Sanctions on Russia

Timothy Nelson5 said:I don't think you quite caught my drift, because you're arguing against something I didn't even say—something most people already take for granted, I suppose.

Oil and gas prices actually had a much bigger impact in the years leading up to the invasion, specifically from 2014 onwards.
During that window, the White House was busy stacking up cash reserves for a war adventure. Sure, about half of that got frozen, which was unexpected and apparently caught the White House off guard.

Actually, the timing is a bit different than that.
High oil prices right before the Russian invasion of Georgia.
High oil prices right before the Russian annexation of Crimea.

After those events, oil prices stayed relatively low and stable, largely thanks to the expansion of American fracking.
That stability was basically nuked by a senile Biden on his very first day in the White House, just signing whatever document his handlers shoved under his nose. He even admitted himself that he 'didn't know what he was signing.'
In a way, he signed off on giving Putin a massive incentive to invade Ukraine.

But prior to the invasion, it was precisely those high oil (and gas) prices that padded the Russian budget and essentially paved the road to war.

Immediately preceding the war, yes.
Putin finally felt emboldened once his slow-motion coup against Trump in the US succeeded.
Trump was against Nord Stream 2, and he used to press NATO members to stop relying on Russian energy and finally hit that 2% defense spending target they all agreed on.
Trump pushed for fracking. If he were still around, I guess US oil production might be at least 0% higher, maybe even 50% more for natural gas, more LNG terminals would have been built, and the Keystone pipeline wouldn't have been halted.
Under those circumstances, Putin wouldn't have even dreamed of invading Ukraine. A core part of his playbook was assuming that after a 'blitz' victory and taking Kyiv, Europe—completely dependent on Russian gas—would react weakly, maybe with some cosmetic sanctions.
By clumsily killing the Keystone pipeline project, Biden gave Putin the green light he needed.
All in the name of the Green New Deal, I suppose.

Biden basically shot the American economy in the foot.
On that same day, gas prices at the American Henry Hub jumped 100% up, and that was effectively the start of the energy price surge before the war in Ukraine.

But if what you're describing were true, Russia, the Saudis, and the whole OPEC group would have cut production to keep prices high.

It seems you clearly don't grasp the point of sanctions.

I don't think anyone honestly expects Putin to just pack up and walk away from the invasion of Ukraine.

The whole motivation behind Putin’s move... I guess it really traces back to those newly discovered hydrocarbon deposits under the sea near Crimea... and also that Solovjansk-Kramatorsk area which the Ukrainians have been fighting so hard to hold onto throughout this entire conflict.

As for what might have happened next... maybe an oil embargo would have hit sooner—like, instead of December 5th, perhaps by early September. Russia might have made a bit less from speculative trading, but I doubt that would have been the deciding factor.

It likely would have started five or six months earlier.

If you look at the comparative charts for Brent, WTI, and Urals, you can see the discounts on Urals were at their peak when speculative pressure was highest. Once that dropped in early September, the Brent-Urals spread narrowed, and it only really widened again after December 5th.

.

Speculative pressure is such a subjective thing, isn't it? It doesn't just rely on supply and demand; it's more about how people perceive them.
That's probably why those firm statements from Western leaders right at the start of the embargo helped keep the speculative price swings somewhat in check.

But even then, it wouldn't have changed the gas market situation much; the outcome would be the same, and the White House was clearly banking much more on gas prices than on oil.

True enough... though I suppose that's because the Germans, led by Merkel, kept pushing for even deeper reliance on Russian pipelines instead of diversifying their supply or actually building out LNG terminals.

Well, the Saudis buy a massive amount of weapons... they're fourth in global spending, yet they practically have zero domestic military production compared to the top three.

The real issue with the Saudi military isn't the gear or the hardware, it's the personnel—it's pretty much the same struggle they face in Russia.

👍

Well, you've fragmented everything and lost the thread of the argument. Some of your comments aren't even relevant, but since you bolded your own main claim and it's the problem here, let's just go back to basics:

1. The Keystone XL pipeline, with a capacity of 800,000 barrels a day (about 0.8% of global production), was only about 8% complete when Biden banned it a few months later. Sure, Democrats were stalling and undermining it during the Trump administration, and even Obama tried to stop it, but even if everything had gone smoothly, would it really be finished? It might have still been in its early stages.
But there's no doubt that KXL definitely wouldn't be finished today if Biden hadn't blocked it in early 2021—it probably wouldn't have opened until 2026 or 2027. So, that decision doesn't have any real physical impact on today's oil supply; it's mostly just affecting market expectations.

2. Why Putin attacked Ukraine specifically on February 24, 2022, remains a mystery, and as I noted on the forums back then, "the reasons that drove Putin to such a suicidal move will likely be analyzed for decades."
However, regarding US moves that might have nudged Putin toward war, I'm certain the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the way it was handled was far more significant than walking away from KXL.
By the way, despite my ongoing belief that it was a smart strategic move that made the US stronger—just imagine the political fallout if Americans were still stuck trying to secure exits in Afghanistan today.
We should support and fight alongside those who truly want freedom, and let everyone else face their own fate.

3. Now, regardless of what was said in point 2, most people will agree that one of the pillars of Putin's decision was that $380 billion fund, built up over years through gas and oil sales.

4. First, gas.
The main culprit here is Merkel, obviously, but there wasn't much anyone could actually do about it. She was just following the lead of the entire German establishment. We can argue about why—whether it’s rooted in Brandt's Ostpolitik, some lingering debt for reunification, or whatever else—but it was a done deal. It couldn't be changed.

Trump was right on this one. For years, Germans will be haunted by footage of Trump essentially "calling them out" over Russian gas, all while they laughed him off. I won't say I'm not enjoying watching that unfold. Hopefully, they learn to show a little more humility before they start lecturing everyone else on the supposed superiority of the German political-economic model.
Especially once they start talking about China, because their hands are pretty deep in that jam, too...

If Merkel had been the kind of statesman people were hailing her as just a year ago, she would have quietly steered Germany away from its dependence on Russian gas.
But that requires being a true statesman—someone like Roosevelt, who quietly but stubbornly pushed the US toward WWII despite most Americans being against it, simply because he knew it had to be done eventually.
(Though, a few US administrations used that exact same method regarding Vietnam with completely different results, so it’s hard to be too smart about how much a "statesman X" should ignore the will of their voters.)

Anyway, let's not forget that Putin's "gas pillar" is significantly more important than his "oil pillar."

5. Finally, oil.
Oil—the "oil pillar"—matters, but it isn't the key.
Its primary importance is as a fund filler; Russian costs sit around $37 per barrel, so any price above that goes straight into the fund.
No amount of Keystone XL, fracking, or oil sands would have managed to drive oil prices down to those levels during the 2014-2021 window. Even if they theoretically could have, the Saudis and Russians would have just cut production according to their own targets to keep the average between $80 and $100.

Those speculative spikes in oil prices prior to the Russian military adventures were just tactics—tactics that proved strategically important at times, but only until 2022.
If Europe had folded under energy blackmail and decided to abandon Ukraine immediately after the invasion, then I might agree that killing Keystone XL was a major factor, since it defined future expectations.
But since that didn't happen, the importance of that decision as a trigger for the invasion of Ukraine is realistically minor.

Regarding LNG, keep in mind that it isn't just about having LNG terminals—which aren't actually that expensive—it’s the massive issue of tanker availability and numbers, which *are* expensive.
That’s why gas—neither LNG nor pipelines—is the solution.

And as for "green policies" and their supposed guilt for everything wrong in the world...

Green policies were nothing more than an excuse, a bit of camouflage for Russia's actual goals.
The Russians set their goal clearly: use energy as a weapon. Everything else was just tactics, where green advocates were used as useful idiots. It was all shaped by targeted political lobbying where the goal was obvious: push the gas through, and then just declare gas "green," even though there’s very little "green" logic to it.
The Russians certainly had a bit of luck with Fukushima, too, but that was all just smoke and mirrors—a distraction, like a magician's trick.
Without the "green" cover, they would have had to come up with something else.
Because the goal was clear, and the Germans wanted Russian gas anyway—not because of green policies, but for the money, for easy export competitiveness, for commissions, for Ostpolitik, and a whole bunch of other reasons that have nothing to do with being eco-friendly.

In the US, these green narratives look a bit different, but it's clear to everyone that Americans were also widely influenced by Russian lobbyists—maybe just slightly less so than Germany.

___

Nathan Thomas12 said:Our leaders weren't exactly clairvoyant.
The US pushed for that LNG terminal to be built, which makes it more of a political move than some stroke of economic genius from our politicians—because, let's be real, the economics never actually made sense.

The whole LNG terminal project on the Gulf Coast has been dragging on for over two decades. People were talking about it back in the late 90s, and the first consortium was put together around 2005 or something...
But hey, it finally got done just in the nick of time.

___

William Miller12 said:The whole LNG terminal project on the Gulf Coast has been dragging on for over two decades. People were talking about it back in the late 90s, and the first consortium was put together around 2005 or something...
But hey, it finally got done just in the nick of time.

___

Honestly, just thinking back to how that specific crowd—most of whom have vanished into thin air by now—used to write about the LNG terminal here in the States regarding the Russia situation makes my blood boil.
It wasn't just rhetoric; it was blatant, paid-for propaganda fueled by money straight from Russia. I’m fairly certain Gojko Drljaca was pumping out one of those pieces every single week in The New York Times... the man was practically being bribed to push this narrative. Seriously, he could have built himself a massive estate just outside of Moscow on that kind of cash.

Best regards,

Like I was saying before, the Russian military is completely tethered to advanced chips and software—stuff that basically dictates how much their high-tech hardware actually works in the field.

Russia’s reliance on Western tech is honestly staggering... we're talking about a situation where their civilian planes are basically flying on borrowed time, running on fumes, and nobody has any clue what's going to happen to them once they lose access to regular maintenance and genuine replacement parts.

Russia is finished. And I don't mean that as some vague hint or a subtle suggestion—it's an open door for every single Russian out there.

William Miller12 said:Well, you've fragmented everything and lost the thread of the argument. Some of your comments aren't even relevant, but since you bolded your own main claim and it's the problem here, let's just go back to basics:

1. The Keystone XL pipeline, with a capacity of 800,000 barrels a day (about 0.8% of global production), was only about 8% complete when Biden banned it a few months later. Sure, Democrats were stalling and undermining it during the Trump administration, and even Obama tried to stop it, but even if everything had gone smoothly, would it really be finished? It might have still been in its early stages.
But there's no doubt that KXL definitely wouldn't be finished today if Biden hadn't blocked it in early 2021—it probably wouldn't have opened until 2026 or 2027. So, that decision doesn't have any real physical impact on today's oil supply; it's mostly just affecting market expectations.

2. Why Putin attacked Ukraine specifically on February 24, 2022, remains a mystery, and as I noted on the forums back then, "the reasons that drove Putin to such a suicidal move will likely be analyzed for decades."
However, regarding US moves that might have nudged Putin toward war, I'm certain the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the way it was handled was far more significant than walking away from KXL.
By the way, despite my ongoing belief that it was a smart strategic move that made the US stronger—just imagine the political fallout if Americans were still stuck trying to secure exits in Afghanistan today.
We should support and fight alongside those who truly want freedom, and let everyone else face their own fate.

3. Now, regardless of what was said in point 2, most people will agree that one of the pillars of Putin's decision was that $380 billion fund, built up over years through gas and oil sales.

4. First, gas.
The main culprit here is Merkel, obviously, but there wasn't much anyone could actually do about it. She was just following the lead of the entire German establishment. We can argue about why—whether it’s rooted in Brandt's Ostpolitik, some lingering debt for reunification, or whatever else—but it was a done deal. It couldn't be changed.

Trump was right on this one. For years, Germans will be haunted by footage of Trump essentially "calling them out" over Russian gas, all while they laughed him off. I won't say I'm not enjoying watching that unfold. Hopefully, they learn to show a little more humility before they start lecturing everyone else on the supposed superiority of the German political-economic model.
Especially once they start talking about China, because their hands are pretty deep in that jam, too...

If Merkel had been the kind of statesman people were hailing her as just a year ago, she would have quietly steered Germany away from its dependence on Russian gas.
But that requires being a true statesman—someone like Roosevelt, who quietly but stubbornly pushed the US toward WWII despite most Americans being against it, simply because he knew it had to be done eventually.
(Though, a few US administrations used that exact same method regarding Vietnam with completely different results, so it’s hard to be too smart about how much a "statesman X" should ignore the will of their voters.)

Anyway, let's not forget that Putin's "gas pillar" is significantly more important than his "oil pillar."

5. Finally, oil.
Oil—the "oil pillar"—matters, but it isn't the key.
Its primary importance is as a fund filler; Russian costs sit around $37 per barrel, so any price above that goes straight into the fund.
No amount of Keystone XL, fracking, or oil sands would have managed to drive oil prices down to those levels during the 2014-2021 window. Even if they theoretically could have, the Saudis and Russians would have just cut production according to their own targets to keep the average between $80 and $100.

Those speculative spikes in oil prices prior to the Russian military adventures were just tactics—tactics that proved strategically important at times, but only until 2022.
If Europe had folded under energy blackmail and decided to abandon Ukraine immediately after the invasion, then I might agree that killing Keystone XL was a major factor, since it defined future expectations.
But since that didn't happen, the importance of that decision as a trigger for the invasion of Ukraine is realistically minor.

Regarding LNG, keep in mind that it isn't just about having LNG terminals—which aren't actually that expensive—it’s the massive issue of tanker availability and numbers, which *are* expensive.
That’s why gas—neither LNG nor pipelines—is the solution.

And as for "green policies" and their supposed guilt for everything wrong in the world...

Green policies were nothing more than an excuse, a bit of camouflage for Russia's actual goals.
The Russians set their goal clearly: use energy as a weapon. Everything else was just tactics, where green advocates were used as useful idiots. It was all shaped by targeted political lobbying where the goal was obvious: push the gas through, and then just declare gas "green," even though there’s very little "green" logic to it.
The Russians certainly had a bit of luck with Fukushima, too, but that was all just smoke and mirrors—a distraction, like a magician's trick.
Without the "green" cover, they would have had to come up with something else.
Because the goal was clear, and the Germans wanted Russian gas anyway—not because of green policies, but for the money, for easy export competitiveness, for commissions, for Ostpolitik, and a whole bunch of other reasons that have nothing to do with being eco-friendly.

In the US, these green narratives look a bit different, but it's clear to everyone that Americans were also widely influenced by Russian lobbyists—maybe just slightly less so than Germany.

___

The highlighted part—never happened. Not even back then. Nobody is quite as convinced of their own brilliance and ingenuity as a Swabian.

Russian Urals crude is trading at $37.8 per barrel
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...ify%20wall

That effectively means they’re bleeding $5 to $10 on every single barrel. But here’s the kicker: those losses are being swallowed up by worthless rubles, while they’re actually collecting hard currency that carries weight on the global stage.

Where are all those Putin supporters hiding now? How are they spinning this one? I'd love to hear their latest excuse for why things are turning out this way.

The Russians are absolute idiots if they think they can afford to lose a client like this when it comes to their oil and gas supply. You have to be a complete moron to let this happen.
https://twitter.com/AlexKokcharov/st...52817431568384

electricsurfer47 said:Just a little thought on processors—stuff even the Russians can't actually manufacture, despite how much they claim they designed them themselves.

I vividly remember when those RT/Sputnik bots were flooding online forums, claiming how much the Mount Elbrus chips would dominate the market. 🙏 🙏
As it turns out, they can't even manage to build them.

George Robinson43 said:I vividly remember when those RT/Sputnik bots were flooding online forums, claiming how much the Mount Elbrus chips would dominate the market. 🙏 🙏
As it turns out, they can't even manage to build them.

Look, that’s an ARM processor. It isn't even fully Russian; they have to pay licensing fees because they're using parts of the ARM architecture.
It’s never going to shake up the market because it doesn't offer anything unique compared to the competition, and they aren't making enough profit to actually invest back into their own manufacturing.
Maybe if they took all that cash from ExxonMobil and put it into production instead, things would be different, but clearly, they just didn't want to take the risk.

electricsurfer47 said:Look, that’s an ARM processor. It isn't even fully Russian; they have to pay licensing fees because they're using parts of the ARM architecture.
It’s never going to shake up the market because it doesn't offer anything unique compared to the competition, and they aren't making enough profit to actually invest back into their own manufacturing.
Maybe if they took all that cash from ExxonMobil and put it into production instead, things would be different, but clearly, they just didn't want to take the risk.

Russia just wasn't willing to gamble with their economic growth. Honestly? It was probably easier for them to just sink it all into 100-foot superyachts.

Nathan Thomas12 said:Our leaders weren't exactly clairvoyant.
The US pushed for that LNG terminal to be built, which makes it more of a political move than some stroke of economic genius from our politicians—because, let's be real, the economics never actually made sense.

I’d argue Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović actually had more pull on getting that built than the Americans did.
She brought up the LNG project at every single meeting with foreign heads of state—I mean, remember how she totally charmed Donald Trump with that angle?
Plus, there wasn't much of an "economic calculation" involved if you consider that the terminal was already running at full capacity even before the Russian invasion hit.
The Canadians jumped on it immediately, leasing up 30% of the capacity the second it went live.

electricsurfer47 said:Look, that’s an ARM processor. It isn't even fully Russian; they have to pay licensing fees because they're using parts of the ARM architecture.
It’s never going to shake up the market because it doesn't offer anything unique compared to the competition, and they aren't making enough profit to actually invest back into their own manufacturing.
Maybe if they took all that cash from ExxonMobil and put it into production instead, things would be different, but clearly, they just didn't want to take the risk.

They did try to set up chip production through several different companies and poured billions of dollars into it, but it just didn't work out...

I'll give credit where it's due: the 2014 sanctions definitely played a role. But honestly, the bigger factor is that this stuff is incredibly hard to do. If it were easy, some specialized Taiwanese firm wouldn't have spent decades outperforming giants like Intel and Apple.

Microsoft had a 90nm process and managed to set up an experimental 65nm process with help from Texas Instruments around 2015, and then everything stalled.
There were some vague plans about buying an old AMD factory, but that was it.
Hitting 28nm or 14nm is complete science fiction for them.

It seems to me that in terms of technology, Russia today might actually be lagging further behind than the USSR was right before its collapse in the late 80s.

Here is a good overview of the Russian microelectronics industry:
https://meet-global.bnext.com.tw/articles/view/47631

Asianometry has a pretty solid YouTube channel, too. This is basically just a transcript from one of his videos...

___

gentlestag15 said:I’d argue Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović actually had more pull on getting that built than the Americans did.
She brought up the LNG project at every single meeting with foreign heads of state—I mean, remember how she totally charmed Donald Trump with that angle?
Plus, there wasn't much of an "economic calculation" involved if you consider that the terminal was already running at full capacity even before the Russian invasion hit.
The Canadians jumped on it immediately, leasing up 30% of the capacity the second it went live.

It’s got nothing to do with Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović; the US was already pushing the LNG terminal way before her.

William Miller12 said:They did try to set up chip production through several different companies and poured billions of dollars into it, but it just didn't work out...

I'll give credit where it's due: the 2014 sanctions definitely played a role. But honestly, the bigger factor is that this stuff is incredibly hard to do. If it were easy, some specialized Taiwanese firm wouldn't have spent decades outperforming giants like Intel and Apple.

Microsoft had a 90nm process and managed to set up an experimental 65nm process with help from Texas Instruments around 2015, and then everything stalled.
There were some vague plans about buying an old AMD factory, but that was it.
Hitting 28nm or 14nm is complete science fiction for them.

It seems to me that in terms of technology, Russia today might actually be lagging further behind than the USSR was right before its collapse in the late 80s.

Here is a good overview of the Russian microelectronics industry:
https://meet-global.bnext.com.tw/articles/view/47631

Asianometry has a pretty solid YouTube channel, too. This is basically just a transcript from one of his videos...

___

What kind of FAB are we talking about here? A couple billion dollars is basically the price tag of a high-end water purification system.
TSMC actually has the know-how, the connections, and the patents. Plus, the US government has plenty of domestic firms packed with patents and essentially unlimited funding at their disposal.
President Joe Biden is joining the founder of TSMC on Tuesday to announce the opening of the company's second chip plant in Arizona, raising its investment in the state from $12 billion to $40 billion. Dec 6, 2022

Just a few years ago, TSMC needed about $20 billion just to expand a single FAB in Taiwan.

Russia or China couldn't replicate this with a slightly larger budget. It would take Russia roughly $200 billion to attempt it, while $100 billion might be enough for the Chinese project they're currently pouring money into.

And honestly? Not even the Taiwanese, Americans, Chinese, or Russians have a shot at pulling this off without the EU.

wearytrucker22 said:What kind of FAB are we talking about here? A couple billion dollars is basically the price tag of a high-end water purification system.
TSMC actually has the know-how, the connections, and the patents. Plus, the US government has plenty of domestic firms packed with patents and essentially unlimited funding at their disposal.
President Joe Biden is joining the founder of TSMC on Tuesday to announce the opening of the company's second chip plant in Arizona, raising its investment in the state from $12 billion to $40 billion. Dec 6, 2022

Just a few years ago, TSMC needed about $20 billion just to expand a single FAB in Taiwan.

Russia or China couldn't replicate this with a slightly larger budget. It would take Russia roughly $200 billion to attempt it, while $100 billion might be enough for the Chinese project they're currently pouring money into.

And honestly? Not even the Taiwanese, Americans, Chinese, or Russians have a shot at pulling this off without the EU.

It’s not just about the money, though. It’s that this is incredibly specific knowledge that hardly anyone in the world possesses because you just can't learn it anywhere else. I'm not talking about the theory of how to make a processor, but the entire process—all those tiny implementation details, the actual manufacturing flow... man, it's intense.

Melissa Rivera5 said:It’s not just about the money, though. It’s that this is incredibly specific knowledge that hardly anyone in the world possesses because you just can't learn it anywhere else. I'm not talking about the theory of how to make a processor, but the entire process—all those tiny implementation details, the actual manufacturing flow... man, it's intense.

I have no clue how chips are actually fabricated, but it is clearly one of those domains where money alone won't buy you entry. There are various technologies that cannot be simply cloned; they require years of mastery, necessitating a culture of extreme secrecy to protect that intellectual property. Look at jet engine technology. Sure, Russia and China can build a jet engine, but they will likely suffer from higher fuel consumption and shorter lifespans compared to Western counterparts. Even in the West, only three major manufacturers possess the independent capability to develop a jet engine from scratch—and even then, they frequently collaborate on new models or rely on external partners for specific components. Most cutting-edge development is built upon the foundation of previous generations. It is also worth noting that ironing out "teething problems" in new engine designs often drags on for years after deployment. No matter how much expertise or tech you possess, you cannot predict every variable; you end up fixing things on the fly during active service.
I suspect the fundamental issue for China and Russia is retaining talent. The people who truly possess high-level skills—those with the drive and capacity to learn—are mobile. They gravitate toward environments that offer more freedom. Meanwhile, those with less specialized skill sets lack the mobility to leave, so they stay put. Look at the situation in Russia: who fled following the mobilization? It was the most capable individuals, the ones whose expertise allows them to find work anywhere in the world. Those left behind, with nowhere else to go, are the ones who end up stuck in a trench in Ukraine.

Nancy Gomez26 said:I have no clue how chips are actually fabricated, but it is clearly one of those domains where money alone won't buy you entry. There are various technologies that cannot be simply cloned; they require years of mastery, necessitating a culture of extreme secrecy to protect that intellectual property. Look at jet engine technology. Sure, Russia and China can build a jet engine, but they will likely suffer from higher fuel consumption and shorter lifespans compared to Western counterparts. Even in the West, only three major manufacturers possess the independent capability to develop a jet engine from scratch—and even then, they frequently collaborate on new models or rely on external partners for specific components. Most cutting-edge development is built upon the foundation of previous generations. It is also worth noting that ironing out "teething problems" in new engine designs often drags on for years after deployment. No matter how much expertise or tech you possess, you cannot predict every variable; you end up fixing things on the fly during active service.
I suspect the fundamental issue for China and Russia is retaining talent. The people who truly possess high-level skills—those with the drive and capacity to learn—are mobile. They gravitate toward environments that offer more freedom. Meanwhile, those with less specialized skill sets lack the mobility to leave, so they stay put. Look at the situation in Russia: who fled following the mobilization? It was the most capable individuals, the ones whose expertise allows them to find work anywhere in the world. Those left behind, with nowhere else to go, are the ones who end up stuck in a trench in Ukraine.

Exactly. With a lot of stuff, you can have all the money in the world, but you still won't be able to mass-produce it. And honestly, Russia doesn't even have that much money.

Christian Torres3 said:It’s got nothing to do with Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović; the US was already pushing the LNG terminal way before her.

So, did America and the EU just drop 100 million euros on building that LNG facility because the US was shoving it down their throats?
aha

Americans are pushing for more LNG strictly because they want to diversify their options. It’s not even about forcing people to buy our gas; it’s just about having a backup plan so we aren't beholden to Russian supply. If you look at the math, gas export revenue probably accounts for maybe 1% of the U.S. GDP. The idea that they would start wars or destabilize their own country over something that insignificant is honestly laughable—it would cost them way more to fund aid to Ukraine than they’d ever make back from selling extra gas. On the other hand, for Russia, gas and oil represent half of their entire revenue stream and their primary source of political leverage. They will do absolutely whatever it takes to protect their market share and crush any competition that tries to move in on them.

gentlestag15 said:So, did America and the EU just drop 100 million euros on building that LNG facility because the US was shoving it down their throats?
aha

Exactly.