which they qualify as "true friends"...

That perspective exists. That's logic. Logic has to hold up across all perspectives. That’s what I was referring to earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary component, which is thought. Rational thought unifies all perspectives. Within any given perspective, you still deal with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, cause, quantity, form, content, essence, concepts, and so on.

I don't think those categories exist in every perspective. They certainly don't exist in most non-human perspectives. They don't even exist in children. And later on, they don't even exist in some adults.

We could slice any system into an arbitrary number of layers if we felt like it, so what’s the actual point of making that distinction?

placidranger said:Neural phenomena *are* reality. Logical categories aren't some fundamental organizer. There are plenty of beings out there that don't perceive logical relationships or concepts. There are much more primitive realities than human ones—which means there are far more basic foundations for constructing reality than mere logical categories.

Think about it: the human nervous system is layered. You have the first layer dealing directly with correlates of external variables. Then you have the next layer handling invariants built from copies of signals from that first layer. This repeats several times until you reach concepts—maybe even more layers beyond that.

Besides, you can't just claim that logical categories are identical for everyone. On what basis?

Kant agreed with empiricism that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge—except that such knowledge wouldn't pertain to truths, but would merely be knowledge of phenomena. Now, where do universality and necessity come from if they aren't found in experience? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations or concepts of understanding constitute the objectivity of empirical knowledge. They generally contain relations; without them, synthetic a priori judgments (those original relations between opposing elements) couldn't be formed. Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't possess objectivity in the sense of being given in perception. Rather, he felt they belonged to thought, making them subjective in that sense (if I'm following you correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness perceives the things standing against it as if they exist independently—as "things-in-themselves." Thought, however, isn't seen as independent; it’s viewed as dependent on something else. But actually, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are truly independent and primary. In that regard, Kant called what belongs to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective element.

I don't see anything particularly useful in that. 🤷

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" business? Well, you first have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept it is, then you're essentially saying you perceive your surroundings accurately.So, if you’re claiming that your perception only gives you insight into phenomena—rather than what a thing actually *is* (its "thing-in-itself," as opposed to how it appears "to you")—then you've hit a contradiction. You'd be claiming to have accurate perception while simultaneously arriving at false conclusions. On the other hand, if you refuse to accept experience as the bedrock of knowledge, you've drifted into radical skepticism. At that point, any further debate regarding perception or epistemology is dead in the water—there's nothing left of substance to discuss.

That doesn't follow. Experience is indeed the foundation of knowledge and cognition, but it isn't the *only* thing.

It's simpler than you're making it. I used my friend as an example earlier. If you have a friend who doesn't act like a friend toward you, then they aren't a friend. It comes down to identity—the concept of being identical to oneself. One has to keep in mind that a concept is a unity of the particular and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have propositions or objects.

That makes no sense to me. If we're talking about the concept of a "true friend," that's just a linguistic construct with its own set of attributes defining what makes someone a true friend. If we're talking about a specific person, that's a different kind of construction entirely—a collection of traits, memories of their behavior, and so on. There is no "identity with oneself" happening here; rather, two things are being compared, or perhaps individuals are simply being categorized by the degree to which they qualify as "true friends"...

That perspective exists. That's logic. Logic has to hold up across all perspectives. That’s what I was referring to earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary component, which is thought. Rational thought unifies all perspectives. Within any given perspective, you still deal with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, cause, quantity, form, content, essence, concepts, and so on.

I don't think those categories exist in every perspective. They certainly don't exist in most non-human perspectives. They don't even exist in children. And later on, they don't even exist in some adults.

Because they are logical.

placidranger said:Neural phenomena *are* reality. Logical categories aren't some fundamental organizer. There are plenty of beings out there that don't perceive logical relationships or concepts. There are much more primitive realities than human ones—which means there are far more basic foundations for constructing reality than mere logical categories.

Think about it: the human nervous system is layered. You have the first layer dealing directly with correlates of external variables. Then you have the next layer handling invariants built from copies of signals from that first layer. This repeats several times until you reach concepts—maybe even more layers beyond that.

Besides, you can't just claim that logical categories are identical for everyone. On what basis?

Kant agreed with empiricism that experience is the sole foundation of knowledge—except that such knowledge wouldn't pertain to truths, but would merely be knowledge of phenomena. Now, where do universality and necessity come from if they aren't found in experience? Kant would argue they reside in thought, or that they are "a priori." These mental determinations or concepts of understanding constitute the objectivity of empirical knowledge. They generally contain relations; without them, synthetic a priori judgments (those original relations between opposing elements) couldn't be formed. Now, Kant believed that mental determinations—like cause and effect—don't possess objectivity in the sense of being given in perception. Rather, he felt they belonged to thought, making them subjective in that sense (if I'm following you correctly). Kant maintained that whatever is universal and necessary belongs to thought, and he was right there. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness perceives the things standing against it as if they exist independently—as "things-in-themselves." Thought, however, isn't seen as independent; it’s viewed as dependent on something else. But actually, what we perceive through our senses is secondary and dependent, while thoughts are truly independent and primary. In that regard, Kant called what belongs to thought—the universal and the necessary—the objective element.

I don't see anything particularly useful in that. 🤷

Regarding the whole "thing-in-itself" business? Well, you first have to decide whether experience is the foundation of knowledge or cognition. If you accept it is, then you're essentially saying you perceive your surroundings accurately.So, if you’re claiming that your perception only gives you insight into phenomena—rather than what a thing actually *is* (its "thing-in-itself," as opposed to how it appears "to you")—then you've hit a contradiction. You'd be claiming to have accurate perception while simultaneously arriving at false conclusions. On the other hand, if you refuse to accept experience as the bedrock of knowledge, you've drifted into radical skepticism. At that point, any further debate regarding perception or epistemology is dead in the water—there's nothing left of substance to discuss.

That doesn't follow. Experience is indeed the foundation of knowledge and cognition, but it isn't the *only* thing.

It's simpler than you're making it. I used my friend as an example earlier. If you have a friend who doesn't act like a friend toward you, then they aren't a friend. It comes down to identity—the concept of being identical to oneself. One has to keep in mind that a concept is a unity of the particular and the universal. Without concepts, we wouldn't have propositions or objects.

That makes no sense to me. If we're talking about the concept of a "true friend," that's just a linguistic construct with its own set of attributes defining what makes someone a true friend. If we're talking about a specific person, that's a different kind of construction entirely—a collection of traits, memories of their behavior, and so on. There is no "identity with oneself" happening here; rather, two things are being compared, or perhaps individuals are simply being categorized by the degree to which they qualify as "true friends"...

That perspective exists. That's logic. Logic has to hold up across all perspectives. That’s what I was referring to earlier regarding Kant—that objective element, the universal and necessary component, which is thought. Rational thought unifies all perspectives. Within any given perspective, you still deal with existence (or non-existence), identity, foundation, cause, quantity, form, content, essence, concepts, and so on.

I don't think those categories exist in every perspective. They certainly don't exist in most non-human perspectives. They don't even exist in children. And later on, they don't even exist in some adults.

I have to disagree with you there.

Amanda Jackson5 said:But why focus specifically on neural processes? Why settle on the neuronal level instead of looking at something deeper—say, the subatomic scale—or perhaps something broader than just neurons? From where I’m sitting, this specific level seems somewhat arbitrary, whereas logical categories seem to permeate every single layer because they are universal.

What does that actually have to do with logic? It’s like arguing that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. Sure, nothing exists—but for the rock.

We could slice any system into an arbitrary number of layers if we felt like it, so what’s the actual point of making that distinction?

Because they are logical.

I have to disagree with you there.

So, where exactly do these "logical categories" reside?

The neuronal level was selected because neural currents actually correlate with external phenomena—it just makes more sense to deal with clusters of neurons. Since an individual neuron introduces a certain amount of signal noise during transmission, you neutralize that static by averaging out larger groups of neurons. These aggregate values are what correlate with external magnitudes.

What does that have to do with logic? It’s like claiming that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. True, nothing exists—but not for the rock.

So logic is only applicable to humans, then.

We could slice everything into any number of arbitrary layers. So what?

We can test anything in neuroscience and hunt for evidence both for and against a specific thesis. The nervous system is organized into layers that are functionally and topologically distinct—plenty of research in the field supports that. If we accept that the brain produces the mind, then we have to accept that it does so through abstraction, not through some inherent set of logical categories.

Once you lose the ability to count individual grains, you aren't looking at a measurement anymore; you're just looking at a pile.

placidranger said:My take? The mind isn't trying to mirror the structure of reality. It constructs its own version of reality—one that certainly relies on external phenomena, but is qualitatively different from those phenomena themselves.

Something along those lines.

If the mind is constructing something based on external phenomena, then those phenomena aren't just white noise; they carry information. That implies the external world possesses some level of organization. I agree that our perception is qualitatively different and much more complex than what we actually see—we simply recognize certain patterns and conceptualize them. For instance, if there is a chair, you could argue it is nothing more than a collection of atoms, but that isn't the full picture because I am here, and it isn't just a chair. I can sit on those atoms, so I am not wrong to call it a chair. Furthermore, Sigmund could use those atoms as a weapon, or he could use them for heat, or even to dry laundry. You cannot claim it is merely a mental construct when a planned action can be performed with those "mere atoms" to produce an expected result. It may be a mental construct, but it remains consistent with reality.

placidranger said:So, where exactly do these "logical categories" reside?

The neuronal level was selected because neural currents actually correlate with external phenomena—it just makes more sense to deal with clusters of neurons. Since an individual neuron introduces a certain amount of signal noise during transmission, you neutralize that static by averaging out larger groups of neurons. These aggregate values are what correlate with external magnitudes.

What does that have to do with logic? It’s like claiming that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. True, nothing exists—but not for the rock.

So logic is only applicable to humans, then.

We could slice everything into any number of arbitrary layers. So what?

We can test anything in neuroscience and hunt for evidence both for and against a specific thesis. The nervous system is organized into layers that are functionally and topologically distinct—plenty of research in the field supports that. If we accept that the brain produces the mind, then we have to accept that it does so through abstraction, not through some inherent set of logical categories.

I’m lost here. Are you asking for their GPS coordinates? It’s more like what we call reality is just the sum total of those logical categories.

placidranger said:So, where exactly do these "logical categories" reside?

The neuronal level was selected because neural currents actually correlate with external phenomena—it just makes more sense to deal with clusters of neurons. Since an individual neuron introduces a certain amount of signal noise during transmission, you neutralize that static by averaging out larger groups of neurons. These aggregate values are what correlate with external magnitudes.

What does that have to do with logic? It’s like claiming that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. True, nothing exists—but not for the rock.

So logic is only applicable to humans, then.

We could slice everything into any number of arbitrary layers. So what?

We can test anything in neuroscience and hunt for evidence both for and against a specific thesis. The nervous system is organized into layers that are functionally and topologically distinct—plenty of research in the field supports that. If we accept that the brain produces the mind, then we have to accept that it does so through abstraction, not through some inherent set of logical categories.

😕
So, according to this, true reality—whatever that implies—isn't just a pile of atoms or even individual neurons, but these collections of neurons? If that's the case, why wouldn't the entire brain, being the ultimate massive collection of neurons, be considered "true reality"?

placidranger said:So, where exactly do these "logical categories" reside?

The neuronal level was selected because neural currents actually correlate with external phenomena—it just makes more sense to deal with clusters of neurons. Since an individual neuron introduces a certain amount of signal noise during transmission, you neutralize that static by averaging out larger groups of neurons. These aggregate values are what correlate with external magnitudes.

What does that have to do with logic? It’s like claiming that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. True, nothing exists—but not for the rock.

So logic is only applicable to humans, then.

We could slice everything into any number of arbitrary layers. So what?

We can test anything in neuroscience and hunt for evidence both for and against a specific thesis. The nervous system is organized into layers that are functionally and topologically distinct—plenty of research in the field supports that. If we accept that the brain produces the mind, then we have to accept that it does so through abstraction, not through some inherent set of logical categories.

Not really. Logic applies to rocks too; it's just that a rock isn't aware enough to realize it.

placidranger said:So, where exactly do these "logical categories" reside?

The neuronal level was selected because neural currents actually correlate with external phenomena—it just makes more sense to deal with clusters of neurons. Since an individual neuron introduces a certain amount of signal noise during transmission, you neutralize that static by averaging out larger groups of neurons. These aggregate values are what correlate with external magnitudes.

What does that have to do with logic? It’s like claiming that because a rock doesn't perceive anything, nothing exists. True, nothing exists—but not for the rock.

So logic is only applicable to humans, then.

We could slice everything into any number of arbitrary layers. So what?

We can test anything in neuroscience and hunt for evidence both for and against a specific thesis. The nervous system is organized into layers that are functionally and topologically distinct—plenty of research in the field supports that. If we accept that the brain produces the mind, then we have to accept that it does so through abstraction, not through some inherent set of logical categories.

I’d love to see someone attempt the act of abstraction without relying on logical categories. 😁The logical categories themselves are the abstractions.