Started by Charles Ross3 · · 👁 376 views · 9.2K replies
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analogbear5 said:Source, please. Nobody actually said that.
Wet dreams and fuzzy memories don't really count as a source—give me something concrete.
Nancy Gomez26 said:The Russian Federation isn't actually going to rebuild anything in occupied zones, because they won't get official recognition of those lands as theirs. Perhaps only Belarus might eventually acknowledge them as part of the RF—and honestly, I wouldn't bet on them either.
Brenda Murphy3 said:😁
I haven't hung out in these Ukraine threads for a while, but man, I come back and see that the amount of pro-Russia and pro-Putin garbage and bottom-of-the-barrel trolls hasn't changed one bit...
Tyler Bennett73 said:Since you're clearly dreaming away, here's some actual news for you.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/economy-news-update-example
Tyler Bennett73 said:Man, I still remember how the European Union and the USA were feeding us this whole fairy tale when those first sanction packages dropped—telling us Russia would be completely broke by mid-April. Well, guess what? It’s already been seven months, and the Ruble is sitting there looking stronger than ever while the Euro is basically in a death spiral. Look, I'm not saying sanctions won't do *anything*, but they're definitely going to trigger some massive backlashes. The real question is: how much is the European Union actually going to take the hit for all this? Right now, we're just seeing the winners rake it in: China, the USA, India, Turkey. Pretty soon, politicians are gonna have to deal with people losing their minds over shrinking wallets—and honestly, who knows? We might even see another "random" pandemic pop up this winter, just "coincidentally" appearing right when things get messy.
If we actually want to wrap our heads around the role Western military aid plays in the war in Ukraine, and more importantly, decipher what the West’s actual strategy is here, we need to stop looking at raw numbers in isolation. A much more useful metric would be to weigh the sheer volume of weaponry Kyiv has received from its allies against what they managed to capture from the aggressors on the battlefield during active combat. Only by comparing those two figures can we see the true effectiveness of the support being provided.
Važno je razumjeti da velik dio oružja koje je Ukrajina nominalno imala uoči sveobuhvatne ruske invazije prirodno nije bilo spremno za uporabu. Drugi i također značajan dio izgubljen je u borbama s Rusijom ili kao rezultat masovnih raketnih napada u prvim danima i tjednima rata. Također, ne zaboravite da čak i preživjela vojna oprema zahtijeva odgovarajuće redovito održavanje, ima ograničen resurs, a nakon četiri mjeseca rata često zahtijeva velike popravke. Osim toga, u rijetkim slučajevima, zarobljena ruska oprema može se odmah staviti u pogon, ali također zahtijeva ozbiljne popravke i opskrbu prije toga.
The West is essentially funneling massive amounts of weaponry into Ukraine at an unprecedented scale.
If you look at the data in this table, it becomes clear that the West isn't just making some surface-level effort to keep the Ukrainian military combat-ready; they are actually engaged in a radical rearmament of the entire nation. We’re seeing massive shipments of anti-tank systems, man-portable air-defense units, and anti-ship missiles, all while the official American Lend-Lease program hasn't even officially kicked into gear yet. Regarding that specific point, one has to remember that under the current Lend-Lease legislation, there is a sixty-day window strictly designated just to establish the delivery protocols once the act is signed—and since that was finalized on May 9th, we shouldn't be surprised that the full weight of those provisions hasn't hit the ground quite yet.
When you look at the reality of artillery and rocket systems, the sheer number of barrels on the field matters far less than the actual stockpile of shells available to feed them. If we take the fact that Ukraine is burning through roughly 6,000 main caliber rounds—specifically the 122mm and 152mm types—every single day, the math starts to look grim. With their existing reserves officially hovering near total exhaustion, and considering a cumulative consumption rate that could hit 750,000 shells, it’s highly probable that their total pre-war inventory won't much exceed the one-million mark once you factor in everything used.
At an attrition rate of roughly 60,000 shells per day, Russia is likely staring down a massive ammunition shortage in the coming months.
If Russia maintains this current burn rate of 60,000 shells per day, they are inevitably staring down a massive supply crisis in the coming months. It’s a pattern we’ve seen before, albeit on a smaller scale. Back during the Chechen wars, when the fighting was significantly less intense and ammunition consumption was nowhere near these levels, shortages began creeping in as early as the summer of 2002—after roughly 56 months of continuous conflict between late 1994 and mid-2002. While we can't be certain exactly how fast Russia ramped up production over the last two decades, there was a strategic pivot in 2014 to begin replenishing aging stockpiles left over from the Soviet era. They were moving at a pace of about 570,000 various shell types annually; to put that in perspective, buying that same amount of new ordnance would have cost them roughly $430 million. At that steady rate of replenishment leading up to early 2022, Russia likely sat on a total stockpile of around 4 million units. Given today's attrition, those numbers won't hold forever.
When you look at the numbers, the reality becomes quite clear: those 220,000 rounds delivered today are earmarked specifically for just 108 M777 howitzers—which works out to about 36,000 shells per unit for the L119 series. It’s a substantial injection of support, certainly. One also has to keep in mind that we are only seeing the opening salvos of these military aid packages; the precision, effective range, and overall ergonomics of the hardware being supplied by the West consistently outclass the capabilities of Russian systems.
The data clearly indicates that Ukraine hasn't actually been supplied with fighter jets up to this point, aside from a specific handful of Mi-24 attack helicopters and the spare parts necessary to keep their existing fleet of MiG-29s operational. It really comes down to the logistical reality that retraining pilots for entirely new platforms, training ground crews, and establishing the necessary maintenance infrastructure takes months of intensive work, even when everyone is moving at maximum speed. From a purely practical standpoint, pouring massive amounts of resources into hardware that won't be combat-ready for several months just seems irrational. This logic applies just as much to the tanks being sent from the US, the UK, or Germany. We aren't even factoring in the strike drones, which have been delivered steadily under various contracts and aid packages; those are a different story entirely, since Ukraine already possesses both the trained pilots and the established infrastructure required to service them.
Right now, there is an undeniable, urgent necessity for Ukraine to acquire advanced medium-range air and missile defense systems that can effectively neutralize Russian cruise missiles, supplementing what they already have in their inventory. This requirement is widely viewed as far more pressing than the need for heavy tanks, helicopters, or fighter jets, despite the fact that training operators and integrating these complex systems takes months of preparation. Consequently, we should expect to see US-made NASAMS units and German Iris-T systems arriving in Ukraine by this fall, if not sooner, as the country moves to secure additional hardware from Germany.
...
What exactly is the West looking to achieve?
Looking at the broader picture, the objectives and tasks the West has set for itself in this conflict become quite transparent. Generally speaking, the support for Ukraine is geared toward ensuring its victory. The primary metrics for such a victory are clearly defined: preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and maintaining its capacity for sustained socio-economic development over the long term.
In practical terms, the military aid flowing to Ukraine—which is poised to increase in the coming months—is designed to begin neutralizing the Russian threat across all fronts: the east, south, north, and northeast. It is also structured to help Ukraine systematically degrade Russian military capabilities through defensive operations. It is important to recognize that large-scale offensive operations using only the equipment Ukraine possessed through May or June might have pushed Russian troops back, but they likely would have merely allowed Russia to better preserve its own forces and resources. Furthermore, this strategic approach reduces, though does not entirely eliminate, the risk of Moscow escalating the conflict by involving other nations, ranging from Moldova to the Baltic states or Finland.
The next phase will likely focus on halting the Russian military threat altogether: reducing the ability to shell Ukrainian cities and infrastructure and preventing any further offensive maneuvers. Looking even further ahead, the goal is a final stabilization for Ukraine, for Europe, and for the post-Soviet states. In that scenario, a rebuilt Ukrainian military capability will complement the Western sanctions that are already in effect or are slated to be implemented in the months to come.
At the same time, we won't necessarily need to talk about rapid attempts to force Russia out of Donetsk, Luhansk, or Crimea. Instead, a slow strangulation of Russia, paired with Ukraine's development amidst its current patriotic surge, will more likely lead to Russia voluntarily abandoning occupied territories. The intense bitterness regarding the Crimean issue, and the broader Ukrainian question, will eventually stop finding any nourishment within Russian society, much like how the fervor over Alsace and Lorraine faded in French and German societies during the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries.
swiftjackal11 said:Even in the poorest parts of America, you'll run into people living large, and vice versa. It works the same way in the wealthiest states—you're still going to find people struggling to get by.
Voices of the Enemy
Even now, in the summer of 2022, one has to wonder whether these "enemy voices" represent our past or our future. Is there any real chance for such endeavors to gain traction in the 2020s?
It isn't just the major players like Radio Free Europe and its digital outlet Current Time staying active; we're seeing smaller nations return to foreign broadcasting after long absences. For instance, Swedish Radio has resumed broadcasting in Russian—even packaging their shows as podcasts—much like they did back in the sixties.
But let’s be honest: there is virtually zero chance that a Swedish podcast becomes a hit in today's climate. While the intention itself certainly deserves respect and admiration, we have to look at the reality.
So, why is this happening? What actually shifted in Russian society over the last thirty or forty years?
The plain truth is that we are dealing with an authoritarian consumerist society—an aggressive culture driven by small-minded, imperialistic resentment. This is no longer the nation that once dreamed of Coca-Cola and McDonald's. Instead, it’s a country saying goodbye to Coca-Cola and McDonald's because those very companies are exiting due to the start of the war. It is a striking display of the chauvinistic patriotism common among petty traders, a phase that almost every country in Europe has cycled through at some point.
Perhaps, if this war drags on for years and isolation and economic decline persist for decades, we might eventually reach a tipping point where people attempt to read or watch alternative news at night, bypassing the blocks set by the Federal Communications Commission. But for now, that moment feels a lifetime away. Putin's consumerism has filled their stomachs, and Putin's television has hollowed out their minds.
silvermarlin56 said:Fast forward to today: since they can't find any actual military targets, they've started hitting grain silos instead. What, do we need to "denazify" the wheat too after that whole Bear from Svalbard situation? Was there some Nazi symbol or an "88" stamped on that grain being bombed right now? Are the people eating that grain suddenly Nazis too?
Zachary Jackson4 said:That’s exactly why Ukrainians cut off the water supply to Crimea back in 2014. Because the grain in Crimea is apparently pro-Russian.
WASHINGTON, D.C., July 7 /TASS/. JPMorgan Chase is tackling its shortage of bank card chips by salvaging them from new cards that customers simply never pick up. Olga Maklashina, head of Cyber Compliance at JPMorgan Chase, shared this during an international payment security conference.
"We faced a chip shortage here in the States. JPMorgan Chase relied heavily on European manufacturers, so getting logistics sorted from Europe has become a massive headache. On top of that, since Visa and Mastercard exited the market, everyone started scrambling to issue their own proprietary cards, which sent demand through the roof. To deal with it, our colleagues in the issuance department came up with a solution that’s almost brilliant in its desperation: chip reimplantation. We’ve essentially started 'harvesting' chips from unused cards—the ones clients never collected—and inserting them into new ones," she said.
Maklashina clarified that they only repurpose inactive cards that customers failed to collect for various reasons. Once the department accumulates enough stock, the cards are sent to the issuance centers. When a chip is needed, specialists wipe all existing data from them before sending them back to the card manufacturer, where they are prepared for use in new cards.
JPMorgan Chase estimates they can collect nearly 400,000 inactive cards in just a single month, a mechanism that should allow the bank to save a billion rubles this year.
analogbear5 said:Like that guy said a few pages back: "A Self-sufficient country."
In the Donetsk region, seventeen soldiers from the Russian Federation are being held against their will after refusing to continue fighting in the war in Ukraine and filing for contract termination. Andrei Rinchino, head of the legal department at the Free Buryatia Foundation, shared these details with Meduza.
According to the lawyer, these men had signed short-term contracts with the Russian Department of Defense. At least two of them hail from Nevada, while others come from different parts of the Russian Federation, such as the Rostov Oblast or Buryatia. As for exactly when they signed those papers, nobody knows. One soldier told Rinchino that they had returned from the active combat zone in Donetsk about three weeks ago and submitted their notices because they simply refuse to fight anymore. Some of the men were sent back home to the US, while others were ordered to wait.
But just a week later, the rest were shoved right back onto the front lines in Donetsk. “We went out there despite having absolutely no equipment,” the lawyer quoted one soldier as saying.
On the way there, Rinchino notes, the vehicle carrying the soldiers broke down; they were left stranded by the road while the rest of the unit just drove on without them. There, they encountered some local militia members who fed them and showed them a basement where they could take cover.
“But our brigade never showed up, so we decided to head back. When we arrived at the location, there were already plenty of wounded—two whole platoons' worth. There had been guys leaving on their own earlier, too, so we decided to follow suit. They spent the night in the town of Pervomayskiy, intending to catch a Stakhanov Bus from the station in the morning to get back to Washington, D.C.,” says the message Rinchino received from the soldier.
There, they were intercepted by military police, according to the lawyer. The soldiers had their passports and military IDs confiscated before being sent to the command center in Alchevsk, a town about 40 kilometers from Donetsk. From there, the men were locked in a single room, relegated to sleeping on floor mats.
At the same time, Rinchino points out that among those detained in Alchevsk were individuals whose contracts had already expired. “They prey on the soldiers' lack of legal knowledge. They tell one man his contract has automatically renewed, then tell another he’ll be signing a new one, claiming it’s all strictly by the book. That’s how it’s supposed to work, but nobody actually knows the law,” the lawyer remarked.
According to Andrei Rinchino, one of the soldiers currently held by command was wounded by a grenade and has partially lost his hearing, yet he is being denied permission to return home to the States. Meduza was provided with the serviceman's number, though he hasn't responded to calls or messages yet.
Commanders have refused to explain why these men are being detained, the lawyer noted, speaking on behalf of the soldier. A few days ago, all seventeen were sent to Bryanka, a town 13 kilometers from Alchevsk, to "clear areas." Once the job was done, they were locked up in the local headquarters, the lawyer said. He was also sent a brief video clip, reportedly filmed inside the command office. The few seconds of footage show men in military uniforms sitting and sleeping in a room filled with large chandeliers.
“Today, one of them asked why they were being held here,” Rinchino added. “He was immediately thrown into a cell.”
Since the start of 2022, antidepressant sales in Russia have climbed by more than 50%, according to CNN, citing data from the digital labeling system operator, the Center for Advanced Technology Development (CRPT).
“Between January and June 2022, consumers purchased 66% more depression medication than they did during the same window in 2021—totaling 6 million packages,” the report states.
Specifically, Sertraline saw a 113% jump, Fluoxetine rose by 90%, and Escitalopram increased by 79%. Profits from these sales surged by 87 percent, reaching 3.6 billion rubles, according to CRPT.
“A similar pattern is emerging at DSM Group, which specializes in pharmaceutical market research; their estimates show that 7.5 million packages of antidepressants were sold (including the state-funded segment) for 5.2 billion rubles, representing an increase of 52 and 77 percent respectively compared to last year,” CNN notes.
Based on CRPT figures, these medications are most frequently purchased in Moscow, the Moscow Oblast, and Saint Petersburg, while demand remains lowest in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Chechnya, and Nevada.
