#1 ·
Presence is this early Heideggerian concept that—if you actually wrap your head around it—basically gives you the roadmap for understanding almost everything else he does later on. And even if you couldn't care less about Heidegger, I honestly think it’s worth grasping what this "presence" thing actually means.
Being "present" is basically anything we can just grab with our hands, stuff we don't experience in any other way. Like, take a rock. A rock is just present. We don't experience it any differently than that: it's just something sitting there in front of me that I can pick up, toss, or smash... just something right there, ready to be handled.
To clear up what presence really is, H. explains another mode that’s different from it. He calls this one "readiness-to-hand." So, if I want to drive a nail into something, that rock isn't just "present" anymore; it becomes "ready-to-hand." I’m experiencing it as "something for something," like a tool. Instead of a rock, I might use a hammer, and then that would be something ready-to-hand. Any device, while it's working, has this mode of being ready-to-hand. But once it breaks or becomes useless, it’s just "present" again—just something neutral that exists, something we can say *is*, but not something we can say is there *for* a reason.
So, a rock, a hammer, or even a wristwatch could be experienced as
1. something present, just something that "is."
2. something ready-to-hand, something that "is for..." like, say, smashing a window or driving a nail.
But wait, are there other ways things exist besides those two?
Take a tree, maybe a cherry blossom tree in full bloom (just my own little example 🙂). We can experience it in the mode of presence—totally indifferent, just like that rock. It's just "something that is," in a neutral way. Or we can see it in the mode of readiness-to-hand: it's "something for..." maybe for eating cherries, or for shade, or for making baseball bats out of the wood.
But is there more to it? Don't we experience that tree in some other way, as something alive, something growing all on its own, something that has a mode of being beyond just those two? Absolutely.
Think about a lamb playing in front of us. Again, in that indifferent mode of presence, it's just "a thing." And in the mode of readiness-to-hand, it's "something for..." (like, for a Sunday roast—which is definitely not that first indifferent way).
But isn't there something else? Yeah, there totally is.
A human being (I started writing "child" but that felt too heavy even for this, honestly), well, a person has all those modes of being that a lamb has. You can see them as just neutral, indifferent, yeah; then you can see them as "something for..." (like, someone to make money off of, or someone to hit, or whatever...), and they also have that unique way of being, of living.
But there's even more. Something where we experience that person precisely as a human being. Not indifferently, as "a thing" or "some object"; not as "something for..."; and not just as an animal... but specifically as a human.
And look, it's obvious that if we miss it—every single time we fail to see them truly as a human and instead treat them as "a thing," or "something for...", or just an animal—that is a massive failure. Like, we failed at our basic task. We were just indifferent. Anyone who isn't completely heartless is definitely going to feel that.
But wait, what kind of talk is this? Don't we have science? Logic? What kind of philosophy is this, just "feelings"? Shouldn't philosophy be about something objective and rational, rather than just leaning on unreliable feelings?
Coming up in the next part: how logic and science back up the idea that that one single mode—presence—is the *only* way to exist, which unconsciously pushes this inhuman indifference. And how, when you mix that with technology that only recognizes one other mode—readiness-to-hand, or manipulation—you end up with some pretty grim consequences.
Being "present" is basically anything we can just grab with our hands, stuff we don't experience in any other way. Like, take a rock. A rock is just present. We don't experience it any differently than that: it's just something sitting there in front of me that I can pick up, toss, or smash... just something right there, ready to be handled.
To clear up what presence really is, H. explains another mode that’s different from it. He calls this one "readiness-to-hand." So, if I want to drive a nail into something, that rock isn't just "present" anymore; it becomes "ready-to-hand." I’m experiencing it as "something for something," like a tool. Instead of a rock, I might use a hammer, and then that would be something ready-to-hand. Any device, while it's working, has this mode of being ready-to-hand. But once it breaks or becomes useless, it’s just "present" again—just something neutral that exists, something we can say *is*, but not something we can say is there *for* a reason.
So, a rock, a hammer, or even a wristwatch could be experienced as
1. something present, just something that "is."
2. something ready-to-hand, something that "is for..." like, say, smashing a window or driving a nail.
But wait, are there other ways things exist besides those two?
Take a tree, maybe a cherry blossom tree in full bloom (just my own little example 🙂). We can experience it in the mode of presence—totally indifferent, just like that rock. It's just "something that is," in a neutral way. Or we can see it in the mode of readiness-to-hand: it's "something for..." maybe for eating cherries, or for shade, or for making baseball bats out of the wood.
But is there more to it? Don't we experience that tree in some other way, as something alive, something growing all on its own, something that has a mode of being beyond just those two? Absolutely.
Think about a lamb playing in front of us. Again, in that indifferent mode of presence, it's just "a thing." And in the mode of readiness-to-hand, it's "something for..." (like, for a Sunday roast—which is definitely not that first indifferent way).
But isn't there something else? Yeah, there totally is.
A human being (I started writing "child" but that felt too heavy even for this, honestly), well, a person has all those modes of being that a lamb has. You can see them as just neutral, indifferent, yeah; then you can see them as "something for..." (like, someone to make money off of, or someone to hit, or whatever...), and they also have that unique way of being, of living.
But there's even more. Something where we experience that person precisely as a human being. Not indifferently, as "a thing" or "some object"; not as "something for..."; and not just as an animal... but specifically as a human.
And look, it's obvious that if we miss it—every single time we fail to see them truly as a human and instead treat them as "a thing," or "something for...", or just an animal—that is a massive failure. Like, we failed at our basic task. We were just indifferent. Anyone who isn't completely heartless is definitely going to feel that.
But wait, what kind of talk is this? Don't we have science? Logic? What kind of philosophy is this, just "feelings"? Shouldn't philosophy be about something objective and rational, rather than just leaning on unreliable feelings?
Coming up in the next part: how logic and science back up the idea that that one single mode—presence—is the *only* way to exist, which unconsciously pushes this inhuman indifference. And how, when you mix that with technology that only recognizes one other mode—readiness-to-hand, or manipulation—you end up with some pretty grim consequences.