Do any animals (besides humans) have a sense of time?

amberviper said:2) The external perspective: alongside our internal view, consciousness also holds an outward gaze—it’s always directed at something, or rather, it’s consciousness *of* something.
We could call this "intentionality." While we might separate them for the sake of a methodological argument, human phenomenal consciousness is truly inseparable from that sense of intentionality.
In my view, the internal perspective is actually shaped by the external one, which seems perfectly capable of existing on its own, as our various sensations clearly demonstrate. A stone, for instance, possesses neither an internal nor an external perspective...

Neither the internal nor the external perspective should be reduced to mere biological mechanics. We have the capacity to conjure up things that don't even touch us directly—whether they lack physical existence entirely or are tangible objects: think of an "unprepared dinner table," "fine Napa Valley wine," a "beautiful woman," or even purely semantic concepts like "bankrupt ideals"...

3) multifunctionality: Humans are natural generalists, whereas animals are specialists. Without consciousness, a human wouldn't stand a chance at surviving based on any single "specialization." Every animal has its niche: one is incredibly fast, like a cheetah; another is venomous like a cobra; a third has crushing jaws like a lion or a hyena, and so on...
Animals are perfectly tuned to their environments, but humans aren't; instead, we reshape the environment to fit our needs. Yet, whatever falls outside the reach of animal senses remains on the periphery or stays completely out of their field of vision. Humans, however, take responsibility for everything...

amberviper said:It's called natural affect, or instinct! A fox isn't making intentional choices; it's just acting on instinct. There's really no need for an anthropocentric interpretation here. I laid out the differences between human and animal consciousness for you, so maybe give that a read before you jump to your next response. I couldn't get to this yesterday because the forum was acting up...

James Lee77 said:A tennis player sprints toward a ball they can barely reach and catches a glimpse out of the corner of their eye that their opponent has rushed the net. The tennis player hits a lob and passes them.

Did the tennis player think, "Aha, there he is at the net, that leaves space behind him—I just need to lob it and the point is mine!" after seeing the opponent?

I don't think so. It feels more like something completely non-verbal—they saw the opponent, realized the opportunity, and acted on that opportunity.

A seagull flies over the ocean and spots a fish. It dives deep. (I would say "it dives deep to catch the fish"—but for some reasons I don't quite get, you and ironmarlin1 don't agree that it's okay to say the seagull dives with the intention of catching the fish it saw, or for the purpose of catching the fish it spotted.)

I don't see any difference between the tennis player making a split-second play and the seagull diving for prey. Sure, the difference comes in that the tennis player can reflect on the move later and look for different options—but the moment of decision itself seems the same to me: there's an insight into a possibility, and then a decision. As far as I can tell, that decision isn't verbal.

So, it seems totally fair to say a seagull has the intention to catch a fish, just like a tennis player has the intention to pass their opponent.

When we're talking about planning for the future, yeah, language clearly lets humans do way more than animals that can't talk.

But, going back to that earlier example:

When a fox buries extra food, it buries it

a) for later
b) just because
c) instinctively.

My answer is a), and I haven't seen anything in this thread yet to change my mind. From what I gather, ironmarlin1's answer is b), and yours is c), but I just don't see the distinction between human intentionality (since it's non-verbal) and animal instinct.

I don't see much of a distinction between a tennis player executing a shot in the moment and a seagull making its move to hunt. Of course, the difference lies in the tennis player's ability to reflect on that shot later and weigh different options—but the moment of decision itself feels identical to me: there is a perception of possibility, followed by a choice. As far as I can tell, that decision doesn't need to be verbalized.

But, circling back to that earlier example:

When a fox buries surplus food, it does so

a) for future use,
b) just because,
c) purely by instinct.

My money is on A, and I haven't seen anything in this thread yet that would sway me from that. From what I gather, ironmarlin1 is leaning toward B, while your argument falls under C, but I’m struggling to grasp the line you're drawing between human intentionality—which is non-verbal, after all—and animal instinct.

ironmarlin1 said:That isn't what I was getting at; rather, I was questioning whether such an explanation holds any actual weight. When we look at a chess engine, should we adopt a stance that it acts because of a specific change within its code, or because it possesses an intent to make a particular move? It really comes down to the empirical utility of adopting an intentional stance versus a stance based on the software's design.

I don't see much of a distinction between a tennis player executing a shot in the moment and a seagull making its move to hunt. Of course, the difference lies in the tennis player's ability to reflect on that shot later and weigh different options—but the moment of decision itself feels identical to me: there is a perception of possibility, followed by a choice. As far as I can tell, that decision doesn't need to be verbalized.

I’m not sure what a "verbal decision" would even look like, but that’s beside the point. What matters is which perspective offers the best predictive power regarding behavior. Is it the intentional stance, or something else entirely?

But, circling back to that earlier example:

When a fox buries surplus food, it does so

a) for future use,
b) just because,
c) purely by instinct.

My money is on A, and I haven't seen anything in this thread yet that would sway me from that. From what I gather, ironmarlin1 is leaning toward B, while your argument falls under C, but I’m struggling to grasp the line you're drawing between human intentionality—which is non-verbal, after all—and animal instinct.

The distinction lies in explanatory value. It's essentially the classic divide between behaviorism and cognitivism when trying to map out human conduct. The former has largely fallen out of favor. Honestly, I'm not sure how much sense it makes to debate whether something "actually" possesses intention; it really depends on how useful that explanation becomes in practice and prediction. Whether a fox "intends" to do something is contingent upon which framework you choose to apply. If I explain the fox's actions through its intentions rather than through the evolutionary mechanisms I use to predict its behavior every single time, then the latter approach is simply more accurate.

For instance, if X is rational and X believes P, then if P implies Q, X must believe Q because they are rational. This is something that requires empirical verification. That is precisely how we determine whether we ought to adopt an intentional stance or some other model.

James Lee77 said:Does that same logic apply to people?

ironmarlin1 said:It absolutely does. If you look at the history of psychology, behaviorism essentially hit a brick wall because it tried to explain the world without ever touching on mentalistic concepts—things like beliefs, desires, or intentions—and, frankly, it just couldn't make the math work.

James Lee77 said:I'm not sure if I'm following you correctly (I probably missed something):
- we look at human behavior through two lenses (like, one mechanical lens and one conscious one)
- but for animals and computer programs, there's really just the one (the mechanical one).

Is the reason just because we can't actually sit down and have a conversation with an animal or a line of code? Like, since we can talk to other people, we can actually discuss their beliefs and wants, but we can't really do that with animals, right?

ironmarlin1 said:I wouldn't necessarily label that second lens as "conscious"; if I were being precise, I’d call it intentional. My point wasn't that animals or computer programs are devoid of anything else, but rather that the perspective you choose depends entirely on the explanatory power you need at that moment. I didn't mean to imply that verbal communication is the sole litmus test for complexity; it really comes down to finding empirical experiments that might demonstrate, for instance, that an animal acts under the assumption that another creature possesses its own set of beliefs—behaviors that are observable and, more importantly, verifiable.

James Lee77 said:I'm still lost, though. 🤷

Let's go back to that one example:

A guy eats some salad. He eats half, then puts the rest in the fridge. Later, he comes back and finishes it.

Based on that, we could maybe set up an experiment: watch a hundred single people putting food away in their refrigerators. The hypothesis is: most of them will come back later to eat it. Say the data actually proves the hypothesis is right.

The explanation would be: those people have this concept—maybe a super clear one, or maybe it's kind of fuzzy—that even though they aren't hungry right now, they're gonna need that food later.

If that logic holds up, why wouldn't the exact same thing apply to a fox? 🤷

X is rational, and if X believes p, and p implies q, then X must also believe q because they are rational. This is something that requires empirical verification. That is how we determine whether we should adopt an intentional stance or opt for some other approach.

ironmarlin1 said:Your explanation doesn't quite hold water for me. It doesn't necessarily follow that they held a conscious intention to use that food later; you really need actual evidence for that. To prove it, you have to demonstrate a consequence that stems from the claim that they believe they will need it later. With humans, proving this is trivial—you simply ask them why they put the food in the fridge. However, I don't see any evidence of such beliefs in foxes, nor can I see the behavioral consequences that would exist if such beliefs were actually present.

So, we are left with that framework I mentioned previously:

X is rational, and if X believes p, and p implies q, then X must also believe q because they are rational. This is something that requires empirical verification. That is how we determine whether we should adopt an intentional stance or opt for some other approach.

James Lee77 said:Okay, look, imagine you're an anthropologist visiting some remote tribe where you don't speak the language at all.
You watch them stash away food, and then you see them coming back for it later.
What would you honestly think?

Wouldn't you just assume, "Hey, they're saving this for later"? I mean, would you really be like, "I won't assume anything until I have hard evidence"?

ironmarlin1 said:Let me try to reframe your argument just a bit. Imagine you're a zoologist out in the Great Plains, coming across a herd of bison. Now, you already know from everything you've studied that bison are herbivores. So, what's your thought process? Are these specific bison also herbivores, or do we wait for more data? 🤷

mistyfox812 said:Think about it—you're a biologist discovering a totally new species, and you see it grazing on grass.
Your gut reaction is gonna be that they're herbivores.

But what gives you the right to assume that? Just because other things that eat grass are herbivores? Obviously, if it turns out they aren't, then the assumption is dead. But until I have proof otherwise, I'm sticking with what I know about similar species.
I'm not gonna say, "Bison are herbivores, but I can't assume anything about this new species until I gather mountains of evidence." I don't think anyone actually lives their life with that kind of extreme scientific rigor. It's the opposite! We're always making assumptions, and we only look for new ones when our old assumptions fail us.

So, like, if a fox caches food and comes back for it later, my assumption—until proven wrong—is that it's doing the exact same thing I do when I stash stuff away to grab later.

Right now, I just don't see any reason to doubt that the answer to "why does a fox store extra food" is simply "to eat it later."

ironmarlin1 said:Look, you’re certainly entitled to your anthropomorphisms, but let’s be honest: they aren't justified. I honestly struggle to understand how you account for the behavior of rabbits, snakes, frogs, and all those other animals that become utterly impossible to explain if you view them through your specific lens. Most researchers in those fields would find themselves fundamentally at odds with your premises. By that same flawed logic, you could look at a fish with vaguely human-like facial features and attribute a whole suite of human traits to it, which really just highlights a fascinating psychological quirk in humans rather than anything biological. If I had to label it, I'd call it feeding one's own prejudices and relying on poor intuition.

James Lee77 said:I don't think you're seeing my point.
What I'm getting at is that anthropomorphism is always our starting assumption. We never actually approach anything with a completely blank slate. It's actually the opposite—we almost always start out with an anthropomorphic bias.
It's only once we have actual evidence—which happens a lot—that we drop that initial assumption.
But again, I'm saying it's only *after* we have a reason to change our minds.

ironmarlin1 said:The thing is, that isn't actually an example of a contradiction. ☕
The various interpretations of quantum mechanics don't contain any inherent logical contradictions themselves. Sure, if they were contradictory, we wouldn't be able to formalize them mathematically—but we can. You would have to demonstrate that within such a system, a judgment is simultaneously true (both A and not-A). And I find myself returning to the same question: without the principle of identity, how could you even begin to distinguish one concept from another, or more simply, claim that Kerber isn't a unicorn?

ironmarlin1 said:No, that’s simply not how it works; contrary to what naive _Ljubo_ seems to think, not every physical structure needs to be infused with some magical substance called consciousness. It is much like health: being healthy doesn't require you to contain a specific "health substance" within you; rather, it requires a certain functional state of the organism. The exact same principle applies to consciousness.

Explaining consciousness through an algorithmic lens is inadequate, since that is precisely how computers and other types of hardware operate, and they clearly lack consciousness.

All you’ve managed to demonstrate here is that the mere existence of an algorithm isn't a sufficient condition for consciousness, but then again, nobody ever claimed it was. What a conscious machine actually requires is the intelligent application of memory for its own internal purposes, rather than for a user (which is how modern computers function). Intelligent memory usage implies that the machine must have its own inherent needs—something we can't say about your computer example. Additionally, a machine needs sensors and the ability to recognize relevant stimuli, and so on. Your examples are merely descriptions of ordinary tools. What you really ought to be attempting to prove is that a Turing machine cannot, in principle, simulate a brain, rather than pointing out that today's laptops aren't sentient.

I see no consistency in this claim whatsoever. The semantic world exists as a realm of abstraction and fantasy, not one governed by logic and rationality.
Why is that so difficult to grasp?

I have to ask you: is the judgment "Kerber = unicorn" true? Since you’ve asserted that the rules of identity don't apply in this semantic world, you can't actually claim the judgment is false. Consequently, you lose the ability to distinguish between any concepts within it at all.
And yes, a world stripped of logic and rationality isn't just difficult to comprehend—it is utterly impossible to understand. 🤷

amberviper said:Dave,
don't be such a smart-aleck!
Just because quantum mechanics tries to squeeze its scientific models into a mathematical formalism doesn't mean that formalism is logically sound. It simply isn't. When you look at the whole issue of light duality, you're looking at a straight-up contradiction where the first logical axiom—the law of identity—is completely violated.

1) "Everything a concept does not encompass, it excludes." Or, put more simply: "Everything is identical to itself and distinct from everything else."

You could even apply two other axioms here, since the third is just an extension of the second, and the second is also being ignored here...

2) "Of two statements where one asserts the opposite of the other, one must be false."

The claim that "light is made of particles" and the assertion that "light is a wave" are two contradictory ideas because they're describing the exact same thing, yet their very essences are fundamentally different.

Davor000;14756055 said:

Nah, I wouldn't go that far... despite what Jack naively thinks, physical structures don't necessarily need some magical "consciousness substance" inside them. It’s just like being healthy—you don't need a literal "health liquid" coursing through your veins, you just need your body to function correctly. Consciousness works the exact same way...

Could you actually break down what you mean by "certain functionality of the organism?" What does that look like in practice?

All you've done here is prove that running an algorithm isn't enough to create consciousness, but nobody ever claimed it was. For a machine to be conscious, it needs to utilize its memory intelligently for its own sake, rather than just serving a user (like a standard PC does). Intelligent memory usage implies the machine has its own needs—something your computer example lacks. Plus, it needs sensors to recognize relevant stimuli and so on. Your examples are just descriptions of basic tools. You really need to demonstrate that a Microsoft machine can't even theoretically simulate a brain, rather than just pointing out that today's computers aren't conscious...

That just proves you can't get more information out of a device than what you put into it. But a human isn't a device, or a computer, or some kind of machine! We generate that information ourselves! That's the fundamental difference. A human is a self-aware being capable of producing more from within than what was originally fed into us...🙂
Is this a paradox, or just some version of Murphy's Law?